İKV Uzmanı Ahmet Emre Usta tarafından kaleme alınan “Challenges in Türkiye’s Road Transport with the EU: Transit, Quota, and Visa Barriers” başlıklı İngilizce değerlendirme IKV Brief serisinden yayımlandı. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’nin AB ile kara yolu taşımacılığında karşılaştığı geçiş belgesi yetersizlikleri, ek ücretler, vize engelleri veya sınır kapılarında uzun bekleme süreleri gibi temel sorunlar ele alınıyor.

Challenges in Türkiye’s Road Transport with the EU: Transit, Quota, and Visa Barriers

Ahmet Emre Usta, İKV Uzmanı

Foreign trade, particularly exports, is crucial in driving economic growth and securing a larger share in global markets. The increasing complexity of foreign trade transactions in recent years has elevated the importance of logistics, making it essential for countries to develop foreign trade policies that are harmonised and integrated with logistics strategies.[1] In this context, logistics and foreign trade have evolved into two interdependent and complementary components.

Türkiye is a key actor in global logistics with its geographical location, advanced transport and logistics infrastructure, substantial trade volume, and dynamic economy. Positioned as a regional logistics hub bridging continents, Türkiye is located along the transit routes connecting Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, reinforcing its role as one of the world’s leading logistics centres. As a natural transit and connection point for east-west and north–south trade routes, Türkiye serves as a strategic intersection in global trade. This strategic location grants Türkiye access to numerous markets with high foreign trade volumes while enabling it to function as a base for regional logistics and transport operations. In this context, Türkiye’s advantageous geographical position significantly contributes to the growth of its exports of both goods and services.[2]

Transport activities constitute the most significant part of logistics operations. Türkiye utilises various transport modalities, including road, rail, maritime, and air transport, in its foreign trade. Among these, international road haulage ranks second after maritime transport in economic value and tonnage. Although the share of road transport in international freight transport has been declining, this modality remains vital for Türkiye due to its strategic location on key international road corridors and its position as a critical crossroads connecting continents.[3]

The importance of road transport for Türkiye is even more pronounced in its trade relations with the EU. Indeed, the EU has a Customs Union with Türkiye, serves as Türkiye’s primary trading partner, and shares borders with Türkiye through Bulgaria and Greece. However, Türkiye encounters significant challenges in road transport exports to the EU. The key issues include insufficient transit quotas allocated to Türkiye, excessive transit permit fees, difficulties faced by Turkish transporters in obtaining visas, and extended delays at border crossings.       

1.Issues Concerning Türkiye’s Road Transport with the EU

In Türkiye’s international exports, road freight transport plays a significant role, ranking second after sea freight transport. An analysis of the data from the 2014-2023 period indicates that approximately 30% of Türkiye’s total exports were carried out by road freight transport. In 2023, 83 billion 127 million dollars worth of total exports were transported via road. However, the share of road freight transport in Türkiye’s exports to the EU stands at over 40%.[4]

Figure 1: Türkiye’s International Exports by Mode of Transport (2014-2023)

Source: Compiled using data from TurkStat.

Road freight transport has become increasingly important in Türkiye’s trade relations with the EU. Indeed, the bilateral trade volume between Türkiye and the EU has increased sixfold since the Customs Union came into effect in 1996, and this upward trend continues. The EU is Türkiye’s number one trading partner, while Türkiye ranks as the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner. In 2023, Türkiye’s exports to the EU totalled 104 billion 283 million dollars, while the EU’s exports to Türkiye reached 106 billion 50 million dollars. The EU alone accounts for over 40% of Türkiye’s exports and 30% of its imports. However, despite this substantial trade volume, Türkiye faces significant challenges with the EU regarding road freight transport, which plays a crucial role in the trade of goods due to its cost-efficiency, security, and time-saving advantages. Before delving into these issues, it is essential to outline how international road transport rules function within the EU.

Although road freight transport rules have been harmonised within the EU, road freight transport between the EU and third countries remains largely based on bilateral agreements between Member States and third countries.[5] A key aspect of these agreements and their associated protocols is the implementation of a permit quota system for bilateral, transit, and third-country transport, as well as the allocation of various types of road transit permits between the parties. The allocation of permits is typically reviewed and determined on an annual basis.

The types of permits used in road freight transport can be categorised as follows:

• Bilateral transport permits, which grant the right to transport goods between two signatory countries.
• Transit permits, which allow the transit of goods through the territory of the country specified in the permit.
• Bilateral and transit permits, which combine the functions of bilateral and transit permits.
• Third-country transport permits, which allow the transportation of goods from the permit-specified country to a third country and vice versa.
• Universal permits, which cover all the permit categories.[6]

Türkiye has signed bilateral road freight transport agreements with all EU Member States, except for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Ireland, and Malta. Under the signed agreements and the protocols concluded during the “Joint Land Transport Commission” (KUKK) meetings conducted within the framework of these agreements, road transit permits are exchanged between Türkiye and EU Member States. In addition, these permits can either be subject to a fee or granted free of charge, depending on the specific terms of the agreements.[7]

In addition to the permits provided by bilateral agreements, since 1974, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport ^[8] (ECMT-UBAK) has operated a quota system that grants multilateral licences for the operation of heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) among the organisation’s Member States. These licences allow road freight operators to conduct an unlimited number of multilateral freight operations across the 43 Member States[9] participating in the system. The quota system also promotes the adoption of environmentally friendly vehicles in road freight transport by introducing standards for exhaust emissions. Stricter emission standards and safety requirements for vehicles have gradually resulted in the deployment of cleaner and safer vehicles within the system.[10] Türkiye holds the highest number of quotas within the ECMT Multilateral Quota System. In 2023, a total of 7,688 ECMT permits were allocated to Türkiye.[11]

Difficulties in obtaining transit permits are among the primary challenges faced by Turkish road freight operators transporting goods to the EU. The five EU Member States to which Türkiye exports the most goods are Germany (21 billion 83 million dollars), Italy (12 billion 372 million dollars), France (10 billion 287 million dollars), Spain (9 billion 783 million dollars), and the Netherlands (7 billion 857 million dollars). These five countries account for approximately 25% of Türkiye’s total exports. However, the routes connecting Türkiye to its key trading partners in the EU require Turkish road freight operators to transit through the territories of third countries. Germany is a prominent example, as it is Türkiye’s largest and most significant trading partner in the EU. 73% of Türkiye’s exports to Germany are transported via road freight. In order to deliver goods, a lorry must possess a road transit permit for all transit countries on the way to Germany and a bilateral road freight permit[12] for Germany itself.[13] In this context, in a scenario where only EU Member States can be transited, as illustrated in Figure 2, Turkish hauliers must transit through one or more other Member States highlighted in orange, such as Slovakia, Austria, Czechia, and/or Poland, while Bulgaria/Greece, Romania, and Hungary are compulsory transit points to reach Germany.

