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  • TÜRKİYE-HUNGARY RELATIONS WERE ELEVATED TO THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP - JANUARY 2024

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Orban announced that the relations between the two countries have been raised to the level of enhanced strategic partnership. 

     

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to Hungary on 18 December 2023 to attend the 6th Meeting of the Türkiye-Hungary High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council at the invitation of Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary. It was very symbolic that this visit coincided with the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two countries on 18 December 1923.

     

    Following the Türkiye-Hungary High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council Meeting chaired by President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Orban, a 17-article cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries. In addition to the Joint Political Declaration on the Elevated Level of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Türkiye and Hungary inked by Erdoğan and Orban, “Memorandum of Understanding for Increased Cooperation in Social Services”, “Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration related to Graduate Policies and Scholarship programs”, “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Defense Industry”, Memorandum of Understanding on Visual and Audiovisual Policy Cooperation”, Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Energy Cooperation”, Cooperation Agreement between the ministries of foreign affairs, a pact on collaboration in civil emergency situations, and declaration of intent for a joint cooperation mechanism between the two countries’ interior ministries were among the documents signed between the two sides.

     

    According to the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “friendly relations between Türkiye and Hungary, which are strengthened by historical and cultural ties, have gained momentum in every field with the increasing mutual high-level visits and consultations”. It is observed that bilateral political and trade relations have progressed rapidly especially since the 2010s. In this process, Türkiye has developed close cooperation with Hungary within the framework of international and regional organisations, in particular NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe and the Organisation of Turkic States, while Hungary has given significant support to Türkiye’s EU accession process.

     

    The establishment of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) between Türkiye and Hungary in 2013 paved the way for high-level contacts, including visits of foreign ministers, prime ministers and presidents, and relations were raised to the level of “strategic partnership” with the HLSCC. An Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the two countries in 2015. In 2018, Hungary also joined the Organisation of Turkic States, of which Türkiye is a founding member, as an observer. In the light of all these developments, the elevation of Turkish-Hungarian relations to the level of enhanced strategic partnership during the 18 December visit is actually a reflection of the progress that has been going on for more than a decade. Looking at the trade dimension of the relations, it is seen that the bilateral trade volume, which was 1 billion 822 million dollars in 2010, doubled approximately in 2022 and reached 3 billion 155 million dollars. It should be underlined that in the 18 March meeting, the two sides set a target to increase the bilateral trade volume to 6 billion euros.

     

    In a period in which Türkiye’s relations with the EU and many Member States are deteriorating, there are various reasons behind Hungary’s aim to further develop its relations with Türkiye. First of all, Hungary wants to improve its political and trade relations with the Central Asian countries within the scope of its “Eastern opening” policy. Being a bridge between Asia and Europe, Türkiye plays a key role for Hungary. Moreover, the fact that Türkiye transports Russian, Azerbaijani and Central Asian natural gas resources to Europe through energy transmission lines further increases Hungary’s importance in terms of energy security. As a matter of fact, 50% of Hungary’s natural gas passes through the Turkish Stream pipeline, which runs under the Black Sea between Russia and Türkiye. In addition, the natural gas it receives from Azerbaijan is also transported through Türkiye. As part of the natural gas agreement signed between MVM, the Hungarian state-owned natural gas company, and BOTAŞ during the 18 December meeting, Türkiye is expected to export natural gas to Hungary from next year. The two countries will also cooperate on the use of Türkiye’s liquefied natural gas infrastructure and natural gas storage facilities.

    WAY FORWARD FOR TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS IN 2024 - FEBRUARY 2024

    In the midst of geopolitical uncertainties, Türkiye-EU relations seek revitalization through modernized trade and economic cooperation, fostering deeper engagement and mutual benefits. 

     

    2023 marked the 60th year of the Ankara Agreement establishing an association between Türkiye and the then European Economic Community. This year will mark the 20th year of the EU’s decision to start accession negotiations with Türkiye, a groundbreaking year for the country’s efforts at democratisation and liberalisation. Unfortunately, the process did not turn out as expected and ran into obstacles in the form of the Cyprus question, objections by Member States, backsliding in membership criteria and bilateral foreign policy issues.

     

    The Positive Agenda which took off in 2021 did not lead to a revitalisation of the relations but still offered a way out of the tension and stalemate. The recent report written by the European Commission and the External Action Service, the Borrell-Varhelyi Report elaborated on new proposals with a view to opening a new avenue of cooperation by revoking the restrictive measures and sanctions decided by the Council in 2019 and focusing on modernisation of the Customs Union, increased collaboration on foreign and security policy and visa facilitation. Yet discussion on the report was postponed to future summits most probably the European Council meeting to be held on 21-22 March 2024.

     

    The EU and its Member States will have a busier than usual agenda in 2024 with the upcoming EP elections and difficult decisions to be made on the election and appointment of important jobs such as the presidency of the European Commission and European Council. The ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the risk of spread of the conflict to the wider region added to geopolitical tensions create additional pressure on the EU agenda. While the EU is finding itself in a rapidly changing, unpredictable and volatile world, the relationship with the USA is also ridden with uncertainties. Especially the spectre of a Trump comeback in the November US presidential elections worries EU leaders due to Trump’s populist style and his dismissive approach to Euro-Atlantic relations and NATO Alliance.

     

    The dependency on the USA in defence-related issues and the EU’s push for strategic autonomy may prove to be critical at this juncture and may necessitate a closer collaboration with Türkiye. Türkiye as a significant NATO member and strategically located country with a dynamic foreign and security policy may prove to be an asset for the Union. While cooperation and joint ventures in the defence industry would help the EU’s aim of strategic autonomy, Türkiye’s industrial production capacity, renewable energy potential and dynamic workforce may also be an advantage for the EU’s economic security and role in international value chains. Building on the Customs Union, Türkiye and the EU can foster closer cooperation by updating the trade and economic relationship by modernising the Customs Union and engaging in partnership in green and digital agendas.

     

    Türkiye’s choice both at the official and public level is still accession to the EU as a member as indicated by a public opinion survey conducted by IKV in September 2023 which found 66% support for the membership goal. Until the conditions are ripe for that goal to be attained, both sides should consider closer and deeper ways and means of engagement. The recommendations for further action enumerated in the Borrell-Varhelyi report may provide the impetus for closer collaboration. However, the most promising and comprehensive step forward would be the modernisation of the trade and economic relationship which would anchor Türkiye in the EU Single Market and contribute to the capability of the European economy. In an era when the green and digital transition and protectionist and defensive trends in world trade require a reappraisal of commercial and industrial policies, the EU internal market is undergoing a major transformation and reappraisal. It is vitally important for the EU to seize the moment to revive and upgrade the relationship with Türkiye. A modernised trade and economic relationship can also serve to anchor the country to the EU-based European governance structures and may serve as the backbone of a stronger and deeply embedded role for Türkiye in tomorrow’s Europe.

    TÜRKİYE’S TECHNOLOGICAL RENAISSANCE: FROM SPACE EXPLORATION TO ELECTRIC VEHICLES, A JOURNEY OF INNOVATION AND PROGRESS - MARCH 2024

    Türkiye’s technological leap sheds light on the story of innovation and progress across a wide spectrum, from space exploration to electric vehicles.

     

    In our rapidly evolving digital era, technology occupies the central stage of our daily existence, continually sculpting and reshaping our lives. Each new technological advancement introduces novel skills and alters the fabric of our reality. Consider the evolution from the novelty of carrying a cellular phone in the 1990’s, tethered to the internet via dial-up connections, to the ubiquitous presence of smartphones, smartwatches, and even cutting-edge smart glasses in contemporary times.

     

    The versatility of these devices is striking; a tablet, for instance, serves myriad purposes across diverse domains. From aiding a physician in accessing and managing a patient’s clinical records to assisting a pilot in charting a flight path, or simply providing entertainment, the tablet exemplifies the multifaceted utility inherent in modern technology. Indeed, the transformative impact of technology permeates every facet of our lives, offering boundless opportunities for innovation, connectivity, and productivity. As we continue to embrace and integrate these advancements into our daily routines, the boundaries of what is possible are continually pushed, ushering in a future shaped by the seamless fusion of humanity and technology.

     

    Türkiye is also actively engaged in keeping pace with the rapid technological advancements shaping our world today, playing a significant role in driving innovation and progress. In recent years, Türkiye has increasingly prioritised technological development as a key driver of its rise and prosperity. Particularly noteworthy is Türkiye’s remarkable strides in areas previously lagging behind, such as space exploration and artificial intelligence, with significant advancements occurring in the past few months alone.

     

    This technological surge can be largely attributed to the burgeoning interest of Turkish youth in various facets of technology. A pivotal starting point was the widespread popularity of video games in Türkiye, with young people flocking to internet cafes and homes to indulge in gaming experiences. This burgeoning enthusiasm sparked a desire among Turkish youth to create their own video games, ultimately leading them to dive deeper into the realms of computer programming languages. Through this journey of exploration and experimentation, many young Turks discovered the thrill of crafting unique digital creations and the potential for profitability therein. This grassroots movement of youthful innovation has served as a catalyst for Türkiye’s burgeoning tech scene, laying the groundwork for unprecedented growth and success in the realm of technology.

     

    Since the dawn of the Commodore 64 era in the 1980s, a generation of young enthusiasts in Türkiye has been captivated by technology, eagerly acquiring coding skills and laying the foundation for a thriving tech ecosystem. Fast forward to 2016, and the fruits of this passion culminated in a remarkable achievement: “Mount & Blade,” developed by Ankara-based studio TaleWorlds Entertainment, emerged as an export champion. This captivating video game has garnered immense success, selling over 3.1 million copies across 212 countries, firmly establishing Türkiye’s presence on the global gaming stage.

     

    Building upon this triumph, TaleWorlds Entertainment continues to push boundaries with their highly anticipated sequel, “Mount & Blade II: Bannerlord.” Embraced by gamers worldwide, this sequel is currently in the early access stage, allowing players to purchase and experience the game’s development journey firsthand. With each update, the game evolves, introducing new features and enhancements, further cementing its status as a beacon of innovation in the gaming industry. Notably, even in its developmental phase, “Mount & Blade II: Bannerlord” has already surpassed 3 million in sales, a testament to its enduring appeal and the studio’s unwavering dedication to excellence. The Turkish video game industry has experienced remarkable growth, exceeding the $1.4 billion mark, propelled by a diverse array of genredefining titles from numerous studios. Among these standout successes is Phew Phew Games’ “Anomaly Agent”, which captivated audiences worldwide and emerged as the one of the most played games of January 2024.

     

    The burgeoning interest of Turkish youth in technology extends far beyond video games, catalysing advancements across various sectors, notably in the realm of defence technology. Over the past few years, Türkiye has undergone a transformative journey in its defence industry, marked by the development of numerous cutting-edge Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). Renowned UAVs such as Bayraktar, KAAN, and Anka have garnered international attention, with several countries already placing pre-orders for these formidable defence assets. In addition to UAVs, Türkiye has made significant strides in aerospace technology, producing helicopters such as the Gökbey and T70 tailored for military and defence applications.

     

    Furthermore, Türkiye’s advancements in communication technology are equally noteworthy. The country is actively engaged in the development and deployment of satellites for both civilian and military communication purposes, collaborating with industry-leading companies to propel its space program forward. This concerted effort underscores Türkiye’s commitment to innovation and excellence, positioning it as a formidable player in the global arena of technology and defence.

     

    In a historic milestone for Türkiye’s space program, January 2024 marked the launch of the country’s inaugural astronaut, Alper Gezeravcı, to the International Space Station (ISS). As the first Turkish astronaut, Gezeravcı embarked on a mission comprising 30 groundbreaking experiments conducted aboard the ISS. His successful completion of these pivotal experiments not only showcased Türkiye’s burgeoning capabilities in space exploration but also laid the groundwork for future endeavours.

     

    Buoyed by the success of this maiden mission, Türkiye is poised to further assert its presence in space exploration. Plans are already underway to dispatch a second Turkish astronaut to the ISS, with a focus on conducting additional experiments and advancing developments in the space industry. These forthcoming missions underscore Türkiye’s unwavering commitment to pushing the boundaries of space exploration and scientific discovery. Indeed, these recent developments have reignited Türkiye’s participation in the global space race, signalling a renewed determination to carve out a prominent role in the ever-expanding frontier of space exploration.

     

    Türkiye’s automotive industry is also soaring to new heights with a fervent focus on electric vehicles. The country’s pioneering brand, TOGG, unveiled its inaugural electric SUV in 2023, marking a significant milestone in Türkiye’s journey towards sustainable mobility. Following its successful debut, TOGG has since expanded its lineup to include a sleek sedan variant, further solidifying its position as a trailblazer in the realm of electric vehicles.

     

    The culmination of these significant technological advancements, coinciding with the centennial celebration of the Turkish Republic, signifies Türkiye’s emergence as a formidable contender in the global arena of technology. With innovations spanning from space exploration to electric vehicles and video game development, Türkiye has firmly established itself as a key player shaping the trajectory of technological progress worldwide. This pivotal moment marks Türkiye’s ascent into the forefront of the technology sector, poised to exert a substantial influence on the future of innovation and technological advancement. As Türkiye continues to harness its creative potential and embrace cutting-edge technologies, it is primed to cement its status as a powerhouse in the global tech landscape, driving forward progress and shaping the course of technology for generations to come.

    2024 ANTALYA DIPLOMACY FORUM: PRIORITISING DIPLOMACY IN TIMES OF GEOPOLITICAL CRISES - APRIL 2024

    The 3rd Antalya Diplomacy Forum, held in Antalya, the Mediterranean city that has witnessed thousands of years of history, continued to serve as a diplomacy platform in the midst of high-tension points around the world. 

     

    T he Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF), which hosted around 5,000 participants from 148 countries, including 19 state leaders and 52 foreign ministers, and attracted great interest on a global scale, was held on 1-3 March. The 52 panels organised at the Forum brought together not only high-level policy makers and policy implementers, in addition to journalists, businesspeople and students from all over the world. Thus, with its multi-stakeholder nature, the ADF has cemented its status as a multi-level diplomatic gathering. The ADF was established during the pandemic and was cancelled due to the earthquake disaster last year, which was inevitably thought to have a negative impact on the development and expansion of the forum. However, ADF has become a platform where all global and regional developments are discussed in detail, different perspectives are discussed at the intellectual level, and especially the perspectives of emerging developing countries and the Global South on world issues are presented in detail.

     

    The Main Theme of the Forum

    Held at a time of rising and spreading geopolitical crises, the AFD aimed to promote dialogue and cooperation against the challenges in the international system with the main theme of “Advancing Diplomacy in Times of Turmoil”. The main issues that came to the fore at the forum were as follows Ensuring peace and security in the Middle East against Israel’s war in Palestine, growing terrorism and criminal threats, on going instabilty, irregular migration flows and migrant smuggling, rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia, the role of digital technologies and especially artificial intelligence in diplomacy, rising xenophobia in the world, Africa’s potential, the EU’s security and self-defence capacity, sustainable development and the climate crisis, food security and the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of space. Around these topics, important issues on the world agenda were discussed among the participants and stakeholders throughout the forum. In his opening speech, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasised that the 21st century has become an era of crises in which the international community has failed to fulfil its responsibilities towards humanity and stressed the importance of multilateral diplomacy in solving current problems.

     

    Ukraine and Gaza

    The forum, which made a name for itself in March 2022 by hosting the Ukraine-Russia contacts, discussed the Ukraine-Russia war this year. While Russia was represented at the forum at the Foreign Minister level, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister did not attend the forum. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who held bilateral talks with his Russian counterpart, said that both sides had reached the end of possible military advances. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban emphasised the urgent need for a ceasefire in the Ukraine-Russia war and stressed the urgent need for pluralism in international relations.

     

    Another issue that was high on the agenda during the Forum was Israel’s actions in Palestine. Drawing attention to the atrocities in Gaza and other parts of the Middle East and the need for urgent action, President Erdoğan emphasised the importance of multilateral diplomacy in solving such problems. South Africa’s Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor, known for her long struggle against apartheid, actively participated in several panels, advocating concrete action rather than rhetoric in response to Israel’s actions.

     

    The Rising Voice of the Global South and Africa, Reforming the UN System

    The forum attracted the attention of representatives from the Global South and African countries. In addition, with panels such as “Understanding the Global South” and “Unlocking Africa’s Potential”, the Forum reaffirmed its role as a powerful platform for dialogue between the countries of the Global South and Africa and the countries of the Global North. Representatives of countries of the Global South and Africa criticised foreign interventions that were clearly ineffective in addressing their problems and the disregard for local realities.

     

    Other prominent issues at the forum were the dysfunctionality of the UN in ending crises, conflicts and wars and the need to reform the UN system. At the closing press conference, Fidan noted that many participants criticised the current multilateral system as unfair and unequal. In particular, representatives from the African continent targeted the UN Security Council and the veto power of the 5 permanent members. Participants also strongly criticised the US veto of ceasefire proposals in Gaza.

     

    Diplomacy, Dialogue and Cooperation

    As a diplomacy platform in the heart of high tension points around the world, with Ukraine-Russia to the North and Israel-Hamas to the South, ADF served as a very significant platform in terms of emphasising diplomacy in times of crises and serving as an important platform for dialogue and cooperation.

    POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS AFTER 31 MARCH 2024 LOCAL ELECTIONS - MAY 2024

    The aftermath of the 31 March 2024 local elections brings opportunities to re-establish Türkiye-EU relations on a value-based basis.

     

    Türkiye held local elections, marking a significant turning point in its political landscape on 31 March 2024. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) received 37.77% of the votes in Türkiye, becoming the first party in an election for the first time since 1977. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which received 35.49% of the votes, finished second in an election for the first time in its 22 years of governance. The vote share of the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Party) was one of the biggest surprises of the elections. In fact, New Welfare Party reached 6.19% of the votes in Türkiye and became the third party in a local election that it had entered for the first time. 

     

    In the elections, with a voter turnout of 78.55% and 61 million 430 thousand voters casting their votes, CHP increased the number of metropolitan municipalities from 11 to 14 and the number of provincial municipalities from 10 to 21. AKP’s number of metropolitan municipalities decreased from 15 to 12, and the number of provincial municipalities decreased from 24 to 12. Consequently, CHP will govern the metropolises, which account for 66.5% of the country’s economy, in the next five years. 

     

    Both ruling and opposition party leaders made very moderate statements about the election results. Özgür Özel, Chairperson of CHP, emphasized, “There is no loser in this victory. Our success will not be a defeat for anyone, it is not a defeat for anyone. Regardless of their party affiliation, we do not want anyone to feel defeated.” Urging party members to express their joy with restraint, Chairperson Özel added, “In order to share this success with our voters who did not vote for us, we are experiencing our happiness within ourselves and as quietly as possible”. 

     

    AKP Chairperson Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed gratitude to all citizens who freely exercised their right to vote, regardless of political affiliation, stating that “AKP won the elections alongside those who voted for AKP and everyone who contributed to the democratic process by fulfilling their civic duty.” Congratulating the elected mayors, Chairperson Erdoğan assured ongoing government support for all local authorities elected by the votes of the nation. 

     

    Prominent Statements on the EU Side

    On 31 March 2024 local elections, the statements made by three EU officials were quite remarkable. In a statement on his social media account, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that the calm and professional conduct of the elections honoured Türkiye and showed the commitment of its citizens to local democracy, adding that “fundamental rights and democracy are at the heart of our relations. I look forward to bringing Türkiye closer to the EU by working together on reforms.” EP Türkiye Rapporteur Nacho Sánchez Amor congratulated all elected mayors and especially the CHP, which he described as the clear winner of the elections. Manfred Weber, President of the conservative European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group in the EP, underlined that they are ready to deepen the Customs Union and partnership with Türkiye if it shows more openness, but emphasised that Türkiye’s EU membership would put an excessive burden on both sides. Weber had previously argued that Türkiye’s EU membership target should be terminated. 

     

    Relationships Can Be Built on a Values-Based Basis

    If the usual timetable holds, no new elections are expected in Türkiye for four years until the presidential elections in 2028. On the EU side, EP elections will be held next June and there will be a reorganization of the European Commission. In this respect, it can be said that the future of Türkiye-EU relations may be seriously discussed again following the summer months, subsequent to the changes in the EP and the Commission. Considering that the EU issue has a political response in Türkiye and the Türkiye issue has a political response in the EU, the parties should carefully assess the 4-5 year period without elections. 

     

    At a time when international tensions are amid unprecedented levels, Türkiye and the EU need each other more than ever. Indeed, both sides are facing the geopolitical and economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis and the growing tensions in the Middle East, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian war. However, it should be noted that in bilateral relations, which have evolved into a pragmatic and interest-based ‘transactional’ dimension, especially since the 18 March Statement, merely addressing immediate concerns once again forced by the current circumstances would be inadequate. On the other hand, there are significant opportunities for re-establishing bilateral relations on a basis of shared values. 

     

    The EU, which claims to be one of the biggest defenders of democratic values, needs to correctly assess the local elections of 31 March 2024, their potential impact on Turkish democracy and the importance the Turkish people attach to the ballot box. Indeed, the Turkish people and democracy have shown to the world that change can be brought about in Türkiye through the ballot box, contrary to those who thought this would not be possible. In this context, at a time when enlargement is at the top of the EU agenda, the revival of the stalled membership process may encourage Türkiye to take important democratic steps towards EU harmonisation. In addition, the issue of updating the Customs Union could bring significant benefits to both sides and could lead to a gradual expansion of relations strengthened in the economic sphere to the political sphere. Finally, it can be said that the green transformation process initiated by the EU after the Green Deal brings important cooperation opportunities. 

    EUROPE DAY AND FUTURE OF TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS - JUNE 2024

    Türkiye-EU Relations need to be revitalised and upgraded in view of the vital contribution that Türkiye can make to the EU’s strategic autonomy and European security. 

     

    The European project commemorates its 74th year on the 9th of May 2024. Since French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman’s call to establish a coal and steel community in war-ravaged western Europe on 9 May 1950, both Europe and the wider World changed immensely in many ways. In addition to the tectonic geopolitical changes such as the demise of the Soviet Union, ending of the Cold War, foundation of the European Union and rise of China, climate crisis and digitalisation put immense pressure on conventional systems be it in the realm of economy, society or labour market. Digital connectivity and digital skills are now primarily important for a functioning economy. Moreover, the use of artificial intelligence opened the Pandora’s box and brought forth major debates about the changes in the labour market and the role and risks involved in increasing use of AI systems. Climate change which has reached the intensity of a crisis also displays the rightfulness of the “limits to growth” argument and confirms that humanity cannot survive much longer if fundamentals of economic production and consumption patterns do not change towards a circular and green economy model. 

     

    Despite immense technological developments, humanity could not establish the basis for perpetual peace despite the fact that more than two centuries have passed since Kant’s famous treatise on the subject. Wars, atrocities, even genocide is still being experienced in today’s world. Humanity that was able to achieve the technology and wisdom to prolong human life even until after 100 years have also developed skilful weapons that can destroy whole houses onto innocent civilians and even babies as we are witnessing in Gaza and Ukraine today. The paradoxes of today’s world between affluence and poverty, war and peace, freedom and oppression and law and arbitrary rule are strong indicators showing why we need organisations like the EU to transform international relations. The EU is also finding it more and more difficult to remain true to its values and act as a civilian and normative power under compelling circumstances whereby war has once more returned to the Continent. Nevertheless, the Union’s twin priorities in the areas of green and digital transitions embody a significant leadership for the regulation of new policy areas and facilitate efforts to fight against climate change. 

     

    Under such volatile and ambiguous conditions, Türkiye-EU relations remain as relevant, if not more, today as they did in 1963 when the Association Agreement was signed between the European Economic Community of the time and Turkish government. Türkiye has become a candidate country which started to negotiate for its membership since then. However, this road was full of hardship and obstacles such as the long shadow of the Cyprus dispute, problems over the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, limits of the EU’s integration capacity, prejudices and effect of geopolitical competition and inconsistencies and disruptions in Türkiye’s reform process. The need to revitalise the relations are felt acutely due to the stalemate in the relations and mutual need for cooperation and engagement between the parties. The Borrell-Varhelyi report which was published in November 2023 brought to the agenda a number of proposals to facilitate a revitalisation of the relations. These proposals have been discussed by the European Council in its meeting in April this year. However, the EU leaders failed to adopt a decision on the issue and conferred the discussions on the Report’s recommendations to the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States). On this Europe Day, it is time to rethink the current state of the relations and come up with novel ideas to facilitate dialogue and engagement between Türkiye and the EU. The common challenges of our time require common solutions that can only emerge if the parties upgrade their relations involving Türkiye more and more in the EU policies contributing to overall strategic autonomy. 

    TÜRKİYE’S POTENTIAL BRICS MEMBERSHIP AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RELATIONS - JULY 2024

    Türkiye’s growing interest in BRICS reflects an economic and strategic trend rather than a radical foreign policy transformation. 

     

    Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited China between 3-5 June 2024 at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. On the first day of his visit, Minister Fidan made a speech at the “China and Globalisation Centre” think tank in Beijing and stated that Türkiye has a Customs Union with the EU and is exploring new cooperation opportunities with various partners in different platforms such as BRICS. According to information leaked to the press, in response to the question, “Would you like to join BRICS?” asked during the private part of the meeting, Minister Fidan gave an answer similar to “If it is in Türkiye’s interests, why not?”. This leaked speech was interpreted by the world press as Türkiye seeking to become a member of BRICS. On the same day, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia welcomes Türkiye’s growing interest in BRICS.

     

    Afterwards, Minister Fidan made statements to the local press about Türkiye’s BRICS membership and addressed that Türkiye is a member of different economic platforms such as the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, D-8 and the Economic Cooperation Organisation. Underlining that Türkiye is not a stranger to such platforms, Minister Fidan noted that BRICS is at an evolutionary stage, and that steps such as a Customs Union or a common currency have not yet been established and therefore it does not have an institutionalised structure. Minister Fidan expressed that it is very normal for Türkiye to follow how alternative international economic platforms are shaped within the framework of its strategic and economic interests. Minister Fidan also stated that international platforms should be seen as complementary rather than alternative to each other.

     

    Upon being asked whether Türkiye’s membership in BRICS would create a problem for the EU, Minister Fidan stated that there is a rule-based functioning in the EU and that there are obligations within this framework. Minister Fidan emphasised that Türkiye’s commitment and obligations to the organisations it is a part of will continue as long as its interlocutors are committed as well. Minister Fidan said, “If we were not in the current situation in the course of our relations with the EU, the EU had the will to take a step forward, and it could act not as transnational but as trans civilisational; our perspective on certain issues here could actually change even more.”

     

    What is BRICS and Why is it Important?

    Seeking to ensure that developing countries have a greater voice in international issues, Brazil, Russia, India and China established the “BRIC” group in 2006. The group takes its name from the English initials of these countries. In 2011, the group was renamed “BRICS” with the addition of South Africa. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates joined BRICS in 2024.

     

    Representing 45% of the world’s population with 3.5 billion people, BRICS accounts for about 28% of the world economy with 28.5 trillion dollars. BRICS countries also produce 44% of the world’s crude oil.

     

    BRICS countries established the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014, aiming to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in developing countries. By the end of 2022, the NDB had lent 32 billion dollars to developing countries for new road, bridge, railway, and water supply projects.

     

    Is BRICS an Alternative for Türkiye?

    In recent years, a shift of power from the West to the East has been observed in the international arena. Experts state that BRICS, consisting of the world’s leading countries with large populations, strong industries, and rich energy resources, is rapidly emerging as an alternative power centre in the world order.

     

    Türkiye is a country that is highly integrated politically and economically into Western institutions. Indeed, with more than 40% of its trade going to the EU, Türkiye is an EU candidate country. Türkiye also plays an active role in NATO and has the second largest army in the organisation. Moreover, BRICS is an institution that cannot replace the EU in terms of democracy, development, and prosperity.

     

    In this context, it is unlikely that there will be a radical change in Türkiye’s foreign policy, considering its longstanding alignment with the West since its foundation. Türkiye is aware that the ongoing transformation process brings both risks and opportunities, and its interest in BRICS primarily stems from economic and strategic considerations. As Minister Fidan emphasised, the international platforms Türkiye engages with are seen as complementary rather than alternative and Türkiye’s growing interest in BRICS is a part of the versatility of Turkish foreign policy. 

