İKV Uzman Yardımcısı Melike Sönmez tarafından kaleme alınan “Cyprus Negotiation Processes and Settlement Debates” başlıklı İngilizce değerlendirme, IKV Brief serisinden yayımlandı. Bu değerlendirme notunda Kıbrıs müzakere sürecinin tarihsel gelişimine ışık tutulurken karşılaşılan zorluklar ele alınıyor. Ayrıca süreç boyunca KKTC’nin dönüşen bakış açısı ve Türkiye’nin üstlendiği rol değerlendirilmekle birlikte ilerleyen aşamalarda faydalı olabilecek adımlar ile literatürde geleceğe ilişkin öne çıkan tespitlerden hareketle bir analiz sunuluyor.

Cyprus Negotiation Processes and Settlement Debates

Melike Sönmez, İKV Junior Researcher

Since the establishment of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus in 1960, efforts have been made to resolve the communicative and political problems between the two communities on the island. The violence directed against Turkish Cypriots, along with Makarios’ proposal to reduce Turkish Cypriot representation and influence in the administration, led to a constitutional breakdown, which in turn escalated the violent incidents across the island.

As a result, the island has remained divided since the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, which was launched to protect the Turkish Cypriot community from the potential threats posed by the coup d’état supported by the Greek junta. The proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus later formally marked the point at which the island became divided into two separate sovereign entities.

Since the foundation of the bi-communal state, tensions between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have persisted. Consequently, efforts to reconcile the main parties on the island have been undertaken by both the United Nations and the guarantor powers.

In this regard, the present study aims to examine the negotiation processes and the proposals put forward from the early stages of the conflict to the present day regarding the Cyprus issue.

1. The Constitution of 1960

The idea that Cyprus, where the majority is made up of Greek Cypriots, should be unified with mainland Greece dates back to the 1821, when the Greek Revolution of Independence surged against the Ottoman Empire resulting in internal disturbance backed by British Empire, Kingdom of France, and the Russian Empire, then to be followed up by the foundation of the independent Greece, predecessor to the modern Greece of today.[1] Causing chronic unrest upon the whole region, the matter of unification of the island with Greece has long been an issue in the island, as the ethnic minorities including Turks, Manorites, Armenians, Latins, Romanis have been anxious over the relevant motivation. The unification and integration of the island with mainland Greece, which is known as ‘enosis’ is a longstanding idea, which also came to the fore when the insurgency by Greek Cypriot nationalists against British rule erupted so that the unification with Greece could be made possible.[2] One of two major uprisings happened in 1931, mainly caused by economic disparities in addition to other reasons of societal discontentment leading to the demand of enosis[3], while the other was experienced in 1955 when EOKA, the group of extremists launched a campaign of bombings, assassinations and mass massacres and it ended in 1959. The EOKA was a terrorist organisation responsible for violent actions inflicted against the inhabitants of the island, aiming to be unified with mainland Greece as was backed by Greek junta in the mainland thus resulting in the Turkish Cypriots’ aggrievement. The EOKA was also responsible of rupturing the harmonised unison of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, whose foundation was laid out in the Constitution of 1960.

2. The Roots of EOKA and Constitutional Breakdown

The EOKA was an extremist group defined as “insurgent” by some, while Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye has long viewed it as terrorist group whose actions mainly are comprised of violence directed at inhabitants of the island, including both Turkish, and Greek who was labeled “traitors” by the EOKA because they opposed violence perpetuated against the Turkish Cypriots. Some Greek nationalists who cherished the idea of enosis argued that the Turkish Cypriots should be deprived of the right of self-determination as they believed Turkish Cypriots to be descendants of the Ottoman Greeks, who converted to Islam to avoid paying ‘cizye’, the poll tax. However, historical evidence indicates that such cases were rare; rather, Turkish Cypriots are largely descendants of families who lived under Ottoman rule.[4] That said, EOKA was composed of extremists who legitimised their views through such narratives and went on to escalate violence against individuals from both communities. While that is an interesting point, the focus of the current study is to present all previously devised resolution proposals supported by the TRNC and Türkiye, as the goal of achieving an everlasting peace has always been at the top of the agenda, while having the international scene respect the sovereignty rights and self-determination rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The Zurich-London Tripartite Talks might be stated to constitute the outset of all the negotiations, which are the principal agreements that established what was formerly referred to as unison, the Republic of Cyprus of 1960.

Even though the 1960’s constitution might be stated to have presented “proportionally equal” conditions for both communities, it was exposed to criticisms such as that the presidential system being dual in nature forestalled the diversity, in that the system recognised both communities as being ‘political monoliths’, contradicting with what consociational theorists advise.[5] It could be argued that the system’s tendency to overgeneralise the complexities of societal composition sets the stage for an inevitable crisis. Furthermore, reducing the Turkish Cypriot community to a mere minority simplifies a historically nuanced reality, as they were once one of the co-constituents of political power pre-British rule and are likely to possess more intrinsic expectations for inclusive and meaningful recognition. As a result, the system recognising the Turkish Cypriot community as the secondary group contributed to the discrimination against them, and soon after the outbreak of the tensions followed.

The outbreak of tension between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot almost coincided with the appointment of Michael Mouskos as Archbishop Makarios III, coming forward as a spiritual community leader for the Greek Cypriot, as complementary to the British Governor as the sole executive. Makarios pioneered a referendum on enosis which displayed great support (96%) for the idea of enosis by the Greek Cypriots, which was disregarded by the British who feared it would further aggravate existing tension and secessionism in the island. However, the British move was no help at all, and it found the solution in ceding the island in 1959. Before that, the UN had already stepped in calling for a solution for Cyprus, to finally host talks preceding the Zurich-London negotiations. [6]

Following the foundation of the Cyprus Republic in 1960 (after the conclusion of Zurich-London Agreements), the constitution was designed in a way to allocate the distribution of tasks and roles between the groups of Cypriots: Turkish and Greek. With Greek President Makarios III, a long-time supporter of enosis, and the Turkish Vice-President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, a prominent advocate of the Turkish Cypriot community. Tensions escalated when Makarios proposed a series of constitutional amendments in 1963. These proposals were perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as an attempt to marginalise their community and diminish their constitutionally guaranteed rights and representation in state institutions. The proposed amendments included the following:[7]

1. “The President and Vice President's right of veto shall be abolished.
2. In the President's absence, the Vice President shall no longer deputise; someone else shall assume the role.
3. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House shall be elected by all members of the House, not separately by Greek and Turkish members.
4. The Deputy Speaker shall be allowed to substitute for the Speaker when absent.
5. The requirement for separate majorities from each community to pass certain laws shall be abolished.
6. Separate municipalities shall be unified under a single municipal structure.
7. The judiciary shall no longer be divided by community; a unified judicial system shall be established.
8. The distinction between police and gendarmerie shall be eliminated; a single security force shall be created.
9. The number of security and defence personnel shall be determined by law.
10. The ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in public service and security forces shall be adjusted according to population proportions (reducing Turkish representation).
11. The number of members of the Public Service Commission shall be reduced from 10 to 5.
12. Decisions of the Public Service Commission shall be made by a simple majority instead of requiring unanimity.
13. The Turkish Communal Chamber shall be completely abolished.”