Figure 2: EU Countries Turkish Hauliers Transit Through When Transporting Goods to Germany[14]

Source: Compiled using data from TurkStat.

However, the demand for transit permits often exceeds the supply provided by some Member States. Therefore, Turkish hauliers must find alternative routes to the destination country to avoid permit restrictions, or they must use Ro-Ro shipping, which involves the transport of wheeled vehicles by sea, or Ro-La shipping, which involves the transport of road trucks by rail. It should be emphasized that intermodal transport is a slower and less flexible alternative to road freight transport and is 56% more expensive than the road freight alternative.[15]

Regarding Ro-Ro, nearly 70% of Ro-Ro transports from Türkiye are conducted on European routes. As illustrated in Table 1, the Tuzla-Trieste Ro-Ro line had the highest number of vehicles transported in 2023, with 107,659 vehicles. Trieste alone accounted for 71% of the Ro-Ro transport from Türkiye to Europe, followed by Sete with 23%.[16] It is known that 67% of Türkiye’s exports to Europe are conducted by Turkish carriers; 39% of these exports are conducted by Ro-Ro shipping and 61% by road freight transport. On the other hand, foreign vehicles, which account for 33% of total exports to Europe, conduct 96% of their transport by road.[17] In this context, these data show that Turkish hauliers are compelled to use Ro-Ro transport primarily due to necessity. Moreover, Ro-La transport causes an additional cost of approximately 650 euros per truck.[18]

Table 1: Number of Vehicles Transported via Ro-Ro Lines to Europe from Türkiye (2023)

Source: Compiled using data from the Ministry of Trade, Republic of Türkiye

In Ro-La transport, it is observed that there is a major transit permit problem in Austria, which is one of the most important routes of Türkiye to Europe, especially Germany. The number of permits allocated to Türkiye by Austria for “environmental protection” is 21,000.[19] If these permits are exhausted, Austria only permits Turkish vehicles to transit its territory via Ro-La lines. Considering that Turkish hauliers conduct an average of 120,000 transports[20] annually to reach Europe, the number of permits issued is highly inadequate. Austria’s treatment of Turkish hauliers has been described as the “second Great Wall of China” for Turkish citizens in Europe.[21]

Turkish road freight operators used to cross Austria via Szeged (Hungary)-Wels (Austria), Trieste (Italy)-Salzburg (Austria), and Maribor (Slovenia)-Wels (Austria) Ro-La lines. However, the Szeged-Wels line was closed in December 2012, and approximately 25,000 vehicles using this route were redirected to other lines. As a result, congestion began to occur on different lines, and the inadequacies of the Ro-La services, promoted as an “alternative” to the transit quotas imposed by Austria, further increased time losses and financial burdens.[22] It is known that Ro-La transport incurs an additional cost of approximately 400 euros[23] per truck, which can double a journey that typically takes 4 days, resulting in issues, especially in the shipment of perishable goods.[24] The fact that Bulgaria and Romania can pass through Austrian territory freely without Ro-La transport after becoming EU members clearly shows the unfairness of this practice towards Turkish hauliers.[25] In 2013, Turkish hauliers organised a protest at the Hungarian-Austrian border to abolish the restriction of transit permits through Austria when these problems became evident.[26]

Protests by Turkish Hauliers at the Hungarian-Austrian Border

In addition to all of this, there are instances where some Member States grant transit permits to Turkish road freight operators for a specified fee when the allocated road transit permits for Türkiye are exhausted. These fees, which represent an additional cost for Turkish road freight operators, are entirely separate from road usage charges.[27] The transit permit fees imposed by selected Member States on Turkish road freight operators are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Transit Permit Fees Charged by Selected Member States to Turkish Vehicles

Source: TOBB

In recent years, with the initiatives of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Türkiye, noteworthy progress has been made to alleviate the sector, especially regarding the issue of road transit permit quotas and other challenges:

• As a result of the KUKK Meeting held with Hungary on 25-26 November 2020, the number of Hungarian road transit permits was increased from 36,000 to 110,000, thus ending the transit barrier that Turkish road freight operators had faced for many years.[28]
• As a result of the KUKK Meeting held with Greece on 26 November 2021, after years, the quota of bilateral road transit permits was increased from 20,000 to 26,000, while the quota of road transit permits was increased from 35,000 to 40,000. In addition, it was decided to allocate half of the bilateral and road transit pass quotas free of charge. It should be emphasised that, in the past, all transit permits were paid.[29]
• As a result of the KUKK Meeting held with Bulgaria on 24-25 February 2022, the number of Bulgarian road transit permits was increased from 250,000 to 375,000, and the number of bilateral road transit permits was increased from 32,000 to 50,000.[30]
• As a result of the KUKK Meeting held with Romania on 29 March 2022, it was decided to liberalise transit transport and completely abolish transit fees.[31]

However, Turkish road freight operators still face limitations in obtaining road transit permits from key transit countries such as Italy, Slovenia, Austria, and Czechia. Italy, which accounts for 42% of Türkiye’s exports by road, does not provide Turkish road freight operators with enough bilateral road transit permits. Although the quota of 35,000 bilateral road transit permits allocated to Türkiye at the 2015 KUKK Meeting was sufficient for that period, it no longer meets today’s needs due to the growing trade volume over the years.[32] The 21,000 road transit permits[33] provided by Slovenia to Turkish road freight operators are insufficient given the increase in exports to Europe beyond Slovenia. The issues with Austria, mentioned in detail above, persist. Finally, at the KUKK Meeting held with Czechia on 29 March 2023, it was decided to liberalise transit through Czechia on a trial basis from 1 July 2023 until the end of the year due to issues with road transit permit quotas. However, the Turkish authorities were informed that the exemption would not be continued in 2024 due to a 193% increase in the transport of Turkish-registered vehicles during the liberalisation period by Czechia compared to the same period the previous year.[34] The limited road infrastructure in Czechia has reached its maximum capacity, along with the increase in vehicle traffic. In this context, the 10,000-peryear transit quota[35] allocated by Czechia for Turkish road freight operators will continue to be a challenge in the coming period.