    HUNGARY’S TURN IN THE EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY AND RELATIONS WITH TÜRKİYE - AUGUST 2024

    Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the EU, given its notably strong relations with Türkiye compared to other EU Member States, holds significant potential to impact Türkiye-EU relations. 

     

    Hungary took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Belgium on 1 July 2024. The potential impact of Hungary’s presidency on Türkiye-EU relations is a subject of considerable interest. Notably, Hungary’s EU Council Presidency programme includes a significant paragraph concerning Türkiye. 

     

    Increasing Momentum of Türkiye-Hungary Relations

    Hungary is one of the countries with which Türkiye has developed the friendliest relations in the EU. Türkiye maintains close cooperation with Hungary within the framework of various international and regional organisations, including the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe and the Organisation of Turkic States. 

     

    The Türkiye-Hungary relations trace their origins back to the Türkiye-Hungary Friendship Treaty, signed on 18 December 1923. However, bilateral relations experienced a significant boost in 2011 with Hungary’s introduction of the “Eastern Opening” policy, aimed at diversifying its economic relations and enhancing trade and investment activities with non-EU countries. The visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Budapest in 2013 marked a pivotal moment, fostering a strong friendship between President Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. This visit also led to the elevation of bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership and the establishment of the Türkiye-Hungary High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC). Hungary demonstrated strong solidarity with Türkiye following the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was among the first high-level officials to visit Türkiye in the aftermath of the attempt. When Türkiye launched “Operation Peace Spring” in Syria in 2019, Hungary was the only EU Member State to support Türkiye. At the 2018 Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States held in Kyrgyzstan, Hungary participated as an observer member. It is important to note that in 2022, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) attained membership in the organisation with the same status. This development is particularly significant given the ongoing unresolved Cyprus issue, which has severely impacted Türkiye-EU relations. Finally, on the 100th anniversary of the TürkiyeHungary Friendship Treaty, in December 2023, President Erdoğan visited Hungary and bilateral relations were upgraded from strategic partnership to “enhanced strategic partnership” 

     

    Not surprisingly, Hungary actively supports Türkiye’s EU accession process. Stating previously that “whatever anti-Türkiye statements are made in important EU Member States, Hungary will never agree with them and will stand by Türkiye”, Prime Minister Orbán has repeatedly stated that he is in favour of Türkiye’s EU membership. Furthermore, Prime Minister Orbán has affirmed that Hungary will make every effort to update the Türkiye-EU Customs Union and support Türkiye’s visa liberalisation during the Presidency of the Council of the EU. 

     

    Hungary’s programme for the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU includes a special paragraph about Türkiye. It is emphasised that Türkiye is an indispensable partner of the EU in many areas, such as energy security, regional security and the fight against illegal migration. It is recognised that the EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. It is underlined that Hungary pays great attention to the resumption and progress of comprehensive settlement negotiations with the GCASC. Stating that it aims to support Türkiye’s rapprochement to the EU, Hungary stresses the need for the resumption of Association Council meetings and high-level negotiations to promote dialogue. The most important statement in the paragraph is Hungary’s declaration that it will “seek to advance the Türkiye-EU political dialogue on Türkiye’s status as a candidate country”.  

     

    Developments During The Presidency

    Following Hungary’s assumption of the EU presidency, Prime Minister Orbán embarked on a diplomatic tour, which he described as a “peace mission”, visiting Ukraine, Russia and China. During this period, Prime Minister Orbán also met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the NATO Leaders’ Summit in Washington on 10 July 2024. During the meeting, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Hungary, Türkiye’s EU accession process and regional and global issues were discussed. President Erdoğan expressed his hope for support in revitalising Türkiye’s EU accession process and improving relations during Hungary’s presidency. In contrast, in a video he posted on the social media platform X, Prime Minister Orbán made the following remarks regarding the meeting: “Türkiye has already proved during the war that it is an indispensable player in peace-making. President Erdoğan was the only successful statesman who was able to conclude a Russian-Ukranian agreement regarding grain shipments in the Black Sea”. Furthermore, in a letter to the EU leaders, Prime Minister Orbán emphasised that Türkiye, as a regional actor, was the only successful mediator in the crisis between Russia and Ukraine. 

     

    Trade Minister Ömer Bolat met with the ambassadors of EU Member States in Ankara on 11 July 2024. Minister Bolat outlined that the meeting addressed key strategic issues, including the modernisation of the Customs Union with the EU, trade in services, digitalisation, green transformation, resolution of visa issues, and increased transport quotas. It is noteworthy that the meeting was hosted by Viktor Matis, the Hungarian Ambassador to Ankara. 

     

    Conclusion 

    Given Türkiye’s particularly close relations with Hungary compared to other Member States and the inclusion of a special paragraph for Türkiye in the Hungarian presidency programme, it is pertinent to assess the potential effects of the Hungarian presidency on Türkiye-EU relations. This relation, which has recently been characterised by significant tension, appears to be entering a phase of détente. Over the past year, high-level EU officials have called for steps towards cooperation with Türkiye on critical issues such as the modernisation of the Customs Union and visa liberalisation. Furthermore, the current conjuncture, marked by multiple crises and geopolitical competition in the international arena, necessitates cooperation between the parties. However, despite this positive atmosphere, the EU, prioritising the Russian-Ukrainian war and the issue of enlargement, has largely excluded Türkiye from this process. In such an environment, Hungary’s assumption of the presidency, which places special emphasis on Türkiye, represents a significant opportunity for Türkiye. By expressing its intention to advance the Türkiye-EU political dialogue regarding Türkiye’s candidacy, Hungary has reminded other EU Member States of Türkiye’s status after many years. It is crucial that the détente process progresses beyond issues such as the Customs Union or visa liberalisation and centres on Türkiye’s EU membership. This shift is essential to move relations from their current pragmatic and interestbased, transactional dimension back to a value-based foundation. 

    TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER FİDAN’S PARTICIPATION TO THE INFORMAL MEETING OF EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS - SEPTEMBER 2024

    After five years, Minister Fidan participated in the Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers held on 29 August in Brussels and exchanged views on the progress of Türkiye-EU relations. 

     

    On 29 August, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan participated in the Informal Meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers held in Brussels. The first session of the meeting, which also included Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitro Kuleba, addressed Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, while the second session discussed ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza. The meeting, which spanned approximately two hours, included bilateral talks between Minister Fidan and his counterparts. 

     

    What Was on the Türkiye-EU Agenda? 

    First of all, the invitation of Türkiye to the EU Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting for the first time in five years is seen as an important development in relations between the parties. The last meeting Türkiye attended in the same format was in 2019. In his speech following the meeting, Minister Fidan stated that two main issues were discussed in Türkiye-EU relations. The first of these was how Türkiye-EU relations could be institutionally advanced, while the second was how cooperation between the parties could be ensured on both global and regional issues. 

     

    Priorities of Türkiye 

    Foreign Minister Fidan underlined that one of the important issues for Türkiye was visa liberalisation. He emphasised that Türkiye had completed 66 criteria for visa liberalisation and that work was being carried out in consultation with the relevant institutions to complete the remaining six criteria. Minister Fidan’s statements indicate that contacts with EU institutions and Member States will continue, especially for the expansion of multiple-entry and long-term visas. 

     

    Minister Fidan also emphasised that Türkiye views the EU accession process as a strategic aim. On the other hand, Minister Fidan also expressed that the Cyprus issue should be kept separate from Türkiye-EU relations. In addition, he addressed that EU membership is a strategic aim for Türkiye and that it would be right for the parties to proceed on a positive agenda. Emphasising that in the future, especially on technical issues, it is necessary to gain momentum, Minister Fidan mentioned that as a first step, the established dialogue mechanisms that were suspended in 2019 should be reactivated and Türkiye’s expectations regarding modernisation of the Customs Union should be met. 

     

    “Türkiye Is a Candidate Country and Will Continue To Be” 

    The EU also emphasised the importance of mutual consultation in the face of Türkiye’s demands. The EU expressed that constructive and sustainable cooperation should continue in all areas, especially foreign policy, security and defence issues in Türkiye-EU relations. In addition, and perhaps the most important emphasis of the EU at the meeting, was that the parties should act together due to Türkiye’s significant role in the recent international crises. The EU underlined the need for Türkiye and the EU to hold closer and deeper consultations and develop common policies in these crises. In a nutshell, the EU stated that it wants to see a Türkiye that views foreign policy from the same perspective, moves forward with joint decisions and supports it. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell touched on the importance of participating in this informal meeting in terms of discussing difficult issues between the parties for Türkiye, a candidate country. Borrell stated that the geopolitical situation in the nearby region and beyond was discussed in detail with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan at the meeting, and shared information about the Cyprus issue and the Middle East, which put Türkiye in a difficult position in its relations with the EU. Borrell also expressed his hope that this meeting would be a step towards resolving the issues, especially regarding Cyprus. Borrell stated that no timetable was discussed regarding Türkiye’s accession process in response to a question asked at the meeting, and said, “Türkiye is a candidate country and will continue to be so.” 

     

    Bilateral Meetings 

    Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis before the meeting. Minister Fidan also met with Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares, Luxembourg Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel and Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib. 

     

    Conclusion

    Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, which Türkiye attended after a five-year hiatus, was seen by Türkiye as a search for dialogue by the EU. Türkiye’s demand was to create a basis for opening a dialogue channel between the parties, specifically regarding the issues discussed at the meeting. On the other hand, the issues Türkiye emphasised at the meeting were modernisation of the Customs Union, which will increase the development of both parties in terms of trade, and also visa liberalisation, while the EU emphasised the importance of dealing with international crises together. The development that draws a positive framework for Türkiye’s EU accession process was included in Borrell’s statements. 

     

    Although it is important for Türkiye to attend the meeting after five years, whether the parties can make progress in the short term on the issues of modernising the Customs Union and visa liberalisation that Minister Fidan brought up is still a big question mark. On the other hand, it is important that Türkiye expresses the bottlenecks it has experienced in the EU accession process and that it will make progress easier as a result of resolving these bottlenecks. When looking at the EU side, it is seen that the EU desires to be in a position to act together with Türkiye, especially in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts. 

    BOOSTING “EU COMPETITIVENESS” THROUGH TÜRKİYE: INSIGHTS FROM THE DRAGHI REPORT - OCTOBER 2024

    The Draghi Report identifies key areas the EU must step up including innovation, energy, and securing critical supply chains where Türkiye emerges as a vital partner in achieving its goals, particularly by boosting Europe’s energy security and reducing single-sided reliance on external suppliers. 

     

    Released on 9 September 2024, the Draghi Report calls for bold EU action to secure its place in the global economy. Under the leadership of Mario Draghi, former ECB President, the report outlines strategies focused on innovation, energy independence, and economic sovereignty, all of which require significant reforms and financial investments. Annual investments worth 750-800 billion euros are essential to address current challenges, including lagging R&D, high energy costs, and supply chain vulnerabilities linked to external dependencies. As Europe seeks to secure its place in the global economy, Türkiye appears as a possible partner in fostering innovation, energy independence, and supply chain resilience. 

     

    Commercialisation of Innovation Matters

    One of the most pressing concerns in the Draghi Report is Europe’s struggle with innovation. The EU produces 17% of global patents but falls short in turning them into commercial successes. With 270 billion euros invested in R&D to be less than the US in comparison, the EU lags in sectors like artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and biotechnology. Draghi calls for more research and development funding and reforms to the Horizon Europe program to eliminate barriers to innovation. 

     

    In contrast, Türkiye’s technology sector demonstrates significant growth potential, supported by government-backed initiatives like Teknoparks and various incentives that have spurred growth in fintech, e-commerce, and AI. However, much like the EU, Türkiye faces challenges in scaling its innovations globally. 

     

    Enhanced Türkiye-EU cooperation in R&D could help address this gap, with joint ventures and cross-border projects offering mutual benefits in bridging Europe’s innovation divide. By integrating Türkiye’s innovation centres into EU programs, such as Horizon Europe, both sides stand to gain from a more dynamic technological landscape. Türkiye’s proximity to European markets and its growing tech startup ecosystem position it as a partner in the EU’s pursuit of increased technological competitiveness. 

     

    Energy Costs: A Barrier To EU Competitiveness 

    Another major issue flagged in the Draghi Report is energy costs. European industries pay two to three times more for electricity and four to five times more for natural gas compared to the US, weakening Europe’s industrial competitiveness. Draghi emphasises the need for the EU to transition to renewable energy sources to break the link between energy costs and fossil fuel volatility while also cautioning against sacrificing industrial performance. 

     

    Türkiye’s renewable energy potential is key to overcoming these challenges. With heavy wind, solar, and geothermal investments, Türkiye aims to produce 30% of its electricity from renewables by 2030. This aligns with the EU’s Green Deal, opening doors for deeper cooperation. Moreover, projects like the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) demonstrate Türkiye’s importance in Europe’s energy landscape, and deeper cooperation in energy infrastructure, hydrogen development, and energy storage technologies could further secure the EU’s energy independence. Türkiye’s growing role in green energy makes it a promising partner in helping the EU meet its decarbonisation goals, particularly by reducing dependence on Russian energy sources. 

     

    A key example of cooperation between both parties is the “Atlas Project”, designed to enhance energy efficiency and align Türkiye’s energy infrastructure with EU standards. The initiative aims to reduce Türkiye’s energy consumption by 16% by 2030, supporting both Türkiye’s sustainability goals and the EU’s broader decarbonisation objectives. The Atlas Project not only strengthens Türkiye’s energy transition but also deepens the alignment process between Türkiye and the EU, contributing to Europe’s energy security and reducing reliance on external energy sources. 

     

    Critical Materials and Strategic Dependencies 

    The Draghi Report also stresses the importance of economic sovereignty, focusing on the EU’s reliance on external suppliers for critical raw materials, such as semiconductors and rare earth elements. Currently, the EU imports 75% of its semiconductors from non-EU countries, leaving it vulnerable to geopolitical risks, particularly in China and some other Asian countries. Draghi calls for increased domestic manufacturing capacities and diversified supply chains to reduce these dependencies. 

     

    Here, Türkiye’s vast mineral wealth including boron, nickel, and chromium can provide a much-needed solution for Europe. Türkiye is home to one of the world’s largest boron reserves, critical for producing clean technologies like electric vehicle batteries and wind turbines. By partnering with Türkiye in sustainable mining and resource processing, the EU could secure a stable supply of these essential materials. Joint ventures in critical material processing would not only help Türkiye’s economy and green energy sector but also bolster Europe’s resilience in the face of supply chain disruptions. 

     

    Conclusion: Strengthening Türkiye-EU Ties 

    The Draghi Report provides a roadmap for enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness, particularly in innovation, energy, and supply chain resilience. Realising these ambitious goals, however, will require a significant financial commitment. Draghi, calls for the EU to increase its investments by 5% of GDP annually, amounting to 750-800 billion euros per year.

     

    To support this level of investment, Draghi advocates for common borrowing mechanisms similar to those used during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although this may face resistance from some fiscally conservative Member States, Draghi emphasises that the risks of inaction, including further economic decline and geopolitical vulnerabilities, far outweigh the costs. By pooling resources and enlarging its strategic partnerships with other countries to diversify its dependencies, the EU can secure its future competitiveness. Such collaborations could also redefine Europe’s strategic autonomy in the coming decade.

     

    Looking ahead, the success of Türkiye-EU cooperation will depend on sustained investment in joint projects, policy alignment, and the ability to overcome political and economic challenges. Given the alignment between Türkiye’s assets and the EU’s strategic goals, there are clear opportunities for closer collaboration in fields like energy, technology, and critical raw materials.

     

    Türkiye’s drive to position itself as a green energy hub presents the EU with valuable opportunities to achieve its decarbonisation goals through collaboration on renewable energy projects, including solar farms and hydrogen development. Such cooperation would diversify Europe’s energy sources and give Türkiye access to advanced green technologies. In technology, Türkiye’s growing tech ecosystem offers potential for joint R&D initiatives that can drive digital transformation across both regions. To secure its future competitiveness, the EU needs bold investments and strategic partnerships. Strengthening ties with Türkiye in energy, technology, and critical materials can unlock mutual benefits, boosting both regions’ autonomy and global standing.

    2024 ENLARGEMENT PACKAGE AND TÜRKİYE REPORT: ‘SEMPER VIGILO FORTIS PARATUS ET FIDELIS’ - NOVEMBER 2024

    The EU’s enlargement process faces significant challenges with Türkiye’s complex path to membership highlighting the need for internal reforms and renewed political will on both sides. 

     

    It has been eleven years since a new Member State joined the EU. In the past decade, one notable Member State chose to leave the Union, raising concerns about the potential for a wave of withdrawals. Fortunately, that has not occurred. While the EU focused on managing Brexit and later the Covid crisis, the enlargement policy was sidelined. This left candidate countries feeling as though they were stuck in a permanent waiting room, with no immediate prospect for accession. However, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine suddenly placed enlargement back at the forefront of the EU’s priorities, leading to new membership applications from Ukraine, followed by Georgia and Moldova. The list of candidates and potential candidates has now grown to ten, increasing pressure on the EU to offer a clear perspective to these nations. While enlargement is often seen as a key tool for stabilising the EU’s neighbourhood, it also risks creating instability if the process drags on and the ultimate goal of membership remains elusive. 

     

    With the revised enlargement methodology, the European Commission aimed to enhance the credibility, predictability, dynamism, and political governance aspects of the accession process. In addition to Türkiye, which has been a candidate country for nearly 26 years without a clear prospect of near-term accession, the nine other candidate and potential candidate countries are also struggling to complete the process in the foreseeable future. Before the EU can expand to include new members, it must reform its internal decision-making and institutional mechanisms. Otherwise, a Union of 35 or 36 states that makes strategic decisions by unanimity may become ineffective and devolve into a mere discussion forum. To facilitate enlargement, the EU should reform itself by adopting majority voting, even on foreign and security policy issues, and by reorganising the Commission, Parliament, and other relevant bodies. The need for reform was highlighted by Chancellor Scholz in a 2022 speech and further detailed in the Report of the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, titled “Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st Century.” Additionally, President Macron of France warned of the “death of Europe” if action is not taken to address the Union’s challenges. Two recent reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi on the internal market and EU competitiveness also underscored the need to revitalise the EU economy in relation to its competitors and to keep pace with rapid changes. 

     

    The 2024 enlargement package and country reports represent the latest developments in the European Commission’s monitoring of candidate countries. Commission President von der Leyen stated: “The tense geopolitical context makes it more compelling than ever that we complete the reunification of our continent under the same values of democracy and the rule of law. We have already made significant progress in integrating new Member States, and enlargement will remain a top priority for the new Commission.” Thus, more than ever, EU enlargement has acquired geopolitical significance for the future stability of Europe. The situation regarding Türkiye is particularly unique and complex in this context. 

     

    While Türkiye is undoubtedly a strategically significant country and regional actor, the EU is more focused on fostering a “cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship” with Türkiye than on its potential future accession. Numerous obstacles remain, as highlighted in the 2024 report, particularly in the “fundamentals first” cluster. Issues such as deficiencies in democracy, human rights and freedoms (including freedom of expression, media freedom, and freedom of association) as well as challenges in the rule of law, particularly regarding judicial independence and impartiality, are of particular concern. 

     

    Türkiye demonstrates positive aspects of a functioning market economy and is sufficiently prepared in some chapters of the acquis, issues such as the autonomy of regulatory bodies like the Central Bank, transparency in policy-making, the absence of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, and ongoing challenges in public administration reform remain significant obstacles to alignment with EU standards. 

     

    Additionally, fundamental divergences in foreign policy and regional issues, especially the GCASC issue, impede progress not only in accession negotiations but also in other areas of cooperation, including Customs Union modernisation, defence collaboration, and visa liberalisation. The report also highlights the differing positions between Türkiye and the EU regarding sanctions against Russia and their respective stance on Hamas. It recommends that Türkiye works toward greater alignment with EU statements and common positions in the future. 

     

    The 2024 report is the 25th of its kind prepared by the Commission since 998. While the report provides a thorough assessment of Türkiye’s progress toward meeting membership conditions, it does not generate momentum on Türkiye’s path to EU integration. Achieving this would require political will on both sides, supported by the impetus of geopolitical developments and mutual interests that go beyond shared identity and solidarity. While Türkiye remains “semper vigilo, fortis, paratus et fidelis” (lt. Always strong, ready and faithful), it should intensify its efforts toward renewed reforms in democratisation, sustainable development goals, and alignment with the common values and norms of the European continent. Ultimately, it is up to the EU to offer guidance and leadership, helping to prevent further alienation of Türkiye and ensuring that Türkiye-EU relations do not fall victim to the GCASC issue. 

  • SWEDEN’S EU PRESIDENCY ARRIVES AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT AS EUROPE FACES SEVERAL CHALLENGES - JANUARY 2023

    Sweden has assumed key institutional and legislative responsibility for the European Council at a time of war and economic turmoil with the recently formed government supported by far-right parties.

     

    Sweden took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from the Czech Republic on 1 January 2023. This is the third time Sweden is assuming the Rotating Presidency of the Council after January-June 2001 and July-December 2009. The Swedish EU Presidency, which will last until 30 June 2023, will also conclude the 18-month programme of the 11th Trio Presidency consisting of France, the Czech Republic, and Sweden.

     

    The Main Priorities Set Out by the Swedish EU Presidency

    The priorities and work programme Sweden put forward reflect its traditional positions in the EU and respond to the current economic and geopolitical challenges it faces. The priorities identified by Swedish EU Presidency are as follows:

    • Security-Unity
    • Resilience- Competitiveness
    • Prosperity- Green & Energy Transitions
    • Democratic Values and the Rule of Law - Our Foundation
    •  

    Sweden’s priorities and programme highlight issues related to the security of the EU and its citizens, joint support for Ukraine, energy security, the climate transition, the need to strengthen the competitiveness and resilience of the European Single Market.

     

    There are already some concerns about Sweden’s EU Presidency, which has recently formed a government led by the centre-right Moderate Union Party and has also been working to join NATO. In light of these four priorities, the Presidency plans to organise around 2,000 official meetings in Brussels and Luxembourg and around 150 official/informal meetings in Sweden.

     

    Since joining the EU in 1995, Sweden has left its mark in many policy areas. Sweden is likely to leave its mark again on both the legislative initiatives started by the Czech EU Presidency and on its own programme. It is also expected that Sweden will seek a broad consensus amongst EU countries and call for pragmatism for real solutions. In particular, Sweden is expected to prioritise the negotiation of the files under the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, negotiation of the Fit for 55 Package, EU leadership on the reform of the WTO, wider trade relations with the US, more ambitious free trade agreements with third countries and the implementation of the Single Market Emergency Instrument.

     

    Sweden will hold the rotating EU Presidency for six months under the motto “greener, safer and freer”. Despite the recent change of government and the difficulties in achieving unity amongst EU Member States, Sweden aims to carry out an effective Presidency. Moreover, during its six-month Presidency, Sweden has to fulfil the EU’s priorities, with challenges such as the war in Ukraine, tackling inflation in Europe and securing energy supplies.

     

    The Future of Türkiye-EU Relations: Sweden’s NATO Membership and Türkiye

    The war in Ukraine, which materialised the Swedish phrase “Ryssen kommer” (“the Russians are coming”), led to a paradigm shift in Swedish foreign policy. Sweden, which had remained militarily neutral and non-aligned for the last 200 years, applied for NATO membership together with Finland in May 2022. However, Türkiye announced that it would veto Sweden and Finland’s membership applications to NATO because both countries “supported terrorist organisations” and imposed an arms/military equipment embargo. Following intensive dialogues on the issue, Türkiye, Sweden and Finland signed a Trilateral Memorandum at the NATO Madrid Summit on 28 June 2022. Sweden assured that it would take Türkiye’s sensitivities into consideration within the scope of the memorandum and has taken some actions in this direction since such as the recent constitutional amendment on the fight against terrorism. However, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stated recently that not all of Türkiye’s demands can be met.

     

    Sweden pointed out in its presidency work programme that a mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye should be developed, including increased cooperation to co-create stable and secure conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean. This means that Sweden’s EU presidency and the EU’s general agenda do not include a view on Türkiye’s accession to the EU or the resumption of negotiations. It is a big question mark how Sweden and Türkiye will maintain bilateral relations during the Swedish Presidency and how these relations will be affected.

     

    Considering that there are also parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled in Türkiye this year, if bilateral relations, which will proceed on a multifactorial basis, do not reach a conclusion, NATO, which supports the participation of Sweden and Finland, will need to look for a new solution.

     

    Türkiye’s recent increased contact with the new Swedish government and its emphasis on co-operation indicate that there may be positive repercussions for EU-Türkiye relations. Especially in the field of energy, which is amongst Sweden’s priorities, Sweden aims to organise a high-level dialogue meeting between Türkiye and the EU on “green transformation” (instead of “energy”, “green transformation” wording is preferred, since the meeting of High-Level Energy Dialogue and the Energy chapter have been blocked by Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus).

     

    Türkiye’s expectations from Sweden and Swedish EU Presidency include a special enlargement summit consisting of ten candidate countries and enlargement countries at the European Political Community Summit in Moldova in June 2023. However, this does not seem to be sufficient. While differences of opinion on enlargement persist within the EU, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus are likely to remain the biggest obstacles to strategic cooperation and dialogue between Türkiye and the EU.

    SOLIDARITY WITH TÜRKİYE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE EARTHQUAKE: TÜRKİYE HAS FRIENDS - FEBRUARY 2023

    The massive earthquakes that stroke Türkiye on 6 February 2023 have resurrected the sense of solidarity between Türkiye and the rest of the world.

     

    The earthquake that took place in Pazarcık in the Kahramanmaraş province of Türkiye on 6 February 2023 affected ten cities in Türkiye and also northern Syria, leading to widespread damage and loss of lives. Even some newly-built buildings collapsed showing either that the construction of the buildings did not abide by strict standards regarding earthquake related impact or that the soil type and site for settlement were not selected in consideration of earthquake-related risks. The earthquake caused a death toll of nearly 50,000 people while thousands were injured and lost their homes and loved ones. Search and rescue operations right after the earthquake were assisted by several teams coming from all around the world from diverse countries such as Japan, Mexico and Spain. Several countries set up field hospitals in the region in order to be able to provide health services to the affected population. Overall, the destruction and loss of lives led to nationwide felt remorse and also efforts from all segments of society to assist and support the affected population.

     

    The earthquake hit the country in the midst of an economic downturn and a pre-election period before the 14 May presidential and legislative elections. The earthquake also focused the country’s attention on the shortcomings in disaster prevention and management as well as the prevention of loss of lives in case of an earthquake by proper housing construction and settlement plans. Being an earthquake-prone country, future debates are expected to dwell on this issue and how best to be prepared for future disasters.

     

    Being a participating country in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 19 EU Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain), as well as Albania and Montenegro, have contributed their teams in coordination with the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the Turkish authorities upon Türkiye’s activation of the mechanism. The number of participating countries increased to 21 and overall 38 response teams consisting of 1652 personnel and 105 search and rescue dogs were deployed to the region. The Commission’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre has delivered 500 Relief Housing Units from the rescEU reserve, 2000 tents and 8000 beds hosted by Romania. An EU Civil Protection team operated in the region to support the local and national authorities with the coordination of incoming EU assistance. A donors’ conference will be hosted by the Commission and Swedish Presidency in Brussels in order to gather even more assistance for earthquake relief and reconstruction efforts in Türkiye and Syria.

     

    The search and rescue teams that returned to their countries were greeted with flowers, hugs and affirmative slogans from the Turkish community living in such countries as Germany and Austria as they landed at the airport. The search and rescue dog from the Mexican team, Proteo lost his life while on duty in Türkiye and many Turks expressed their gratitude to the deceased dog that became a symbol of the sacrifices and great humanitarian mission of the search and rescue teams all around the world. The Turkish people felt that they were not alone and had friends all around the world. The feeling of being abandoned by the world, influenced by nationalistic discourses about the ill intentions of other countries towards Türkiye, and conspiracy theories about foreign powers making life hard for Turks by way of triggering an economic crisis were relegated to the margins as people from different ethnic and national backgrounds risked their lives in order to rescue and bring to safety victims of the disaster.

    TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTIONS: PROSPECTS FOR A REVITALISATION? - MARCH 2023

    The presidential and parliamentary elections in Türkiye to be held on 14 May will determine the future direction of Türkiye-EU relations.

