İKV Uzman Yardımcısı Aygen Torun tarafından kaleme alınan "Climate Security in the EU and Türkiye" başlıklı İngilizce politika notu İKV Politika Notu serisinden yayımlandı.

Climate Security in the EU and Türkiye

Aygen Torun, IKV Junior Researcher

Climate change has a close relationship with a diverse and complex array of security risks. Therefore, there are multiple ways to conceptualise the climate-security nexus, i.e., securitising climate change. How climate change is securitised greatly informs policy decisions.  EU and Türkiye, although to different degrees, securitise climate change and make climate change policies. This Policy Note assesses how climate change is securitised in the EU and Türkiye and produces policy recommendations that apply to both:

1. Türkiye needs to define climate security as a separate policy area.
2. There needs to be a comprehensive framework on climate change securitisation.
3. The EU and Türkiye should increase efforts to gather climate risk data.
4. Discourse needs to be followed by actions.
5. Türkiye and the EU need to ensure close cooperation between the defence and security sectors and the climate change sector.
6. Bureaucratic communication between security and climate change actors is required for effective climate change policies.
7. Both the EU and Türkiye need to increase stakeholder engagement in climate security policymaking.
8. Türkiye should harmonise its policy with the EU environmental and CSDP/CFSP policy areas.

Definitions of Climate Security

Climate change intersects with economic, political, and societal factors, producing complex effects on our lives. The relationship between climate change and security was first examined by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2007, and the Council has continued to hold debates on this issue ever since. UNSC Resolution 2349 acknowledged the climate-security nexus and emphasized the need to mitigate climate change related risks regarding the conflict in the Chad Basin[1].

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines climate security as the “…impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.”.[2] It is argued that climate change reduces access to natural resources and increases the competition over them. This, in turn, increases the social tensions and the likelihood of conflict. Secondly, the devastating effects of climate change on resources and the destruction caused by extreme weather events lead to mass displacement, resulting in increased social tensions. Thirdly, climate change worsens existing inequalities while creating other novel ones and disproportionately affects disadvantaged communities. Political polarisation, extremism and strained relations between neighbours are listed as many negative results as possible of social tensions caused by climate change.[3] It is apparent that climate change bears the likelihood of driving tension and conflict.

This approach is parallel to the conceptualisation of climate change as a threat multiplier. Recently, there has been a consensus that climate change is a threat multiplier. The UNSC held a debate on the 25^th of January 2019 about the impacts of climate change on peace and security where climate change was recognised as a threat multiplier. It was also stressed that the major armies and businesses are assessing climate change as a threat multiplier and that the UN needs to follow these developments.[4] However, this recognition appears to be a minor reference to the concept, rather than a comprehensive framework through which policies are encouraged by the UN. To elaborate further, climate change as a threat multiplier means that climate change interacts with pre-existing threats or has the potential to exacerbate them, thus increasing security risks.[5]

The map below shows the overlap between climate-related hazards and forced displacement in 2023:

Source: UNHCR[6]

The UNDP defines climate security in terms of its risks to peace and its threat of inducing social tension and conflict. However, the climate-security nexus has undergone many changes and has been conceptualised in various other ways, as climate and security interact with each other in multiple ways. Most of these conceptualisations rely on how one talks or writes about climate change, i.e., how it is used in discourse. While it would be too lengthy to include all the concepts here, it is possible to mention a few prominent ones.

Firstly, climate change can be conceptualised as a national security threat, which suggests that there is a relationship between climate change and conflict- a definition closer to the UN’s. This idea maintains that the threat is to the sovereignty and institutional capacity. Such a conceptualisation can be tied to the traditional way of understanding security in international politics, whereby the referent object of security is the sovereign state itself. Secondly, climate change can be conceptualised as posing a threat to human security. This definition is broad, as climate change puts the “well-being” of humans at risk. It mostly relies on the fact that climate change, intersecting with social, political and economic inequalities, has the potential to deprive populations of the ability to control their lives. Therefore, such a conceptualisation has its roots in the wider environmental justice approach. Thirdly, climate change can be referred to as an international security issue. It is thought that climate change can put international stability, peace and the international society governed by norms and a rules-based international order. This approach refers to international efforts as the best solution to climate change and has been championed by the UN for many years. Lastly, climate change can be conceptualised as an ecological security threat. Perhaps the one with the least importance given to it, this approach puts the biosphere at the centre of threats. It comes from the understanding that the environment and the people are not two separate entities; rather, they are interconnected and there is a need to rethink this relationship. The disruption in the balance between nature and people leads to insecurities. This approach holds that there is a need to reconsider how climate change is embedded in political, economic and societal practices.[7]