As a result, Slovenia’s, Austria’s, and Czechia’s blocking of road transit permits will persist in undermining Türkiye’s trade with the rest of Europe, particularly with Germany, the top destination for road exports in terms of the number of outbound vehicles and the value of exports.

Table 3: Top 10 Countries in Türkiye’s Road Transport Exports (2023)

Source: Ministry of Trade, Republic of Türkiye and UND

Another significant issue faced in road freight transport with the EU is the visa problem. Currently, citizens of EU Member States can enter Türkiye without a visa or obtain a visa at the border for an appropriate fee. However, the same privileges do not apply to Turkish citizens. Turkish citizens face high visa fees and extensive application procedures when they wish to travel to EU countries[36]. Moreover, in the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the visa rejection rate of Turkish citizens’ Schengen visa applications. While the rejection rate for all applications was 5.09% in 2014, it increased to 15.81% in 2023.[37]

The visa requirement imposed by the EU on Turkish citizens extends to Turkish businesspeople, service providers, and thus to Turkish road freight operators. Obtaining a Schengen visa is not a vital issue for tourists, but for the international transport sector, this visa is essential for the continuation of goods transport. It is known that Turkish road freight operators have faced difficulties in obtaining Schengen visas in the past. However, these difficulties have reached unprecedented levels, particularly after the COVID-19 outbreak. So much so that “Schengen visa refusals, which continued to rise after the pandemic, made exporters unable to do business.”[38]

The main problems faced by Turkish road freight operators in recent years regarding Schengen visas are summarised as follows:

• Short and Insufficient Visa Durations: Driver visas obtained from Schengen Area countries are usually issued for 6 months and rarely for one year. The stay period provided by these visas is limited to 90 days for 6-month visas and 180 days for annual visas. However, due to the nature of their professional activities, drivers are required to spend most of their time in the Schengen Area. Therefore, the residence periods provided are insufficient to meet the needs of drivers.
• Excessive Number of Required Documents and the Necessity of Re-preparation: Most Turkish road freight operators engaged in international transport have carried out hundreds of transports to EU countries for more than 5, 10, or even 20 years and have never attempted to settle in the EU territory during this period. Despite this, approximately 20 different documents are requested from the drivers in each visa application, and in some cases, these documents may be expanded with additional requests. Drivers are required to prepare and submit these documents again for each application. An example of the extensive list of documents requested by Belgium from Turkish drivers is provided below.
• Request for Invitation Letter and Non-compliance with the Simplified List of Documents: Some Schengen Area countries still require invitation letters from EU companies for “truck/TIR drivers entering or transiting the Schengen Area.” These countries include the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Spain, Hungary, and Italy, which play an important role in visa requests for Turkish drivers. However, in July 2021, the European Commission published a simplified list of Schengen visa application documents for international transport drivers, clarifying that invitations should not be requested from drivers. In this list, it is stated that only a letter of invitation from a company in the destination country to the driver’s employer or a business partnership document is sufficient. Despite this, some Schengen Area countries still require invitations from drivers. Turkish road freight operators generally do not face any problems in obtaining invitation letters or business partnership certificates from the companies they work within Europe. However, significant problems have arisen, particularly for international transport driver visa applications to Germany. In addition, as transport operations are in some cases delegated to sub-carriers instead of being carried out directly by the transport company and delivered to the recipient in this way, there is no direct communication between the sub-carriers and the recipient based in Europe. This situation may result in the sub-carriers not being able to obtain an invitation letter or a direct business partnership document.
• Lengthening of Appointment and Processing Times: Road freight drivers face serious challenges in scheduling appointments for visa applications to Schengen Area countries, particularly since May 2022. The process is further complicated by the fact that consulates occasionally close their appointment systems or reschedule appointments for extremely late dates. Before the pandemic, drivers could schedule an appointment for their visa applications within 1-2 days, while after the pandemic, this period increased to 30 to 50 days. Particularly for visa applications to countries such as the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland, prolonged appointment processes, coupled with the finalisation time of the processed passports, have meant that the total duration of the procedures can reach 30 to 50 days. Furthermore, it is known that consulates with insufficient staff do not increase their personnel.
• Unjustified Rejection Decisions: Even though road freight drivers demonstrate that they have been carrying out regular transport activities and complying with visa rules for many years, they are increasingly facing unfair rejection decisions in their Schengen visa applications. Grounds for refusal include doubts about the authenticity and reliability of the documents submitted, concerns that the driver will not be repatriated, or allegations of a threat to public health. However, in many cases, these justifications lack a concrete basis, and such decisions have a negative impact on transport activities.[39]

Documents Requested by Belgium for Driver Visa

It is estimated that the Turkish road transport sector incurs costs exceeding 4 million euros annually on average solely to obtain Schengen visas, while the additional costs paid to third-party organisations exceed 1.5 million euros annually.[40] The inability of Turkish drivers to obtain visas, particularly during a period when the market faces significant challenges in finding internationally employed drivers, negatively impacts the EU’s own logistics sector. Delays in obtaining or renewing visas result in drivers being unable to work for 2 to 3 months, which may ultimately lead to drivers leaving their jobs.[41] Eventually, even if goods are available and there is a vehicle to transport them, increased uncertainties and delays caused by drivers’ inability to obtain visas lead to disruptions in international transport operations and higher logistics costs.