The relevant recommendations aimed at reducing Turkish Cypriots’ influence over the administrative bodies either by eliminating offices held by the Turkish Cypriot or merging binary offices/roles into one, thus undermining the power-sharing structure established in 1960. This attempt of eliminating Turkish from the administration structure sparked backlash in the Turkish Cypriot Community, resulting in Cypriot Turkish community protesting in masses against the proposed amendments.

Picture 1: Newspaper Cutting on Negotiations by Leaders Küçük and Makarios

Source: Daily News (IKV’s Archives on Cyprus by Halûk A. Kabaalioğlu)

Before moving further into presenting the resolution proposals, one might need to get a grasp of the zero-point of all the challenge: the breakdown of the 1960’s constitution in 1963, a process that includes the abdication of the practices arising from the 1960’s constitution which envisaged certain work sharing between the two communities of the island such as the election of a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. Growing tensions between the two main communities on the island led to a rise in violent incidents, culminating in the events of what became known as “Bloody Christmas,” during which significant violence occurred, particularly affecting the Turkish Cypriot population. While the island witnessed a series of conflicts, especially concentrating on Maraş/??????? (Varosia), the government system collapsed as the Turkish Cypriot withdrew from the administration rejecting the political structure as it stood.[8]

The breakdown of the 1960 Constitution garnered international attention, prompting numerous reconciliation efforts. The period following this collapse can broadly be divided into two phases: negotiations conducted before 1974 and those after 1974. What distinguishes these two phases is the nature of the talks and the expectations surrounding their outcomes. The period prior to 1974 resembled an effort to “save a marriage,” whereas the post-1974 phase was more comparable to “setting up separate homes after a divorce,” with each party pursuing its own future prospects and agenda.

The talks before 1974 focused on reconciling the two communities, returning to the foundations of the 1960 Constitution, and resolving existing issues through compromise. In contrast, the period after 1974 has centred on advancing a model based on sovereign equality and two-state cooperation, as supported by both the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Türkiye.

3. 1974: The Year When It All Changed

The year 1974 marks a milestone for the modern history of Cyprus: the downfall of Makarios and the partition of the island into two. In that regard, the military junta in Greece conducted a coup d'état against the Makarios, who thought to be furthering away from enosis, the idea of unifying Cyprus with Greece. On 15 July 1974, Makarios was thought to be dead and Nikos Sampson, who was an acclaimed enosis supporter was brought to the Presidency chair. 5 days later, on 20 July 1974 Turkish army entered the island with an attempt to protect Turkish community based on 1960 Treaty of Guarantee Article 4, where it states the guarantors (Türkiye, Greece, Britain) may come together to act re-established the principles laid out in the Treaty, being the basis of the state.

“In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.”[9]

Thus, Türkiye consulted with Britain to determine whether they would agree to take joint action against the threat to Cyprus’s territorial integrity and the well-being of the Turkish Cypriots. However, Britain remained non-committal, leaving Türkiye with no option but to act unilaterally as time was running out.[10]

In the meantime, the UN called for a ceasefire and urged the restoration of constitutional order. A second resolution followed the establishment of the TRNC in 1983, declaring it illegal and calling on all states not to recognise it. The year 1983 thus marked the beginning of a new phase, one that continues to this day.

This study aims to list and explain all the reconciliation efforts made by Türkiye, Greece and other international parties including the UN. In this regard, the negotiation attempts are analysed in two sections: the phase one (1963-1974), and the phase two (1974-today).

2. 1. The Phase One (1963-1974)

The phase one, which this study suggests beginning with the year 1963 preceded the year 1964, when the London Conference took place.

1. The London Conference (January-1964)

The London Conference, which occurred in January 1964 aimed to reconcile the parties, after the constitutional breakdown. Being the first ever one of the everlasting deadlocks, the conference held by the Britain’s Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys, brought together representatives from Türkiye, Britain, Greece, and from both Cypriot communities.

The conference ended after two weeks without any tangible outcome, as efforts to reconstruct the constitutional order failed. The positions of the two communities sharply diverged: the Greek Cypriots advocated for a new constitution that would recognise Turkish Cypriots merely as a minority, limit their representation in proportion to their population, and annul the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance (both foundational treaties for Cyprus). In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots insisted on upholding these treaties and sought to enhance their legal and political visibility through a constitution that introduced a federal system, including partition.[11] This marked the first official proposal of a bi-zonal administration by the Turkish Cypriot side.

1. The Establishment of UNFICYP and the Acheson Plan (March-July 1964)

Upon Türkiye’s messages to Makarios that if the violence against Turkish Cypriots would not end, Türkiye would use its rights of performing the functions arising from the principle treaties (the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee) unilaterally and would send its troops to the island with an aim of putting an end to the systemic harassment imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, the need to handle further escalation of the crisis, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established. Additionally, along the establishment of the UNFICYP, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson proposed a set of recommendations to make peace between the two communities as that Cyprus would be united with Greece (Enosis), Türkiye would be granted a military base on the Karpas Peninsula, Greece would cede the island of Castellorizo to Türkiye; two Turkish Cypriot cantons would be established and  minority rights of Turkish Cypriots would be guaranteed as compensation would be provided to Turkish Cypriots wishing to leave the island. While Türkiye demanded a bigger portion of the Karpas, Greece offered a much smaller field than anticipated. Also, the negotiation did not include the Greek Cypriot which created further unrest.