There are many alternative ways of framing the climate-security nexus. Sometimes, climate change risks are understood as risks to the ability to wage war, meaning that climate change might weaken military infrastructure or the means of conducting warfare in a country. Alternatively, it can be conceptualised as a territorial risk, where the threat undermines some countries’ territories (one example being island states). At the same time, the issue is two-sided in the sense that violent conflict also contributes to environmental degradation and increases emissions due to war-making, as has recently been proven in the Russia-Ukraine war.[8]

Although there is an abundance of definitions, the primary issue that they all point to is that climate change creates many security risks. To respond to them effectively, it is vital to analyse how they are conceptualised in different contexts, as conceptualisations shape policy responses.

Climate Security in the EU

There are several climate security risks for the EU, identified by the European Environment Agency. The report maintains that climate change threatens natural resource security, energy security, the health of the population and of workers who work outdoors, leading to risks for social cohesion and stability. It also threatens terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems. Climate change risks occurring in other regions are likely to cascade into Europe, one example being large-scale droughts affecting water and food security. In Europe, heatwaves and economic losses have reached a critical level.[9]

The Niniistö Report, titled “Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness”, refers to the twin climate-environmental risks and their effects on daily life. The risks are conceptualised as risks to societies and as exacerbating existing social, economic and health risks. In this report, the focus appears to be more on the human welfare side. The document also argues that the effects of climate change will demonstrate regional variances, hinting at region-based climate change risks. Referring to the international order as the referent object of security, the report states that climate change and environmental degradation create risks for international peace and security.

The EU has been working in this area for many years, conceptualising climate security through various means. As early as 2008, the EU referred to the security implications of climate change with a dominant focus on international security. The 2008 paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council follows the 2007 UNSC debate on the implications of climate change on international security. The document acknowledges that climate change is a threat multiplier and increases instability. There is a reference to humanitarian security as well, with political and security risks to European interests. It analyses the international security implications and the possible effects on European security. Alongside mitigation and adaptation measures, the EU recognises a full range of EU instruments (including CFSP/CSDP) as tools to address climate security risks. EU actions in this area are listed as continuing its role in international climate change negotiations, coordinating EU foreign policy accordingly, enhancing the EU’s capacity for prevention and preparedness, continuing multilateral leadership to promote global climate security and cooperating with third countries.[10]

In 2016, the European Union Global Strategy document was released. Although the document does not devote concerted attention to climate change security risks, it recognises that climate change and energy security threaten the European security architecture. Additionally, the EU needs to make itself resilient to climate/energy fragility. Overall, the discourse used in the European Union Global Strategy handles climate risks in a reductive way, focusing on energy rather than broader climate issues.[11]

The European External Action Service (EEAS) published the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap in 2020. The roadmap is based on discussions in the EU around climate-security nexus and Council Conclusions. The roadmap defines three areas of action:

1. The operational dimension: mainstream environment and climate change into the planning and implementation of CSDP operations and missions, assess the environmental impact of CSDP operations, employ environmental advisors for CSDP missions and operations, promote civil-military cooperation.
2. Capability development: develop training, increase technological innovation to make military equipment greener, sustainable and circular energy solutions, seek synergies with other instruments and directives, reduce energy consumption and increase energy efficiency in the defence sector, improve transport in military mobility, gather data on energy use.
3. Strengthening multilateralism and partnerships: increasing the EU’s leading role in global climate change efforts.[12]

The main aim of the document is to integrate climate change policy into EU defence research and development, technology, industry, infrastructure and CSDP.[13] Evaluating the progress of the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, the EEAS finds that between 2020 and 2022, some areas show progress while others need further attention. There is a need to connect providers and users of data and information and to develop concrete actions for EU-level curricula. Progress has been made in mainstreaming climate change and environment in CSDP mandates, reporting on the environmental footprint of CSDP missions and operations and integrating climate change into conflict analysis. The European Defence Agency has taken progressive steps, and through staff-to-staff talks, partnerships have been strengthened with the UN and NATO.[14]