     

    Türkiye’s relations with the EU have gone through a long and arduous process and entered into a period of stagnation since 2016. The negotiations for Türkiye’s accession to the EU have come to a standstill since the opening of the chapter on financial and budgetary provisions in June 2016. The General Affairs Council (GAC) of the EU noted in its conclusions in June 2018 that no new chapters will be opened. It also added that the start of the Customs Union modernisation process is not contemplated. The visa liberalisation process which started with the signing of the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement in 2013 and accelerated with the Turkey-EU Refugee Deal of 2016 could not be completed.

     

    The positive agenda proposed by the Union in 2020 as a means to defuse the tension in the relations and lay the groundwork for a re-engagement could not produce the desired effects. It did however manage to control the dangerous heightening of a confrontational turn in the relations. While high-level dialogue meetings were initiated in areas such as climate and public health, trade facilitation talks took place between the European Commission and the Ministry of Trade with a view to providing solutions to trade irritants. It is certainly the case that the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Türkiye to be held on 14 May with the possibility of a second round on 28 May, will make a critical impact on the future direction of Türkiye-EU relations.

     

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was first elected as the President while Türkiye was still governed by a parliamentary regime. With the 2017 referendum, the country made a transition towards a presidential regime and President Erdoğan was elected for the second time in 2018. He is the candidate of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) this time as well. The other candidates are Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Chairperson of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) who is the joint candidate of the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı), Muharrem İnce, the Chairperson of the Country Party (MP) who was the candidate for the CHP in the 2018 elections and Sinan Oğan, who is the candidate for the Victory Party (ZP) and ATA Alliance. According to the latest opinion poll by Asal, Erdoğan is set to receive 46.8% of the votes while Kılıçdaroğlu is set to receive 42%, Ince 8.4% and Oğan 2.6%. In another opinion poll by Yöneylem Araştırma, Kılıçdaroğlu leads with 43.8% followed by Erdoğan with 39.2%, İnce with 8.6% and Oğan with 2.7%. Regarding the parliamentary elections, various polls point to a range between 28-30% and 37-40% for AKP, 24 to 28-31% for CHP. There is considerable variation in the results of opinion polls and surveys. While who the winner of the presidential election will be causes the most anticipation, the distribution of the votes in the parliamentary elections will also be critically important.

     

    The results of the elections are critical for the future of the country since the Nation Alliance runs the election campaign on an agenda of returning to the parliamentary system and carrying out reforms which are expected to bring about progress in the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms and also run an economic recovery program. If President Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance win, then we can expect a continuation of the present regime which may take an even more conservative and authoritarian turn. It also seems to be a geopolitical election which will make an impact on Türkiye’s international orientation in the direction of a revitalisation of the western dimension of a strengthening of the Eurasian dimension.

     

    Following the elections Türkiye’s relations with the EU will be on the table. If the candidate of the Nation Alliance Kılıçdaroğlu wins, the agenda will likely include a revitalisation of the relations on the basis of the Customs Union modernisation, Green Deal and visa liberalisation processes. Türkiye’s probable return to a parliamentary system where a system of checks and balances are better protected is also in line with the EU’s norms and values as embedded in the Copenhagen criteria. The differences over the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean will likely continue even in the case of a change in government. But still a more amicable relationship based on dialogue may also serve to view these conflicts under a new light and provide for an impetus for renewed negotiation.

     

    The refugee issue will continue to be critical for the future of Türkiye-EU relations. The CHP and İYİ Party’s insistence on the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland is surely viewed sceptically by the EU in the light of the Turkey-EU deal and due to its impact on migration management and humanitarian dimensions. Hence in the case of a change in government, the new President should make sure that international protection for refugees continue and forced expulsions will not take place. The management of the economy will also be critical. Re-establishment of the autonomy of such institutions as the Central Bank will be viewed favourably by the EU and a rationalised management of the economy in addition to a positive turn in rule of law issues may also increase Türkiye’s value as a destination for investment and economic cooperation.

     

    Last but not least, what about Türkiye’s membership perspective? While Türkiye continues to be a candidate country, highest level EU officials such as the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and leaders of the Member States no longer make any references to Türkiye’s status as a country to join the EU in the near future. In her 2022 State of the Union address, President von der Leyen called out to “the people of the Western Balkans, of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia” that they are a part of the European family but did not care to include the people of Türkiye. The recent membership applications by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia revitalised the enlargement process of the EU. Although these countries are not likely to fulfil the conditions for membership in the near future, it is up to the EU to respond to the rightful expectations of all the candidate countries including Türkiye by encouraging and supporting their European perspective and progress towards membership.

     

    If Türkiye’s critical elections lead the way to a renewal of Türkiye’s democratisation efforts and lead to improvements in rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, then Türkiye may be re-inserted into the map of an enlarged EU. This will surely make a positive contribution to the EU which is struggling with internal problems and trying to find a normatively sound and pragmatically valid position in the midst of the global competition for power between the US and China. Improvement in the political and economic situation in Türkiye and a rationalised, transparent, and effective management of the economy with a renewed emphasis on climate and environmental policies will most likely lead to effective cooperation and coordination between Türkiye and the EU and elevate Türkiye’s value as an indispensable partner and future member state.

    RELEVANCE OF TÜRKİYE’S EU PERSPECTIVE TOWARDS THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS - APRIL 2023

    Türkiye is heading towards one of the most critical elections of its history at the centenary of the Republic. The Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk hundred years ago upon the principles of republicanism, nationalism, and secularism in the wake of a war of independence fought against occupying powers. These principles differentiated Türkiye from many other developing countries with a Muslim predominant population. Türkiye’s European identity was also very much connected with the political and socio-cultural choices of the early republican era. In the aftermath of the Second World War President İsmet İnönü steered the country’s direction towards a multiparty regime. The first party that took over from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 1950 introduced a more conservative dimension to Turkish politics and made use of traditional and religious values to gain favour especially among the rural population. Religious and traditional values have often been employed as a way to receive the support of the electorate and gain political power. In addition to economic and distributional concerns, identity politics based on nationalism and religious-secular divide defined the parameters of Turkish politics. 


    The May 14 elections are very critical since the future direction  of the Republic will be decided by popular vote at the centennial of its foundation. Both the President and the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly will be elected. Looking at the electoral campaigns of the two major Presidential candidates and the governing and main opposition parties, we observe that the following issues will be pertinent to the choice of the voters: 


    The economic crisis, high inflation and debtedness: The economic crisis that the country has been going through and the choice of unorthodox economic policies led to a considerable decline in the standard of living particularly for the middle and lower middle classes. In this regard, voters that view the current crisis as the fault of the government and expect a change of direction in the country’s economic policies are likely to vote for the opposition. 


    The future of the political regime: The results of the elections will also determine the future of the political regime in Türkiye, i.e., it will reflect a choice between the continuation of the presidential regime in case President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wins or a return to a parliamentary regime in case the candidate of the opposition, the Nation Alliance and leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu wins the elections. 


    Leadership qualities: The elections are also a contest between two different leadership styles. President Erdoğan’s leadership style is mostly based on the image of a strongman who likes to rule single-handedly and whose public oratory skills bring him favour with the public. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has a more subtle style of leadership based on democratic compromise, modesty, and tolerance. 


    Syrian refugees and migration policy: Whether the Syrian refugees in Türkiye are going to continue to stay in the country or be directed to return to Syria is another critical topic of the elections. In fact, one of the smaller single-issue parties, the Victory Party bases its entire party program on sending Syrians back to their country. Opposition candidate Kılıçdaroğlu also propagates the return of Syrians as well as irregular migrants to their home countries. President Erdoğan is most likely going to preserve the status quo if he wins the elections. Considering that the anti-immigration approach is gaining ground among the public in Türkiye, this issue may also impact on voter preferences. 


    External relations: Although Türkiye continues to be a candidate to join the EU and a customs union partner, the current government’s relations with the EU have gone through very difficult times in the recent period. While it was not possible for President Erdoğan to resurrect the relations with Europe despite the initiation of the positive agenda, relations with Russia, and China have become more amicable. While Türkiye adopted a middle-of-the-road approach to the war in Ukraine, it kept relations with both sides. The country has also benefited from increased trade and economic relations with Russia as well as energy cooperation including natural gas imports and the building of a Russian nuclear plant in Akkuyu. Türkiye also instigated a normalization process with countries such as Israel, and Egypt with which relations had soured in the earlier period. If President Erdoğan is re-elected, the relations with Europe and the West are not expected to enter into a new period but are expected to continue on the basis of a transactional relationship. If the opposition candidate Kılıçdaroğlu, wins the elections a revitalization of the Türkiye-EU relationship may be expected since Kılıçdaroğlu promises a return to the parliamentary system based on a democratic agenda which would also be compatible with the EU’s expectations. 


    Governance issues and the experience of the earthquake: The problems experienced as a result of the transition to the presidential regime in Türkiye were most acutely felt during the Kahramanmaraş earthquake that took place in February this year. The hierarchical system which was established lacked effective institutional mechanisms of delegation, competence and efficiency while also destabilizing the bureaucratic administrative tradition in the country. The earthquake acutely displayed two important shortcomings firstly the neglect and misconduct inherent in the housing and public works system and the lack of effective search and rescue operations to help those who were trapped under the rubble after the earthquake. The experiences with the presidential regime regarding whether or not it was able to deliver the promised efficiency and agility in public administration and the earthquake may also prove to be significant in determining voter preferences. 


    Identity-related issues: Identity-related issues both in terms of religious affiliation and ethnic background may also be quite critical in the results of the elections. President Erdoğan and his team are placing a strong emphasis on the identity dimension in terms of Islamic preachings and conservative social values such as being anti-LGBTQ and also getting the support of religious sects which are quite traditionalist in terms of women’s rights and their role in society. The Kurdish issue is also likely to play an important part as the opposition is criticized by President Erdoğan and his team  of siding with the PKK while the People’s Alliance including the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) have also included the HÜDA-PAR which is a militant party associated with the Hizbullah terrorist organisation. The Green and Left Party which includes the candidates from the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) since the HDP was faced with a party closure case, support Kılıçdaroğlu while the former leader of HDP Selahattin Demirtaş who is at the present serving a prison sentence also voiced his support to Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy. Hence identity in terms of where the voters are placed with regard to the Kurdish movement and the religious-secular divide will also play an important role in determining the outcome of the elections. 


    To conclude, Türkiye is situated at a critical crossing point in its history at the centennial of the Republic. The results of the elections will herald a new beginning either in the direction of a return to liberal democratic values or a more authoritarian regime. At this critical juncture Türkiye’s EU perspective may play an important role.  After the elections, irrespective of the government that will be formed, Türkiye will continue to exist in its present geographical location with a population of 80+ million, with a dynamic economy and industry. It will continue its membership to European organizations such as NATO and the Council of Europe and for the time being candidacy to the EU. It will continue to play an important role in European security, defence, and migration governance. However, the nature of the relationship may alter significantly depending on the results of the elections and the new government that is going to be formed. Unless a return to Türkiye’s EU reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, accountability, and good governance is possible, relations with the EU may again be limited to the bare essentials and Türkiye may seek alternatives such as a closer association with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the other hand, a return to reforms may revitalize Türkiye-EU relations on the basis of dethawing the stalemate and triggering action in areas such as customs union modernization and visa liberalisation. Hence the elections are also critical for the future direction of Türkiye-EU relations. 

     

    EUROPE DAY 2023: TÜRKİYE IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE - MAY 2023

    Europe Day coinciding with the centenary of the Turkish Republic this year requires a reflection of the past of Türkiye-EU relations and the possible options for the future.  

     

    As the EU commemorates Europe day 73 years after the declaration of the Schuman Plan, Türkiye celebrates the centenary of the Republic’s foundation by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The precursor of the Republic, the Ottoman Empire was recognized as a member of the European system of states at the Paris Congress of 1856. It was declared in Article 7 of the ensuing peace treaty that "the Sublime Porte [is] admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert) of Europe." Some historians also argue that the Ottoman Empire had earlier been accepted as part of the system and benefited from its “advantages'' since it concluded treaties with European states such as the Treaty of Carlowitz of 1699. According to Hurewitz, the Empire was the first non-Christian country to take part in the European state system and the first to fully accept the rules of European diplomacy.

     

    The Ottoman Empire participated in World War I on the side of Germany, experienced defeat and was imposed harsh peace conditions with the Treaty of Sevres. Atatürk united the country to support his resistance and fight the War of Independence that nullified the Sevres conditions and established a new Republic. The Turkish Republic was based on the model of a European nation-state adopting the principles and nationalism, secularism and populism. Atatürk’s motto of “catching up with contemporary civilization” reflected the overarching aim of making a new start and achieving a rapid pace of development based on science and technology. Education and culture were very important aspects of this new start and aimed to carry the country to the level of equality with European peers.

     

    Türkiye found a place for itself in the post-World War II European order by becoming a member of the Council of Europe and NATO and also making a transition to multi-party politics. The Turkish government of the time showed an early interest in the European Communities as well and applied for an association with the European Economic Community in 1959. This 9 May Europe day also reflects upon 64 years of relations with the European Community/Union. Most of this period witnessed a slow progress of the association relationship culminating in the Customs Union of 1996. Türkiye then became a candidate to join the Union in 1999 and started accession negotiations in 2005. However, the accession process could not be successfully executed and ran into several problems due to problems in Türkiye, changes in the EU’s approach towards the country and changes in the overall enlargement strategy. One of the most important issues was linked with questions of culture and identity. The Christian Democratic Party convention in 1997 put forth that Türkiye could not be a member due to differences in culture and identity while President Sarkozy of France argued that Türkiye did not belong to Europe. While such opinions rested on perceptions about Türkiye and Europe based on difference, Türkiye’s eligibility has already been accepted both in Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement and also in the commission’s opinion on Türkiye’s application dating back to 1989. Later the Member States also agreed to give Türkiye a membership perspective and even to start accession negotiations due to Türkiye’s success in sufficiently fulfilling the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. 

     

    The General Affairs council of the EU in 2018 decided not to open and close any chapters in the negotiations and not to start the customs union modernization process. Problems over hydrocarbon explorations off the coast of Cyprus and in the Aegean brought further tensions in the relations resulting in sanctions being implemented against Türkiye. The positive agenda which was initiated in 2020 in order to moderate the tensions and revitalise the relations could not achieve the intended outcome. The result of the elections to be held on 14 May in Türkiye is anxiously awaited in order to reflect on the future of the relations based on the political configuration which will be shaped after the elections. 

     

    The last decade witnessed many crises both in Europe and the world. While the financial crisis and the pandemic had global implications, the refugee crisis, Brexit and Russian aggression against Ukraine mostly impacted on Europe and the EU. As the EU struggled to survive through the crises, it was also able to renew itself and assume new prerogatives. Since 2019 the twin priorities of the green deal and the digital agenda were adopted by the EU as the major processes which could carry the union to the new century and create a bond with new generations. The EU entered into an accelerated period of legislative activity including new initiatives in the area of renewables, decarbonisation, carbon border adjustment, semiconductors, digitalisation, personal data protection, cybersecurity, etc. The Union initiated the first ever regulation on the use of artificial intelligence. While the strategic compass aims to lay the basis for a strengthened security and defence policy in the new decade, the digital compass aims to lay the basic parameters of a digital European marketplace.

     

    As Türkiye stands on the centenary of the Republic, its future in Europe and the EU is also being questioned and discussed. While its importance as a regional actor and a neighbouring country is acknowledged by many, its future as a candidate to join the Union is being contested since the accession process has de facto been frozen and the possibility of a restart seems far off. Alternatives to membership such as privileged partnership or strategic partnership have been proposed before. However, such schemes were quite thin in terms of content and could not keep the relations on track since they lacked a consistent and credible framework. At the same time, it should also be acknowledged that the relations have to be revitalised with a view to initiating an honest, effective and mutually-beneficial dialogue between the parties. One way to do so could be to associate Türkiye in the twin priorities of the EU, the green deal and digital agenda. This need not take the place of the accession framework. However, it may serve to keep the relations on track while the geopolitical landscape becomes clearer and more understandable. In this way, Türkiye may be affiliated with the EU on the basis of these critical agendas while such engagement will also form a preparatory background regarding the Customs Union modernization and accession processes. 

    “THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN`”: A GREEN AND DIGITAL AGENDA FOR TÜRKIYE-EU RELATIONS - JUNE 2023

    Assessing Türkiye-EU relations amid recent crises and changes requires embracing a green and digital agenda to align with the EU's twin transformations. 

     

    “The Times They Are a-Changin'” was a famous song written by Bob Dylan and released in 1964. The song’s universal message of the inevitability of change is even more relevant today in our fast changing, perplexing, and uncertain world. Sailing from one crisis to another, it is possible to lose a sense of direction and purpose. Survival, rather than planning and strategising for the future, becomes the focus. Each crisis is also an important opportunity to alter and adapt oneself to the changing conditions. Without a strong foundation, however, change may become disruptive and difficult to adjust to.

     

    As change in the international system becomes much more apparent with increasing global competition, the rise of non-western powers, particularly China and India, as well as the belligerence of Russia, and the climate crisis and environmental challenges coupled with the digital revolution are transforming the way we live, work and interact with each other. States and organisations are also finding themselves in this complex environment which necessitates them to rethink and redesign their institutions and policies.

     

    Both the EU and Türkiye have gone through several changes and crises over the last decade or so. While the EU’s struggle to redefine itself, reform its institutional system, rectify internal imbalances, and improve its global actor qualities continues, Türkiye has also been struggling with the reform of its political regime, cultural polarisation, regional security challenges, and economic crisis. The EU, its Member States, and Türkiye are caught in the midst of many challenges, including the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war and the corresponding crises in European security, energy policy, supply change disruptions and food security. The search for strategic autonomy has become a buzzword for the EU not only in its defence policy but also energy, industrial, and trade policies as well. As the phase of hyper-globalisation began to regress, global interdependencies still matter. Questions of supply security have been added to and taken precedence over considerations of cost-effectiveness and quality. Friend shoring, nearshoring or reshoring have altered and shaped trade and investment decisions.

     

    Such profound changes also require a recalibration and adjustment in Türkiye-EU relations in line with current developments, the needs of both sides, and a consideration of what is possible and what is desirable. When reflecting on possible avenues for the future of the relations, careful attention should be given to the historical roots of the relations as well. What is needed is to find ways to trigger improvements in the relations without jeopardising the previous achievements and targets.

     

    A Green and Digital Agenda for Türkiye-EU Relations: Identity, Context, Content, Purpose and Aim

     

    The identity aspect, the context and content of the relations, as well as their purpose and aim, should be taken into consideration in order to relieve Türkiye-EU relations from the current stalemate and provide for an adjustment in line with current challenges.

     

    Identity: Any relationship is based on and determined by the identifications of the parties concerned. Türkiye has been interchangeably defined as a “would-be European”, a “friendly other”, and even as a “competitor” by prominent figures in the EU. It is a candidate country to join the EU and started accession negotiations in 2005. Despite this status, Türkiye has also experienced many upheavals and disputes with the EU and individual Member States, and the negotiations have been at a standstill with scant hope regarding their restart in the foreseeable future. The basis of a revitalisation should definitely be based on a friendly/European perspective in which Türkiye’s Europeanness is accepted as a given owing to its long-standing role in European politics, security and state system, candidate status, and will to become a future member. Although it may seem quite difficult to achieve that aim under the present conditions, it should not be totally disregarded and terminated just on the basis of current realities which can also change in line with global, regional and domestic changes. Such an identity perspective also presupposes a will to engage, find mutually beneficial solutions to disputes, coordinate and cooperate in foreign and security issues, and contribute to building joint resilience.

     

    Context and Content: The proposal to revitalise and recalibrate the relations rests on the changing context of the global system as well as the parameters of European security and economy. The EU is intent on responding to the challenges of global competition and transformation by way of the twin priorities of the European Green Deal and the digital agenda. These priorities manifest themselves in a renewed effort to regulate the European economy in terms of sustainable and green norms and methods and the digitalisation of production, distribution, and related models. As a norm entrepreneur and regulator, the EU also acts as a leader in the international economy by way of its initiatives such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), cybersecurity and artificial intelligence legislation. The context thus becomes a radically changing legal, technological, and regulatory environment which requires the Türkiye-EU relationship to adapt. The content of this renewed relationship should also be based on the ground-breaking targets inherent in the green and digital agendas. As the EU has reflected these priorities in its external relations with several actors, such as the Green Alliance with Japan and Norway, a digital alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean, and digital partnership with Singapore, it could also be an opportunity for a breath of fresh air for Türkiye-EU relations. The Green and Digital Agenda (GDA) proposed should be based on an institutional framework which will include levels of engagement and dialogue at the intergovernmental and parliamentary levels as well as business and civil society platforms, thus going beyond the mere formal to impact the different echelons of society. The proposals which may be developed as a result of the institutionalised dialogue should provide the basis of new initiatives by the European Commission in Türkiye-EU relations. The Green and Digital Agenda should include subheadings in different policy areas such as trade, industry, energy, climate, defence, security, R&D, ICT, and related sectors. Hence it would display the potential to trigger developments in the overall perspective of Türkiye-EU relations.

     

    Purpose and Aim: The revitalisation of the relations based on the Green and Digital Agenda aims not to replace the accession perspective or the association relationship altogether. Rather, its goal is to act as a means to further the engagement between the parties regarding the challenges of the current period and lay the groundwork for a future where the conditions for a revitalisation of the eventual goal of integration as a member may become a reality. It rests on the observation that the Positive Agenda which was proposed to revitalise the relations in 2020 could not provide the expected momentum. The modernisation process of the Customs Union could not be initiated, the visa liberalisation process could not be completed, and the high-level dialogues initiated on issues such as climate and public health produced only limited results. The proposal is based on the acknowledgement that the relations are rooted in a 60 years old deep, significant and valuable association and goal to become a member. Such a deep-rooted relationship is today neglected and underestimated by some circles although its continuation is still relevant, indispensable, and beneficial for both Türkiye and the EU. It is necessary to recognize some deep problems and disputes that block the progress of Türkiye’s accession to the EU, such as the Cyprus dispute and problems in Türkiye’s democracy and human rights record. Based on evaluations of what is possible and what is desirable in the relations, we propose a green and digital agenda that will facilitate further engagement and dialogue between Türkiye and the EU to increase the desire for cooperation in responding as well as adapting to the twin transitions.

    HOPES FOR A REVITALISATION OF TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS: PIPE DREAM OR WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY? - JULY 2023

    A reinvigoration of Türkiye-EU relationship starting with negotiations on modernisation of the Customs Union and visa liberalisation supported by the legislative alignment to the EU on its European Green Deal and digitalisation agendas would pave the way to an eventual accession.

     

    Türkiye-EU relations have gone through ebbs and flows since the 1960’s and evolved into a close relationship based on an association agreement and driven by the prospect of accession to the Union. Since President Erdoğan’s new term in office started in the aftermath of the May elections in Türkiye, the subject of a revitalisation of the relations began to come up frequently. President Erdoğan talked with the President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen over the phone. He emphasised his commitment to the goal of membership to the Union and focused on the need to increase contacts at all levels on the basis of a concrete and positive agenda aiming for full membership. President Erdoğan also emphasised the need to step up Türkiye-EU cooperation by way of the modernisation of the Customs Union, visa liberalisation, migration management and fight against terrorism. President Erdoğan later brought up the issue of Türkiye’s integration to the EU in connection with Sweden’s membership to NATO and demanded the removal of obstacles in Türkiye’s path to EU membership in return for lifting his veto over Sweden’s accession to the Alliance. Minister of Treasury and Finance Mehmet Şimşek talked about the need to modernise the Türkiye-EU Customs Union in a panel he attended in Austria and said that the EU needed Türkiye just as Türkiye needed the EU.

     

    While the long-running accession talks were at a standstill since 2016, a revitalisation of the process caught the headlines in Türkiye. At the same time the Türkiye Rapporteur of the European Parliament Sanchez Amor recommended the start of a period of reflection on the future of the relations, the conclusions of the European Council meeting on 29-30 June 2023 included an instruction to the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to prepare a report on the same topic. The underlying theme was quite clear: to propose new ways for engagement between Türkiye and the EU which could replace the accession track. Hence the “privileged partnership” offers which dated back to a 2004 report prepared for Germany’s Christian Democratic Union by KarlTheodor Zu Gutenberg. In an article published in the New York Times on 15 December 2004 Zu Guttenberg wrote: 

     

    “Should the European Union give full membership to Turkey? If we go by the European Commission’s own report on the question, the answer should be no. The report’s list of special regulations that would apply to Turkey — most notably regarding free movement of labour — shows that the EU’s offer of membership would only lead to second-class status for Turkey. A privileged partnership instead of an underprivileged membership is the better — and more honest — option for both sides.” 

     

    Later Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy adopted the idea which formed the basis of a consensus between the two leading countries of the EU. Other concepts involved the formation of a strategic partnership or a process of gradual integration to the EU. However, it was not possible to replace the membership goal with any of these alternatives which depended on half-cooked conceptualisations. Once the goal of membership was accepted as the basis of the accession process, any such proposal would mean a downgrading of the relationship and would be very difficult to accept from the viewpoint of an aspiring candidate country. Accordingly, the Turkish governments since then categorically rejected the replacement of the membership perspective with some sort of privileged partnership even during the most problematic and tense times in bilateral relations. In addition, offering a privileged or strategic partnership did not amount to a meaningful proposition since Türkiye was already an associated country with the EU and the Ankara Agreement was already quite extensive in the scope of the targets it set for the advancement of the relationship. 

     

    Based on this background, the EU is once again contemplating a “new” perspective to Türkiye which would replace the membership track. Yet the Turkish leadership is insisting on the membership perspective and stressing the need for a revitalisation of relations. At a time when the threats to European security in the aftermath of the Russian aggression against Ukraine require a united front and collaboration among all European countries, Türkiye’s rapprochement with Europe and the EU acquired an urgency. The EU leaders also feel the need to engage with Türkiye and upgrade the relationship. Yet in spite of geostrategic developments which may create a susceptible environment for a re-engagement between Türkiye and the EU, the Union’s priority concerns the protection of Ukrainian integrity in the face of Russian aggression and its gradual integration to the EU as well as anchoring countries in the region in European structures. Türkiye’s membership is not viewed as feasible or probable under the circumstances. Yet, Türkiye is still a candidate country “destined to join the Union” in the wording of the Helsinki Summit conclusions. 

     

    A reinvigoration of the relationship starting with the Customs Union modernisation negotiations and completing the visa liberalisation process would bring Türkiye closer to the EU, support the legislative alignment especially with a view to the European Green Deal and digitalisation agendas and pave the way to an eventual accession. Such a vision depends upon action in two important fronts: internal reform agenda and diplomatic efforts with regards to the Cyprus issue and engagement with Greece. It is vitally important to steer the country towards a more democratic direction by way of rectifying the current presidential regime with a view to introducing a system of checks and balances and ensuring independence of the judiciary. At the same time resolving the economic crisis through rational policymaking, ensuring the autonomy of regulatory institutions, achieving transparency and fighting against corruption are vital conditions for a return to the European perspective. An activism at the diplomatic front is also necessary while the Cyprus question blocks progress in not only the accession negotiations, but also the Customs Union modernisation, defence cooperation and visa liberalisation. Finally winning the hearts and minds of the European peoples and regular diplomacy and dialogue with the leading EU countries are also complementary and necessary items of a renewed EU strategy. 

    THE CURRENT STATUS OF GRAIN DEAL AND ITS FUTURE - AUGUST 2023

    As Russia refuses to extend the Black Sea Grain Corridor Agreement, the future of the Black Sea Initiative becomes uncertain. 

     

    The Black Sea Grain Corridor Agreement, which was mediated by the UN and Türkiye in July 2022, has been reached to ensure the safe export of Ukrainian grain in order to prevent a global food crisis following the Russia-Ukraine war. One year on, a statement from the Kremlin announced that Russia refused to extend the agreement on the grounds that conditions for its extension had not been fulfilled. Russia complained that none of Russia’s requirements agreed to in the agreement had been met. With respect to the grain deal, the immediate implication of the agreement ceasing to function is the withdrawal of the safety guarantees for shipping. In this context where global food prices are increasing, the cessation of grain shipment makes future problems inevitable. 