Another problem Turkish road freight operators, who obtain their visas and permits after considerable difficulties, may encounter at the next stage is the long waiting times at EU borders. There are five border crossings between Türkiye and Europe for road transport. In this context, trucks travelling from Türkiye to Europe must pass through at least one of these border crossings, namely those in Bulgaria or Greece. However, trucks departing from Türkiye to enter the EU face significantly longer waiting times at border crossings compared to those departing the EU to enter Türkiye.[42] These waiting times, which typically average 6 hours per crossing, have been recorded to reach up to 72 hours.[43]

As shown in Table 4, the highest number of road freight crossings from Türkiye to Europe is significantly through Bulgaria. Indeed, in 2023, a total of 775,467 road freight transport vehicles passed through the Kapıkule and Hamzabeyli border crossings, accounting for 88.6% of all crossings from Türkiye to Europe.

Table 4: Departure Statistics of Freight Transport Vehicles from Turkish Borders, (European Direction, 2023)

Source: Compiled using data from the Ministry of Trade, Republic of Türkiye

The partial accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Area as of 31 March 2024 and the additional border control measures introduced by these countries in the context of accession to combat irregular migration have exacerbated the problem of waiting times. The waiting time for lorries at the Bulgarian border could reach 4-5 days.[44] In June 2024, trucks crossing from Türkiye to European countries formed a queue of up to 24 kilometres at the Hamzabeyli border crossing from Edirne to Bulgaria.[45]

2.Legal Dimension of Road Transport Problems between Türkiye and the EU

Free Movement of Goods vs. Services

Central to the road transport issues between Türkiye and the EU lies a significant difference in interpretation regarding whether road transport pertains to the freedom of movement for goods or services. To shed light on this issue, it is important to examine the Ankara Agreement, which serves as the legal foundation of Türkiye-EU relations.

Türkiye applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959, shortly after its establishment. The Ankara Agreement, which designates Türkiye’s full membership in the Community as a goal, was signed on 12 September 1963 and entered into force on 1 December 1964. The Ankara Agreement outlined the path to full membership in three phases: the “preparation period,” “transition period,” and “final period.” Following the completion of the preparation period outlined in the Agreement, the Additional Protocol, signed on 13 November 1970 and entered into force in 1973, regulated the provisions of the transition period and the obligations to be undertaken by the parties. During the transition period, which began with the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, the aim was to gradually establish a Customs Union between Türkiye and the EU. Eventually, the Customs Union became operational on 1 January 1996, in accordance with Decision No 1/95 of the Association Council at the Türkiye-EU Association Council Meeting on 6 March 1995.[46] The Customs Union, covering the free movement of industrial goods and processed agricultural products, requires the elimination of existing customs duties and equivalent duties (Article 4), and quantitative restrictions and all other measures having equivalent effect (Articles 5-6) in trade between the parties.[47]

This is the point at which the difference in interpretation between Türkiye and the EU regarding road transport arises. According to the view of Türkiye, based on the relationship established between the parties by the Customs Union, Türkiye and the EU form a single customs area, and within this area, “quotas and other discriminatory restrictions and charges imposed on road vehicles carrying goods in free circulation are contrary to the rules of the Customs Union, as they constitute measures equivalent to customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods.”[48] The EU, on the other hand, argues that the issue is not related to the free movement of goods, that road transport should be addressed within the scope of the free movement of services, and that this issue falls outside the scope of Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council, which regulates the Customs Union. However, while the goods being transported fall within the scope of the Customs Union, the service aspect of this activity is secondary, and “elements such as driver qualifications or vehicles used in transport may fall under the free movement of services.”[49]

Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council states that the provisions set out in the text, in so far as they are identical in substance to the corresponding provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, shall be interpreted for their implementation and application to products covered by the Customs Union, in conformity with the relevant decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).[50] As shown in Figure 3, Articles 4, 5, and 6 of Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council and Articles 29, 34, and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are substantially identical.

Figure 3: Similar Provisions of Decision No 1/95 of the Association Council and the TFEU on Free Movement of Goods

Source: Decision No 1/95 of the Association Council and the TFEU

To date, the CJEU has issued notable judgments on the scope of measures equivalent to customs duties and quantitative restrictions. Illustrative cases are outlined in Table 5.

Table 5: Selected CJEU Judgments on Measures Equivalent to Customs Duties and Quantitative Restrictions

Source: Compiled using IKV sources.

It can be observed that the EU’s approach to road transport regarding Türkiye is legally contradictory to the CJEU’s judgments concerning the free movement of goods. Moreover, in the two CJEU judgements directly concerning Türkiye about the passage of road freight vehicles through EU Member States, the dilemma between the free movement of goods and services has resurfaced.

• Istanbul Logistics Decision (C-65/16, 2017)

Istanbul Logistics is a company headquartered in Türkiye and engaged in international road haulage operations between Türkiye and the EU Member States, particularly Germany. On 30 March 2015, near Nagylak, the Hungarian National Tax and Customs Administration inspected a convoy from Istanbul Logistics’ road haulage fleet transporting textile products from Türkiye to Germany. Although the convoy possessed a valid Hungarian-Türkiye transit permit, it allegedly lacked the tax stamps confirming payment of the motor vehicle tax. Consequently, the transit permit was declared invalid, and a fine amounting to 660,000 Hungarian forints (approximately 2,200 euros) was imposed on the company under the Hungarian Motor Vehicle Tax Act. The company’s objection was rejected by the higher authorities, leading to a lawsuit before the Szeged Administrative and Labour Court. That court subsequently referred the matter to the CJEU, seeking clarification as to whether Hungary’s Motor Vehicle Tax Law is compatible with the relevant provisions of Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council governing the Customs Union between Türkiye and the EU.[51]

In the first instance, the CJEU examined the scope of charges having equivalent effect to customs duties, as prohibited by Article 4 of Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council, in light of its case law on Article 30 TFEU, a corresponding provision. According to the Court’s established jurisprudence, any financial obligation unilaterally imposed solely due to the movement of goods across a national border -irrespective of the amount, designation, or way it is levied constitutes a charge having equivalent effect under Articles 28 and 30 of the TFEU. Ultimately, the CJEU concluded that the Hungarian Motor Vehicle Tax is such a fiscal charge, unilaterally imposed because of goods crossing a border, and thus amounts to a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty within the meaning of Article 4 of Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council.[52]

• CX Decision (C-629/16, 2018)