1. The Galo Plaza Report (26 March 1965)

Although the Galo Plaza Report did not present any ways of reconciliation or solutions for the problems in the island, it outlined the ways how Sefior Galo Plaza, the United Nations mediator views the situation, thus the outcome rather remained as a report. The proposed plan called for Cyprus to remain an independent state with a possible chance of Enosis in the future, suggested demilitarisation and a review of British bases, opposed ethnic partition or autonomous states, proposed strong UN-backed protections for Turkish Cypriot rights and Turkish Cypriot rights to be reduced from the 1960 Constitution, and recommended that the entire settlement be guaranteed by the United Nations through both the General Assembly and the Security Council.[12]

As the report seemingly “favoured” and was favoured by the Cypriot Greek, the Cypriot Turkish and Türkiye rejected the insights in the report.

1. Intermittent Dialogue Processes (May 1966-September 1967, 1968-1974)

In the literature, some researchers refer to what they call the “Greco-Turkish Dialogue” to describe the diplomatic process during which Turkish and Greek representatives engaged in negotiations. This led some Greeks to believe that the Turks might be willing to compromise and accept Enosis in exchange for certain concessions such as the establishment of a Turkish base in Cyprus. Since the process was conducted confidentially at the level of foreign ministers, little is known about the exact course of the negotiations. Although the parties came together several times after the talks failed in 1967 to restart the negotiation process, these efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful.[13]

1. The Phase Two (1974-Today)

The threat of Enosis was considered a legitimate reason for the Turkish government to act based on its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, especially since Makarios who later distanced himself from the idea of Enosis, was eventually overthrown in a coup d'état. Moreover, many scholars argue that the coup d'état in Cyprus legally granted Turkish government the right of intervening as the coup created existential threats for the Turkish community. Some scholars also align in the idea that the first Turkish intervention on 20 July 1974 was legal and legitimate, whereas the second intervention in August 1974 is widely viewed “illegal.” [14] However, the Turkish troops maintaining their prolonged presence on the island was perceived to be essential, as the Turkish Cypriot community had been flagrantly subjected to systemic violence, and no other option was deemed viable; military presence was considered the only effective means of protecting the community from militia attacks.

On the other hand, it was alleged that former Greek Minister of Defence Petros Garoufalias stated 2000 to 5000 soldiers were transferred to the island in 1964, so militarisation of the island by Greece started much earlier according to a newspaper dated 1974.

Picture 2: Turkish daily Milliyet covers Garufalias’ secret Cyprus troop transfer statement

Source: Milliyet (IKV’s Archives on Cyprus by Halûk A. Kabaalioğlu)

1. The Agreement of 1977

The division of the island led to the relocation of both communities: Turkish Cypriots moved to the north, while Greek Cypriots settled in the south. With the island now divided, hopes for the re-establishment of the constitutional order were shattered. In response to the violence they had endured, Turkish Cypriots began to pursue at least a federal structure that would allow them to function as an autonomous community with administrative identity on the island. One year later, in February 1975, the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus was established. Two months later, the United Nations launched a new round of negotiations marking the beginning of a new phase aimed at bringing the two sides back together after a period of severe breakdown in communication until it retried in 1977 once again, to complement formerly failed negotiations. The negotiations in 1977 this time opened a new chapter for the two communities of the island as the leaders Rauf Denktaş and Makarios agreed on a four-point agreement outlining the conditions of a possible reunification as such:

1. The pursuit of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory of each community to be aligned accordingly with economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. The challenges that could come out for the Turkish Cypriot community to be handled along with the principles such freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other topic with a projection of a bicommunal federal system.
4. Defining the powers and functions of a central federal government to supervise the unity of a federated state.

In addition to the contents of the agreement points presented above, a proposal comprised of twelve-point was prepared by a group of countries including the US, Britain, and Canada and that proposal focused on a federation of two states as in the agreement of 1977. However, Greece rejected the proposal suggesting the principles referred in both agreement and in proposals are not very well highlighted and the draft was scrapped.

1. Denktaş and Kyprianou Talks-Waldheim Formula of 1979

After the efforts made in 1977, Denktaş the Turkish Cypriot leader was brought together with the new leader of the Greek Cypriot, Spyros Kyprianou by the UN Secretary General Kurt in May 1979 during a visit.

As will be covered in the upcoming sections, the typical pattern in Cyprus negotiations is that the talks tend to be continuation of the former one with exceptions. So, in 1979’s formula was indeed a follow-up to the 1977’s agreement. In this regard, the parties met in the auspices of Secretary General Waldheim agreed on the points below:

1. The talks to be continued as of 15 June 1979,
2. 1977’s agreement to be taken as the base line,
3. All the citizens of the Republic to be respected equally and human rights to be considered,
4. The talks would cover territorial and constitutional subjects,
5. Maraş/Varosha’s resettlement under UN supervision would be prioritised,
6. Both sides to refrain from actions that would disturb the talks,
7. The demilitarisation of Cyprus to be discussed,
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-alignment of Cyprus would be protected from union with another state, partition, or secession,
9. The talks would be continuous and sustained, avoiding unnecessary delays,
10. Talks would be held in Nicosia.[15]

The Waldheim formula is striking in that first time ever, the resettlement of Maraş (which is still closed to settlement) was vocalised. Moreover, it is indicated that the on-and-off talks were becoming weary, which contributed to the non-functionality of the talks. Lastly, the 8^th point which suggests the non-alignment of Cyprus with any other structure was clearly intended to address the issue of Enosis, a concept that had previously contributed to significant instability on the island. In addition to the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriots were also urged to refrain from pursuing unification with Türkiye, as there were concerns that the Cyprus Peace Operation might lead to a potential union. The relevant point serves the same function as the Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee which anticipates prohibiting any political or economic union or whatsoever:

“Article I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever.
It further undertakes not to promote or advocate union with any other State or partition of the Island.”

While both the Treaty of Guarantee and the 1979 Waldheim Formula call for the avoidance of the union of Cyprus, in whole or in part, with other state; it is striking that despite these restrictions, enosis was still pursued along with other discouraged actions such as the application for the EU membership submitted on behalf of the entire island which also infringed the clear provision. However, this particular study aims to present proposals for the resolution of the Cyprus issue; therefore, the legal implications of the GASC’s EU membership fall outside its scope and are not handled in this study.