     

    Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Ukraine profited from the Grain Corridor Agreement whereas the terms of the agreement harmed Russia. Putin wanted both the sanctions on banks, individuals and agricultural companies in Russia and the obstacles to the transportation of Russia’s grain to the middle and high-level regions to be lifted. In his video message at the BRICS Summit, Putin expressed that Russia is ready to return if the obligations related to the Grain Corridor Agreement are fulfilled in real terms. 

     

    Stating that the sanctions imposed on Russia by European countries are damaging the global economy, Putin emphasised that these damages will inevitably increase the food crisis. After facing these major sanctions, Russia refused to extend the agreement on 18 July 2023. However Russia left open a door for returning to the deal on the condition that the obligations to Russia are fulfilled in concrete terms. 

     

    What Will Happen If Russia Does Not Return to the Grain Deal?

    Following the agreement that entered into force on 22 July 2022, a total of 32.9 million tons of grain reached the international markets. The biggest handicap of the grain shipments was that mostly high-income countries such as EU Member States were the primary beneficiaries of the agreement. Only 2.5% of the shipments went to low-income countries, which include most African countries. Although Russian grain and fertiliser exports were allowed under the Grain Agreement, the removal of the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) from the Belgiumbased SWIFT system created a problem for Russia in grain exports. 

     

    If Russia does not return to the Grain Agreement, grain shipments will have to be carried out from Ukrainian ports. In this case, it seems unlikely that shipping companies will continue their shipments, as there is a possibility of loss of life and property. As an alternative, Ukraine will need to ship grain to Romanian ports by road and rail, as was done before the Grain Corridor Agreement. This will result in less grain being transported in more difficult conditions. As mentioned before, a grain corridor without Russia does not offer significant advantages to countries other than EU Member States. In addition to the conveniences provided in terms of logistics, Russia is also a country rich in grains and fertilisers. 

     

    The Grain Corridor Agreement hold as significant importance for Türkiye, as it is the third largest beneficiary of the agreement. Türkiye, which both initiated the grain agreement initiative and benefited greatly from this agreement, is expected to act as a mediator today but, it is anticipated that Russia will not return to the table again until the difficulties experienced in grain and fertiliser shipments are resolved. On the other hand, Türkiye believes that establishing a new route without Russia may not be beneficial. 

     

    The UN, which led the formation of the Grain Corridor Agreement, asserts that if the agreement is not extended, price increase is inevitable. On the other hand, the UN stated that the duration of rising prices will depend on market reactions. In addition, the UN warns that Russia’s withdrawal from the agreement could exacerbate the existing problems in East Africa. 

     

    The agreement is important not only for the smooth delivery of grain and fertiliser shipments but also for ensuring safety of ships entering and leaving Ukrainian ports from potential attacks. This agreement, which is scheduled to be extended every four months, offers a solution to the end of the ongoing war. For this reason, the renewal of the agreement offers a diplomatic solution not only for the addressing the global food crisis but also for potentially ending the Russia-Ukraine war. 

     

    Joseph Schulte Departs from the Port of Odessa

    On 18 August, the ship named Joseph Schulte arrived in İstanbul, utilising the unilateral corridor announced by Ukraine after Russia’s withdrawal from the Grain Corridor Agreement. After passing through İstanbul, Joseph Schulte continued its journey towards the Greek port of Piraeus. Carrying 30 thousand tons of cargo, the ship avoided being a target of Russian warships and reached Bosphorus without entering international waters. The fact that Joseph Schulte completed the Black Sea route without any problems is important in terms of establishing an alternative grain route without Russia. 

     

    Türkiye Continues Its Mediator Role

    Since Russia refused to renew the Grain Corridor Agreement, Türkiye made attempts to revive the deal as progress in this area is of critical importance for the global food crisis to come to an end, especially for African countries who are reliant on grain imports. 

     

    The long awaited meeting between President Erdoğan and President Putin finally took place on 4 September 2023 in Sochi, Russia. President Putin reiterated his stance that Russia would agree to revive the grain deal if Russia’s interests are met. The conditions he put forth include Western sanctions on Russia to be relaxed and restrictions on Russian agricultural exports be dropped. He also mentioned Russia would provide shipments of grain to selected African countries for free instead of renewing the deal. President Erdoğan emphasised that the deal was the only option and efforts should be made to prevent African countries from being affected by the food crisis. President Erdoğan said that he presented proposals to revive the deal and reiterated Türkiye’s wish to help mediate between Russia and Ukraine. 

     

    While Russia may return to the agreement if the necessary conditions are met since the decision to suspend it, the final decision remains uncertain at this moment.

    EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S 2022 REPORT ON TÜRKİYE HAS BEEN ADOPTED - OCTOBER 2023

    The 2022 EP Report on Türkiye shows the stance and viewpoint of the EP concerning the Türkiye-EU relations and its future.

     

    European Parliament (EP) has adopted the 2022 Report on Türkiye on September 13, 2023. The report, which was penned by EP Türkiye Rapporteur Nacho Sánchez Amor, is an advisory one rather than a binding document. Nonetheless, the report is of vital importance due to its high potential to show the stance and viewpoint of the EP concerning the Türkiye-EU relations and its future. It also needs attention to see the general perspective towards Türkiye within the EU institutions as more high-level reports such as the 2023 EU Enlargement Strategy and the special report on EU-Türkiye relations, which is being prepared by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, are on the way.

     

    The report starts with giving references to European Council conclusions, decisions, statements, and reports which were benefitted in preparation phase of the report. This is followed by important events shaping current Turkish politics and the Türkiye-EU relations like 2023 Presidential Elections held in Türkiye and decreasing but not ending tension in Eastern Mediterranean are provided. Next are the two main body sections constituting the report, which are titled “General Assessment and Latest Developments” and “The Way Forward for EU-Türkiye Relations.”

     

    General Assessment and Latest Developments

    This section mainly deals with significant events in relation to Türkiye-EU relations. Turkish Presidential Elections are evaluated as an indicator of continuation of the current political situation in Türkiye. While the report appreciates the high voter turn-out, it claims lack of fair competition ground before the elections exemplified with problems on media coverage, harsh and polarising discourse and so on. The report presents EU support provided just after the twin earthquakes which hit Southern Türkiye on 6 February as a vivid example of European solidarity with Turkish people.

     

    When it comes to foreign policy, normalisation processes with Armenia, Egypt, Israel, and Gulf states are welcomed in the document. However, existence of various points of dispute is also noted as Türkiye and the EU follow different policy paths as in the cases of Libya and Syria. Since the underlying issues remain unsolved, the report approaches the current stability in the Eastern Mediterranean cautiously. As for the Cyprus issue, the report reiterates the support for bi-zonal and bi-communal solution. With respect to the developments on Ukraine, is the report highlights that Türkiye is looking to maintain its relations with both the West and Russia while stressing the utmost importance Türkiye gives to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. The report also appreciates Turkish efforts for mediation and the Black Sea Grain Corridor; however, Turkish alignment level of EU Common Security and Foreign Policy, which is predicted to be at 7%, and the Turkish position vis-à-vis the EU sanctions on Russia are criticised. It is also mentioned that the Swedish accession process to NATO cannot be linked to Türkiye’s accession to the EU.

     

    In the report, Türkiye is criticised on the topics linked with human rights, gender equality and minorities. The report claims that the gap between Türkiye and the EU is widening as Türkiye does not show any interest neither to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria nor to bridge this gap and reverse the current trend.

     

    On climate and environmental policies, Türkiye’s ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement and its 2053 carbon-neutral target are appreciated. Türkiye is invited to be a party to the UN Economic Commission for Europe, Espoo (The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context) and Aarhus Conventions (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters) and the report makes a call for Türkiye to reevaluate/stop construction of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.

     

    The Way Forward for Türkiye-EU Relations

    Türkiye’s strategic importance for the EU in terms of political, economic, energy and foreign policy areas is emphasised. However, “in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government”, the report says that the accession process cannot be resumed. Thus, the report stresses the need of “a realistic framework for EU-Türkiye relations.”

     

    It is highlighted that upgrading of the Customs Union should take digitalisation and Green Deal into consideration; and any progress on the subject is conditional upon human rights, fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations. On visa liberalisation process, the report suggests that steps will be taken as soon as remaining six benchmarks are fulfilled by the Turkish authorities.

     

    What to Expect from the Upcoming Special Report

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement after the adoption of the EP 2022 Türkiye Report. The statement takes attention on the current situation in Europe where a war continues and stability and security in the region are at stake; and says that in such a context, seeking alternative ways for Türkiye-EU relations other than accession negotiations, which constitute the base for the relations, is defined as “irrational.” The statement indicates that the report is fed with anti-Türkiye disinformation and populism. The EP Report’s approach towards the issues in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus are seen as “unilateral views of certain circles and detached from historical and legal facts”. The Customs Union and visa liberalisation processes are defined as the key cooperation fields between Türkiye and the EU; and it is noted that a visionary perspective would acknowledge the importance of Türkiye for the EU to become a global power and cope with uncertainties and challenges. 

     

    European Council held on 29-30 June 2023 invited the High Representative and the European Commission to submit a report on the “state of play of EU-Türkiye relations.” The report which will be presented by the High Representative Josep Borrell is expected to be ready in October alongside the 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy. The content of the report and what it proposes for the future of the relations might not be a passionate one under the current circumstances. The special report may not point at any specific mechanism; nonetheless, calling for parties to negotiate alternative association or partnership styles -other than full accession of Türkiye to the EU- to restructure the relations and shape the very nature of the future of the relations might be an option there. Accelerating and completing the upgrading of Customs Union and visa liberalisation processes, as the new setting will be negotiated, might probably be a part of the upcoming report. Nevertheless, whether and to what extent it is reasonable for both parties to end the accession process and seek cooperation at lower levels while full accession offers the possibility of cooperating at the highest level is an open-ended question and necessitates an answer prioritising strategic and long-term benefits rather than focusing on daily polemics between Türkiye and the EU. 

    HUNDRED YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC: THE EUROPEAN VOCATION AND EU PERSPECTIVE - NOVEMBER 2023

    Amidst global shifts, Türkiye’s centenary heralds progress, seeking EU membership to embrace modernity and contribute to a transformed world.

     

    The Turkish Republic is commemorating its centenary on 29 October 2023. Judged on the basis of the long perspective of world history, hundred years might be likened to a blink of an eye. Yet viewing the tremendous transformation in world affairs, economy, society, science, culture and technology since 1923, the trajectory of the young Republic’s journey in its first hundred years has been arduous and breath-taking. In that sense, the World and the Turkish Republic experienced such changes, challenges and transformations during these last hundred years that they could have occurred over many centuries in former historical periods when change had not been so fast and so staggering. The reorganization of the international system following the Second World War, the Cold War, ending of the Soviet Union and the post-Cold War era, 9/11 attacks, the unipolar moment of American hegemony followed by relative decline and rise of non-Western powers, 2008 global financial crisis, Arab uprisings and Syrian War, migration crises, COVID-19 pandemic, Russian aggression against Ukraine, IsraelHamas War, and the ambiguous and hectic transformation into a multicentred and multi-polar world order has been a series of groundbreaking developments that marked the first hundred years of the Republic.

     

    The young Republic founded by the great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk aimed to catch up with contemporary civilization in culture, industry, science and technology and raise the standard of living, education and culture of a wartorn country. Atatürk initiated revolutionary changes in political, administrative, social and cultural domains such as the abrogation of the Sultanate and Caliphate, founding a secular system based on rule of law, adoption of the Latin alphabet, Gregorian calendar and European weights and measures, change in attires in line with the contemporary European trends, and providing for women the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections. Atatürk aimed to transform a society mired in an obsolete system in the direction of modern values, methods and mechanisms of the contemporary world. He wanted to create a new dynamism by addressing the passion of nationalist sentiments and create the perfect citizen of the new Turkish Republic who was supposed to be endowed with the awareness of his/her role in national revival.

     

    On the centenary of its foundation, the Turkish Republic has achieved many important aims and targets such as becoming an industrialised society, elevating much of the population from absolute poverty, and acquiring near 100% literacy rate (about 97%) despite lingering social and economic problems. Türkiye’s efforts at democratization and liberalisation have undergone a challenging journey marked by ebbs and flows. This journey is still continuing with several challenges in creating the basis of a free, democratic and rules-based society.

     

    The Turkish Republic is a member of the G-20 group of countries, a member of NATO, Council of Europe, OECD, OSCE, BSEC, Organization of Turkish States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation and a candidate to join the EU. It is a country which combines divergent geographic, cultural and developmental identities. It is situated on the crossroads of continents and yet associates itself mostly with Europe as exemplified by its many memberships in European organizations. However, Türkiye still hasn’t become a member of the EU with which it had a long-standing association relationship dating back to 1963, a bid for membership dating back to 1987, with negotiations starting in 2005. Membership in the EU is the ultimate goal for Türkiye’s integration to European structures and assuming its place in European governance. Türkiye must fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the Union which it is striving to accomplish since the declaration of candidacy in 1999. In addition, the joint political will of the 27 Member States is also necessary to accept Türkiye as a member of the Union. Türkiye’s goal of EU membership acquires a new meaning and importance in the centenary of the Republic since it is commensurate with the goals and vision existent at the outset of the Republic. We hope that this goal will be accomplished in the second hundred years and that Türkiye will be able to contribute to a better future for our region and the World we live in in line with the goals of the current era such as the perspective of the green and digital transformations.

    EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT ON TÜRKİYE 2023: A REVIEW OF THE REPORT ON TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS - DECEMBER 2023

    The European Commission’s 2023 Türkiye Report states that Türkiye remains a key partner and candidate country for the EU, but similar to previous years, criticism of Türkiye continues in the same tone. 

     

    Member of the European Commission responsible for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi, published the 2023 Enlargement Policy Communication and Candidate Country Reports on 8 November 2023. The Türkiye Report 2023 on Türkiye’s progress towards EU membership contains criticisms of Türkiye in various areas, particularly in the areas of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, while acknowledging that Türkiye has made progress, which are mostly limited progress in some areas.

     

    As every year, the report emphasises that Türkiye remains a key partner and candidate country for the EU. Since the Council of the European Council’s decision to suspend accession negotiations in 2018, Türkiye has not reversed the trend away from the EU and has made limited progress on accession related reforms.

     

    Political Criteria

    The report states that although the Turkish political leadership has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to the objective of EU accession and expressed it at every opportunity, Türkiye has not taken concrete steps in this regard and has not developed any positive momentum on its reform agenda. The report highlights the most critical issues in the realm of political criteria, notably democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the independence of the judiciary. It underscores a more pronounced regression in these areas compared to others. In sum, the 2023 reporting period points to a worrying and sustained backsliding, highlighting the judiciary’s non-compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgements, the continued existence of corruption, the deteriorating human rights situation and unresolved structural deficiencies in the judicial system.

     

    Economic Criteria

    The Economic Criteria section of the Türkiye Report, although more moderate in tone than the other sections, emphasises the lack of progress in alignment with EU standards. Despite its advanced level of harmonisation, Türkiye has stalled in recent years and has not taken any significant steps towards full alignment with EU economic principles. The report reiterates familiar criticisms of Türkiye’s economic policies, including a tendency towards loose monetary policy, reduced policy credibility and transparency, and continued direct state intervention in price setting. These concerns, coupled with apprehensions regarding the independence of the Central Bank, also cast doubt on Türkiye’s dedication to maintaining sound economic management. Despite these criticisms, the report recognises some positive developments in the Turkish economy, such as economic growth.

     

    Foreign Policy

    The criticisms made in the past years on security, defence and foreign policy issues continue in this year’s report. In general terms, Türkiye’s rate of alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policies remains at 10% and the steps taken in foreign policy continue to contradict EU priorities.

     

    The report criticises Türkiye for refraining from complying with its restrictive measures against Russia, refraining from condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine and failing to recognise and condemn Hamas as a terrorist organisation for its attacks on civilians in Israel, pointing out that Türkiye’s foreign policy is in conflict with EU values and interests.

     

    Drawing attention to Türkiye’s regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, the report states that there were no drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the SCGA during the reporting period and recommends that Türkiye-Greece relations, which were quite tense until February 2023 but softened after the 6 February earthquakes, should be maintained in good faith. It also draws attention to the necessity of cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean.

     

    An Overview of the Chapters

    The chapters that draw the most attention in the report are Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Digital Transformation and Media, Agriculture Public Procurement and Agriculture and Rural Development. This attention is due to the report highlighting the backsliding in these chapters. Since 2015, the word “backsliding” has been increasingly used in the reports, meaning that Türkiye has started to lose the progress it has made in the harmonisation process with the EU and the grounds for EU membership.

     

    The Future of Relations

    Türkiye is the country with the most negative feedback among the ten country reports published and Türkiye’s EU membership process seems to have reached a dead end. Based on the 2023 and previous years’ reports, it is estimated that Türkiye will be left out of the new wave of enlargement planned by the EU.

     

    From the EU’s perspective, Türkiye’s EU membership process has reached a deadlock due to foreign policy incompatibilities (the Cyprus issue, tense relations with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye’s approach to regional issues) and increasing contradictions with EU norms and values (regression in democracy, neglect of the rule of law and human rights and values, undermining freedom of expression). From Türkiye’s perspective, the EU does not see Türkiye as European and even if Türkiye fulfils the criteria, it will continue to keep Türkiye waiting at the door as it has done for years. Indeed, the EU does not offer Türkiye an objective membership perspective. The Commission should know that “You don’t chase an unattainable goal.” Could Türkiye be doing the same?

     

    The future course of the relationship between Türkiye and the EU is rather blurred. The future of Turkish citizens and its economy depends more on its own actions than on the EU’s decisions. If Türkiye truly desires EU membership, it must first and foremost demonstrate a firm political will to fulfil the criteria for membership. This unwavering determination must translate into concrete actions that uphold democratic principles, promote the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, and protect fundamental rights.

  • TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS IN 2021: AN OVERVIEW AND THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON TÜRKİYE - JANUARY 2022

    2021 was a détente and dialogue year for Turkey-EU relations which were characterised with the de-escalation in Eastern Mediterranean. However, no major breakthrough was achieved in the relations.

    2021 was a year in which Turkey-EU relations have improved compared to previous years. Turkey and the EU tried to leave behind tensions and problem areas and focus on the “positive agenda” instead. No concrete progress was made on major issues envisaged by the positive agenda such as the modernisation of Customs Union and visa liberalisation. However, there has been de-escalation in important areas of tension such as the Eastern Mediterranean and migration, which has increased hopes for the future of Turkey-EU relations.

    While most European Council meetings held in 2020 spelled out the possibility of additional sanctions concerning the rising tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, the situation took a better turn parallel to the moderation of the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of 2020. The European Council meeting in March 2021 expressed the EU’s willingness to “engage with Turkey in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner” and set out a roadmap to operationalise the positive agenda first proposed in October 2020. At the June 2021 European Council meeting, the importance of advancing cooperation with Turkey based on mutual interests was emphasized for the EU’s strategic interests. Messages expressing the EU’s desire for deepening sustainable cooperation with Turkey were conveyed by senior EU officials. However, neither Turkey’s EU accession process nor its candidacy status was highlighted at the European Council meetings. This gave the impression that Turkey’s EU accession bid was postponed for an indefinite period of time.

    The high-level dialogues and exchanges between Turkey and the EU intensified in 2021 most notably with the European Council and Commission Presidents visiting Turkey in April. At the European Council meeting in June, the EU signalled that high-level dialogue meetings between Turkey and the EU would take place on areas of common interest such as migration, health, climate change, counter-terrorism and regional issues. Turkey’s Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced at the annual assessment meeting that three new high-level dialogue mechanisms covering climate, migration and security, and public health were launched between Turkey and the EU. The first meetings under these dialogue mechanisms were held during the second half of the year.

    Turkey-EU Relations at the Year’s End: EU General Affairs Council Conclusions

    Prior to the European Council meeting on 16 December, the EU General Affairs Council convened to address the agenda for 2022 as well as the latest situation regarding enlargement. The outcome document adopted at the meeting included assessments on Turkey as well as other candidate and potential candidate countries.

    It is seen that the Council appreciates the Western Balkan countries for their efforts and cooperation which produced tangible results on migration, and Turkey for its efforts to continue to host more than 4 million refugees and to meet their needs. In this context, it was stated that the full implementation of the Turkey-EU Statement and the support of the Western Balkan countries on the migration route were necessary.

    The outcome document covers many issues related to Turkey and a critical language has been preferred in a way that has not changed in recent years. Reminding the European Council conclusions dated 24-25 June 2021 on the Eastern Mediterranean, it was stated that a safe and stable environment in the Eastern Mediterranean was the interest of the EU. Therefore, the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean was welcomed. In this context, the importance of establishing an open and sincere dialogue with Turkey and cooperating in areas of common interest such as migration, public health, climate change, and counter-terrorism was emphasized in order to address common problems.

    The Council noted that the resumption of high-level dialogues between the EU and Turkey and Turkey’s ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement were particularly noteworthy. However, as has been the case in recent years, it was stressed that the continuation of backsliding in areas such as democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and judicial independence caused concerns. Drawing attention to the pressure experienced by civil society, the impact on the judiciary and the detention of journalists, the Council pointed out that Turkey should increase its cooperation with the Council of Europe and related institutions and organisations, and fully implement the human rights conventions.

    It is known that the EU has been highly critical of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. Criticisms concerning Turkish foreign policy were also expressed in the General Affairs Council Conclusions. In this context, the Council reiterated its call for Turkey to progressively align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and primarily reverse the growing negative trend. It reminded the EU’s stance and position on the participation of Member States in international organisations. The Council welcomed the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean while expressing concern over Turkey’s contradicting EU’s priorities regarding Libya and Operation IRINI.

    There is strong emphasis on the Cyprus issue in the document. While the EU’s determination to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus issue was reiterated, it was stressed that it was vital for Turkey to commit and contribute to a peaceful solution on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality. Arguing that the re-opening of the fenced-off Maraş/Varosha was against UN Security Council resolutions, the Council urged Turkey to abandon the actions which the EU deemed unilateral and reverse all the steps taken in the area since October 2020.

    Turkey’s Response to the Conclusions and the Outlook for 2022

    Turkey responded to the General Affairs Council conclusions with a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 December. In the statement, Ankara emphasized that the EU was approaching enlargement from a membership solidarity perspective, rather than a strategic perspective. It was stated that Turkey was ignored as a country negotiating for EU accession and the EU denied the significance of Turkey for the EU and regional peace, stability and prosperity. Turkey interpreted the decisions as a “new example of abusing the EU for narrow-minded and selfish interests of certain member states”. In this regard, it was stated that the EU was adopting these conclusions not as a Union of principles and values, but rather as a bargaining interest group.

    It is seen that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs objected to criticisms regarding foreign policy in general and the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus issue in particular. It was mentioned that the Turkish Cypriots were still ignored and the criticisms reflected the maximalist attitude of the Greek Cypriot-Greek duo. On the other hand, Ankara called on the EU to see the truth, abandon its “strategic blindness” and end its unilateral and ideological policies towards Turkey.

    Looking back at the developments in 2021 and the conclusions adopted by the EU General Affairs Council, it is seen that the criticisms expressed in recent years continue. However, it must be mentioned that the high level of tension defining the relations in the past year has been replaced by a détente.

    In 2021, the dialogue between the two actors has increased and the level of tension, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, has subsided. No tangible progress has been made on topics concerning the positive agenda, such as the modernisation of the Customs Union and visa liberalisation. However, the decrease in the level of tension and resumption of dialogue has raised hopes for Turkey-EU relations in 2022. Of course, these hopes will be closely related to how much the EU brings back the enlargement spirit that lost momentum in recent years and whether Turkey brings the EU accession negotiations to the forefront of its political agenda.

    PRESIDENT ERDOĞAN: “TÜRKİYE SURELY IS COMMITTED TO ITS GOAL OF FULL EU MEMBERSHIP” – FEBRUARY 2022

    Addressing the ambassadors of EU countries, President Erdoğan underscored that the goal of EU membership continues to be a strategic priority for Turkey.

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came together with the ambassadors of EU countries to Turkey at the Çankaya Presidential Palace in Ankara on 13 January 2022. The last time President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted the ambassadors of EU countries in Ankara was on 12 January 2021, where he emphasized the importance of updating the 18 March Turkey-EU Statement, promotion of cooperation in the field of security and counter-terrorism, resumption of Turkey-EU summits and high-level dialogue meetings. At the meeting on 13 January 2022, President Erdoğan gave important messages on Turkey’s continued commitment to the full EU membership goal, the global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, cooperation on the root causes of migration to Europe and Turkey, the modernisation of the Customs Union and the Cyprus issue.

    Commencing his speech by greeting the ambassadors, President Erdoğan expressed his condolences to the ambassadors on the loss of European Parliament President David Sassoli who passed away on 11 January. President Erdoğan stated that partly due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the perception of security in the world has changed, threats have diversified, and the power struggle between countries was on the rise. President Erdoğan criticised the countries that witnessed the biggest health crisis of the century who turned inwards instead of choosing cooperation and solidarity, propounded that the current injustices increase every day in terms of fair access to vaccines and shouldering the economic burden of the pandemic.

    Turkey Is in Favour of Dialogue

    President Erdoğan highlighted that Turkey, as a candidate country negotiating EU accession, has a problem-solving role in important issues such as supply chains, terrorism, migration, security, defence, ethnocentrism, health, and energy supply security. Moreover, President Erdoğan emphasized Turkey’s readiness to take forward Turkey-EU relations in all areas at a critical time. President Erdoğan stressed that Turkey was in favour of dialogue and diplomacy to implement a positive agenda based on the accession perspective, but despite that the expected response from the EU had not come. President Erdoğan also expressed the hope for the EU to act more bravely in advancing relations with Turkey in 2022. Erdoğan mentioned that to achieve this, some Member States should abandon the tactic of solving the existing problems with Turkey in the corridors of the Union.

    The Migration Problem Continues to Deepen

    President Erdoğan underlined that it was unrealistic to expect migratory pressures to Europe and Turkey to decrease unless the current crises were resolved, and that the migration problem would continue to worsen if new crises were added to the existing ones. Erdoğan indicated that Turkey was striving to solve the main problems in the countries that are the source of irregular migration, and that it had prevented the northern part of Syria from turning into a terrorist centre that exports terrorists to the whole world, with cross-border operations. Erdoğan also mentioned the success story of Turkey, which has enabled nearly 500,000 Syrians to return to their homes safely and voluntarily. In addition, Erdoğan expressed that the necessary support was not received from the EU in this process, and that Turkey was trying to cope with this with extraordinary efforts. He also criticised the EU for not implementing the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme.

    Customs Union, Visa Liberalisation, and the Cyprus Issue

    Modernisation of the Customs Union, which would be to the advantage of both the EU and Turkey, was also among the key issues President Erdoğan referred to in his address. Stressing that the process was frustrated by political motives and resulted in a damage for both sides, Erdoğan underscored that some Member States voted against some aspects of the positive agenda, modernisation ofthe Customs Union in particular, and therefore applied a delaying tactic against Turkey to prevent the realisation of the positive agenda between Turkey and the EU. President Erdoğan also noted that some members exploited the rights emanating from EU membership and sacrificed the EU’s collective interests for political motives.

    Erdoğan stated that progress should be made particularly on visa liberalisation and the modernisation of the Customs Union in the coming days, saying that Turkey has made significant progress in meeting the remaining six of the 72 benchmarks specified under the visa liberalisation dialogue.

    Concerning the Cyprus issue and the Eastern Mediterranean, President Erdoğan said that Turkey was operating the dialogue mechanism with Greece and was making great efforts to the de-escalation of tensions in the region. Stating that the problems could be solved through direct constructive dialogue with Greece, President Erdoğan also stressed that Turkey’s stance on the Cyprus issue was clear. Highlighting that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots should not be ignored, Erdoğan expressed that acknowledging the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriots would also contribute to the emergence of a more cooperative environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. President Erdoğan also called on the EU to deliver on the promises it had made to the Turkish Cypriots in 2004 to ensure these conditions.