Under Austrian law, road haulage undertakings headquartered in Türkiye require permits to transport goods to or through Austria to other EU Member States, by quotas established under the bilateral road transport agreement between Austria and Türkiye. On 2 April 2015, a Türkiye-based company, FU, hauled textile products from Türkiye to Germany via Austria. However, the Austrian authorities fined FU 1,453 euros for operating without the necessary authorisation. CX, the director of FU, appealed to the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Administrative Court) after exhausting all national remedies. CX argued that the annual quotas imposed by Austria contravened the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and equivalent measures under Articles 5 and 6 of Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council. CX further noted that these insufficient quotas compelled Türkiye-based road haulage undertakings to resort to Ro-La services, resulting in increased costs and transit times. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof, however, considered the dispute within the context of the freedom to provide transport services rather than the free movement of goods, subsequently referring the matter to the CJEU. The CJEU first examined whether the issue fell under the scope of the free movement of goods or the free movement of services. The Court emphasised that the free movement of goods, free movement of services, and transport activities each fall under distinct regulatory regimes in the Türkiye–EU association framework. While the free movement of goods is primarily governed by Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council, the free movement of services and transport has not yet been liberalised. In this context, the CJEU acknowledged that although Austria’s quota system may indirectly affect the free movement of goods, its principal objective is to impose conditions on transport services. Consequently, the Court concluded that the dispute pertains to the regulation of transport services rather than the free movement of goods.[53]

In addition, Article 5 of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits the imposition of unnecessary and unjustified restrictions on transit and vehicles transporting goods in transit. Under the Agreement, transit may only be restricted in exceptional circumstances, such as war or civil disturbances, and in cases involving certain categories of goods to safeguard public health and safety, public morals, or to prevent plant and animal diseases. Furthermore, paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), signed at the Ninth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Bali and in force since 22 February 2017, stipulates: “The Member States shall not seek to adopt or maintain any measure that voluntarily restricts transit or any similar measure that would have this result. Bilateral or multilateral agreements, as well as existing or future national regulations governing transport that are compatible with WTO rules, are excluded from this scope.”[54] In this context, the unfair treatment of Türkiye concerning transit permits contradicts the EU’s principles, especially given its role as one of the principal advocates of the multilateral global trading system.

Unfair Visa Regime for Citizens and Economic Actors of Türkiye

In 1980, Germany became the first EU Member State to introduce visa requirements for citizens of Türkiye, a practice soon adopted by other EU Member States, including France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This shift was seen as a response to the increasing number of asylum applications to European countries, particularly following the military coup in Türkiye. Although these Member States had previously concluded reciprocal visa exemption agreements with Türkiye and participated in arrangements promoting the free movement of citizens, such as the 1957 Council of Europe Treaty, they pursued more restrictive policies from the 1970s onwards. The visa regime, initially intended as a temporary measure, ultimately became permanent, and is now enforced by 27 EU Member States.[55]

Türkiye bases its efforts for the removal of visa requirements on Article 41(1) of the 1970 Additional Protocol. This provision includes a “standstill clause,” which prohibits the introduction of new measures restricting the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services between Türkiye and the European Community. Accordingly, if visa requirements were not in effect for Turkish citizens at the time of the Additional Protocol’s entry into force (1973) or at the date of accession for later EU Member States, it is prohibited to impose such requirements subsequently. As confirmed in the Soysal Case and other judgements of the CJEU, imposing visa requirements on Turkish nationals travelling to provide services after these dates constitutes a new restriction under Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol and is contrary to EU law.[56]

• Soysal Judgement (Soysal and Savatli, C228/06, 2009)

The applicants in the case at hand, Mehmet Soysal and İbrahim Savatlı, reside in Türkiye, work as lorry drivers for an international transport company and transport goods from Türkiye to Germany. The lorries used in their transport activities belonged to a company registered in Germany. Although visa applications were accepted until 2000, they were rejected in 2001 and 2002. The reason for the refusal was that the lorries used in their transport activities were registered in Germany rather than in Türkiye. Subsequently, the claimants brought their case to the Berlin Administrative Court, arguing that Germany had not required visas for Turkish nationals in 1973 and that the introduction of the visa requirement violated the “standstill” clause under Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. After receiving an adverse decision from the national court, the applicants appealed the decision, leading the Upper National Court to refer the case to the CJEU.[57] Ultimately, the CJEU concluded that the visa requirement imposed on Mehmet Soysal and İbrahim Savatlı was incompatible with Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, which prohibits the introduction of additional restrictions on Turkish citizens travelling to Member States to provide services.[58]

Although the Soysal judgement raised hopes for the abolition of visa requirements for Turkish citizens providing services in EU Member States, most Member States have been reluctant to implement the CJEU judgment. “The problem is a technical and legal issue, but the political and economic aspects always take precedence over the legal process.”[59] Indeed, the “Visa Liberalisation Dialogue,” launched on 16 December 2013, which envisages lifting the Schengen short-stay visa requirements for Turkish citizens, was largely motivated by political and economic concerns, particularly the need to curb irregular migration to the EU via Türkiye.

Visa Liberalisation Dialogue

The Visa Liberalisation Dialogue between Türkiye and the EU aims to enable short-term (up to 90 days within 180 days) visa-free travel of Turkish citizens to Schengen countries. Initiated on 16 December 2013 alongside the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement, the process is guided by the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap. This Roadmap comprises 72 criteria grouped into five thematic categories: document security, migration management, public order and security, fundamental rights, and the readmission of irregular migrants. Türkiye has largely fulfilled these criteria, with significant progress driven by legislative amendments, notably the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection. In its 4 May 2016 report, the European Commission confirmed that Türkiye had fully met 66 of the 72 criteria, including obligations such as biometric passports. However, efforts are ongoing to finalise the remaining six criteria, such as concluding a cooperation agreement with Europol. If the dialogue succeeds, Türkiye is expected to be removed from the Schengen visa-required list and placed on the visa-exempt list, enabling visa-free travel for Turkish citizens to the Schengen Area.[60]

3.Türkiye’s Alignment with the EU’s Transport Policy (Chapter 14)

Türkiye’s accession negotiations with the EU began on 3 October 2005. On the same date, the “Negotiating Framework Document,” which outlines the principles and procedures governing the negotiations, was adopted. Türkiye’s accession negotiations are conducted across 35 chapters under the provisions of the Negotiating Framework.