1. Cuéllar’s Vienna Working Points and Draft Framework Agreement (1984-1986)

Following the independence declaration of the TRNC, the UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar’s work has been the first of negotiations in Cyprus. The Secretary General Cuéllar arranged one-to-one talks with each party then drafted a proposal covering the issues to be handled. In addition to the document that goes by the title “Working Point” which was drafted to handle the Cyprus issue through an extended perspective by taking up all the concerns in detail, an agreement titled “Draft Framework Agreement” was presented. The relevant agreement entailed the establishment of a federal state with two nations with a Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and granting them the right of veto and Turkish side to have total territory of more than 29 percent. While Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş conveyed that he was ready to adopt the agreement, his Greek Cypriot counterpart Kipriyanu rejected the plan and called for an international conference.[16]

1. Ghali’s Set of Ideas (1992)

As part of the ongoing efforts to reconcile the two communities in Cyprus, the newly appointed UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, invited the leaders of both sides to reach a framework agreement regarding the general status of the island. Initially, Secretary-General Ghali and his representatives held five separate meetings with each leader. These talks focused primarily on two key issues, territorial adjustments and displaced persons, as part of the broader set of eight themes outlined in what came to be known as the Ghali Set of Ideas. Secretary-General Ghali made it clear that he would not proceed with the remaining themes unless the parties reached consensus on the two main issues. Greek Cypriot leader George Vassiliou emphasised that acquiring territorial concessions were a priority for the Greek Cypriot administration.

After two rounds of negotiations, a third round was held in New York on 28 October and 11 November, during which all eight themes were discussed: displaced persons, constitutional aspects, territorial adjustments, overall objectives, guiding principles, security and guarantees, economic development and safeguards, and territorial arrangements. The Turkish Cypriot side reportedly accepted nearly all of the proposed ideas, agreeing to 91 out of 199 paragraphs. In contrast, while the Greek Cypriot side did not fully accept the content, it acknowledged the framework as a constructive starting point. As no final consensus was achieved, the process ended in a deadlock and was postponed until after the Greek Cypriot “presidential elections” scheduled for early March 1993.

1. Annan Plan (1999-2004)

Even though the Annan Plan, introduced by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was presented in the year 2002, its preparatory process dates back to the year 1999 as the plan was one of the most extended and detailed proposals, if not the most comprehensive one, and was a result of Türkiye’s initiative[17] for the thaw of the deadlock created in the early 90’s.

The plan presented prior to Cyprus’ EU membership approval as the Greek Cypriot Administration applied for the EU membership in 1990 prioritised the issue of displaced persons, those being both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, as in Ghali’s set of ideas. The plan seemed to acknowledge the political existence of the Turkish Cypriots in that a Senate with an equal distribution of members from both communities was envisaged (24 Turkish Cypriot and 24 Greek Cypriot Senators). The Chamber of Deputies was to consist of 48 members, proportional to population, but ensuring each constituent state held at least a quarter of the seats which stood similarities to the 1960’s constitution as it had specified the numbers of the deputies anticipated for each community again in a proportional manner to the population. According to the Annan Plan, ordinary decisions required a majority including at least one-quarter from each community. For vital matters like electing the Presidential Council, a special majority was needed: two-fifths of Senators from each side, plus approval from the Chamber of Deputies. In this regard, Turkish Cypriot representation mattered significantly.

The other major points of the Annan Plan included:

• Cyprus would be a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal state which would consist of two Constituent States, each largely autonomous and has its own government, legislature, police, and control over internal affairs, in a federal framework,

• A Presidential Council would be composed of 6 members (4 Greek Cypriots, 2 Turkish Cypriots), elected on a single list by special majority in the Senate and approved by the Chamber of Deputies,
• The presidency would rotate between two members from each state, with the Greek Cypriot member serving two-thirds of the term.
• Decisions required at least one affirmative vote from each side, reinforcing political equality but also increasing risk of deadlock as the bureaucratic burden would increase,
• A bicameral legislature was anticipated with no less than 25% from each community in the house,
• When deciding key matters, two-fifth of each community block (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot senators would vote separately but in the same body) would be needed,
• Some regions like Güzelyurt/Morphou would be resigned to the Southern Cyprus and displaced Greek Cypriots could apply for compensation, restitution, or exchange,
• At the beginning, Greek Cypriots could settle in the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State only up to 6% of its population to be increased to a maximum of 18%, starting from the 9^th year to maintain the principle of bizonality and protect the demographic balance,
• From the 20^th year onward, all restrictions on Greek Cypriots acquiring property in the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State would be lifted only if economic conditions of Turkish Cypriots’ would improve in that average income to reach 85% of the Greek Cypriots’ income to allow full property rights once economic parity was achieved,
• Approximately 40,000 Cypriot Turks who settled after 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation to be granted citizenship of the federal Cyprus state to be founded,
• Retaining the Treaty of Guarantee but Turkish Troops on the island to be reduced overtime only for a specific number of troops to be left,
• A unified Cyprus would enter the EU as a federation, though with derogations (temporary exceptions) to EU law, especially concerning property and residence rights in the Turkish Cypriot state.
• The implementation of territorial and administrative changes would be in a gradual mean,
• Phased return of property and displaced persons would be designed,
• International monitoring and implementation support would be provided by the UN.

Due to the rule of two-fifths support from both communities, it was thought that a risk of government formation failure would be expectable, particularly for the first Presidential Council, since it was hard to secure. Even though a proposal where outgoing government stays on if no agreement is reached was proposed, it was considered insufficient to fully resolve the challenges related to forming the initial government.[18]

To determine whether or not to adopt the Annan Plan, a referendum was held in April 2004. The Greek Cypriots rejected the plan by 76 percent, while 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of it. As a result, the expectations of the plan could not be fulfilled. One month later, the island was accepted into the European Union as a whole, even though the application had been submitted unilaterally by the Greek Cypriot Administration, in contradiction to Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibits an economic or political unification. As the accession process of the GASC was completed, Türkiye was expected to open its ports to GASC trade vessels and comply with the obligations arising from the Customs Union. However, Türkiye refused to do so, as it opposed the disregard for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’s right to self-determination. This development negatively impacted Türkiye’s own accession process to the EU and arguably led to a partial loss of its motivation to meet the accession criteria.