    The EU Remains Turkey’s Strategic Priority

    Pointing out to the developments in Turkey and EU’s shared neighbourhood, President Erdoğan emphasized that cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy should be strengthened. Noting that Turkey belongs to the European continent geographically, historically and socially, he said that Turkey has been aspiring for EU membership for more than 50 years. President Erdoğan stated that despite all the injustices that were done to Turkey on the way to full membership, Ankara was fully committed to the goal of EU membership which remains its strategic priority. “It is in our common interest to act with a long-term perspective rather than with prejudice or fear,” Erdoğan said. President Erdoğan also stated that he expected the ambassadors attending the meeting to support the opening of a new page in Turkey-EU relations.

    THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR AND TÜRKİYE’S POSITION - MARCH 2022

    Supporting a diplomatic solution to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Turkey has proposed acting as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, however as the tension escalates into a broader war, Turkey finds itself in an increasingly delicate position.

    Turkey is one of the countries that will be most affected by the Ukrainian-Russian war due to its good relations with these two countries, which stand in a delicate balance, and for many reasons such as the security of the Black Sea. Aware of the possible risks, Ankara has been trying to de-escalate the crisis from the very beginning.

    Dynamics of Turkey’s Relations with Ukraine and Russia

    Looking at Turkey’s relations with Ukraine, Crimea and the Crimean Tatars occupy a special place due to Turkey’s strong historical ties. Turkey, which defines Russia’s intervention in Crimea as an invasion and rejects the illegal annexation of Crimea, has supported Ukraine in this regard from day one and has frequently expressed its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, political unity, and territorial integrity. Turkey has also gradually expanded its defence cooperation with Ukraine, particularly through the sale of armed drones. In addition, the signing of a free trade agreement, which is projected to increase the volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and Ukraine to 10 billion dollars, and a defence agreement seeking to boost the drone trade between the two countries within the framework of President Erdoğan’s visit to Ukraine on 3 February 2022 is expected to advance relations further.

    Turkey’s relations with Russia are more complex. Turkey has developed strong bilateral relations with Russia in the economic and political spheres despite being a member of NATO. Turkey and Russia have managed to maintain a functioning relationship even though their interests diverge in geographies such as Syria, North Africa and the South Caucasus. Russia is Turkey’s largest supplier of natural gas and one of Turkey’s top three trading partners. Turkey imports 70% of its wheat, one of the most strategic products in agriculture, from Russia. Russia is one of the countries that sends the most tourists to Turkey. In addition, Russia is the country building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant and from which Turkey has acquired the S-400 air defence system despite enormous pressure from the US.

    Turkey has so far managed to maintain a balance between actors such as Russia, Ukraine, NATO and the US despite the present conflicts and hostilities. However, the Russia-Ukraine war risks pressuring Turkey’s policy which is based on a delicate balancing act. As the level of tension escalates and the West slaps massive sanctions on Russia, Turkey might be expected to make a choice. This implies that it will not be easy for Turkey to escape sanctions imposed on Russia, and Turkey might face significant pressure to align with the restrictive measures imposed by the EU.

    In case of deterioration of relations with Russia, many economic and political issues may cause trouble for Turkey. The damage to bilateral economic and trade relations, mentioned in detail above, may cause difficulties for the Turkish economy and Turkish businesses. Disruption of the flow of natural gas that Turkey receives from Russia may lead to an energy crisis in Turkey, disruption of wheat supplies may affect Turkey’s access to many staple foods, and the decline in Russian tourists coming to Turkey may seriously affect Turkey’s tourism revenues. In addition, Russia may take action against Turkey in theatres such as Syria, North Africa, and the South Caucasus, risking a deterioration of the sensitive relations.

    In addition to all these, the possible discussions concerning passages from the Turkish Straits and the deterioration of the status quo in the region pose a threat to Turkey’s long-standing policy of balance in the Black Sea. Turkey does not want the US and NATO to have too much presence in the region, nor does Turkey want Russia to gain more power in the Black Sea.

    Turkey’s Position Regarding the Ukraine Crisis

    Aware of all these risks, Turkey has repeatedly underlined its support for a diplomatic solution and proposed to play a mediating role between Russia and Ukraine. As a matter of fact, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during his visit to Ukraine on 3 February, said that an agreement had been reached with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that if Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin were to meet, there is a possibility that meeting could take place in Turkey. In January, President Erdoğan had spoken on the phone with Russian President President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Zelensky, inviting the two leaders to Turkey to find a solution to the crisis.

    However, Putin’s signing of documents recognising the independence of the so-called “people’s republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine on 21 February has left diplomatic efforts inconclusive, including those by Turkey. The Turkish Foreign Ministry reacted to this move by issuing a statement rejecting Russia’s decision regarding the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Similarly, President Erdoğan stressed that the recognition of the so-called “republics” was a clear violation of Ukraine’s political unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, President Erdoğan’s statement that Turkey did not want to make a choice between Ukraine and Russia was remarkable in demonstrating Turkey’s efforts to maintain the delicate balance between Russia and the West.

    Following Russia’s decision to launch a military operation against Ukraine in the early hours of 24 February, President Erdoğan indicated that Russia’s military operation against Ukraine was unacceptable and stressed that Turkey considered the operation as a violation of international law. Moreover, Erdoğan added that “Turkey supports the struggle Ukraine wages to protect its territorial integrity.”

    Despite all these developments, Turkey has not given up its desire to be a mediator between the parties. Calling for a halt of Russian military operations in Ukraine during a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 26 February, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey was ready to host negotiations that could take place between Ukraine and Russia. On the fourth day of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, indicating that the situation constitutes a war, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu announced that Turkey will implement all provisions of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits in a transparent manner.

    TÜRKİYE’S RISING PROFILE IN DIPLOMACY AND THE ANTALYA DIPLOMACY FORUM – APRIL 2022

    The international community’s attention turned to Antalya where Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministers met thanks to Turkey’s mediation efforts and many prominent leaders gathered for the 2nd edition of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

    The 8th İstanbul Mediation Conference was held under the auspices of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in Antalya on 10 March 2022. For the first time this year, the conference was realised outside of İstanbul to create a synergy with the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. The conference was held under the theme “Spotlight on Mediation in a Changing Peace Landscape”. During the conference, which is Turkey’s contribution to the world with its solution-oriented diplomatic approach, regional and global problems were discussed. However, the most remarkable moment of the conference was the appearance of Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sitting around the same table. Thanks to Turkey’s mediation effort, Ukraine and Russia had a high-level diplomatic contact for the first time since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu stressed the importance of mediation and reconciliation to ensure lasting peace and stability after the trilateral meeting.

    Although no agreement was reached on a ceasefire, Turkey succeeded in gathering the two sides around the same table to negotiate the terms of a possible compromise. Foreign Ministers Kuleba and Lavrov praised Turkey for its efforts and support, while Kuleba signalled that Ukraine would not leave the diplomatic table and would continue to participate in similar efforts in the future. In addition, for the first time since the war began, the meeting provided an opportunity for the press to address their questions directly to the governments in Moscow and Kyiv. Nearly 400 local and foreign media representatives came to Antalya to follow the Turkey-Ukraine-Russia Trilateral Foreign Ministers Meeting.

    The 2nd Antalya Diplomacy Forum Took Place at a Critical Moment

    On 11-13 March, the 2nd Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF), held under the auspices of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and hosted by Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu, took place at a critical time when the Russia-Ukraine war was unfolding. 17 heads of state and government, 80 ministers and 39 representatives of international organisations attended the Forum, which hosted more than 3,000 participants from 75 countries in total. Commenting on this high level of participation, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu said that about 40% of the world was represented at the highest level in the ADF. President Recep Erdoğan held 11 meetings and Çavuşoğlu held a total of 67 bilateral meetings during the Forum.

    The rich content of the ADF was shaped around the question of “how can we better use diplomacy to fight injustices in the world?”. The ADF, which expanded in content compared to last year, covered numerous topics such as climate change, clean energy, energy security, security in Europe, the role of the UN, democratic governance, justice, maritime borders, food security and agriculture, irregular migration, green economy, and gender equality. In parallel with these themes, three meetings of heads of state and government, 27 panels, four interviews, three roundtable meetings and side events took place throughout the ADF. The Forum, centred on the main theme of “Recoding Diplomacy,” focused on what can be done in a collaborative effort to manage change, facilitate adaptation, and foster collaboration to address global challenges by leveraging technology and innovative digital diplomacy capabilities.

    Leaders and diplomats from various countries conveyed important messages about the Ukraine-Russia war, holding discussions on the global importance of various issues, in sessions “The Price of Peace, the Cost of War” and “Paths to Peace and Prosperity” in particular. The ADF, with its format, high-level of participants and its broad content, has taken its place among the important platforms shaping discussions in the field of international relations, and highlighted that we need diplomacy more than ever.

    Stoltenberg Praised Turkey’s Leadership Role

    NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who attended the first day of the ADF, held bilateral talks with President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu. Stoltenberg praised Turkey for facilitating diplomatic and political processes that “could lead to a peaceful discussion between Ukraine and Russia” and called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war. At the same time, Stoltenberg noted that “NATO is partially united in imposing unprecedented costs on Russia in a way that we have not seen before”.

    Borrell Pointed Out to the Importance of Turkey

    EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell attended the second day of the ADF and held several bilateral talks, including with Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu. During his meeting with Minister Çavuşoğlu, High Representative Borrell discussed how Ankara and Brussels could work together to mitigate the impact of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Borrell also noted that this situation should strengthen relations with Turkey as a partner and a candidate for full EU membership. Speaking at the panel session on EU’s strategic autonomy, Borrell said that Turkey is an important geopolitical actor and that its influence extends to Africa. Borrell emphasized that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine challenged the world and Europe, and that these challenges were growing every day. “All these problems affect all of us, the EU Member States, NATO, and Turkey. We need to strengthen our relations with Turkey, and that is why I am here”, Borrell added.

    Constructive Talks with Armenia

    On 12 March, one of the most notable meetings on the sidelines of ADF took place between Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. Both foreign ministers issued constructive statements after their meeting. Çavuşoğlu and Mirzoyan reiterated that the two rounds of normalisation talks had begun and stated that they were assessing the process. “We are working for stability and peace in the South Caucasus and receive support from all sides for our efforts in this direction”, Çavuşoğlu told the reporters.

    STEERING EU SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY THROUGH TURBULENT WATERS: WHERE DOES THE STRATEGIC COMPASS POINT? - MAY 2022

    The Strategic Compass offers a detailed action plan to reinforce the EU’s role as a security provider. However, it represents a missed opportunity in unlocking the vast full potential of Turkey-EU security cooperation due to its problematic stance vis-à-vis Turkey.

    The long-awaited “Strategic Compass” document was formally approved by the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 March 2022 and later endorsed by the European Council.The Strategic Compass aims to steer the course of the EU’s security and defence policies in the next five to ten years.Two years in the making, the Strategic Compass comes at an overly critical moment when great power competition has intensified, the core tenets of the rules-based international order are under attack and the European security architecture is undergoing a profound transformation due to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

    Unlike its predecessors, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the Strategic Compass is not just a strategy document, but also a guide for action with timetables and concrete deliverables. Moreover, the fact that the Strategic Compass was borne out of a process led by EU capitals increases the hope that the Member States will be more willing to implement the identified actions. Dubbed as “part strategy, part action guide”, the document includes a detailed action plan consisting of more than 50 actions to be fulfilled over the next five years. It is important to note that the document has undergone six revisions since the presentation of the first draft in November 2021 and the language on Russia has been substantially toughened at the request of the Baltic states and Poland. A major novelty regarding the Strategic Compass has to do with the fact that it includes the first-ever EU-wide threat assessment which is regarded as a significant step on the path to a common strategic culture.

    Four Pillars of the Strategic Compass

    In an era of raw power politics, the Strategic Compass aims to boost the EU’s role as a security provider and to equip it with the ability to think and act strategically building on the following four pillars: Act, Secure, Invest,
    Partner. In order to improve the EU’s ability to act swiftly and robustly in the face of crises, the Strategic Compass proposes the creation of the “EU Rapid Deployment Capacity” consisting of 5,000 troops by 2025, which is the most striking initiative in the document. This flexible modular force, which will consist of air, land, and maritime components, is to be deployed in different operational scenarios and increase its readiness through EU-wide regular live exercises.

    Moreover, the document underlines the necessity to reinforce CSDP missions and operations through a more rapid and flexible decision-making process. This implies mobilising the Treaty provisions providing for flexibility and differentiated integration in CSDP such as forming ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” and the use of “constructive abstention” enshrined in Articles 44 and 31 of the Lisbon Treaty. Increasing financial solidarity, military mobility, and developing the capacity to station 200 fully equipped civilian experts in crisis areas within 30 days by mid-2023 form the other actions foreseen under this pillar.

    Under the second pillar, which focuses on improving the EU’s ability to deter and respond to the fast-changing nature of threats, the document concentrates on boosting the EU’s ability in countering hybrid and cyber threats. To this end, various “toolboxes” combining different instruments in a more coordinated manner are to be developed.

    Based on the understanding that the EU’s collective ambition to become a more robust security provider should be matched with adequate resources, the Strategic Compass includes a pledge by the Member States to substantially increase their defence spending and invest more in disruptive technologies, under the third pillar. The changing threat perceptions due to Russia’s war on Ukraine have led numerous EU capitals such as Berlin, Copenhagen, and Warsaw to announce vast defence budgets and more Member States are expected to follow suit. At a time when the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to put pressure on national budgets, the EU’s recent defence initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) have become more important than ever. The Strategic Compass puts forward proposals such as VAT exemption and a bonus system to encourage joint capability development and joint procurement to make full use of these instruments.

    Finally, the fourth pillar focuses on strengthening cooperation with long-standing strategic partners such as NATO, UN, and regional organisations including the OSCE and ASEAN as well as developing tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners such as Turkey, the US, the UK, and Norway.
    Establishing tailored partnerships with Western Balkan countries as well as southern and eastern neighbours
    through enhanced dialogue is another priority in this regard.

    The Strategic Compass and Turkey

    The document’s position on Turkey highlights the dichotomy between the short-term interests of the certain Member States and the collective interests of the EU in the EU’s effort to set a long-term strategic vision. Given Turkey’s status as an EU candidate country and a key NATO Ally and the significant role Ankara has been playing in mediating a ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv, the way the document mentions Turkey is quite problematic and difficult to comprehend. The document cites Turkey in two sections, firstly in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean where the security environment is analysed in a rather negative light, and secondly in the section on bilateral partnerships as a cooperation partner with long-standing contributions to CSDP missions and operations. In the latter part, while underlining the EU’s commitment to developing a mutually beneficial partnership with Turkey, the document argues that this would require an equal commitment on the part of Turkey to cooperation and de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean as stated in the 25 March 2021 European Council Statement.

    The fact that the section on the Eastern Mediterranean was written with a language reflecting Greek and Greek Cypriot claims, has triggered strong criticism from Ankara. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement issued on 22 March 2022, noted that this section seems to have been dictated by the Greek and Greek Cypriot duo who have maximalist maritime boundary claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Given the document’s failure to point the right direction, the Foreign Ministry stated that it could be perceived neither as a “compass” nor as “strategic”. Finally, referring to the Russia- Ukraine war and Ankara’s mediation efforts, “Taking into account the latest developments, it is unfortunate and non-visionary for the EU that the document misses the truth and reality and sees a candidate country and a NATO Ally from such a shallow perspective”, the statement noted.
    It is very unfortunate that a document that should provide long-term guidance and a strategic vision for the EU’s defence and security policies has become hostage to the unilateral claims of certain Member States. If it had been designed with a more objective and balanced approach regarding

    Turkey, the Strategic Compass could have been a game-changer. Not only would it present concrete opportunities for revitalising Turkey-EU relations which would ultimately contribute to the deepening of NATO-EU cooperation, as stated in the Compass, but it would also reinforce the EU’s global actorness. In its present form, however, the document represents a missed opportunity in this respect. Both Turkey and the EU have a lot to win from closer cooperation in security and defence. Turkey could provide substantial added value to the EU’s defence initiatives and turn the EU into a true geopolitical actor.

    9 MAY EUROPE DAY CELEBRATED WITH MESSAGES FROM KEY EUROPEAN AND TURKISH OFFICIALS - JUNE 2022

    While Turkey-EU relations are progressing within the scope of the Positive Agenda, Turkey has determinedly been maintaining its ultimate goal, EU membership. Therefore, 9 May has been celebrated as “Europe Day” in Turkey as well since the approval of Turkey’s candidacy.

    Symbolically celebrated on 9 May every year, Europe Day marks the anniversary of the historic Schuman Declaration, which is considered to be the first step towards European integration.

    However, Europe Day has been celebrated bitterly for the last two years, especially due to the COVID-19 pandemic that has negatively affected the EU. This year’s Europe Day, on the other hand, was celebrated in an atmosphere where the future of the long-established prosperity and peaceful environment in Europe came into question in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine war.

    With the security concerns European countries had to face following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the former Eastern Bloc countries started to turn towards the West. This reminded the international community that the security and welfare of their countries had been provided by the West all along.

    In this context, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia applied to become full EU members without delay. Furthermore, Sweden’s and Finland’s application for NATO membership on 8 May 2022 also escalated the debates on European security. Thus, how long the EU’s institutional and security architecture can withstand all these events and changing European conditions has become a significant discussion topic.

    The economic consequences of the war undoubtedly brought a rise in prices of many products, especially food. Hence, the outbreak of war on the edge of EU borders has further aggravated the burden on the EU economy, which was already fragile due to the lasting economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

    On Europe Day celebrated in such an atmosphere, EU leaders once again accentuated the importance and achievements of the EU project. By recalling that the foundations of the Union were laid 72 years ago, the leaders expressed that the EU would emerge stronger from the crises, just like the previous ones experienced throughout the history of EU integration.

    Amongst all EU leaders, it was French President Emmanuel Macron who made the most resonant proposal, which was also on behalf of the Presidency of the Council of the EU and envisaged the establishment of a European political community. During his address on Europe Day, Macron emphasised that the EU membership negotiation processes of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia could continue for many years. Instead, Macron advocated the establishment of a larger political community in Europe consisting of the democratic EU Member States and non-EU states.

    The Conference on the Future of Europe

    Another important development that marked this year’s Europe Day was the finalisation of the Conference on the Future of Europe. Throughout the one-year journey, EU citizens discussed what kind of Europe they want to see in the future. Unlike the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002, candidate countries were not invited to make contributions to this conference. The debate subjects included climate change and the environment, health, economy, social justice, unemployment, foreign policy, security, democracy, rule of law, rights and values, digital transformation, migration, education, culture, youth, and sports. While the final report centred around 49 proposals, the proposals that required changes in the EU treaties aroused interest the most and brought to fore discussions on institutional reform.

    The Future of Turkey-EU Relations and Turkish Leaders’ Messages on the Europe Day

    Despite being a long-lasting EU candidate country, Turkey was not invited to make contributions to the conference. However, Turkey has not withdrawn from its aim of becoming a member state of the EU. It has continued to contribute to the debates on the future of Europe and to make its voice heard. In this context, a series of online meetings were carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs in order to receive the opinions of Turkish young people, NGOs working in the field of youth, and academics on the future of Europe and the EU. Within the scope of the “Future of Europe and Youth” meetings consisting of four series, young people had the opportunity to express their views.

    In the message issued on the occasion of Europe Day, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underscored the importance of focusing on mutual interests rather than differences. On the other hand, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs Ambassador Faruk Kaymakcı quoted: “Turkey’s membership in the EU will be a great gain not only for Turkey or the EU but also for the world and third countries. That’s why we celebrate Europe Day with enthusiasm and wish Turkey’s EU membership process to accelerate.” The Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu also asserted that “Turkey has always contributed to the region’s stability and prosperity and Ankara will continue to follow cooperation and dialogue-based policy.”

    The key Turkish officials’ messages on Europe Day demonstrate that Turkey still regards EU membership as a primary goal that will contribute to both parties. Although Turkey-EU relations are progressing within the scope of the Positive Agenda at the moment, it does not mean that Turkey has moved away from its ultimate goal, the EU membership.

    RETHINK, REBUILD, REPOWER: PRIORITIES OF THE CZECH EU PRESIDENCY AND PROSPECTS FOR TÜRKİYE-EU RELATIONS - JULY 2022

    The Czech Republic, also known as Czechia, took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from France for the second half of 2022 on  July 2022. The Czech Republic takes over the EU Presidency for the second time after its EU Presidency in the first half of 2009.

    The Czech Republic will carry out this task with France and Sweden under the th Presidency Trio. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 not only brought a “security concern” to the EU agenda, but also affected the priorities of the Prague administration for the EU Presidency, which will last until the end of 2022. In this case, the priorities of the Presidency have been announced on 5 June 2022 at the Hrzánsky Palace by Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala. Priorities include the management of the refugee crisis and Ukraine’s post-war recovery, energy security, strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and cyberspace security, strategic resilience of the European economy, and the resilience of democratic institutions.

    At the press conference, it was also announced that the motto of the Czech Presidency would be

    “Europe as a task: rethink, rebuild, repower”, inspired by a speech delivered by former Czech President Václav Havel at the Charlemagne Award ceremony on 5 May 996. The motto emphasises that the tasks ahead of Europe should be handled carefully and comprehensively. Within the scope of the motto, priorities and logo design, the Czech Republic has declared to the entire European nation that it sees its EU Presidency as a “call to duty”.

    The Main Priorities Set out by the Czech Presidency

    First of all, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, which has been on the agenda of Europe since 24 February, will be, unsurprisingly, one of the prior topics on the EU agenda during the Czech Presidency. This priority includes the continuation of the economic sanctions against Russia and the continuation of the military and political support given to Ukraine by the EU countries. In addition, it was announced that the situation of Ukrainian refugees who rushed into Eastern European countries as a result of the ongoing conflicts will be one of the issues to be addressed during the Czech Presidency.

    Secondly, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine deepened the energy security concerns of the EU. In particular,

    the efforts to impose sanctions on Russian oil and natural gas led to the objections of various EU countries who are dependent on Russian fossil fuels. For this reason, the energy security debates will continue to

    be one of the main subjects during the Czech Presidency. It was stated in the declaration that the EU could not be dependent on the countries that directly threaten its security and therefore had to end its dependence on Russian gas, oil, and coal. It was emphasised that the implementation of the REPowerEU should have been accelerated, and that energy sources should have been diversified by investing in low-emission and renewable energy.

    Third, it was announced that defence and cybersecurity should be strengthened. In this context, it has been noted that the implementation of the Strategic Compass, which constitutes the EU’s military strategy for 2030, would be supported. However, these capabilities will be realised

    by cooperating with non-European partners under the umbrella of NATO. It was remarked that implementation efforts of the EU Hybrid Toolbox would be accelerated.

    Fourth, the economy will become more prominent, particularly in relation to the global inflation trend, rising energy prices, and deterioration of the supply chain. The COVID-9 pandemic and Russia-Ukraine war have severely disrupted global supply chains and increased energy prices to a record level. Therefore, tackling these economic problems would be a priority of the Czech Presidency.

    Last but not least, democratic values will be one of the main headings of the Czech Presidency. In this regard, the Prague administration has set some goals such as transparent financing of political parties, the independence of mass media and establishing an open dialogue with citizens in order to maintain and develop democratic values and the rule of law in the EU.

    Türkiye-EU Relations Under the Czech Presidency

    The future of Türkiye-EU relations during the Czech Presidency should also be mentioned in this regard.

    In domestic politics, Türkiye has entered a period in which it shifted its focus to soaring inflation, supply chain problems, and the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, due

    to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, Türkiye’s importance in terms of European security has increased and due to this fact, Türkiye developed a dynamic foreign policy agenda. These issues in domestic and foreign policy will become the determining factors in Türkiye-EU relations during the Czech Presidency.

    Türkiye enjoys positive relations with the Czech Republic and the Prague administration supports Türkiye’s EU membership process. Czech Prime Minister Andrej

    Babiš visited Türkiye in 209 and emphasised that the two countries act together on many issues. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Negotiator Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu wrote an article in the Czech newspaper Lidove Noviny last month. Noting that the Czech Presidency is an opportunity for Türkiye-EU relations, Çavuşoğlu emphasised that Türkiye contributed to the EU in many areas such as security, defence, foreign policy, energy security, economy, and migration management.

    In April 2022, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs Ambassador Faruk Kaymakcı paid an official visit to the Deputy Foreign Minister for European Issues of Czech Republic Aleš Chmelar. During the meeting, they pointed out that the cooperation between

    Türkiye, Czech Republic and the EU would be increased during the Czech EU Presidency, and that the two actors also agreed on reviving Türkiye’s EU membership process.

    In the first half of 2022, during the French Presidency of the Council of the EU, Türkiye and the EU attempted to turn a new page in their relationship and various high-level dialogue meetings were held in

    this regard. In this context, we have witnessed positive developments such as the first high-level agricultural dialogue between the two actors, the holding of a political dialogue meeting at the political directors’ level, or the Türkiye-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting after three years. Maintaining this momentum during the Czech Presidency is quite significant for the normalisation of Türkiye-EU relations, which have faced many crises in recent years. The Czech Republic’s supportive attitude towards Türkiye may increase the dialogue and high-level meetings between the two actors.

    In conclusion, we should note as a warning that there are also various minefields that could increase the tension in Türkiye-EU relations during the Czech Presidency. For example, the EU’s reaction to a possible new military operation by Türkiye in Northern Syria may create tensions in the relations. On the other hand, the EU’s backing for Greece in the event of a possible escalation between Türkiye and Greece as a result of Athens’ militarisation of the Eastern Aegean Islands is another minefield for the future of relations. Possible developments on these issues could de-escalate the tension amongst

    the parties if the dialogue would be increased instead of nonconstructive criticism, while another scenario could lead the current ongoing dialogue to be frozen, as has been experienced in previous years.

    HISTORIC DEAL BROKERED ON GRAIN CORRIDOR AS A RESULT OF SUCCESSFUL TURKISH DIPLOMACY - AUGUST 2022

    With the historic deal, the hopes are high that the İstanbul facility will speed up grain shipments through the Black Sea.

    Since Russia’s invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukrainian grain has been in short supply worldwide. The fact that Ukraine accounted for 10% of global wheat exports in 2021 caused concerns in global food security with the outbreak of the war. While the war has also driven up food prices, the concerns have increased as more than 20 million tons of grain have been stuck at Black Sea ports in Ukraine. Hence, to ensure global food security, Ukraine and Russia signed the historic deal with Türkiye and the UN on 22 July 2022. Türkiye’s efforts to mediate the Russia-Ukraine crisis resulted in two Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) signed in Istanbul to restart grain shipments from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. The deal was signed by Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov and Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu while Defence Minister Hulusi Akar and UN Secretary-General António Guterres signed the deal on behalf of Türkiye and the UN, respectively.

    How Will the Deal Work?

    The primary aim of the deal is to secure the passage of grain and essential goods from three Ukrainian ports, Odesa, Chernomorsky and Yuzhny. The deal also seeks to guarantee the safe passage of Russian-made fertiliser products, amidst efforts to ease a global food crisis provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

    According to the deal, the entire operation will be managed by a coordination centre established in Istanbul. Officials from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine, and the UN will be represented in this centre so that the security of vessels on their way to the world markets and to the Ukrainian ports in Odesa, Pivdennyi, and Chornomorsk will be jointly monitored.

    The agreement will be effective for 120 days and will be renewed after without further negotiations. This was necessary in order not to interrupt the supply of food and fertilisers to the world market.

    As demining the surrounding of these ports will take time, the parties agreed that the commercial vessels will be guided by the Ukrainian navy until they reach a safe corridor in the Black Sea. Russia’s concerns over the possibility of Ukrainian empty vessels carrying weapons and military equipment were also taken into consideration. Before the deal was signed, the Ukrainian government warned Russia against any provocations. The Ukrainian side added that in case of provocations, they will use an immediate military response and that Ukraine did not sign an agreement with Russia, but with Türkiye and the UN as mediators.

    Under the deal, Ukrainian naval vessels will guide the ships carrying the grain through the mined areas on the coast, using a map of safe channels provided by the Ukrainian side. The ships will then cross the Black Sea towards Türkiye’s Istanbul Strait.

    Ukraine plans to ship around 25 million tons of wheat to the world markets. Many countries in Africa depend on Ukrainian and Russian wheat to escape the shortage of food. The deal will also allow the unimpeded access of fertilisers from Russia, which is one of the major producers in the world, to global markets.