At the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting on 11 December 2006, nearly one year after the formal negotiation process began, the Foreign Ministers of the EU Member States adopted the European Commission’s recommendation of 9 November 2006 and decided to impose a political blockade on Türkiye’s accession negotiations. According to the 2006 Council Decision, 8 negotiating chapters would remain unopened, and no chapter would be provisionally closed until Türkiye fulfilled its obligations under the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to GCASC.[61] Chapter 14 on “Transport Policy” is among the eight chapters ^[62] blocked by this Council Decision.

The EU’s transport policy aims to enhance the functioning of the Single Market by promoting safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally sustainable transport services. A key objective of this policy is to ensure clean, safe, and efficient transport options across Europe, enabling EU citizens to travel freely. In this context, balancing and interconnecting various modes of transport -such as road, rail, air, and maritime- is a top priority. EU transport policy is user-centric, and EU-wide binding legislation have been adopted to address road safety, user rights, working conditions, and reducing environmental impacts through regulations tailored to specific transport sub-sectors.[63]

The Transport Policy Chapter encompasses road, rail, maritime, and air transport. In the area of road transport, the key principles are to ensure sustainable, efficient, safe, and environmentally sustainable transport, in line with general EU transport policy. To achieve these goals, priority objectives include promoting efficient road freight and passenger transport, establishing fair competition conditions, harmonising technical standards such as vehicle emissions and safety requirements, ensuring a minimum level of financial and social alignment, and enforcing road transport rules effectively and in a non-discriminatory manner.[64] EU legislation in road transport regulates the key areas outlined in Table 6.

Table 6: Subjects Regulated by EU Acquis in the Field of Road Transport

Source: Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Türkiye

The explanatory meetings of the Transport Policy Chapter were held on 26-29 June 2006, and the Country Sessions were held on 25-28 September 2006. The screening report of this chapter has not been sent to Türkiye, “but it was stated informally that the chapter can be opened for negotiations once the following two opening benchmarks are met, excluding the political benchmark concerning the full non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol.”

1. “Türkiye has provided a clear strategy for the progressive alignment on the acquis in the railway sector. The strategy should include detailed plans for the separation of functions regarding infrastructure management and provision of services with target dates as well as institutional capacity-building measures.
2. Türkiye has engaged in a process towards the recognition of “Community designation” and provided a clear strategy for the progressive alignment to the acquis on the Single European Sky. The strategy should address an acceptable technical solution to ensure the necessary communication to guarantee the appropriate level of air safety in the Southeastern Mediterranean Region.”[65]

With the momentum of EU membership and harmonisation with the EU acquis, Türkiye has embarked on comprehensive reforms of the road transport sector since the early 2000s. Accordingly, measures including entry criteria for the profession, vehicle roadworthiness inspections, social legislation (e.g., digital tachographs to monitor driving hours), vocational training requirements for drivers, and updated licensing systems were introduced in the sector.[66] The measures implemented by Türkiye in the process of EU integration regarding transport policy, particularly in road transport, are detailed in Table 7.[67]

Table 7: Steps Taken by Türkiye in Road Transport During the EU Membership Process (2000-2023)

Source: Compiled from the European Commission’s Reports on Türkiye.

In addition to these efforts, although the Transport Policy Chapter has been suspended during Türkiye’s EU accession process, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Türkiye continues to advance harmonisation with the EU acquis in the transport sector and the projects within the framework of financial cooperation with the EU. The ongoing EU funded projects in this field are as shown in Table 8. Furthermore, a decision was made in 2012 to establish a high-level transport dialogue mechanism between Türkiye and the EU to address issues in their relations and accelerate technical cooperation.

The first Türkiye-EU High-Level Transport Dialogue meeting took place on 9 December 2013, followed by the second on 27 November 2017 and the third on 15 January 2019. However, due to political tensions in broader EU-Türkiye relations, these high-level meetings in the transport sector have not continued.

Table 8: Ongoing EU Funded Projects in the Field of Transport[68]

Source: Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Türkiye

4.An Overview of the Logistics Sector and Road Transport in Türkiye

The Turkish logistics sector continues to expand and strengthen its role in the economy, in line with Türkiye’s rapidly growing trade volume. The reshaped global trade and logistics landscape, driven by the Russia-Ukraine war and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, has enhanced Türkiye’s potential to emerge as an effective, strong, and reliable logistics hub. According to data from TurkStat under the heading “Transport and Storage,” the logistics sector’s average share of GDP over the past decade has been 8.5%, rising to 9.5% in 2023.

Figure 4: Share of Transport and Storage in GDP

Source: Compiled using data from TurkStat.

According to the 2023 “Logistics Performance Index” (LPI) published by the World Bank, Türkiye improved its international logistics ranking by 9 places compared to 2018, reaching 38th place with a score of 3.4 out of 5. The LPI comprehensively evaluates a country’s logistics capabilities and reveals its competitiveness in the global arena. It assesses a country’s logistics profile based on six key components: “customs,” “infrastructure,” “international shipments,” “logistics competence,” “tracking and tracing,” and “timeliness.”[69]

Table 9: Türkiye in Logistics Performance Index, (2018 vs 2023)

Source: World Bank

In the 2023 “Agility Emerging Markets Logistics Index,” Türkiye ranked 11th with a score of 5.45 out of 10. This index evaluates 50 countries based on four criteria: domestic and international logistics opportunities, business fundamentals, and digital readiness.[70]

Table 10: Türkiye in Emerging Markets Logistics Index (2023)

Source: Agility

The importance of the logistics and transport sector in Türkiye’s service exports has been increasing steadily each year. As key contributors to economic growth, logistics and transport represent one of the most significant foreign currency-earning service export sectors. As shown in Table 11, revenues from exports in the sector have grown consistently, except during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2023, out of total service exports amounting to 106 billion 26 million dollars, 38 billion 931 million dollars were generated by the logistics and transport sector, resulting in a trade surplus of 20 billion 307 million euros and accounting for 37% of total service exports. With exports totalling 38 billion 931 million dollars in 2023, Türkiye achieved a 2.5% share in global logistics service exports, ranking 11th globally.