The Annan Plan was the first proposal to receive support from most of the EU Parliament, the Turkish government, and the United Nations. Although some circles in both the TRNC and Türkiye criticised the plan on the grounds that it would grant undue privileges to Greek Cypriots and, the TRNC leader Rauf Denktaş even claimed that its adoption would amount to the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots, the referendum results revealed that 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the plan, while 72% of Greek Cypriots rejected it. The Greek Cypriot public had initially been divided over the plan, until the then-leader Tassos Papadopoulos delivered a televised address emphasising its drawbacks. His speech led the coalition partner AKEL to withdraw its support, triggering widespread rejection among Greek Cypriots. Reportedly, in addition to concerns that the plan would disproportionately benefit the Turkish Cypriots, some Greek Cypriots believed that Cyprus would become an EU member regardless of the referendum’s outcome, and that the plan would mainly serve Türkiye’s EU accession interests.[19]

Conversely, the overwhelming Greek Cypriot “no” vote reinforced the Turkish narrative that "it is always the Greek Cypriots and Greece who sabotage reconciliation efforts, even when the proposals clearly favour them." Even though in some cases, the plan seemingly favoured one party’s interest over that of the other, it eventually aimed to mix the key interests of both parties, attempting to create a fusion which would address the vulnerabilities or concerns of both parties.

1. Talat-Christofias Talks (2008-2010)

Following the failure of the Annan Plan, the TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat initiated a new round of negotiations with his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Dimitris Christofias. These negotiations came to be known as the Talat-Christofias talks. Initially, the two leaders met privately, followed by intercommittee discussions. Both sides agreed on a framework for a solution based on UN Security Council resolutions, specifically the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a single sovereignty, a single citizenship, and a single international identity[20].

In total, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders met 140 times; the final 70 of these meetings took place between Greek Cypriot leader Christofias and Talat’s successor, Derviş Eroğlu. Unlike his predecessor, Eroğlu did not uphold previously agreed positions regarding sovereignty, which contributed to the collapse of the negotiations.[21]

Thus, the course of the talks can be divided into two distinct phases:

1. Talat Phase: Characterised by Turkish Cypriot leader Talat’s conciliatory and pro-unification stance, supporting a federal structure with a single citizenship.
2. Eroğlu Phase: Marked by Eroğlu’s resistance to the concept of single citizenship and his limited support for a federal solution.

Criticism of these negotiations includes the claim that Turkish Cypriot proposals were often sidelined from the main agenda. At the same time, it was frequently speculated that the Greek Cypriot side once again adopted a dominant approach, showing little genuine interest in reconciliation. The Greek Cypriot leadership’s resistance to recognising the Turkish Cypriots as a sovereign community was so strong that then-leader Dimitris Christofias even criticised UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon for holding unilateral talks with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat.[22] As in previous attempts, the talks ultimately failed to yield results, as neither side was willing to make significant compromises.

1. Akıncı-Anastasiades Talks (Crans Montana)-Guterres Framework (2015-2017)

The talks characterised by increased hope for a possible reconciliation as the Greek Cypriots became more moderate and sensible towards the Turkish Cypriots demands, as both parties were aware that trying to sit at the table after many failed attempts is very fragile and the will to reconcile on determined subjects mattered a lot. The agenda of the talks was on the internal issues of Cyprus such as governance and power sharing, economy, property and territory, and lastly the EU relations. Unlike his former counterparts, Turkish leader Akıncı did not fully reject a federal system but instead he acknowledged the complexity of the situation in that he believed him and his Greek Cypriot counterpart were the last members of their generations whom actually believed in the functionality of the federal system[23], which was thought to be the only way to end international isolation towards the Turkish Cypriots.

During the negotiations, one of the most controversial topics was the issue of property. It was reported that the parties agreed that the owner of a property would have the first say; however, other matters such as entitlement, who would be excluded from the ownership scheme, and the future development of the property were left to be decided later, as the Greek Cypriot side believed the issue was linked to territorial readjustments.

Another point of contention was Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı’s rejection of the total withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. He refrained from the idea that the Turkish troops would be removed from the island entirely, as he believed Türkiye as a guarantor served as an assurance for the Turkish Cypriots. He also supported Türkiye’s proposal that any major decision would require the affirmative vote of at least one of the four Turkish Cypriot ministers or officials in an eleven-member council. Greek Cypriot leader Anastasiades argued that this would lead to a bureaucratic deadlock. He also claimed it would render a possibly federal Cyprus entirely dependent on Türkiye, potentially resulting in either the collapse of a future federation on the island or the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state.[24]

One particularly striking moment during the negotiations occurred when the Greek Cypriot leader abruptly left the table after the Turkish Cypriot counterpart expressed discomfort over the GASC’s parliamentary decision to commemorate the anniversary of the 1950 Greek Cypriot Referendum. The Greek Cypriot leader reportedly slammed the door as he exited, only to later deny this action and instead blamed Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı for the breakdown of the talks.[25]

1.  Geneva 5+1 Informal Talks (2019-2021)

After several failed attempts to reconcile the Cypriot parties, UN Secretary General António Guterres proposed the parties to come together so that it could be understood if there is a mutual ground. Serving as a new way of dialogue, the talks were a part of the efforts of Guterres as reconciling the parties was more challenging than ever. [26]

The participants of the talks were: Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar, Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Greece Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, UK Foreign Minister Dominic Raab and the UN Secretary General António Guterres.

The talks were an example of first of its own as the then newly elected Turkish Cypriot President Ersin Tatar presented two-state solution for the first time ever. President Tatar proposed a six-point formula for a possible reconciliation as such:

1. The Secretary-General Guterres to take the initiative to have the UN Security Council adopt a resolution guaranteeing the equal international status and sovereign equality of the two parties, such a resolution to establish a new basis for the establishment of a cooperative relationship between the two existing states.
2. Established equal international status and sovereign equality of the two parties to lead to the parties commencing results-oriented, time-bound negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General to establish a mutually acceptable cooperation agreement.
3. The negotiations to focus on the future relations between the two independent states, including property, security, and border arrangements, as well as relations with the EU.
4. The negotiations to be supported by Türkiye, Greece, and the United Kingdom, as well as, where appropriate, the EU as an observer.
5. In the context of any agreement, the two states to mutually recognise each other, and the three guarantor states to support it.
6. Any agreement reached as a result of these negotiations to be submitted for approval by referendums to be held simultaneously in each state.[27]

President Tatar heralded the two-state solution as he believed through and after many failed attempts of talks focused on federation structure as Türkiye also supported his thesis.[28]

While it was speculated that the United Kingdom proposed a formula consisting of eight-points, including the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island and Türkiye’s guarantorship ends automatically in ten years, it was never addressed and attracted intense criticisms. Likewise, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island but presented no formula, plan or whatsoever.