In the 2022 EU Strategic Compass for security and defence, climate change has its section. The 2022 EU Strategic Compass envisions greater coherence between Member States in security and defence. In the context of global security, climate change is often characterized as a 'risk multiplier,' as it intensifies the frequency and severity of natural disasters, heightens competition over scarce resources, and increases the likelihood of social and political instability. Interestingly, the document also includes the fact that a transition to climate-neutral economies can also exacerbate conflict. It is stated that the EU assesses the impact of climate change and environmental degradation both in regional and global contexts, including within CSDP missions and operations. The EU will adapt the security and defence sector in accordance with climate and environmental objectives under the Green Deal through energy and resource efficiency, green technology, sustainable digitalisation, mainstreaming climate change throughout missions and operations and strengthening analysis capacities and early-warning mechanisms. By the end of 2023, all Member States are expected to develop national strategies to prepare their armed forces for climate change, and by 2025, all CSDP missions and operations will include environmental advisors and report on environmental footprint.[15]

Perhaps one of the most influential documents is the Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, published in 2023 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Deemed a “new outlook” on the climate-security nexus, the document addresses the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence. Although most references are to national security and international peace, it is also recognised that climate change can be instrumentalised by corrupt or authoritarian governments and armed groups. The document also devotes a section to the effects on food security. There is a slight reference to humanitarian security, as the document mentions the health effects of climate change, albeit concluding with the impact on societal destabilisation. Strategic competition is envisioned to lead to more international conflict, posing a danger to Member States’ security. he document also highlights such dangers as spillover effects; however, it overlooks the fact that these effects are not only external but are also generated and experienced within the European Union.Additionally, the document includes the costs of EU aid to affected communities and regions and the potential for internal displacement, which demonstrates that there is also an externalisation of security risks.[16]

In line with the EU’s Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, the document lays out various measures:

• Promoting and enhancing the use of evidence-based analysis and foresight for the planning, decision-making and implementation,
• Operationalising the climate-security nexus in EU external action policy,
• Increasing climate change mitigation and adaptation measures to help Member States enhance civilian and military capabilities and develop infrastructure,
• Promoting the EU’s work in the international arena and reinforcing international partnerships.[17]

The recent EU Preparedness Union Strategy, launched on March 26^th, 2025, recognises that the EU is increasingly facing complex crises and challenges, and must build the capacity to respond effectively. The document leans towards conceptualising security in relation to the welfare of European citizens. The strategy’s main aim is to protect the essential functions of European society, for example, by developing preparedness criteria for social services such as hospitals. In Ursula von der Leyen’s address on the strategy, the focus was on citizens, Member States and businesses as the referent objects of security. This marks a slight shift towards a human security approach and reflects the diversity of conceptualisations across EU documents and discourse.[18]

The Progress report on the implementation of the Joint Communication- “A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus”, published on 17^th of February 2025, presents relatively positive outcomes. Progress has been achieved on all actions outlined in the Joint Communication. The report also recommends adopting an integrated EU-wide approach to tackling climate security threats. Strengthening the main aims outlined in the Joint Communication is deemed essential for the future of such efforts. In addition, the Commission and the EEAS should collaborate to increase the share of international climate funding, develop and implement a training package and strengthen international cooperation.[19]

However, it is noteworthy that the Joint Communication does not account for the possible effects of geostrategic tools on international security. Although the EU successfully conceptualises climate change as a security risk, some argue that the EU is not sufficiently prepared. A specific foreign policy with clearly defined objectives and possibly a designated staff is needed. Efficient coordination between EU institutions is also vital to unify different security issues under the climate security agenda, as well as building the necessary capacity to achieve this objective.[20] This indicates that building a successful narrative of the climate-security nexus is not the end goal, but a tool for efficient policymaking and implementation.