Table 11: Logistics and Transport in Türkiye’s Trade in Services

Source: Compiled using data from the Ministry of Trade, Republic of Türkiye.

Road transport is the second most utilised mode of transport in Türkiye’s foreign trade by value, following maritime transport. As shown in Figure 5, there has been a notable upward trend in the value of road transport in terms of trade volume, which became particularly noticeable after 2020. In 2023, road transport accounted for 83 billion 127 million euros of Türkiye’s total exports, marking a 56% increase compared to 2020.

Figure 5: Road Transport in Türkiye’s General Exports

Source: Compiled using data from TurkStat.

Finally, Türkiye has one of the strongest road transport fleets in Europe, with nearly 6,000 companies holding authorisation certificates for international transport and approximately 250,000 vehicles operating in the sector.[71]

5.Conclusion: The EU Is Harming Its Economy

Under normal circumstances, the primary land trade route between Europe and China is the “Northern Corridor”[72], a rail freight system with a transport capacity exceeding 100 million tonnes passing through Russia. However, the Northern Corridor has become non-functional due to the geopolitical instability in the region caused by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which began on 24 February 2022, and the sanctions imposed against Moscow.

On 7 October 2023, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict flared up again, rapidly escalating tensions across the Middle East. On 31 October 2023, the Houthis in Yemen began seizing and attacking commercial vessels owned by Israeli companies off the coast of Yemen in response to Israel’s actions in Gaza. Consequently, many international shipping companies suspended their operations in the Red Sea and opted to utilise the Cape of Good Hope route instead of the Suez Canal, through which approximately 12% of global trade flows. However, the diversion of vessels via the Cape of Good Hope resulted in an additional travelling time of 10 to 14 days, an increased distance of 6,500 kilometres, supplementary fuel expenditures of approximately 1 million dollars, additional insurance costs and delayed delivery times.[73]

At a time when geopolitical crises have substantially altered global trade, the Russia-Ukraine war has made the Northern Corridor and the crisis in the Middle East has made the Southern Corridor insecure. Consequently, the Middle Corridor, with Türkiye at its centre, has gained increasing significance for global trade. The Middle Corridor is a multimodal transport route that combines sea, land, and railway connections through Türkiye, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Turkestan, extending from China to Europe. This corridor is divided into two main routes in Turkestan: the Northern route, which encompasses the China-Kazakhstan-Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan line, and the Southern route, which includes the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan line. These routes converge in Azerbaijan and connect the Middle Corridor to Europe via the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Türkiye-Bulgaria-Serbia-Hungary route. Furthermore, the geographical scope and strategic importance of the Middle Corridor have the potential for expansion to incorporate additional countries.[74]

Figure 6: Trade Corridors between Europe and Asia

Source: German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The most striking feature of the Middle Corridor, which is 2,000 kilometres shorter than the Northern Corridor, is that in the trade of goods between Europe and Asia, products can be delivered from one point to another within 10 to 15 days. In the Northern Corridor, this duration extends to 15 to 20 days, whereas in maritime transport, it can reach 45 to 60 days.[75] Moreover, the countries along the Middle Corridor are notable for their abundant energy resources. Kazakhstan possesses 30 billion barrels of oil, 2.7 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, and 25.6 tons of coal. Uzbekistan has 600 million barrels of oil and 1.2 trillion cubic metres of natural gas. Turkmenistan holds 600 million barrels of oil and 19.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, while Azerbaijan has 7 billion barrels of oil and 60 trillion cubic metres of natural gas reserves. This wealth of resources provides a significant advantage for the dual and active operation of the Middle Corridor in the fields of trade and energy.[76]

It should be underlined that even though more than 90% of global trade is conducted via the seas, geopolitical tensions jeopardise the security of these routes and push countries towards road transport. The fact that 530,000 tonnes of trade through the Middle Corridor in 2021 exceeded 2.3 million tonnes in 2023 supports this argument. According to the World Bank, the volume of trade on the Middle Corridor is expected to rise to 11 million tonnes by 2030.[77] However, it is also evident that the infrastructure development and technical efficiency of the Middle Corridor fall short of the standards observed in other corridors. In this direction, Türkiye and other countries in the region seek to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation for the development of the Middle Corridor. In March 2022, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan signed a declaration to strengthen the transit potential of the Middle Corridor. Following the meeting of the trade and transport ministers of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Türkiye in Tashkent on 2 August 2022, the Tashkent Declaration was signed, outlining steps aimed at advancing the development of the Middle Corridor. At the Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States held in Samarkand on 11 November 2022, the “Agreement on the Establishment of Simplified Customs Corridor among the Governments of the Organization of Turkic States” was signed. This agreement aims to simplify customs formalities, enhance digital information exchange, and reduce transit times between the parties.[78] On the other hand, with the launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line in 2017, a key component of the Middle Corridor was completed. The opening of the Zangezur Corridor, included in the agreement signed after the 2nd Karabakh War that ended in 2020, will directly connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Türkiye, further enhancing the geopolitical significance of the Middle Corridor. Additionally, the “Development Road Project,” which will connect Türkiye to the Port of Faw in the Persian Gulf via 1,200 kilometres of railway and highway, is projected to influence a broad region extending from Europe to the Gulf countries. This project will provide seamless connectivity by road and rail from Iraq to London.[79] Expected to be completed by 2030, the project is anticipated to further increase the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor.