Since attempts to establish common ground between the parties were unsuccessful, no progress was made, and formal negotiations have not commenced.

1. Geneva Informal Talks (2024-2025)

The attending parties of the relevant process included former TRNC leader Ersin Tatar, the GASC Counterpart Nikos Christodoulidis, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, British Minister of State of the United Kingdom for Europe and North America Stephen Doughty, as well as the Head of Unit Cyprus settlement of the Commission, Giulia Bertezzolo. Since October 2024, the talks have been being conducted with an attempt to increase bilateral dialogue and cooperation which might be told to be boosted by the positive dialogue process started between Türkiye and Greece at the end of 2023. While the talks were started with Secretary General Guterres’ initiatives, Türkiye and the TRNC have emphasised the fact that the relevant talks were not the continuation of the 2021 Geneva Process, and the agenda still remains to be the same as ‘two-state solution’. In that sense, they unquestionably defended their ground that the talks should be constructed with a preclearance of the two-state existence on the island.

Different from before, the talks rather revolved around increasing the cooperation between the parties than uniting the island. In this context progress was made in these topics:

1. Establishment of youth technical committee,
2. Initiatives on environment and climate change,
3. Restoration of the cemeteries,
4. Demining works.

Unlike previous efforts, the current talks focus more on increasing cooperation between the parties rather than unifying the island. Previously agreed topics such as the opening of four new crossing points and the establishment of a solar energy project in the buffer zone remain unresolved. In this regard, TRNC President Tatar stated that they have already proposed the opening of two crossing points in Akıncılar and Haspolat but emphasised that his counterpart has yet to present any proposal.[29]

Although the talks were initiated by Secretary-General Guterres, Türkiye and the TRNC have emphasised that these negotiations are not a continuation of the 2021 Geneva Process. They maintained that the agenda still centred on the pursuit of the two-state solution.

The 2025 informal talks in Geneva demonstrated that it is possible to reach agreements on certain matters, even if the overarching agenda remains the two-state solution.

Onset Of a New Era?: Erhürman and Christodulides Process

Following the presidential elections of 2025 in the TRNC, Tufan Erhürman of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), took his post as the new President of the TRNC. Prior to him getting elected, he attracted some criticisms regarding his stance in the settlement of the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, he dismissed all criticisms, noting that cooperation with Türkiye in foreign policy is a principle that will always stand.

President Erhürman has long adopted the discourse that no foreign policy could be made without Turkish cooperation. In this regard, he always emphasises in statements to the press that it has never been possible, nor will it ever be possible during his term, to determine a foreign policy or adopt a policy regarding the Cyprus issue without consulting the Republic of Türkiye. Describing this as a state tradition, President Erhürman stated that relations with Türkiye are extremely important and vital.[30]

Being a long-known supporter of a ‘federal Cyprus’, President Erhürman of CTP advocates the existence of two nations as equal parties living on the islands. According to Article 2 of the official party charter of the CTP, which is available on the party's website, the party advocates for "the establishment and survival of a Federal Republic of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal structure, the political equality of the communities, independence, territorial integrity, membership in the European Union, freedom from militarism and military bases, and the application of social European values."[31] However, President Erhürman clearly rejects any proposals suggesting removal of Turkish military forces from the island and the termination of the guarantorship, as he answered his Greek Cypriot counterpart’s statements indicating the settlement process is only possible with the abolishment of the guarantorship system and withdrawal of Turkish troops.[32]

In line with this framework, President Erhürman became the second President to ever hold a federalist view following former President Mustafa Akıncı who held office during the Crans-Montana negotiations which was the last major negotiation process to be abandoned. [33]

President Erhürman also attended Antalya Diplomacy Forum and answered questions regarding his views on their foreign policy. When asked about the current state of the negotiation process, President Erhürman explained that UN Secretary General António Guterres believes that any negotiation process resumed after 2017 would need to try different approaches and should be handled through what is known as a phased approach, requiring a new methodology this time.[34]

President Erhürman stated that, following a period of work with his team, they had established the “rules of the game” through a four-point methodology. He noted that the principles of this methodology were derived from the lessons learned during previous rounds of negotiations. The TRNC President Erhürman further argued that the reason a settlement has not been achieved so far is that the Greek Cypriot side has been unwilling to share political power on the island and the island’s resources with the Turkish Cypriots. He reiterated that if this attitude continues, a solution will not be possible.[35]

The four-point methodology involves these steps:

1. Reiteration of the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot,
2. Identifying a timetable for the negotiations,
3. Not going through already mutually agreed items,
4. Abolishing the isolation on the Turkish Cypriot in case of the Greek Cypriot abandoning the negotiation table.[36]

In summary, the Turkish Cypriot leader advocates for a settlement between the two communities, underscoring that the Turkish Cypriot community is one of the two equal voices on the island and must be treated accordingly, with sovereignty put forward as a condition for a possible settlement.

On the other hand, Greek Cypriot leader Christodulides has also pursued a more constructive approach to bridging the existing communication gap, consistently keeping channels open in consideration of President Erhürman’s views.

While both leaders held bilateral private talks and UN Secretary General Guterres conducted separate meetings, it has been noted that a new series of talks in an unprecedented format may be forthcoming.[37]

Discussion

The breakdown of the 1960s bi-communal order stemmed from internal crises and acts of violence, impacting mainly Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots who resisted the unrest. The cause of the crisis, which is assigning Turkish Cypriot community to a secondary status, the system not only disregarded their historical role as co-constituents of political authority, but also fostered discrimination, ultimately paving the way for the eruption of intercommunal tensions.

Starting with the London Conference, the settlement process initially offered a glimmer of hope for the unification of the island, which persisted even after the violent events of 1963. Following the attempted overthrow of Makarios by the junta known for its hostile stance towards Turkish Cypriots) supported by Greece Türkiye (as a guarantor under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee) called upon Britain, the other guarantor power, to cooperate in resolving the crisis on the island. As Britain remained reluctant, Türkiye was left with no option but to deploy troops to the island to suppress the coup d’état and protect the Turkish Cypriots.

Following the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, the reconciliation talks entered a new phase, no longer envisioning a unified single administration but rather a potential federated structure. The notion of a federative solution gained further prominence after the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot state in the North in 1983.