Overall, the EU primarily securitises climate change through its links to conflict, coupled with other conceptualisations such as human security, albeit less prominently. This may stem from the EU’s supranational structure, which could evolve. However, it is evident that the European Union’s engagement with the climate-security nexus remains predominantly at the discursive level, with several studies highlighting persistent challenges in translating discourse into effective policy implementation.These policy tools and documents reflect a well-established understanding of the climate-security nexus, but they lack a solid practical dimension. The nexus has yet to be incorporated into the EU’s security and defence agenda.[21] The EU works mainly towards mainstreaming the issue. The main problem that emerges is the lack of policy coherence, for example, between developmental and security policies. As previously mentioned, how the climate-security nexus is defined directly influences the scope of actions to be taken. Integrating climate concerns into conflict assessments requires resources, but when the EEAS receives additional sources, it is often directed toward immediate threats, rather than long-term challenges like climate security. The myriads of expertise and definitions within the EU lead to conceptual confusion.[22]

A comprehensive study concludes that there is an “action gap”. EU institutions frame the climate-security nexus in different ways, which leads to varying proposed actions. EU-wide actions generally operate in two categories: climate change mitigation and crisis response, the former being long-term and the latter reactive. The study also demonstrates that the EU often overlooks how climate change can exacerbate risks in more indirect or complex ways.[23]

In conclusion, many studies and documents indicate that, while the EU has to some extent successfully securitised climate change through its discourse, this securitisation has yet to be substantiated by concrete and consistent practical measures.

Türkiye’s Approach to Climate Security

Türkiye is one of the countries that face increasing and complex security risks because of climate change. As a country situated in the Mediterranean, Türkiye faces extreme drought, wildfires and the accompanying environmental degradation, necessitating a climate security approach in policymaking.

A study dated 2017 on the discourse analysis of official documents, official speeches in the Security Council and two mainstream newspapers has been conducted and produced valuable results. Türkiye’s conceptualisation of climate security dates to the periods of 2007-2009 and 2014-2017. In the first period, it has been largely referred to by military officials, as can be seen in newspaper articles. The focus in such articles is on securitising climate change with reference to international conflicts and instability. The Turkish General Staff analysed the effects of climate change on Türkiye’s security policies. Regarding the second period of securitisation, climate change has mostly been securitised by academia.[24]

Looking at the important strategy documents on climate change, it is evident that climate change is referred to as a threat; however, only in the Türkiye Climate Change Strategy 2011-2023, it is mentioned concerning its threats to national security. In the Türkiye Climate Change Strategy 2010-2023, the Turkish Republic Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2023 and Türkiye’s Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2023, climate security is addressed within the boundaries of food and energy supply security. More importantly, in these three documents, the reference is predominantly on food security, followed by water and energy security threats. However, it is not clear whether this threat is military or stemming from food, water or energy needs. In the Türkiye Climate Change Strategy 2010-2023, it is maintained that climate change has impacts on the environment and socioeconomic state, with likely effects on national security.[25] 

Moving beyond 2017, Türkiye enacted various documents on climate change ambitions. The Green Deal Action Plan, enacted in 2021, aims to comply with the EU Green Deal. The Action Plan recognises the effects of climate change on security, and one of the headlines in the document is energy supply security.[26] Therefore, climate change is reduced to its risks on energy security.

Another important document is Türkiye’s 2024-2030 Climate Change Mitigation Strategy and Action Plan (CCMSAP). CCMSAP acknowledges that climate risks affect health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security and economic growth. Energy supply security is also one of the security issues that has been devoted great attention to in the CCMSAP.[27] The conceptualisation of the climate-security nexus is more pronounced, different from the EU, as the focus is on the human security dimension and resource security.

The most recent document is Türkiye’s 2053 Long-Term Climate Strategy, submitted to the UNFCCC in November 2024. It establishes strategies for Türkiye to achieve its net-zero goal by 2053. Regarding climate security, the document refers to food security and energy supply security. Importantly, unlike the other documents, the Strategy acknowledges that climate change poses risks to outdoor workers, including in the security sector.[28] This is interesting in the sense that although the impact of climate change as a national security risk is not discussed, its effects on security staff are slightly mentioned. However, such conceptualisation appears to be limited.