Figure 7: Development Road Project and Zangezur Corridor

Source: Anadolu Agency and TRT World

The growing “hegemony of Russia-China cooperation” in Central Asia and the Russia-Ukraine war have prompted the EU to reassess its Central Asia policy and prioritise the Middle Corridor, which it has not favoured until now. In 2019, when geopolitical tensions were not as high as they are today, the EU launched an initiative called “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership”, focusing on comprehensive, sustainable, and rules-based connectivity to play a new role in regional economic and political integration. High-level diplomatic visits between the EU and Central Asia have intensified in the post-war period to establish relations centred on connectivity and strategic trade autonomy. Accordingly, the number of high-level visits by EU officials to the region has increased since 2022. In October 2022, EU Council President Charles Michel attended a high-level meeting in Astana with the heads of state of the Central Asian countries, emphasising the importance of developing a regional vision and fostering sustainable connectivity between the EU and Central Asia in line with the EU Global Gateway project. The second high-level meeting between the parties took place in June 2023, where the leaders agreed to review and advance EU-Central Asia cooperation. A “Global Gateway Investors Forum” was organised in Brussels in 2024 to promote resilient inter-regional connectivity. As a result of the Forum, European and international financial institutions committed to invest 10.8 billion dollars to develop the Middle Corridor in Central Asia.[80]

The increasing importance of the Middle Corridor in international trade has inevitably enhanced the strategic significance of Türkiye, which lies at the very heart of this route. There has been a significant increase in the number of vehicles travelling from Europe, particularly from EU Member States to Central Asian countries via Türkiye. Countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, which do not typically utilise Türkiye as a transit route, have begun to do so.[81] Accordingly, in light of recent developments, the Türkiye-EU border has transformed into a “Euro-Eurasian trade gateway.” The data clearly illustrate this trend. Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war and the resulting geopolitical turmoil, the number of freight-carrying vehicles entering Türkiye from Europe was 749,342 in 2021. This figure rose by 20% to reach 901,301 in 2023, representing an increase of 66% compared to 2018 according to TurkStat. Approximately 63% of the transports from Europe to the Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States countries, predominantly Central Asian countries, transiting through Türkiye are carried out by Türkiye-origin trucks.[82] However, the EU is undermining the Middle Corridor -currently the safest and most critical route for its trade- by creating obstacles for Türkiye-origin trucks carrying its goods, thereby hindering its economic interests. More importantly, EU Member States account for 70% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Türkiye; 50% of Türkiye’s exports to the EU are carried out by companies with EU capital, and 74% of the imports used as inputs for these exports originate from EU countries to Türkiye.[83] In this context, obstructing road freight transport, which accounts for more than 40% of exports to the EU, through various means harms EU companies operating in Türkiye, EU exporters supplying intermediate goods to Türkiye, and ultimately EU consumers.

Although the Transport Policy Chapter is under blockage, Türkiye has already achieved 98% alignment with the EU acquis on road transport.[84] The high level of alignment in road transport with the EU acquis is frequently highlighted in the annual reports on Türkiye published by the European Commission. As has been emphasised many times before, Türkiye possesses one of the strongest road transport fleets in Europe. However, the EU disregards these facts for political reasons, leaving Türkiye disadvantaged despite its compliance and capabilities.

The restrictions imposed on Türkiye’s road transport trade to EU Member States, such as transit permits, transit permit fees, Ro-La impositions, difficulties in obtaining visas, and waiting times at EU borders, are contrary to the spirit of the Customs Union. The Customs Union, by its nature, requires the free movement of goods between the parties. The free movement of goods is inherently linked to the free movement of vehicles and drivers, which are inseparable from the goods themselves. In other words, in road transport, goods, trucks, and drivers form an inseparable whole.

Despite these obstacles, the Türkiye-EU bilateral trade volume has increased sixfold since the Customs Union became operational in 1996. This raises the critical question: how much greater could bilateral trade be if road transport were carried out without these barriers?

In 2015, a detailed analysis ^[85] of the economic impact of a potential agreement between the EU and Türkiye on road transport was conducted on behalf of the European Commission. The study assessed multiple scenarios for the liberalisation of road transport between the EU and Türkiye. It concluded that full liberalisation, which would include the abolition of bilateral and transit permits, could result in an estimated increase of 3.5 billion euros in bilateral trade volume. Of this amount, Türkiye’s exports to the EU were projected to rise by 1.9 billion euros, while EU exports to Türkiye were expected to grow by 1.6 billion euros. As illustrated in Table 12, calculating these 3.5 billion euros as the percentage change in Türkiye-EU bilateral trade volume over the years reveals a cumulative trade loss of 37.29 billion euros between 2015 and 2023. This data clearly shows the untapped potential of bilateral trade that could be realised through full liberalisation.

Table 12: Trade Volume Lost Due to Barriers to Road Transport between Türkiye-EU, (2015-2023)

Source: Calculated by the author using data from the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Türkiye.

In conclusion, Türkiye’s road transport challenges with the EU undermine the principle of free movement of goods, a fundamental pillar of the Customs Union. Since the parties interpret the issue in fundamentally different ways, a comprehensive resolution remains unlikely unless decisive action is taken. In this context, the primary measures that could be implemented to address the key road transport issues between Türkiye and the EU are outlined below:

• Resolving Road Transport Issues Through the Customs Union Update Between Türkiye and the EU: Extending the scope of the Customs Union to include the agriculture and services sectors lies at the heart of the update discussions. Specifically, incorporating services and road transport into the Customs Union would eliminate the differences in interpretation of the parties and largely resolve the challenges Türkiye currently faces. Furthermore, resolving this issue within the framework of the Association Law could significantly advance Türkiye-EU relations. Until this process is finalised, the EU should, at the very least, facilitate Türkiye’s road transport of goods covered by the Customs Union, namely industrial goods and processed agricultural products.
• Signing An Agreement Between Türkiye and the EU on Road Transport: The EU has established agreements with certain third countries regarding the liberalisation of road transport. Notable examples include the European Economic Area Agreement with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, as well as the Agreement on Road Transport between the EU and Switzerland. Additionally, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement contains a specific chapter addressing road transport. In this context, Türkiye and the EU could work towards negotiating a road transport agreement similar to these existing models.
• A New Visa Regime for Truck Drivers: Time sensitivity in the transport of goods makes visas for drivers entering the EU both more urgent and more critical compared to other visa categories. In this context, drivers should be prioritised due to their vital role in trade, and driver visas should be categorised separately from general visa types. Under a new visa regime for drivers, the process should include simplified document requirements, streamlined appointment systems, and the issuance of longer-term visas. Additionally, the duration of visas should be extended based on drivers past compliance and experience.
• Reducing Waiting Times at Border Gates: To minimise waiting times at border gates, particularly at Kapıkule, it is essential to modernise these facilities to enhance efficiency and meet increasing demands. Measures such as increasing the number and competence of personnel, implementing digital solutions, and, if necessary, exploring the possibility of opening new border gates for road transport with Bulgaria and Greece should be considered.