Fast forward to 2015, former Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı stated that the negotiations with Anastasiades could represent the last chance for reunification, warning that if their plan failed, a unified Cyprus might no longer be a viable option. On the other hand, the talks conducted by the Turkish Cypriot President and his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Nicos Anastasiades, marked a turning point, as the Turkish Cypriot side would start voicing the idea of a two-state solution more strongly than ever before, which they did as Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar took over the Presidency. Interestingly, Turkish sources increasingly began referring to the Turkish Cypriot leader as “President,” signalling a broader acceptance of the two-state discourse in mainstream media (instead of the wording “leader” signifying a non-state structure). Since then, the two-state solution has been firmly supported by both Türkiye, while the GASC continues to reject this framework, remaining committed to the possibility of a federated structure. On the other hand, as of 2026, the TRNC government of Erhürman voices support for beginning of the talks to explore if unison could be an option in the future of the island.

A review of the negotiation processes suggests that the talks have evolved in three distinct phases. Initially, the focus was on reconciling the parties under the assumption that they were parts of a unified whole. Subsequently, discussions shifted to whether reunification was feasible, after the partition in the island. Finally, the concept of a two-state solution was introduced. Over time, fatigue seems to have set in among the parties, fostering a tendency to cling to the status quo. Yet again, as of 2025, two Cypriot communities in the island are working to come up with ways to start negotiations. Nevertheless, the sovereignty of the TRNC remains of paramount importance, and its international recognition is seen as vital.

The Cyprus issue continues to be a central component of Turkish foreign policy due to its protracted and complex nature. The island’s accession to the EU in 2004 provided the GASC with a legitimate platform to advocate for its interests, while the TRNC remains isolated, with Türkiye being the only country that recognises it.

Within this context, the main aim of this study is to compile the key proposals made for reconciliation on the island (excluding some efforts that yielded no tangible results).

It is known that Türkiye’s EU accession talks are frozen due to the GASC’s veto in certain chapters. The issue also intrinsically involves the EU, as Türkiye, being a candidate country, faces significant obstacles in its accession process. These include blockages imposed by the GASC, alongside chapters frozen by the Council’s 2006 decision and its subsequent refusal to close any opened chapters. At present, the GASC’s veto remains one of the most challenging impediments to Türkiye’s accession.

Table 1: Blocked Chapters in Türkiye’s Negotiation Process

Source: Directorate for EU Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Some argue the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 serves as a milestone in the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue, as the link between Türkiye’s EU membership and the reconciliation of the Cyprus issue was specified in the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions. Regarding the relevant document, it was even cited “the Helsinki European Council on 11 December 1999 formally declared that the accession of Cyprus to the EU was not conditional upon a settlement of the political situation.”[38] Such thesis not only disregards Copenhagen criteria’s political prerequisite, which anticipates having good neighbourly relations with the neighbouring countries, but also presents the unfairness projected on Türkiye, suggesting its relations with Greece and the GASC (even before its full accession to the EU) obstruct its full accession to the EU and thus it needs to first fix its relations with them. In verbatim reports of parliamentary proceedings, it is seen that some parliament members representing various Member States voiced their request for a common position of a proposal for the participation of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in negotiations for the accession of Cyprus.  While such request was met with huge opposition by the Greek parliament members, the Council kept its discourse of fully embracing both communities of Cyprus, while recognising Greek Cypriots the sole interlocutor, and that the views of parliamentary members on Turkish Cypriots to not be excluded is binding on them.[39] On the other hand, one may argue that Cyprus’ sui generis status, rather than obstructing its integration into the EU, paradoxically provides the rationale for requiring a referendum on matters relevant to the unison (as the case for Annan Plan). In this context, it could be suggested that the EU’s perspective was shaped by the composition of its member states: Greece, already an EU member, lobbied on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, while the EU simultaneously advanced its foreign policy objectives, thereby reinforcing its normative influence.

Another striking aspect is how the EU exercises its normative hegemony by promoting the perceived legitimacy of the GASC’s position. As popularly  argued in the literature, the EU exerts influence on the global stage through a paradigm based on values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. [40] Accordingly, one might contend that the EU portrays the GASC as the main affected party in the Cyprus issue, as it frames the Cyprus Peace Operation as the starting point of the conflict, while overlooking the fact that Türkiye acted under legal provisions that granted it the right to intervene, thereby preventing a violation of the Turkish Cypriots’ right to exist. However, it should be acknowledged that the true origin of the conflict lies in 1963, when the violations against Turkish Cypriots intensified and EOKA terrorism was at its peak. To prevent further violations against Turkish Cypriots, the presence of Turkish troops serves as a means of ensuring their security and right to exist.

The fact that the GASC became an EU Member State before Türkiye represents a significant lost opportunity for Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots, who thereby missed the chance to benefit from the EU political support. Now that the GASC holds EU Member State status, it rightfully uses the platform provided by the EU to present its case, often highlighting its interpretation of historical events in the island’s history. In this regard, theory of the EU’s normative power once again proves highly relevant.

Even long before the GASC’s accession in 2004, it had been widely discussed that EU accession would not contribute to resolving the Cyprus issue but rather exacerbate it. Following the Commission’s issuance of its avis on Cyprus’ accession as Kabaalioğlu argued, those who claimed that “a bizonal and bicommunal accession of Cyprus would facilitate a solution” disregarded the supranational character of the EU.[41] In this regard, considering the current state of the Cyprus issue and the prevailing agenda, it could be inferred that Kabaalioğlu’s statement has proved right: the EU’s decision to process the GASC’s application on behalf of the whole island never helped resolve the crisis. One could suggest that the EU’s acceptance of the GASC’s unilateral application was a problematic starting point in handling the crisis. Rather than sincerely addressing the underlying causes of the conflict and seeking a comprehensive settlement, the EU opted to ‘pick a side’, deferring the problem and thereby limiting the prospects for a sustainable solution from the very outset. Kabaalioğlu also argued that the TRNC’s inclusion even as a sovereign entity in the absence of Türkiye’s membership would create asymmetrical conditions in the decision-making processes within the EU leaving the TRNC isolated in relation to Greece-GASC alliance.[42] More clearly, such a situation where the GASC and Greece would both hold membership while Türkiye remained outside would limit parity and weaken the prospects for building a fair and coherent basis to address the Cyprus issue in terms of Turkish Cypriot representation. Therefore, it could be suggested that without Türkiye’s accession, the Cyprus issue could hardly be addressed effectively, given the lack of an equitable ground. Afterall, one could suggest that the relevant incident contributes to the narrative that the EU is more of a political entity rather than a value-based unit (an outcome that, one might note, was almost too predictable).