    As a result of Türkiye’s and UN’s efforts, both the US and the EU provided assurances that there will be no sanctions on the companies and vessels transporting Russian products to the world markets. Banking and insurance procedures will also be exempted from these sanctions. On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia could export around 50 million tons of wheat until the end of this year.

    Türkiye’s Role on the MoUs

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his gratitude to those who contributed to making these deals possible, including Russia, Ukraine, and the UN, stressing that all parties involved have the right to feel proud of this initiative in resolving the global food crisis. President Erdoğan emphasised that millions of people will be relieved of the danger of starving as a result of the deal. He added his expectation that the deal signed in İstanbul will revive hopes for ending the war in Ukraine.

    On the other hand, UN Secretary-General Guterres started his speech by thanking Türkiye for its endeavours and persistence, stressing that Ankara’s efforts in the process have proved essential to brokering the deal. While stating that the deal did not come easy and should be implemented thoroughly in order to avoid a food crisis, Guterres also emphasised the role Türkiye will play in the implementation of this humanitarian mission in the Black Sea. Lastly, Guterres highlighted that the deal would pave the way to significant volumes of food exports from Ukraine and alleviate a food and economic crisis in the developing world.

    THE TRILATERAL SUMMIT WAS HELD IN LVIV: TÜRKİYE TO REBUILD UKRAINIAN INFRASTRUCTURE - SEPTEMBER 2022

    Türkiye continues diplomatic efforts to reduce tension in the Russian-Ukrainian war as well as maintaining the security of Ukrainian grain exports.

    On 18 August 2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UN Secretary-General António Guterres met in Lviv to discuss the potential steps to be taken to end the Russia-Ukraine war by diplomacy, to retain the mechanism established for the export of Ukraine’s grain and to exchange views about the precarious situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

    The summit marked President Erdoğan’s first visit to Ukraine since the Russian invasion. Prior to the Trilateral Summit, President Zelensky and President Erdoğan came together and discussed the economic, trade and defence industry relations between Ankara and Kyiv within the scope of the ongoing war. The two leaders also discussed how the conflict should be resolved, as President Erdoğan has been asking Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate a ceasefire in Türkiye. President Zelensky described Erdoğan’s visit as “a strong message of support”.

    Following the two presidents’ private meeting, Türkiye and Ukraine signed an agreement regarding the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. The agreement was signed by Turkish Trade Minister Mehmet Muş and Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov. The agreement included a decision to establish a task force for Ukraine’s reconstruction which will coordinate the necessary efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s water, electricity, hospitals, bridges, schools, and other infrastructure.

    Separately, President Erdoğan stated that Ukrainian people who fled to Türkiye will be temporarily hosted until peace is restored in the conflict zones, and support will be provided for the reconstruction of Ukrainian cities which have been heavily damaged by the war. Erdoğan also invited the international community to take responsibility for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

    Markets Finally Accessed the Ukrainian Grain

    On 22 July 2022, Türkiye, the UN, Russia, and Ukraine signed the İstanbul Grain Agreement to reopen three Ukrainian ports – Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny – to allow the export of Ukrainian grain that has been stuck for months due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The positive effects of the İstanbul Grain Agreement, which paved the way for the export of Ukrainian grain to the global market via the Black Sea, were addressed by President Erdoğan at the summit. After the agreement, the first commercial ship departed from the Ukrainian port on 1 August while 25 ships, and 625 thousand tons of Ukrainian grain accessed the world’s market in August.

    “We Don’t Want to Experience a New Chernobyl”

    Zaporizhzhia, where the Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is located, was also one of the topics the leaders discussed at the Trilateral Summit. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, located near the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar, causes concern in nearby countries as it was damaged by being shelled. The power plant was occupied by Russian forces in March 2022. A possible radiation accident in Zaporizhzhia could affect not only the EU Member States, but also Türkiye, Georgia and even distant territories. President Zelensky sought help from the international community as the nuclear power plant could cause a disaster in the region and he demanded new sanctions against Russia in this regard. President Zelensky also addressed UN Secretary-General Guterres during the summit that the UN should ensure the security of the facility. Zelensky previously reiterated that the Russian army should leave the plant, but Russia refused this request. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg also made a statement that the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors should be allowed to examine the region and that Russian troops should be withdrawn from the region. On the subject, Erdoğan stated that Türkiye will remain on Ukraine’s side to maintain the security of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, emphasising that measures should be taken to prevent another Chernobyl disaster.

    “Türkiye Is Ready to Undertake the Mediation Task to Ensure Peace”

    During the press conference following the Trilateral Summit, President Erdoğan addressed that an exemplary action was carried out by the UN, Ukraine and Türkiye to secure the grain exports as the İstanbul Grain Agreement made the transportation of Ukrainian grain from the Black Sea to the whole global market possible. About the ongoing war, Erdoğan stated that “As Türkiye, we are ready to provide all kinds of support and to undertake the task of mediation to ensure peace.”

    As a NATO member and an EU candidate country, Türkiye aims to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war by preventive diplomacy. Türkiye has acted as a mediator between the two sides since the beginning of the conflict while underlining its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Maintaining stable relations with both countries allows Türkiye to act with international interests. Taking this into account, President Erdoğan is expected to meet with also Russian President Putin to discuss the outputs of the summit. The summit indicates Türkiye will continue its leadership in the resolution of the crisis by increasing its efforts to bring the parties together in the the coming days.

    TÜRKİYE HAS A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY IN AN ENLARGED EU - OCTOBER 2022

    Despite highlighting further enlargement as a necessity for a “geopolitical EU”, European leaders Scholz and von der Leyen failed to demonstrate the same enthusiasm for Türkiye’s membership bid although it is crucial for the EU’s emergence as a geopolitical actor.

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz outlined his ideas on the future of Europe in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine in a speech he delivered at Charles University in Prague on 29 August 2022. Making the case for a “geopolitical Europe”, Scholz defined his vision for an EU consisting of 30 to 36 Member States and called for internal EU reform to adapt to an enlarged EU. Scholz expressed his staunch support for the EU’s eastward enlargement namely to the countries described as the “Western Balkans” along with the “Association Trio” i.e. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia which were granted an EU perspective in June, as a necessity to ensure stability in Europe and protect the values at the core of Europe. Calling for the accession perspective of the aforementioned countries to be taken seriously, the German Chancellor stated that the candidate countries deserved support on their paths to the EU. Missing from Chancellor Scholz’s classification of prospective Member States; however, was Türkiye which has more extensive and deep-rooted relations with the EU than any of these states.

    A similar omission was made by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who made no mention of Türkiye while talking about enlargement in her annual State of the European Union address on 14 September 2022. In an address that focused largely on the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of the Kremlin’s aggression and how the EU plans to mitigate the shockwaves caused by the war, von der Leyen underscored that the EU would not be complete without integrating the Western Balkan countries, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Turning to the peoples of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, she sent the following message: “You are part of our family, your future is in our Union, and our Union is not complete without you!”. While welcoming these countries with open arms, Commission President von der Leyen did not demonstrate the same welcoming approach to the people of Türkiye.

    Türkiye Holds the Key to the EU’s Quest for Geopolitical Actorness

    The speeches by these two influential EU leaders portray a worrying tendency to overlook Türkiye’s status as a candidate country destined to join the EU. The absence of references to Türkiye in the two speeches speaks volumes not only about the light in which the EU views Türkiye, but also about how the EU’s current leadership charts the future of the European project. While charting the EU’s future direction, EU leaders should bear in mind that an EU that does not have Türkiye as a member would be solely confined to the European continent and lack global outreach along with the capacity to become a security provider for its own citizens.

    Moreover, Chancellor Scholz and Commission President von der Leyen’s selective reading of the EU’s enlargement policy is quite problematic as Türkiye has always been part of Europe both geographically and historically. A founding member of leading European institutions such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Türkiye has taken part in almost all European institutions. More importantly, one should keep in mind that although Türkiye’s EU accession talks have been at an impasse due to political obstacles resulting from the EU’s strategic mistake to admit the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) as a member prior to the resolution of the Cyprus question, Türkiye still is an EU candidate state with which accession negotiations have been underway since 2005. Therefore, by singling Türkiye out while extending an invitation to other countries covered by the current enlargement agenda, the EU is essentially sending the wrong message to the Turkish public which risks perpetuating the view that the EU is applying double standards to Türkiye.

    Besides, it is a widely known fact that Türkiye’s contribution to the European project as a prospective member would by far exceed that of the remaining candidate and potential candidate countries. In this respect, the deliberate omission of Türkiye by von der Leyen and Scholz contradicts the former’s promise of a “geopolitical Commission” and the latter’s vision of a “geopolitical EU”.

    One needs only to look at the map to see that Türkiye has a vital role to play in the making of a geopolitical EU. With its geographic location at the crossroads of trade and energy transit routes, Türkiye is a panacea to the challenges exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war in a plethora of areas from energy security to security of supply chains. Moreover, being a key NATO ally that has undertaken numerous tasks for ensuring the security of the south-eastern flank of the Alliance, Türkiye’s EU accession would be decisive for EU’s emergence as a security provider. Türkiye could add real value to the EU’s latest security and defence initiatives aimed at the creation of a genuine defence union, which have become even more important in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

    As a key regional actor, which has long-standing historical, cultural, and human links to the countries of Eurasia and neighbouring regions, Türkiye’s prospective membership could turn the EU into a truly global actor. By bringing Türkiye into its ranks, the EU’s outreach would expand beyond Europe to the countries in the Middle East, South Caucasus and Central Asia. Having Türkiye as a member, the EU could benefit from Türkiye’s historical ties and experience in adjacent regions and help to find lasting solutions to ongoing conflicts in a geography spanning from the Balkans to the Caucasus. Türkiye’s mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine, are a case in point. In this respect, with Türkiye as a member, the EU could move from being viewed as a peace project confined to the European continent to a genuinely global peace project. We hope that prominent EU leaders do not overlook these facts while designing the future architecture of the European project.

    KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PRESIDENT ERDOĞAN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY MEETING - NOVEMBER 2022

    Türkiye’s success in mediating between Russia and Ukraine and being a part of the solution to Europe’s common problems as well as its strategic importance within Europe secured a place at the EPC meeting.

    Over the past two and half years, the world and Europe have been trying to come to terms first with the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermaths and then with the war in Ukraine and the threat of Russia in Europe. Therefore, at a time when Europe’s stability and security are being threatened by a war for the first time since the end of World War II, the EU held the first meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) under the Czech Presidency of the European Council on 6 October 2022.

    First proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron on Europe Day on 9 May as a concept for future Europe, the EPC is intended as a broad platform to bring leaders across the continent “on an equal footing” to “foster political dialogue and cooperation to address issues of common interest” and to “strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the continent of Europe. ” While stressing the need for political collaboration and solidarity not only within the EU but also between the countries in Europe in its statement, the EU made a point of the fact that the EPC platform is intended solely for political coordination and not for replacing any existing organisation, structure, or process by creating new ones at this stage.

    The Top Issues on the Agenda Addressed by the Participating Countries

    27 EU Member States and 17 European countries were invited to the meeting. Although it took some convincing, Türkiye and the UK, the two countries whose relations with the EU are rather stalled due to different reasons, were also amongst the invitees, along with the two countries in conflict with each other, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was amongst the 44 leaders who attended the meeting hosted by the Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala at Prague Castle in Prague. Other countries which participated in the EPC meeting included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Kosovo, Lichtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, and Ukraine. The meeting started with an opening session followed by roundtable discussions on topics of common interest and bilateral talks between leaders and ended with a closing session. The issues discussed during the meeting focused on two main areas: the Russia-Ukraine war and the peace and security issues arising thereof and the energy crisis.

    Türkiye in the EPC

    The changing geopolitical circumstances in Europe due to the Russia-Ukraine war and the threats it poses for the critical issues around security, energy crisis, migration, and climate change as well as the economic challenges do not affect the EU Member States but all European countries. Therefore, there is a need for more cooperation and solidarity amongst these countries in a broader context. Not only as a candidate country to the EU but also as a country having strong trade and strategic relations with Europe, Türkiye has a well-earned place at the first meeting of the EPC.

    Representing Türkiye at the EPC, President Erdoğan held bilateral talks with a number of leaders on the sidelines of the meeting, expressing Türkiye’s views, contributions, and assessments on the challenges Europe is currently facing to its peace and security, energy, climate, and economic situation during these talks. One of the highlights of the EPC meeting for Türkiye was when President Erdoğan had a talk with both Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as part of the efforts to bring the two countries together as well as the efforts for the normalisation of relations between Türkiye and Armenia. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, French President Emmanuel Macron, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, then UK Prime Minister Liz Truss and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte were amongst the other leaders he met during the event. President Erdoğan also participated in a trilateral meeting with Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev.

    Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye to the Czech Republic Egemen Bağış stated that Türkiye’s participation in the first EPC meeting in Prague represented an important opportunity. Referring to Türkiye’s mediation role between Russia and Ukraine since the start of the war and praising it as a “tremendous performance”, Ambassador Bağış described Türkiye as “the most Western country in the East and the most Eastern country in the West” and stated that it has demonstrated that it can “solve problems that other countries cannot” with its skilful approach and as “the only country that can establish a dialogue with both sides”.

    Underlining its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty since the beginning of the war, Türkiye also closed its straits to prevent some Russian vessels from crossing through even though it has opposed international sanctions designed to isolate Moscow. Türkiye has mediated between the two sides on a number of occasions including bringing together the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine, signing of the most important and crucial İstanbul grain corridor deal together with the UN as well as enabling a prisoner swap recently. The high demand by the other leaders to meet with President Erdoğan during the EPC meeting was seen by the Ambassador as a sign showing that Türkiye has come a long way in terms of raising its profile and reputation for tackling problems.

    What is Next?

    As in the recent past, Türkiye continues to be a part of the solution to the challenges Europe has been facing in the security, economic, and social realms as a result of the changing geopolitical context on the continent. While Türkiye’s ambition to be a member of the EU remains to be the ultimate goal, Türkiye is no doubt a part of broader Europe in a strategic and political sense. Therefore, Türkiye continues to be an indispensable country for the EPC project which will continue as a bi-annual informal platform, starting with the next one due to take place in Moldova.

    G20 BALI SUMMIT AND TÜRKİYE’S STANCE ON GLOBAL ISSUES - DECEMBER 2022

    During the 17th G20 Summit, held on Bali Island under the auspices of the Indonesian Presidency, Turkish President Erdoğan conducted bilateral meetings with prominent world leaders.

    G20 countries represent 85% of the global economy and 75% of world trade. In addition, these countries have two-thirds of the world’s population, which has recently reached eight billion. As a result of its capacity, the G20 platform plays a vital role in addressing global issues and influencing international politics. This year, the 17th G20 Leaders’ Summit was held on Bali Island on 15-16 November 2022 under the theme of “Recover Together, Recover Stronger”.

    Due to the simultaneous occurrence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis and soaring inflation, the G20 Summit drew international attention. In particular, the Russian invasion of Ukraine which started on 24 February 2022, had a profound effect on international politics and caused divergences in the G20 parties. Russian President Vladimir Putin chose not to attend the Bali Summit, just as he did not attend many summits held throughout the year and Russia was represented by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

    Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo made various diplomatic initiatives to manage the diversities in the G20 due to the war, and even visited Russia this summer. Although Ukraine is not a member of the G20, Widodo also visited Ukraine and invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the G20 Summit.

    The Summit Agenda and the Final Declaration

    At the summit, opinions and suggestions were exchanged through closed sessions held under three headings as “Food and Energy Security”, “Health” and “Digital Transformation”. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was also at the forefront during the talks at the summit. It was reported that under the term of its G20 Presidency, Indonesia determined the recovery of the global economy as a priority, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, and has made significant efforts in this regard throughout the year.

    The meeting of US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time since Biden took office was amongst the prominent news regarding the summit. Although the meeting took place after a period of increased tension between the US and China due to the Taiwan crisis, it was stated after the meeting that priorities and intentions were shared on many issues and “a sincere meeting” was held between the two leaders.

    After the summit, G20 states published a 52-item final declaration. In the declaration, it was seen that attention was drawn to the ongoing crises throughout the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was the most frequently mentioned issue in the summit declaration as well as in the summit agenda. It was emphasised that today’s world should not be an “age of war”. It was underlined that the multilateral system protects international law, peace and stability and it is important to adhere to the principles of the UN charter and international human rights law.

    It was also remarkable that Russia’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from Ukrainian territory was demanded in the declaration. Due to these statements regarding Russia in the final declaration, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov left the summit early and Russia was represented by the Minister of Finance for the rest of the summit.

    Energy and food security were also included in the final declaration extensively. On the one hand, it was stated that urgent steps would be taken to ensure food security for the vulnerable countries, on the other hand, the Istanbul Grain Corridor initiative, which was implemented in the Black Sea under the leadership of Türkiye and UN, was welcomed by all members.

    G20 Summit and Türkiye

    It can be stressed that the summit was quite fruitful for Türkiye. President Erdoğan held many bilateral and inter-delegation meetings within the scope of the summit. President Erdoğan’s meeting with US President Joe Biden during the summit drew particular attention. In the closed bilateral and inter-delegation meeting, it was announced that trade and security issues were discussed. US President Joe Biden thanked Türkiye for its efforts to solve the issues in the grain corridor and emphasised that the US administration will continue to support the process for procurement of F-16s.

    During the G20 Summit, President Erdoğan held bilateral meetings with many world leaders as well as Joe Biden. In this context, extensive meetings were held with Indonesian President Joko Widodo, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italy’s new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

    Speaking at the health session within the scope of the G20 Summit, President Erdoğan drew attention to the vaccine injustice and emphasised that only 11% of the population and only 37% of healthcare workers in low-income countries are vaccinated. In this context, President Erdoğan stated that Türkiye opposes vaccine injustice and reminded that they donated more than 6.3 million doses of vaccine to 19 countries.

    Speaking at the food and energy security session, President Erdoğan emphasised that the world is facing the possibility of a shortage in rice, just as in grain, sunflower oil, and corn. Erdoğan also warned the international community that if measures are not taken, there will be a bigger food crisis next year. Stating that more than 10 million tons of grain have been shipped from the grain corridor, which was established under the leadership of Türkiye, Erdoğan emphasised that Türkiye has made an active effort in the energy crisis as well as in the food crisis.

    Holding a press conference at the Bali International Conference Center on the last day of the G20 Summit, President Erdoğan also evaluated the G20 Summit while explaining Türkiye’s stance on various current issues. In his speech, Erdoğan gave remarkable messages regarding the ongoing war, the fight against terrorism, food and energy security, health, and the recovery process of economies after the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Pointing out that the world is going through a crisis era as well as conflicts and regional tensions, Erdoğan stated that it is indispensable for all states to fight against inflation which has reached its peak over the last 50-60 years. Emphasising that the G20 platform is successfully carrying out its leadership role in tackling the challenges that arise at the global level, Erdoğan stated Türkiye plays a key role in the crises that the world is facing by taking a pro-active stance.

  • THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS ROLE IN SHAPING EUROPEAN CULTURE – DECEMBER 2021

    The Ottomans were not just blood-thirsty warriors or decadent courtiers as depicted in common images but much more advanced, intelligent and able statesmen, explorers and merchants.

    “Like the Roman Empire it [the Ottoman Empire] was a multi-ethnic, multilingual, multiracial, multireligious empire… It was a European Empire that remains an integral part of European culture and history.” That is one of the main points argued by historian Marc David Baer in his book titled “The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars and Caliphs”. The Ottoman Empire played a “central role” in European history, extending its rule over the Balkans before it ventured into the East. Edirne (Hadrianopolis of the Byzantine Empire) was taken over by the Ottomans between 1361 and 1371, while the conquest of Trabzon in Eastern Black Sea coast happened a century later in 1461. The Ottomans ruled over nearly a quarter of Europe by the 15th and 16th centuries as far as Hungary. Trade relations with Western Europe were also extensive during this period. The capital of the Ottoman Empire, İstanbul, which remains the central point of attraction in today’s Turkey as well, was and continues to be a European city.

    The multi-ethnic and multicultural composition of the Ottoman Empire was a source of richness and dynamism. Kılıç Ali Pasha, who presided over the Ottoman navy during the Battle of Lepanto, was a Calabrian who converted to Islam in order to enter into Ottoman service. Several other important figures in Ottoman history such as the architect of the Süleymaniye and Selimiye Mosques Mimar Sinan was also of Christian roots and was recruited to serve among the Janissaries. Hence, the success of the Ottomans lay in intermingling the West and East and providing for conducive conditions for people of various backgrounds to thrive in the service of the Empire. This understanding contradicts several prejudices and preconceptions about the Ottomans which still persist in the West.

    History of the “Forgotten Giant”: Ottomans as the “New Romans”

     In his influential book, Baer noted that the Ottomans identified themselves as the “new Romans” owing to their conception as inheritors of Byzantium:

    “Arabs, Persians, Indian and Turks referred to the Ottoman rulers as Caesars and their dominion as the Roman Empire,” writes Baer. “Beginning with the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, some Western European writers did too… Why have we forgotten what Europeans thought five hundred years ago? The Ottomans did not evolve in parallel with Europe; their story is the unacknowledged part of the story the West tells about itself.”

    William Dalrymple, in his essay on Baer’s book published in the Financial Times on 24 November 2021, referred to the Ottoman Empire as the “Forgotten Giant” and noted that research on the Ottoman Empire by historians is far from being extensive and adequate. Baer, as a result of his extensive research in the Topkapı Palace archives, challenged old assumptions and prejudices which mostly viewed the Ottomans as fierce warriors who retreated both in terms of borders and power after the 17th century. In the words of Dalrymple, “Today, if they are remembered at all, the Ottomans are usually dismissed in the west as aggressive but ultimately decadent and intellectually incurious warriors who controlled an old-fashioned land empire and who were ultimately defeated by the intellectual firepower of European science, then finally outflanked by its growing transcontinental sea power.” Baer in his influential book shows us that these superficial assumptions may not really reflect the truth about the Ottomans.

    Map of Piri Reis: Ottomans Rising up to the Challenge of the Age of Explorations

    In his book, Baer explained the origins of Piri Reis’ map dating back to the 16th century, which included the coastline of the New World. Baer wrote about the background to this map by Piri Reis: “He had based it on Columbus’s original, which is lost, and even interviewed a crew member from Columbus’s voyages. To produce for the sultan one of the most complete and accurate maps of the world, Piri Reis had consulted ancient Ptolemaic, medieval Arab, and contemporary Portuguese and Spanish maps.” Baer explained that the interest of Ottomans in geography, astronomy and nautical sciences reflected a desire to rival the Portuguese and Spanish in their discoveries and not to be left behind. After the conquest of Egypt in the 16th century, the Ottomans became a major maritime power not only in the Mediterranean but also the Indian Ocean, aiming to have control over the trade route to south-east Asia. The Sultans referred to themselves as “Lord of the Two Seas and Two Continents,” and “Masters of the Seven Climes”.

    The Ottomans, at the height of their power between the 15th and 17th centuries, were the most powerful actor over a large part of the world, including Europe, Asia and Africa. Diverse peoples from different ethnic backgrounds, speaking different languages and adhering to different religions lived in the territories ruled by the Ottomans. Yet these differences were not viewed by the Ottomans as sources of weakness or instability. Baer described this diversity and the Ottomans’ approach as “a kind of pluralist equilibrium — what Spanish historians have called convivencia or “living together” — which had no parallel in Christendom”. He noted that Jews, who had been evicted from Granada, found refuge in the Ottoman Empire.

    The Ottoman global vision and influence over a large territory spanning Eurasia is ably described in the following excerpt from Baer’s book delivered by William Dalrymple in his essay: “From his palace on the Bosphorus, the 16th-century Grand Vizier, Mehmed Sokollu Pasha, a Serbian convert from Christianity and son-in-law of Selim II, simultaneously planned canals between the Don and the Volga, and the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; one day he might send artillery experts to the Sultanate of Aceh, Sumatra, to cut off the Malacca Strait and dispatch agents to fan rebellion against the Portuguese across the Indian Ocean; the next, choose a new king of Poland to thwart the Russians; the third, dispatch ‘musketeers to fight as guerrillas on the side of Morisco rebels in Andalusia.’ “He ordered pictures from Venice and commissioned an eleven-arched bridge over the Drina river. His inner circle included “Jewish courtiers, Venetian ambassadors and members of the Ottoman Greek elite.”

    In a nutshell, Marc David Baer’s book “The Ottomans, Caesars and Caliphs” presents an eloquent, refined and insightful approach to the history of the Ottomans as a central actor in shaping European history and culture. The Ottomans were not just blood-thirsty warriors or decadent courtiers as depicted in common images but much more advanced, intelligent and able statesmen, explorers and merchants. Consequently, it would be a mistake to look at history today and construct an otherness between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Such a perception sadly influences debates about Turkey’s suitability for EU membership even today.

    Assoc. Prof. Çiğdem NAS, IKV Secretary General

    THE 2021 TURKEY REPORT: IMPASSE IN THE ACCESSION PROCESS CONTINUED - NOVEMBER 2021

    It was a year in which efforts were made to pursue a “positive agenda” in Turkey-EU relations and tension has eased on some issues. However, looking at the Turkey Report, one can see that no concrete progress has been made in the relations.

    As part of the Enlargement Package for 2021, the European Commission published theCountry Reports for all candidate and potential candidate countries on 19 October 2021. The Enlargement Package was announced with the presentation of Olivér Várhelyi, the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement. The reports were prepared in line with the new enlargement methodology following the decision taken by the EU last year. The new methodology puts more emphasis on fundamental reforms in areas such as the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions and economy, freedom of expression, freedom of press and pluralism, and public administration.

    The 2021 Enlargement Strategy underlines that Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership. However, it states that the accession negotiations with Turkey are still frozen and Turkey is an important partner for the EU in key areas of common interest. On the other hand, it also points out that the high-level dialogue and cooperation between Turkey and the EU have increased in 2021.

    It was a year in which efforts were made to pursue a “positive agenda” in Turkey-EU relations and tension has eased on some issues. However, looking at the Turkey Report, one can see that no concrete progress has been made in the relations. The content and language of the report do not contain surprises for those who have been following Turkey-EU relations closely in recent years.

    The Commission’s Assessments

    In the report, Chapters 23 and 24 -respectively on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom and Security -stand out as the sections where the most critical expressions were used and according to the Commission, the backsliding continued. One can see that criticism is expressed in almost all areas covered by these chapters and that  the warnings and recommendations made in the previous reports are reiterated. Noting that Turkey’s preparations are at an early stage in Chapter 23, it is stated that serious backsliding continued in the reporting period. While acknowledging that some positive steps were taken last year with the adoption of the new Human Rights Action Plan, the report notes that the plan does not provide concrete steps to solve urgent problems. In addition, it is underlined that the backsliding continues regarding the civil society, democratic institutions and human rights.

    In contrast to the bleak picture the Commission paints in the above areas, migration and asylum policy stand out as areas where Turkey’s efforts are praised. The report emphasizes that Turkey has made some progress in immigration and asylum policy. It is praised and appreciated that Turkey increased the surveillance and protection capacity especially at its eastern borders and hosts the largest number of refugees in the world. Despite all these positive statements, it should be noted at this point that the EU does not make any statement about its own obligations regarding migration and asylum.

    Turkey’s withdrawal from the İstanbul Convention is paid particular attention in the report. It is stated that the withdrawal raised concern regarding Turkey’s commitment to international agreements. Besides, the withdrawal is interpreted as a setback in women’s rights in Turkey. It is also criticized that many human rights defenders protesting the withdrawal in the streets were detained and imposed a fine.

    Turkey’s foreign policy is also an area that has been harshly criticized as in previous reports. The report claims that Turkey maintains an “assertive” foreign policy and criticizes its military presence in the regions such as Iraq, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Although de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and discontinuation of hydrocarbon exploration and drilling activities by Turkey are considered positive, it is underscored that the EU will maintain defending the rights of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece in the region. For such reasons, the report argues that Turkish foreign policy  continued to collide with EU priorities under the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policies. It is seen that Turkey’s alignment rate with CFSP declarations, which was 21% in the 2020 report, decreased to 14% in the 2021 report.