It is also vital to analyse how such a securitisation contributed to climate security in Türkiye. The Climate Change Performance Index shows that although Türkiye adopted many documents, the country’s performance ranking is very low. Despite Türkiye’s focus on food security in its documents, the Index demonstrates that there is a threat to food security.[29] In addition, the Climate Action Tracker Database shows that Türkiye’s climate action is critically low, and further efforts are needed.[30] World Bank climate indicators show that Türkiye is among the countries at the most risk, especially regarding the transport system, food and water security and natural disasters; Türkiye is in a position of high risk.[31] There is a need for more efforts to address climate change in Türkiye.

Citizens report high levels of concern for climate security. In fact, both the public and MPs recognise climate change predominantly as a security threat and they mostly conceptualise climate change as a threat to human security and the bioecology. Both the public and the MPs prioritise water security, which in turn suggests that climate change poses threats to human security, welfare and livelihoods -an approach very different from that of both the EU and Türkiye. Additionally, most of the public thinks that Türkiye needs to do more in combating climate change.[32]

Studies suggest that Türkiye’s ambition for economic growth both overshadows climate change mitigation efforts and approaches climate change as a security issue.[33] Additionally, another study concludes that in the period between 2002-2019, climate change became a more visible problem, and many official initiatives were undertaken. However, the issue of climate change has been predominantly framed in tandem with sustainable development, with the primary focus placed on economic values and sectoral measures. In other words, instead of addressing climate change as a security issue, it has been incorporated into official sectoral policies, plans, and projects, thus becoming a political issue. This trend has been especially evident in international negotiations. Therefore, the issue has been politicised rather than securitised. ^[34]  

Policy Recommendations

Both the EU and Türkiye need to address the shortcomings in their climate security policymaking. Some recommendations differ, while others are feasible for the EU and Türkiye.

1. Türkiye needs to define climate security as a separate policy area: As demonstrated in the previous section, Türkiye enacted many climate change strategies and action plan documents. Yet, explicit reference to the climate-security nexus is limited. Türkiye would benefit from defining climate security as a separate policy area that requires in-depth risk assessment and has specific policy needs. This would also lead to the establishment of a unit within the Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change, dedicated to climate security issues.
2. There needs to be a comprehensive framework on climate change securitisation: The way climate change is securitised through policy documents or official statements influences policy. If climate change is not framed as a security issue considering all the risks it brings, both the EU and Türkiye risk developing reductive approaches and policies.
3. Both the EU and Türkiye should increase efforts to gather climate risk data: Some international organisations gather such data but often apply the same criteria for all entities. This limits the scope of how individual countries or international entities understand climate security. There is a need for data and analysis tools that are specific to both the EU and its Member States, and to Türkiye. Climate security risks are well-known but can vary significantly from one country to another. Policy backed by science is more crucial than ever, especially as climate security involves existential threats.
4. Discourse needs to be followed by actions: Securitising climate change through an evidence-based approach alone is not sufficient. Both the EU and Türkiye need to support their climate security discourses with solid policies, strategies and action plans.
5. Türkiye and the EU need to ensure close cooperation between the defence and security sector and the climate change sector: This Policy Note demonstrates that there is a close relationship between security issues and climate change. This necessitates policymaking processes that include the participation of both sectors and calls for a platform on which they can collaborate. Although the EU’s EEAS delves deeply into the issue, a dedicated platform or an agency that unites these two fields is of utmost importance.
6. Bureaucratic communication between security and climate change actors is required for effective climate change policies: Successful policymaking also depends on effective implementation and monitoring. As climate security is an interconnected area, constant and effective communication between security and climate change officials, actors, units and ministries is crucial. Both the EU and Türkiye would greatly benefit from promoting communication between the two sectors.
7. Both the EU and Türkiye need to increase stakeholder engagement in climate security policymaking: To achieve this, awareness-raising activities targeting various stakeholders within the climate-security nexus will be necessary. Extensive stakeholder consultation processes would inform a more comprehensive perspective on the future climate security policies, which considers the overlooked and complex climate security risks voiced by the stakeholders and their recommendations for effective solutions.
8. Türkiye should harmonise its policy with the EU environmental and CSDP policy areas: One study evaluating the level of climate security ranks EU Member States at the top, while Türkiye is ranked 83^rd. Firstly, this disparity should be repaired between the two parties as this also demonstrates further need for Türkiye to align its climate change policies and security policies with the EU. Certain important developments are underway, as outlined in the previous sections; however, there is still a need to align policies in these two areas.