There have been several attempts to settle the Cyprus issue, some of which involved the concept of federalism, while others disregarded the distinct identity of the Turkish Cypriots by reducing it to simply “Cypriot.” On the other hand, even those Cypriot Turkish leaders who championed the idea of federal Cyprus embraced Cypriot Turkish identity, advocating that the Cypriot Turkish is one of the two founding nations in the island.

On the other hand, it is important to recognise that a segment of the Turkish Cypriot community has become increasingly uncomfortable with the extent to which the Cyprus issue has been politicised by external actors. From this perspective, the future of the island should primarily be determined by its two communities, rather than by outside powers. Many who hold this view also argue that the guarantorship system has outlived its historical purpose and now functions less as a security mechanism than as a structure that reinforces division and perpetuates the conflict. Such arguments reflect a broader dissatisfaction with approaches that prioritise geopolitical considerations over the needs, aspirations, and lived experiences of the communities themselves.

Some also contend that proposals concerning the future of Cyprus should derive principally from the people directly affected by the conflict. Accordingly, incorporating the perspectives of Turkish Cypriots into the debate is not only appropriate but also enhances the legitimacy and credibility of discussions on possible settlement models.

Former negotiator and presidential adviser Mustafa Ergün Olgun similarly argue that the experiences and political narrative of the Turkish Cypriot community have long been overshadowed by the dominant international discourse. He further maintains that Turkish Cypriots continue to be expected to accept a federal settlement based on outdated United Nations Security Council parameters despite the collapse of the 1960 constitutional order and the repeated failure of decades of federal negotiations. In his view, the Turkish Cypriot community increasingly favours a new negotiating framework centred on cooperation between the island's two existing entities on the basis of sovereign equality and equal international status. Olgun argues that the long-standing federal model promoted by the Greek Cypriot side and the United Nations has failed to produce results over more than six decades. Instead, he suggests that an institutionalised cooperative relationship could enhance political, economic, and security cooperation on the island while simultaneously contributing to improved relations between Türkiye and Greece and between Türkiye and the EU. It should, however, be noted that this proposal largely reflected the policy orientation of the Turkish Cypriot administration in office at the time of his writing.[43]

The political landscape has since evolved with the election of Tufan Erhürman. His presidency may reopen discussions on whether a common governance framework remains feasible, provided that it is founded upon genuine political equality and effective participation of both communities. Nevertheless, Olgun's emphasis on practical cooperation retains considerable relevance, as confidence-building measures and functional cooperation could help reduce tensions irrespective of the eventual constitutional settlement.

Having examined the principal approaches pursued to resolve the Cyprus issue, this study proposes two complementary scenarios that could contribute to a more sustainable settlement.

The first is to deepen practical cooperation between the TRNC and the GASC while acknowledging the political reality that two separate administrations currently exist on the island. As long as the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community persists, many potential benefits of cooperation will remain unrealised. Economic disparities between the two communities are unlikely to narrow without greater international engagement with the Turkish Cypriot side. While the non-recognition of the TRNC remains rooted in political considerations, its consequences are borne by both communities, particularly Turkish Cypriots, whose limited access to international political, economic, and commercial networks places them at a significant disadvantage. Expanding trade, investment, and economic interdependence could strengthen mutual confidence and reduce incentives for confrontation. Likewise, joint development of the Eastern Mediterranean's hydrocarbon resources and an equitable sharing of the resulting revenues could generate substantial economic benefits while contributing to greater regional stability and cooperation.

The international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community therefore remains one of the most pressing issues requiring attention. Exclusion from international representation and participation in global political and economic structures continues to constrain the community's development. Under these circumstances, exclusive focus on a comprehensive political settlement risk postponing practical solutions to the immediate challenges faced by Turkish Cypriots. Addressing their isolation should therefore be regarded not only as a matter of equity but also as an important confidence-building measure capable of creating more favourable conditions for a lasting settlement. At the same time, it is widely recognised that any significant change in the international status of the Turkish Cypriot community remains closely linked to broader political negotiations and the willingness of the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements.

As a long-standing EU candidate country, Türkiye’s accession path remains intrinsically linked to wider regional dynamics; indeed, reviving progress in these negotiations could foster a highly favourable political climate for resolving the Cyprus dispute, particularly against the backdrop of the profound transformation currently reshaping Europe’s security architecture. In an era where the EU increasingly strives to fortify its strategic autonomy and defence capabilities, Türkiye presents indispensable assets through its formidable military capacity, extensive operational experience, and a robust, highly sophisticated defence industry. Within this geopolitical context, breaking the deadlock on the Cyprus issue and advancing Türkiye’s EU integration could emerge as mutually reinforcing catalysts. Such a breakthrough would not only unlock the full spectrum of Türkiye’s strategic capabilities for the benefit of European security but also dismantle one of the most pervasive political barriers that has historically stalled Ankara-Brussels relations. Viewed through this strategic lens, the EU’s overarching geopolitical interests should transcend being indefinitely constrained by the bilateral foreign policy priorities of an individual Member State.

Concurrently, domestic political shifts within the Turkish Cypriot community continue to fundamentally recalibrate approaches to the Cyprus question. Historically, transitions in political leadership have directly dictated the preferred framework for negotiations, underscoring that future presidential cycles invariably introduce fresh dynamics into the peace process. Nevertheless, transcending ideological divides, a resilient consensus persists among Turkish Cypriot leaders: political equality, sovereign equality, and the unyielding preservation of the community’s democratic legitimacy remain non-negotiable bedrock principles of any viable future settlement.

Ultimately, while the international community offers a several hypothetical frameworks for resolution, a pragmatic approach dictates that the explicit agency and demands of the Turkish Cypriots must be prioritised. Consequently, this study contends that the Turkish Cypriot community constitutes the primary, most legitimate actor entitled to a decisive voice in determining their own future. At the same time, the ongoing intellectual contestation and conceptual debates surrounding the settlement should be embraced as vital, as they significantly enrich both the academic literature and contemporary civil society dialogue.