    As a result, it is stated in the Turkey Report that more efforts are needed for legislative alignment with the EU acquis in many areas. It is mentioned that implementation and enforcement in all areas are needed to be significantly improved. It should be noted that the Turkey Report covers the period from June 2020 to June 2021. The 2021 Turkey Report indicates good progress in 1 chapter, some progress in 10 chapters, limited progress in 9 chapters, no progress in 6 chapters, and backsliding in 7 chapters. Overall, Turkey’s alignment in 3 out of 33 chapters is well advanced and its preparations in 6 chapters are at a good level. Turkey is reported to be moderately prepared in 11 of the remaining chapters. It has some level of preparation in 10 chapters while preparations in 3 chapters are said to be at an early stage.

    Turkey’s Response

    The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the 2021 Turkey Report with a strong written statement. The harshest reaction was shown to the criticism at Chapter 23. Emphasizing that the allegations in the aforementioned section were baseless and unfair, the statement pointed out that the political obstacles in front of these chapters have not been removed and criticisms are directed on controversial issues even in the EU Member States. In addition, it is mentioned that unjust and disproportionate assessment were made without taking into consideration the specific conditions of Turkey.

    As regards the praise shown to policies in areas such as migration, “The EU’s willingness to conduct  ‘give and take’ relations on a daily basis with Turkey only in areas of its own interests” is harshly criticized and it is emphasized that this approach is unacceptable. As stressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the statement, it is seen that the EU uses a balanced and soft language and reduces the level of criticism, especially on issues that are in its own interest.

    It should be noted that placing the responsibility for the slowdown in the EU accession process solely on the shoulders of Turkey is a one-sided approach. In this context, the tone adopted in the report as if  Turkey were the only party responsible for the interruption of the process is not promising for the future of relations between the two sides.

    As a result, for the solution of current problems and for the future of relations, both Turkey and the EU need to show full political will. It is clear that no matter how willing Turkey is and whatever it does for the chapters, it will not be able to make significant progress with an EU whose appetite to enlarge further has disappeared. It is of utmost importance for the future of bilateral relations and Turkey’s EU journey that the EU sees Turkey as a candidate country again and removes political blockages in front of the crucial chapters.

    It should also be noted that Turkey’s EU membership perspective and Europeanisation process continue. Being a member of the EU still continues to be a strategic choice for Turkey. In particular, the recent steps taken on the European Green Deal and the ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey are cases in point. The most important indicator of Turkey’s continuing European perspective this year is the declaration of the Human Rights Action Plan, the Judicial Reform Strategy and the National Action Plan for Accession to the EU, although the EU is cautious on the grounds that it does not offer concrete solutions. Turkey must maintain this perspective and strive to fulfil the membership criteria and give impetus to reforms. It is necessary to take steps especially in areas where harsh criticism is directed, such as the political criteria.

    THE INAUGURATION OF THE LANDMARK TÜRKEVİ IN NEW YORK DURING 76TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY - OCTOBER 2021

    The 76th Session of the UN General Assembly was held in New York in-person and under tight security measures between 14 and 30 September 2021 following last year’s virtual session due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The UN General Assembly convened under its new President, Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid, elected on 7 June 2021. Shahid took over from Turkey’s former Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ambassador Volkan Bozkır, who presided over the 75th UN General Assembly and was the first Turkish citizen to assume this post.

    The agenda of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly was dominated by Sustainable Development Goals, the climate crisis and refugee issues as well as work to be continued until September 2022. The General Debate and the high-level meetings of the 76th UN General Assembly which took place from 21 to 27 September featured many prominent world leaders including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, US President Joe Biden, European Council President Charles Michel, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, Chinese President Xi Jinping, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

    World Leaders Addressed the 76th UN General Assembly

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the 15th place as a speaker at the UN General Assembly. In his address to the UN General Assembly, President Erdoğan touched upon many issues, particularly the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, the refugee problem and the situation in Afghanistan and expressed his views on the need to reform the UN for a more equal world and to increase the number of members of the UN Security Council. One of the key points of President Erdoğan’s speech and one that attracted the most international attention was his announcement about Turkey’s decision to ratify the Paris Climate Agreement before the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 26), due to take place in November. As Turkey was the last remaining G20 country not to have ratified the Paris Climate Agreement, this statement caused a positive reaction.

    In his first address to the UN General Assembly, US President Joe Biden made important points on the climate issue. President Biden announced his decision to double the budget to help developing countries tackle climate change from 2024. Biden emphasized the importance of the worldwide climate design in his words stating that “the best part of these investments is not only a good climate policy, but also a great chance for each country to invest in itself and their future.”

    Iran’s new president, Ebrahim Raisi, harshly denounced the state’s arch-rival in his first UN General Assembly speech, declaring that US hegemony efforts “failed miserably”.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech included China’s commitment not to build any new coal-fired power plants abroad and to step up its support for developing green and low-carbon energy in developing countries. Xi did not provide any details, but depending on how the policy is implemented, financing of coal plants in the developing world could be significantly limited. In a pre-recorded video speech at the annual UN meeting, Xi Jinping emphasized China’s peaceful intentions in international relations. US Climate Envoy John Kerry welcomed Xi’s statement and described the decision as a “major contribution” to the efforts needed to achieve success at COP26 which will take place from 31 October to 12 November.

    Official Inauguration of the Türkevi Center in New York

    One significant development for Turkey was the inauguration of the Türkevi (Turkish House) Center by President Erdoğan in New York on 20 September 2021. In his speech at the inauguration ceremony, President Erdoğan stated that the Türkevi Center will be home to the Turkish Consulate in New York and will also host the New York Representation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

    The new 36-storey building has been under construction for four years in the same plot of land purchased in 1977. President Erdoğan emphasized the importance of the Türkevi Center being open to everyone and said that it was one of the exemplary buildings of New York. The building stands out among others as it was built using the latest technology in architecture and engineering, and the building design was made on the basis of environmental awareness at this time when talks about climate change are at the top of the international agenda. The environmentally-friendly Türkevi, built in accordance with the “Leed Silver” green building certificate and with a system to store rain water, holds a 200-person auditorium, meeting and exhibition halls. The tulip-shaped building with traditional Turkish architecture and Seljuk motifs can be seen from Downtown Manhattan, East River and Long Island City.

    Regarding the Türkevi’s location right across the UN building, President Erdoğan said, “The UN is also a symbol of our belief in justice and peace. Our Türkevi building will also be a reflection of our place in the international community.” President Erdoğan once again emphasized the significance of the Türkevi not only as a symbol of Turkey’s belief in the UN, multilateralism, justice and peace but also as a new structure of the diplomatic weight and vision of a growing, developing and strengthening Turkey.

    The inauguration ceremony was also attended by UN Secretary General António Guterres, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus President Ersin Tatar, Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, and Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda. Speaking at the ceremony, Guterres stated that Türkevi was a very good example of the cooperation between the UN and Turkey. UN Secretary General Guterres also expressed his gratitude for the support Turkey gave to the refugees.

    LETTER FROM IKV TO INTA COMMITTEE ON THE CUSTOMS UNION - SEPTEMBER 2021

    Ahead of the debate on the future of the Customs Union, IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu expressed IKV’s views in a letter addressed to members of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA). IKV’s views as expressed in the letter dated 27 August 2021 are as follows:

    “The Turkey-EU Customs Union has entered into operation in 1996 and is based on the Ankara Agreement which created an Association between Turkey and the then European Economic Community. Whereas Turkey made an application to join the EC in 1987, this application was rejected by the EC Commission on grounds of inadequacy although Turkey’s eligibility for membership was acknowledged. Relations continued on the path of the Ankara Agreement and the entry into force of the Customs Union in 1996 marked the transition to the final stage of the Association.

    The Customs Union can be seen as a success story that elevated Turkey-EU relations to a new level despite the lack of progress in the accession perspective. Paradoxically, negotiation chapters in Turkey’s accession process which were related with the Customs Union were suspended in 2006 by the Council of the EU due to the Cyprus issue. Turkish industry became an indispensable part of EU value chains especially in automotive, household appliances, and chemical sectors. However, due to changes taking place in world trade and EU trade strategies as well as technological advances, an upgrading of the Customs Union became an urgent necessity.

    One of the most important points to take into account while studying the EU-Turkey Customs Union is the principle of the free movement of industrial goods (and processed agricultural goods) between the parties as expressed in Article 3 of the 1/95 Decision of the Association Council. A product manufactured in Turkey according to EU standards or imported from a third country in compliance with the necessary import requirements can acquire an A.TR document. This document means that the product can be exported to the EU free of customs tariffs and quotas. It also means that the product is in free circulation inside the Customs Union without the need for additional documentation such as a certificate of origin which would be needed in the case of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The same is true for products originating from EU Member States and which are imported to Turkey.

    The report to be discussed at the Committee on 1 September, argues that a customs union necessitates a considerable level of political integration which is lacking at the moment in the Turkey-EU relationship. The authors conclude that replacing the Customs Union with an FTA should also be considered as a plausible option for the future of the relations. However, the Positive Agenda which was proposed by the European Council as a mechanism to revitalise Turkey-EU relations already included the aim of the modernisation of the Customs Union and resolving the current difficulties in its functioning. While it may be difficult to ignore the present political problems in Turkey-EU relations, it would also be quite erroneous to argue that any hopes for a revitalisation of the Turkey-EU relationship are lost. The Positive Agenda proposed by the European Council in October 2020 and recently elaborated in the June European Council, aims to revitalise the relationship including proposals for the modernisation of the Customs Union, restart of high level dialogues, people-to-people contacts and support to Syrian refugees. While Turkey’s accession process has come to a standstill, the membership perspective has not been officially renounced either by Turkey or the EU. Therefore, the premise of the report on the political aspects of Turkey-EU relations are quite partial and do not reflect the whole picture.

    It is our opinion that the Turkey-EU Customs Union which encompasses industrial goods should remain intact and should not be transformed into an FTA due to the benefits of the principle of free movement of goods which differentiates a customs union from an FTA as a more advanced level of trade liberalisation. As the application of the UK-EU FTA has already shown, the need for certificate of origin and import restrictions based on the local content of the product create cumbersome procedures and hinder free trade between the parties. Therefore, the preservation of the Customs Union while modernising it with an effective dispute resolution mechanism and also expanding the scope of the trade relationship to include agriculture, services and public procurement seems to be the best route available to the parties at the moment.

    The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU is based on an Association which aims to establish free movement of factors of production between Turkey and the EU so as to prepare the country for the possibility of a future membership. Abrogating the Customs Union would also mean abrogating the Ankara Agreement thereby placing the Turkey-EU relationship on an even more slippery slope than today. The Ankara Agreement is still the basic document providing a framework to Turkey-EU relations. Following the de facto suspension of accession negotiations, the parties could refer to the provisions of the Ankara Agreement in order to revitalise the relationship by modernising the Customs Union. The other aspects of the Positive Agenda which were foreseen by the European Council were restarting high level dialogues, people-to-people contacts and refugee cooperation which were not included in the Association relationship but which may be seen as necessary additions to it in line with current developments.

    Turkey as a customs union partner is also under the obligation to adapt to the EU’s commercial policy and common commercial tariff with respect to trade with third countries. This means that whenever the EU signs an FTA with a third country, Turkey has to follow and start negotiations with that country. In several cases this may lead to some delays which create an asymmetrical situation whereby the third country’s goods can enter the Turkish market without any charges or restrictions due to the Customs Union whereas Turkish goods do not enjoy quote-free access to the third country market until a separate FTA is signed between Turkey and the country in question. Turkey began to apply some additional duties to goods originating from third countries entering the Turkish market via EU Member States. This situation led to complaints by EU exporters since they were faced with additional barriers in entering the Turkish market. However, within the framework of the Turkey-EU Positive Agenda, technical talks started on the resolution of the current problems in the functioning of the Customs Union and Turkey’s Ministry of Trade took steps to solve these particular problems.

    In addition to this problem, it is possible to cite additional difficulties in the functioning of the Customs Union such as transport quotas applied to Turkish trucks carrying export goods to the European market and need for an effective dispute resolution mechanism. All these are included in the agenda of a probable modernisation of the Customs Union which would necessitate the start of official talks between Turkey and the EU. The modernisation process is also expected to entail an upgrade of the trade relationship between Turkey and the EU including the expansion of the relationship to agricultural goods, services and public procurement. There is already a decision of the Association Council regarding the liberalisation of agricultural trade (Decision 1/98). Liberalisation of services, public procurement markets or agricultural trade may be agreed between Turkey and the EU by way of additional Association Council decisions or additional trade agreements.

    In a nutshell, I would like to draw your attention to the link between the Customs Union and Ankara Agreement and underline that the replacement of the Customs Union with an FTA would also damage the applicability of the Ankara Agreement. Moreover, economic analyses show us that a customs union guaranteeing the free movement of goods without formalities such as certificate of origin or restrictive requirements such as local content of products enhance bilateral trade. In the case of the Turkey-EU Customs Union, Turkey’s role in European value chains and a dynamic and up-to-date trade relationship is relevant for the effectiveness of the Single European Market. Taking into account the twin priorities of the EU, i.e. the Green Deal and digitalisation, the modernisation of the current Customs Union could provide an effective framework for the upgrading of the Turkey-EU trade relationship.”

    TURKEY’S RISING CLIMATE AMBITIONS: THE “GREEN DEAL ACTION PLAN” AND THE G20 CLIMATE MINISTERIAL MEETING - AUGUST 2021

    Turkey has published a roadmap for its green transition just two days after the EU released its much-awaited “Fit for 55” climate package. The “Green Deal Action Plan”, published by the Turkish Ministry of Trade on 16 July 2021, aims to support Turkey’s transition into a sustainable, resource efficient and green economy, in line with Turkey’s development goals. The action plan primarily strives to preserve and further the integration provided within the scope of the Turkey-EU Customs Union. It includes 32 targets and 81 actions designed under nine main headings: (i)carbon border adjustment, (ii)green and circular economy, (iii)green finance, (iv)clean, affordable, and safe energy supply, (v)sustainable agriculture, (vi)sustainable smart transportation, (vii) fight against climate change, (viii)diplomacy, (ix) information and awareness-raising on the European Green Deal.

    The Green Deal Action Plan is deemed to be a roadmap that will be consistent with the transition policies put forward by leading world economies. It is set to incentivise green investments, contribute to the transitions in global value chains as well as support value-added production, while also protecting Turkey’s export competitiveness.

    According to the action plan, the effects of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the energy intensive and resource intensive sectors will be modelled on the basis of scenarios and sectors. Furthermore, a monitoring system will be developed for the greenhouse gas emissions arising from industry, and roadmaps and activities will be drafted to support the greenhouse gas emission reduction in the Turkish manufacturing industry. Turkey will also take a position on carbon pricing while taking into account the CBAM.

    Under the plan, Turkey will prepare a Circular Economy Action Plan consistent with the EU Circular Economy Action Plan. It will also work to launch Green Organised Industrial Zones and a Green Industrial Zone certification system and to adapt its laws to the EU legislation on sustainable products, chemicals as well as eco-design and energy labelling.

    Relating to green finance, Turkey strives to revise the national incentive system by taking into consideration the incentives provided by the EU. In addition, a roadmap will be prepared for sustainable banking while guidebooks for green bonds and green sukuk will also be published. National, international and EU-based climate financing opportunities will be inquired and compiled.

    Turkey will also work to build infrastructure and raise awareness on the Green Tariff and YEK-G, to mainstream renewable energy. It will prepare national strategies for energy efficiency and low carbon heating and cooling systems.

    Organic agriculture, reduction of pesticides, chemical fertilisers, and anti-microbials will be encouraged under the action plan. Additionally, Turkey also aims to raise awareness on the EU’s Fork to Farm and Biodiversity Strategies.

    In line with the action plan, Turkey is planning on implementing regulations on the “Combined Transportation” and “Logistical Centres” to support the development of transportation types and modes. Some activities will be carried out to improve infrastructure for electric vehicles and their charging stations. To reduce the greenhouse gas emissions generated from cars, micro-mobility vehicles with low emissions and alternative fuels will be encouraged through legislation. Work will be carried out to reduce harmful maritime emissions. The railway infrastructure connecting Turkey and the EU will be improved and further developed.

    While the details are still to be elaborated, other initiatives envisaged under the action plan include the preparation of a “Fight Against Climate Change Report”, a “2023-2030 Climate Change Action Plan” and a “2050 Climate Change Strategy”. In addition, as stated in the action plan, Turkey’s position concerning the Paris Climate Agreement will be determined following a multidimensional evaluation in view of its international financing needs. Nature-based approaches will be adopted in land practices. Under the action plan, Turkey will work to reduce land degradations and increase its carbon stocks. R&D projects will be carried out to determine the effects of climate change on biodiversity and ecosystems.

    As part of the diplomatic initiatives envisaged within the scope of the action plan, Turkey aims to improve cooperation opportunities with the EU and its Member States. Additionally, it will continue to protect its rights arising from the Turkey-EU Customs Union, WTO, and other related international regimes, in the face of the CBAM and the legislative alignment issues.

    Lastly, as foreseen in the action plan, information and awareness raising activities will be carried out with the participation of relevant organisations and stakeholders in order to encourage Turkey’s alignment with the European Green Deal.

    Turkey in the G20 Climate and Energy Ministerial Meeting

    On 23 July, G20 climate and energy ministers convened in Naples, Italy, to debate and exchange views on the steps that can be taken in the search for a prosperous and sustainable future, in line with the agenda of the Italian G20 Presidency which focuses on “People, Planet, Prosperity”. More ambitious and decisive steps were expected to be taken during the ministerial meeting to pave the way for the COP26 set to take place in November; however, failure to agree on a coal phase-out by 2025 and the wording on 1.5-2°C limit on global temperature rise in the joint final communiqué dampened the hopes for more ambitious climate commitments ahead of the COP26.

    Turkey was represented by Environment and Urbanisation Minister Murat Kurum in the G20 Climate and Energy Ministerial Meeting. Addressing the session on “Cities and Climate Action”, Minister Kurum underscored the importance of devising policies and strategies aimed at building climate-resilient cities. On the sidelines of the meeting, Minister Kurum also reiterated Turkey’s request to be removed from the Annex I list of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and receive funding from the Green Climate Fund in his meeting with US President Joe Biden’s Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. Finally, Minister Kurum stated that Turkey’s ratification of the Paris Agreement would depend on this request being fulfilled.

    JUNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND POSITIVE AGENDA IN TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: IS THERE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? - JULY 2021

    Relations with Turkey were again on the agenda of the European Council Summit meeting on 24 June 2021. In the previous European Council meeting which convened online on 25 March, the strategy towards Turkey was defined as being “phased, proportionate and reversible” and aiming to “enhance cooperation in a number of areas of common interest”. The primary concern in both Summits was the continuation of de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean. On this front, no news was good news for the European Council that expected the positive agenda to kick off a new phase of engagement in Turkey-EU relations.

    Customs Union Modernisation: Can It Be the Low-Hanging Fruit?

    Expectations regarding the start of talks on the modernisation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union were running high as the European Council in March referred to the June Summit to take further action on the positive agenda. While the matter was deliberated among the leaders, it became evident that the time to finalise the mandate to start negotiations was still not ripe. The Council conclusions stated that the Council “takes note of the start of work at technical level towards a mandate for the modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union and recalls the need to address current difficulties in the implementation of the Customs Union, ensuring its effective application to all Member States”. Hence, technical talks between Turkey and the EU would need to continue with a view to resolving the current trade irritants in the Customs Union while at the same time; preparations for a mandate for the modernisation of the Customs Union would be pursued. This mandate could be adopted by the Council “subject to additional guidance by the European Council”. This quite tricky expression implied that the European Council would have to specifically task the Council to go ahead with the mandate, a process which would again bring about bargaining and compromise among the Member States at the highest level.

    Engagement at the Highest Level: Window Dressing or Sincere Exchange?

    While the “jewel in the crown” of the positive agenda can be denoted as the Customs Union modernisation, refugee cooperation, restart of high level dialogues and people-to-people contacts –which was omitted from the 24 June Conclusions- are the other components. The European Council noted that preparatory work was ongoing with regard to the high level dialogues on “issues of mutual interest, such as migration, public health, climate, counterterrorism and regional issues”. This seems to be a more easily attainable part of the positive agenda and despite the lack of high stakes involved due to the absence of an integration perspective, it may turn out to be a useful tool for engagement between the parties. Taking into account that high level dialogues will address very relevant issues such as climate, public health and counterterrorism, both Turkey and the EU may use this platform to coordinate their respective policies and strategies and engage in meaningful cooperation.

    Refugee Cooperation as a Trigger for Closer Relations?

    Refugee cooperation remains as the most critical issue on the agenda of Turkey-EU relations especially from the point of view of the EU which finds it difficult to develop a coherent migration policy based on equitable burden sharing. The most concrete step has been taken by the European Council in this issue area by calling on the Commission “to put forward without delay formal proposals for the continuation of financing for Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and other parts of the region”. However, refugee cooperation between Turkey and the EU is part of a larger framework of the EU’s support to Syrian refugees and host communities in the region and is not directly linked to the other aspects of Turkey-EU relations. In this respect, it cannot be seen as a continuation of the 18 March 2016 Turkey-EU Statement which included a more general perspective on Turkey-EU relations including targets such as opening of chapters in accession negotiations, visa liberalisation and Customs Union modernisation.

    Cyprus Issue and Political Concerns

    The Cyprus issue remains a primary concern of the European Council which creates a flash point in Turkey-EU relations due to the differing positions of the parties. The European Council noted its support for a comprehensive settlement of the problem “on the basis of a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions”.

    The European Council included the political criteria in its new strategy towards Turkey, yet avoided to attribute priority to this issue area. Reference to rule of law and fundamental rights as a key concern came towards the end of the part on Turkey in the conclusions of the June European Council. It was noted that dialogue in these issues remains “an integral part of the EU-Turkey relationship”. The relevance of democratic and good governance issues for Turkey-EU relations not only in the accession perspective, but also in the other areas of the positive agenda should be taken into account. It is impossible to conceive a durable cooperation between Turkey and the EU based only on interests since coinciding of interests is closely linked with shared values and world views.

    In a nutshell, it may be concluded that there is still some way to go in the implementation of the positive agenda. Preparations are underway regarding the current problems in the Customs Union and convening of high level dialogues while a decision has already been taken to continue financial support to Syrian refugees in Turkey. The issue of people to people contacts is not clarified at this point due mostly to the restraining effects of COVID-19 and the unpopularity of the visa liberalisation issue. As supporters of Turkey’s integration to the EU, we very much look forward to an effective implementation of the positive agenda. To answer the question posed in the title of the article, it could be said that there is light at the end of the tunnel but it is up to Turkey and the EU’s resolve to make sure that this light is not just a flicker of a candle but a powerful light source that will shine over the future of the relations and clarify any ambiguities and misunderstandings between the parties.

    Assoc. Prof. Çiğdem NAS, IKV Secretary General 

    REFLECTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: CAN TURKEY CONTRIBUTE? - JUNE 2021

    At long last, the Conference on the Future of Europe (CFE) took off on 9 May 2021 with a ceremony held at the European Parliament (EP). The Conference is expected to reach a conclusion in spring of 2022. Citizens’ participation in the proceedings of the Conference is prioritized as well as securing institutional contributions. The proposals for the future of Europe, which will be gathered during the CFE, will then be presented to the EU bodies and decision-makers. The CFE will concentrate on the following issues with regards to the debate on the future of Europe: climate change and environment, health, economy, social justice and employment, the EU in the world, values and rights, rule of law and security, digital transformation, European democracy, migration, education, culture, youth and sports, other issues. The CFE will operate at multiple levels. While the hub of the CFE is the multilingual digital platform, other levels and dimensions will consist of decentralized events, European Citizens’ Panels and Conference Plenaries.

    The major institutions of the EU, namely the Council, European Commission and the EP represented by their Presidents will be responsible for governing the CFE. The Joint Presidency is aided by an Executive Board, which is co-chaired by the three institutions. The EP will be represented by Guy Verhofstadt, the Council will be represented by Ana Paula Zacarias, Secretary of State for EU Affairs for the Portuguese Council Presidency and the European Commission by Dubravka Šuica, Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of Democracy and Demography. It reports on a regular basis to the Joint Presidency. The Executive Board is responsible for securing the general progression of the Conference activities, taking decisions on all aspects of the Conference by consensus, and preparing the meetings of the Conference Plenary. As the Council Presidency passes over to Slovenia in July 2021 and to France in January 2022, they will take over from the Portuguese Presidency regarding the Council’s representation in the Joint Presidency of the CFE.

    Significance of the CFE and Turkey’s Role

    The EU representing the utmost integration movement on the continent of Europe stands at a critical junction of its current history. It is a Union of 27 Member States following the withdrawal of Britain from membership. Turkey and Western Balkan countries are waiting to join the Union as candidates and potential candidates. Although candidate countries are not invited to participate in the deliberations of the CFE, this does not preclude CSOs and other interested actors in the candidate countries from voicing their ideas about the Future of Europe debate and if possible engaging with their counterparts in the EU to contribute to concrete proposals to be presented to the CFE. Turkish CSOs and universities are also interested in the CFE and aim to make their contribution to the debate for the Future of Europe. After all, the Conference concerns the future of not just the EU, but Europe as a whole.

    The topics to be debated during the CFE also concern the candidate countries, countries in the neighbourhood of the EU, and those countries such as the members of the European Economic Area which are European countries but not members of the EU. Especially climate change, the Green Deal, digital agenda, migration and health issues are among the top priorities regarding the future of Europe. An effective and extensive cooperation in these issues including the EU and neighbouring countries is vital for the success of the EU policies. The Green Deal for instance aims to transform Europe to become the world’s first climate-neutral continent, a target that can only be achieved if candidate countries such as Turkey and also neighbouring countries such as Ukraine are brought into the fold.

    The same can be said for migration and digitalisation agendas. Regarding migration, Turkey has been a valuable partner for the EU especially following the 18 March Turkey-EU Statement on collaboration regarding Syrian refugees and revitalization of accession process. While Turkey has been hosting nearly 4 million refugees, mostly Syrians but also including other nationalities, the EU contributed funding amounting to 6 billion euros for projects under the FRIT programme (EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey). The financial assistance is set to continue to aid Syrian refugees in Turkey and also Lebanon and Jordan. It would be quite absurd to discuss the migration issue in the CFE without taking into account Turkey’s role and its viewpoint.

    Similarly, Turkey in addition to being a candidate country is a customs union partner since 1996 in accordance with the terms of the Ankara Agreement. It is the only sizeable country –other than San Marino and Andorra- which entered into the customs union prior to membership of the EU. Thus, Turkish industry was included in European value chains thanks to extensive trade linkages –exports to the EU amounted to 41.3% of total exports in 2020-and also direct investments from European countries which make up around 62% of the total FDI in Turkey. The adaptation of Turkish industry to the requirements of the Green Deal, circular economy action plan and the digital market are vitally important due to Turkey’s role in production cycles. The CFE process can be best served by the formal or informal inclusion of voices and ideas from not only Member States of the EU but all European countries.

    Assoc. Prof. Çiğdem NAS, IKV Secretary General 

    EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND COMMISSION PRESIDENTS VISITED TURKEY AFTER POSITIVE STEPS AGREED AT EU SUMMIT- MAY 2021

    President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council Charles Michel visited Turkey upon the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 6 April 2021 following the critical European Council meeting of 25-26 March. As it can be recalled, at the December 2020 European Council meeting, EU leaders had given the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Security Policy Josep Borrell the task of preparing a report on Turkey-EU relations. The report had been discussed at the European Council meeting which took place on 25-26 March 2021 and the Council conclusions signalled the beginning of a new process marked by a “positive agenda” between Turkey and the EU. Therefore, the recent visit is considered as a step forward in the EU-Turkey relations. The fact that this visit took place in person is an indication of the importance given to the meeting and to keeping the channels open for high level dialogue. After the meeting, Michel and von der Leyen held a joint press conference whereas the Spokesperson of the Presidency Ambassador İbrahim Kalın gave out a written statement on behalf of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

    Turkey Expects Concrete Actions

    In the statement, it was indicated that the meeting was held in a positive atmosphere. According to the statement, President Erdoğan underscored Turkey’s goal of full EU membership and said that Turkey expects concrete action from the EU. In the meeting where it was emphasized that finding sustainable solutions to regional crises will be beneficial for both the EU and Turkey, President Erdoğan stressed the importance of the cooperation between Turkey and the EU regarding the refugees and the fight against terrorism as crucial for stability in the region. In response to criticisms regarding Turkey’s withdrawal from the stanbul Convention, he said that Turkey will continue its fight against violence directed towards women by strengthening the mechanisms within the current legal framework. 

    A Mutually Beneficial and Positive Relationship with Turkey

    In his statement, European Council President Michel emphasized that “the EU’s strategic interest remains a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and a mutually beneficial and positive relationship with Turkey.” Michel continued by saying that the recent positive developments and the bilateral exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey have been welcomed by the EU and the EU is looking forward to the Cyprus talks that will take place in the coming weeks. Michel then pointed out that “the concrete and positive agenda” the EU is ready to put on the table is based on economic cooperation, migration, and people-to-people contacts and mobility and underlined the fact that the relationship will be “progressive, proportional and reversible”. Finally, he stressed the EU’s determination to defend the interests of the Member States as well as the interests of the EU and to promote the EU values.

    Enhanced Cooperation Benefits All

    European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her speech, stated that the underlying reason for this visit is the interest Turkey has shown to “re-engage with EU in a constructive way”. In order to give a new momentum to Turkey-EU relations, she mentioned four areas in which enhanced cooperation would benefit both parties and listed these as economic relations, high level dialogues, people-topeople contacts and mobility, and refugees and migration. Von der Leyen emphasized that respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights is crucial for the EU and that it should be an “integral part of the EU-Turkey relations” and pointed out that it is crucial for Turkey to respect international human rights and standards as a founding member of the Council of Europe. Referring to the fact that the EU is Turkey’s number one trading partner and the uniqueness of the Customs Union between the two parties, von der Leyen said that modernising the Customs Union is one of the top priorities but only after resolving some of ongoing issues in the implementation of the Customs Union. She also mentioned that work is being carried out to improve the public-private sector cooperation with a focus on green and digital transformation. The European Commission President pointed out to the potential benefits to both Turkey and the EU of Turkey’s participation in the EU programmes like Horizon Europe and Erasmus+ in relation to the high level dialogues on issues like climate change, public health and people-to-people contacts. She praised the achievements in relation to migration and refugees so far as a result of the cooperation between Turkey and the EU in line with the 18 March Turkey-EU Statement and said that more can be done if Turkey stands by its commitments especially regarding the prevention of irregular migration and resuming return operations from the Greek islands. Von der Leyen said that the EU will continue to provide funding in this respect and that work is being done to extend this funding to other countries like Jordan and Lebanon. Finally, she said that the EU is aiming for an “honest partnership” with Turkey and that the attitude Turkey will adopt in the near future will determine where the new relationship between the EU and Turkey will lead.

    While no reference was made to Turkey’s status as a candidate country in their speeches, both EU leaders have mentioned that respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights are core EU values and expressed concern over certain recent developments in Turkey and Turkey’s decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. They also said that the state of Turkey-EU relations will be reviewed at the June European Council meeting which is a message that the EU will closely follow the developments regarding Turkey and that the “reversible” aspect of the relationship, even sanctions can be triggered in case the developments are not in line with the EU’s expectations.

    “Positive Agenda” with a Grain of Salt

    The outcome of this visit was no surprise as the expectation was that similar messages were going to be conveyed by the EU leaders during their visit to Turkey. Looking at the content of the discussions, parties reiterated what they have already been saying and the remarks made after the meeting confirmed their previous stance regarding Turkey-EU relations. The fact that no mention was made of Turkey’s candidacy is considered an indication that Turkey is viewed more as a country in the neighbourhood area of the EU rather than a candidate country aiming for full membership and that Turkey-EU relations are being assessed from a foreign affairs and security policy perspective. In line with this narrow perspective, more emphasis is put on the steps to be taken within the framework of the “positive agenda” put forth after the October and December 2020 European Council meetings. And yet the EU’s message is that Turkey has to overcome a condition for every positive step to be activated and that it will be under a constant observation and ongoing review the results of which would impact the nature of the future of the EU-Turkey relations.

    The unexpected outcome of the visit by the leaders of EU institutions to Turkey has been the “sofagate” crisis. The protocol crisis, which has been occupying the agenda since the visit, has erupted as a result of the lack of equal seating arrangements for the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and the President of the European Council Charles Michel during the meeting with President Erdoğan. The resulting blame game and a range of interpretations of the events thereof have caused the surfacing of the power struggle between Michel and von der Leyen and their respective EU institutions and was even carried to the European Parliament. Unfortunately, it can be said that the “sofagate” crisis has dampened the constructive spirit of the visit. It seems like in order to understand the actual outcome of this visit, we have to wait until the European Council meeting in June.

    TURKEY-EU RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE MARCH EUROPEAN COUNCIL: TOWARDS A POSITIVE AGENDA? - APRIL 2021

    Turkey-EU relations have followed a bumpy path since 2016. The year 2020 was especially challenging because of rising tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean in addition to the dire effects of the coronavirus pandemic. Seismic explorations for hydrocarbons off the coast of Cyprus and in the Aegean exposed flashpoints in the region emanating from the unsettled Cyprus question and bilateral disputes between Turkey and Greece. Moreover, Turkey’s assertive foreign policy and operations regarding Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts clashed with EU and its Member State interests. Such developments increased the EU’s threat assessment vis-à-vis Turkey while it led Turkey to question the EU’s support for its security. The growing rift between Turkey and the EU created a paradoxical situation in the relations: Will Turkey continue as a candidate to join the EU or will a different sort of relationship emerge which will be more conflictual than cooperative?

    The EU mostly led by Germany and facilitated by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell aimed to prevent the further deterioration in Turkey-EU relations through the proposition of a positive agenda.

    The positive agenda included further cooperation on mutual interests such as trade facilitation, modernisation of the Customs Union, restarting high level dialogue meetings, refugee cooperation and people-to-people contacts. Turkey’s first reaction to the positive agenda was lukewarm however, the Turkish government took care not to antagonize the relationship further by moderating its approach to the Eastern Mediterranean tensions and improving its bilateral relations with EU Member States such as Greece and France. While an exchange of letters was followed by a phone conversation between Turkish and French Presidents, exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece restarted after five years. Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas’ visit to Turkey took place in an amicable atmosphere as did Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s visit to Brussels. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s strategic goal of EU membership noting that accepting Turkey as a Member State would be an ontological choice for the EU. These overtures were followed by an intensifying discourse on reform culminating in President Erdoğan’s declaration of a Human Rights Action Plan and an Economic Reform Package. What proved to be quite problematic was the discrepancy between the proclaimed aim of reforming the political and economic situation in the direction of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance and the actual turn of events.

    Three developments took place in Turkey right before the critical 25-26 March European Council. The EU leaders had postponed a lengthier debate on Turkey-EU relations to the March Summit. These developments were Turkey’s decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention on fighting violence against women, the decision to replace the Central Bank governor who was an internationally renowned technocrat with a more controversial figure and the opening of the closure case against the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the lifting of immunity for yet another one of its members of Parliament. While the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention had a symbolic significance regarding the Turkish government’s adherence to women’s rights and gender equality, coupled with the disregard for the European Court of Human Rights decisions and delay in the ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement it also attests to a falling out with multilateralism and global norms. The sudden change in the Central Bank raises questions about economic governance in an extremely fragile economic situation adding to the worries of international investors about the soundness of the management of Turkish economy. The closure case against HDP, the third largest party in terms of the votes it received in the last elections and a member of the “Millet” coalition was viewed from Europe as an undemocratic move induced by the government not an act against terrorism initiated by an independent judiciary. Despite these developments which led to a questioning of the government’s determination to revitalize the EU accession perspective, the 25 March

    Statement of the Members of the European Council did not include a harsh criticism regarding these developments and accorded the 8th place to the rule of law and fundamental rights question among a total of 11 points (point 16 under the title of “Eastern Mediterranean” starting with point 9). Moreover, the debate about Turkey-EU relations was under the title of the “Eastern Mediterranean” giving pundits an idea about the lenses through which the EU has been eyeing Turkey lately.

    The EU Leaders’ Statement noted “the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey”, and welcomed “the recent de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean through the discontinuation of illegal drilling activities, the resumption of bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey and the forthcoming talks on the Cyprus problem under the auspices of the United Nations”. Hence, it may be evaluated that the recent change in Turkey’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean pleased the EU and tilted the balance in favour of positive measures to revitalize Turkey-EU relations. The leaders also added that the situation in the region was still fragile and more time was needed in order to reach a definitive view on the implementation of the positive measures. The EU put forth three positive measures in order to trigger cooperation with Turkey “in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner”: economic cooperation and talks regarding the current problems in the Customs Union and starting work on a mandate for the modernisation of the Customs Union; restarting high level dialogues with Turkey on issues such as public health, climate, counter-terrorism and regional issues; and engaging in cooperation regarding mobility and people-to-people contacts.

    The European Council underlined that if Turkey’s actions in Eastern Mediterranean threatened EU and Member State interests again, then it would use “the instruments and options at its disposal to defend its interests...”. Such instruments that could be used against Turkey were not elaborated in the statement. However, the report titled “State of play of EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations” prepared by the European Commission and High Representative Borrell detailed the possible sanctions that could be employed against Turkey such as adoption of additional listings for restrictive measures, restrictions on economic cooperation, sectoral measures such as prohibition to supply of tourism services, and additional measures in energy and related sectors such as import/export bans on goods and technologies. The implementation of such sanctions, which would go beyond the framework of Turkey-EU relations but would target the already fragile Turkish economy, could have drastic effects on stability in Turkey. Hence, while the focus of the European Council is on rewarding the recent de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and kick off a more amicable relationship based on mutual interests, the sanctions toolkit is developed behind the scenes in order to be availed in case of a return to tension and crises in the region.

    In a nutshell, Turkey-EU relations are at a crossroads. Although Turkey is still a candidate country to the EU, it is no longer regarded as a genuine candidate by the EU and its Member States. An alternative relationship based on a strategic partnership is being formulated in this process. However, any new relationship between Turkey and the EU would definitively be considered as a downgrading from the status of candidate and acceding country. Based on the current conditions, a revitalisation of Turkey-EU relations is urgently needed for both parties and will entail both de-escalation in the foreign policy domain and building of cooperation and trust as well as progress in the human rights, democracy and rule of law situation in Turkey.

    Assoc. Prof. Çiğdem NAS, IKV Secretary General 

    A STEP TOWARDS EU’S POST-PANDEMIC RECOVERY: THE RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FACILITY APPROVED - MARCH 2021

    The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 has changed the current and future economic outlook throughout the world and in the EU. Industry and economy in Member States have been directly affected by the pandemic. As a result, production has declined, investments have been cut significantly which required urgent action. One of the essential requirements has been the need to address the major economic and social challenges related to the pandemic crisis to prevent loss in productive capacity and employment thereby protecting economic and social resilience. Accordingly, to fight the socioeconomic challenges arising from the pandemic and to ensure the EU’s recovery from this crisis, the EU designed a comprehensive recovery package. 

    After long negotiations, on 21 July 2020, EU leaders agreed on a comprehensive package of 1,824.3 billion euros in total, combining the 1,074.3-billion-euro Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), and an extraordinary 750-billion-euro recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). MFF, with the firepower of the NGEU, is the main instrument for implementing the recovery package to tackle the socioeconomic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The recovery package also aims to help transform the EU through its major policies, particularly the European Green Deal, the digital revolution and resilience. Under the package, 30% of the total expenditure from the MFF and NGEU is planned to target climate-related projects. 

    The regulation on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), adopted by the European Council on 11 February 2021, marks an important step in supporting reforms and investments in the EU as part of NGEU. The RRF with an amount of 672.5 billion euros in loans and grants will be available to the 27 Member States to help them address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic by fostering green and digital transitions and building resilient and inclusive societies. Member States will receive support from the facility based on their national recovery and resilience plans. 

    The RRF is at the centre of NGEU, a temporary recovery instrument that enables the EU to raise funds to help repair the sudden economic and social damage caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Investing in green and digital technologies, capacities and processes aimed at assisting clean energy transition, boosting energy efficiency in various key sectors of the economy will help create jobs and sustainable growth and enhance the competitiveness of the EU as well as increase its resilience and autonomy by diversifying key supply chains. 

    RRF offers large-scale financial support for public investments and reforms that make Member States economies more resilient. Moreover, it will be an instrument for Member States to address the economic and social challenges they are facing in various areas such as social, employment, skills, education, research and innovation, health issues, as well as issues related to the business environment, including public administration and the financial sector. The RRF is envisaged to ensure that the investment and reforms focus on the challenges and investment needs related to the green and digital transitions, thereby ensuring a sustainable recovery. It will provide up to 672.5 billion euros to support investments and reforms designed to help countries recover from COVID-19 and enable the green and digital transitions. The total amount will be disbursed as 312.5 billion euros in grants and 360 billion euros in loans. 

    Structure and Objectives of the Recovery and Resilience Facility 

    The scope of the RRF is centred around six pillars: green transition, digital transformation, economic cohesion, productivity and competitiveness, social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience, and policies for the next generation. Member States will set out in their national recovery and resilience plans a package of reforms and investment projects, covering the six policy areas mentioned. 

    The plans prepared by the Member States should effectively address challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council. As it is known, the European Semester is a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU as part of the economic governance framework focusing on the 6 months from the beginning of each year. During the European Semester, the Member States align their budgetary and economic policies with the objectives and rules agreed at the EU level. 

    The national recovery and resilience plans should also include measures to address the challenges and the benefits of green and digital transitions. Each plan is expected to contribute to the four dimensions (environmental sustainability, productivity, fairness, macroeconomic stability) outlined in the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy in conjunction with the European Semester cycle. The RRF will be crucial for
    the Member States in the process of addressing effectively the challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations under the European Semester framework of economic and social policy coordination. During the process, the next step is the submission by the Member States of their national recovery and resilience plans until 30 April 2021 which will be assessed by the Commission and adopted by the Council to set their reform and investment agendas until 2026. 

    The RRF will also contribute to the EU’s goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and set it on a path of digital transition while creating jobs and spurring growth in the process. In this light, expenditure on investments and reforms contained in each national recovery and resilience plan should take into account the standard percentage decided by the EU on boosting green and digital reforms. This means that while at least 37% of the budget should support climate objectives, 20% should be allocated to the digital transition. According to that, under the RRF a total amount of 250 billion euros will be channelled into the green transition and 134 billion euros into the digital transformation. The RRF will allow countries to tackle the fiscal problems caused by the pandemic, while at the same time increasing public investments in EU’s priority areas. 

    With the adoption of the RRF, the EU has created a common instrument, funded by common debt to achieve a common goal. This shows an unprecedented sign of EU solidarity in response to a crisis. The RRF is an opportunity to create European flagship areas for investments and reforms with benefits for the economy and citizens across the EU. It is planned to address issues that need significant investment to create jobs and growth which are also essential for green and digital transitions. 

     

    The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 has changed the current and future economic outlook throughout the world and in the EU. Industry and economy in Member States have been directly affected by the pandemic. As a result, production has declined, investments have been cut significantly which required urgent action. One of the essential requirements has been the need to address the major economic and social challenges related to the pandemic crisis to prevent loss in productive capacity and employment thereby protecting economic and social resilience. Accordingly, to fight the socioeconomic challenges arising from the pandemic and to ensure the EU’s recovery from this crisis, the EU designed a comprehensive recovery package. 

    After long negotiations, on 21 July 2020, EU leaders agreed on a comprehensive package of 1,824.3 billion euros in total, combining the 1,074.3-billion-euro Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), and an extraordinary 750-billion-euro recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). MFF, with the firepower of the NGEU, is the main instrument for implementing the recovery package to tackle the socioeconomic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The recovery package also aims to help transform the EU through its major policies, particularly the European Green Deal, the digital revolution and resilience. Under the package, 30% of the total expenditure from the MFF and NGEU is planned to target climate-related projects. 

    The regulation on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), adopted by the European Council on 11 February 2021, marks an important step in supporting reforms and investments in the EU as part of NGEU. The RRF with an amount of 672.5 billion euros in loans and grants will be available to the 27 Member States to help them address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic by fostering green and digital transitions and building resilient and inclusive societies. Member States will receive support from the facility based on their national recovery and resilience plans. 

    The RRF is at the centre of NGEU, a temporary recovery instrument that enables the EU to raise funds to help repair the sudden economic and social damage caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Investing in green and digital technologies, capacities and processes aimed at assisting clean energy transition, boosting energy efficiency in various key sectors of the economy will help create jobs and sustainable growth and enhance the competitiveness of the EU as well as increase its resilience and autonomy by diversifying key supply chains. 

    RRF offers large-scale financial support for public investments and reforms that make Member States economies more resilient. Moreover, it will be an instrument for Member States to address the economic and social challenges they are facing in various areas such as social, employment, skills, education, research and innovation, health issues, as well as issues related to the business environment, including public administration and the financial sector. The RRF is envisaged to ensure that the investment and reforms focus on the challenges and investment needs related to the green and digital transitions, thereby ensuring a sustainable recovery. It will provide up to 672.5 billion euros to support investments and reforms designed to help countries recover from COVID-19 and enable the green and digital transitions. The total amount will be disbursed as 312.5 billion euros in grants and 360 billion euros in loans. 

    Structure and Objectives of the Recovery and Resilience Facility 

    The scope of the RRF is centred around six pillars: green transition, digital transformation, economic cohesion, productivity and competitiveness, social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience, and policies for the next generation. Member States will set out in their national recovery and resilience plans a package of reforms and investment projects, covering the six policy areas mentioned. 

    The plans prepared by the Member States should effectively address challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council. As it is known, the European Semester is a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU as part of the economic governance framework focusing on the 6 months from the beginning of each year. During the European Semester, the Member States align their budgetary and economic policies with the objectives and rules agreed at the EU level. 

    The national recovery and resilience plans should also include measures to address the challenges and the benefits of green and digital transitions. Each plan is expected to contribute to the four dimensions (environmental sustainability, productivity, fairness, macroeconomic stability) outlined in the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy in conjunction with the European Semester cycle. The RRF will be crucial for
    the Member States in the process of addressing effectively the challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations under the European Semester framework of economic and social policy coordination. During the process, the next step is the submission by the Member States of their national recovery and resilience plans until 30 April 2021 which will be assessed by the Commission and adopted by the Council to set their reform and investment agendas until 2026. 

    The RRF will also contribute to the EU’s goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and set it on a path of digital transition while creating jobs and spurring growth in the process. In this light, expenditure on investments and reforms contained in each national recovery and resilience plan should take into account the standard percentage decided by the EU on boosting green and digital reforms. This means that while at least 37% of the budget should support climate objectives, 20% should be allocated to the digital transition. According to that, under the RRF a total amount of 250 billion euros will be channelled into the green transition and 134 billion euros into the digital transformation. The RRF will allow countries to tackle the fiscal problems caused by the pandemic, while at the same time increasing public investments in EU’s priority areas. 

    With the adoption of the RRF, the EU has created a common instrument, funded by common debt to achieve a common goal. This shows an unprecedented sign of EU solidarity in response to a crisis. The RRF is an opportunity to create European flagship areas for investments and reforms with benefits for the economy and citizens across the EU. It is planned to address issues that need significant investment to create jobs and growth which are also essential for green and digital transitions. 

    NEW YEAR BRINGS FRESH HOPE FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS AS DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS INTENSIFY - FEBRUARY 2021

    Turkey-EU relations started the new year at a very high pace as a result of the increased number of diplomatic contacts between the two parties. By the end of the third week in January, there have already been numerous diplomatic meetings at the presidential and foreign ministerial level. 

    Key Messages by President Erdoğan Signal a New Page in Relations 

    First, there has been the video conference call that took place between President Erdoğan and the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In a statement by the Communications Directorate of the Presidency, it was said that during the video conference call ways of enhancing the relations between Turkey and the EU were discussed and regional developments were addressed. President Erdoğan sent a message by saying that the EU was high on Turkey’s agenda and that they saw Turkey’s future in Europe. He noted that the situation that evolved with respect to the future of the relations and the shared geography in 2020 as a result of “the caprices of some EU members and the artificial problems created by them” was not sustainable and that Turkey wanted to turn a new page in the new year. Emphasizing the fact that Turkey is a candidate country, much more than a neighbouring country, President Erdoğan underlined the need for an end to exclusionary and discriminatory acts and rhetoric against Turkey. He pointed out that mutual trust should be restored and the consultation mechanisms should be re-activated and stressed the importance of resuming regular Turkey-EU summits and high-level dialogue meetings. After stressing the importance of updating the 18 March 2016 Turkey-EU Statement known as the “refugee deal” for setting the first stage of a positive agenda, President Erdoğan said that the year “2021 offered a productive atmosphere in terms of new cooperation to be built in the field of migration”. He further stated that modernisation of the Customs Union, visa liberalisation  for Turkish citizens and accession negotiations were other areas where progress should be made. For her part, Commission President von  der Leyen referred to the meeting as a “good exchange” with Turkish President Erdoğan on the issues of COVID-19, the economic recovery and the implementation of tasking of the European Council of December 2020. 

    Next was President Erdoğan’s meeting with the ambassadors of the EU countries in Ankara on 12 January 2021. President Erdoğan’s message as regards Turkey’s relations with the EU, was that Turkey sees its future together with Europe and that the strategic choice of becoming a full member still holds true even after 60 years of struggle towards achieving this ultimate goal despite all the challenges. He continued to say that “accepting Turkey as a full member will be an ontological choice in terms of the future of the Union” and that “the uncertainty that has heightened with Brexit will be dissipated with Turkey taking its rightful place in the European family.” President Erdoğan referred to a number of problematic issues during his speech. With respect to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, President Erdoğan said that as a result of some EU members trying to resolve their bilateral problems, the Turkey-EU agenda was “exploited under the pretext of the Union solidarity.” He continued to say that “this approach not only takes hostage our long-standing  ties but also undermines the Union’s projection to be a regional and global power.”Turkey favours“peace, cooperation, equity and justice in the Mediterranean, not tension” and yet is ready “to protect the legitimate interests of the country and nation regarding the region’s hydrocarbon resources” was the message conveyed by President Erdoğan, objecting to the injustices and the maximalist initiatives to confine Turkey into its coasts regarding both the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus issues. He also touched upon the exploratory talks which were scheduled to begin on 25 January with Greece as a new era, pointed out that alternatives other than the two-state model will not produce a solution and called  for new and realistic alternatives to the Cyprus issue. President Erdoğan criticised Europe for not standing with Turkey fighting the terrorist organisations in Syria, for not supporting Turkey enough during and after the 15 July coup attempt as regards the members of the FETÖ terrorist organisation living and organising protests in European countries against Turkey. President Erdoğan put forward Turkey’s position on Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh which was deemed to be problematic and said that “they were not related to the essence of the relations with the EU and member countries”. With respect to both the visa liberalisation and the Syrian refugees, President Erdoğan said that the EU did not fully deliver on its commitments to Turkey;  yet Turkey is still willing to work towards the joint management of migration, stressing the importance of working together to make 2021 a successful year with respect to Turkey-EU relations. 

    On 15 January, a telephone call took place between President Erdoğan and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. President Erdoğan stated that Turkey valued its relations with Italy and made a point of organising the third intergovernmental summit with Italy in Turkey after the pandemic. President Erdoğan thanked Italy for the support it provided to Turkey regarding the EU and expressed his belief that Italy would lead the EU “towards adopting an attitude based on common sense and equity in the Eastern Mediterranean”. He also praised Italy’s attitude for cooperating with the Government of National Accord of Libya. 

    Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu’s Comprehensive Brussels Agenda 

    Finally, on 21 January, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu went on a two-day visit to Brussels. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu held meetings in the EP, came together with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell. The other meetings Çavuşoğlu had in Brussels were with European Council President Charles Michel, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas, Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi and Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson, and Belgian Foreign Minister Sophie Wilmes. During the meetings with his interlocutors from EU institutions, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu made the point that Turkey wishes to turn a new page with the EU and underscored Turkey’s intention to work towards a positive agenda. He noted that the 18 March Turkey-EU Statement should be revised and drew attention to the need to revitalise the EU accession process, the modernisation of the Customs Union, the cooperation to fight against terrorism, irregular migration, and racism and Islamophobia in Europe. 

    Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu also met with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and stressed the critical role of Turkey within NATO’s deterrence and defence, talked of Turkey’s continued support to the NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his meeting with EP Turkey Rapporteur Nacho Sánchez Amor, Çavuşoğlu expressed that EP should play a more constructive role in developing the Turkey-EU relations and pointed out that the 2021 Turkey Report should be “fair and balanced” and emphasize “Turkey’s candidate status”. 

    As indicated by German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas’ visit to Ankara a few days before Çavuşoğlu’s visit to Brussels, although Turkey’s intentions are seen as positive, if there are to be developments on issues of importance for Turkey such as modernisation of the Customs Union, and visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens, concrete actions along these intentions are expected from Turkey. 

    To conclude, the EU saying that the issues relating to Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean will be coordinated with the incoming US administration and the European Council meeting due to take place on 25-26 March 2021 are important factors in Turkey’s intensified efforts to establish diplomatic contacts to revitalise the relations since the beginning of 2021. They are signs that Turkey is determined to “create a positive agenda with a long-term perspective” and put Turkey-EU relations “back on track” prior to the crucial European Council meeting of 25-26 March 2021. EU High Representative Borrell, as tasked by the European Council on 10-11 December 2020, will present his report where relations with Turkey and possible options will be on the agenda once again and has the potential to determine the direction of Turkey-EU relations for the foreseeable future depending on the EU leaders’ decision as to how to move forward with respect to Turkey-EU relations. 

    TURKEY-EU RELATIONS AT YEAR’S END: WHAT NEXT? - JANUARY 2021

    The Turkey-EU relations went through quite a difficult period in 2020. Above all, foreign policy differences and conflicts over Eastern Mediterranean maritime zones, Cyprus issue and Aegean disputes between Turkey and Greece created a growing divergence between the two parties. The EU mostly backed Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) and paid scant attention to Turkey’s point of view and claims of what it saw as its legitimate interests. Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the region, most notably sending off seismic exploration vessels in search of hydrocarbons, operations in Syria and intervention into the Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts drew sharp criticism from the EU and especially some of its Member States such as France. Turkey’s foreign policy moves were seen as threats to stability in the region and EU’s interests. However, the fact that Turkey intervened on behalf of the UN-recognised government in Libya and hydrocarbon explorations sanctioned by the GCASC mostly left out the Turkish Cypriot interests or the fact that any deal regarding the delimitation of territorial waters and continental shelf in the Aegean Sea had to take into account the sui generis nature of the region were mostly omitted from public debates on Turkey’s foreign policy activism.

    The Debate on Turkey-EU Relations ahead of the December European Council

    2020’s final European Council meeting took place on 10 and 11 December in Brussels amid a soaring wave of COVID-19. Prior to the Council meeting, several EU Member States expressed their approach towards Turkey and focused on the need for further sanctions. While the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dendias argued for a suspension of the Customs Union, French Minister for European Affairs Le Drian noted that EU’s policy towards Turkey would change in the direction of harsh sanctions. However, the 10 December European Council was mostly dominated by other issues such as resolving the Hungarian and Polish vetoes over the recovery fund and multiannual budget of the Union. German Chancellor Merkel also played a moderating role and postponed the more intensive debate on Turkey to the March European Council. Until that time the EU’s policy towards Turkey could also be coordinated with the soon-to-be inaugurated Biden Administration in the USA.

    Decoding the European Council Conclusions on Turkey

    The conclusions of the European Council included the relations with Turkey under the “Eastern Mediterranean” heading. The Council firstly criticised Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean since the 1-2 October European Council when the proposal for a positive political agenda was offered. While noting the withdrawal of the Oruç Reis vessel to the Antalya Harbour, it called for “sustained de-escalation so as to allow for the early resumption and smooth continuation of direct exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey”.

    The Council then went onto outlining its approach to relations with Turkey for the time being and underlined “EU’s strategic interest in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey”. In order to develop this relationship, the earlier offer of a positive political agenda was declared to “remain on the table”. However, it was made conditional upon Turkey’s willingness to start a dialogue with the EU and its Member States: “The offer of a positive EU-Turkey agenda remains on the table, provided Turkey shows readiness to promote a genuine partnership with the Union and its Member States and to resolve differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law”.

    The offer of a positive agenda is seen by the EU as the only way to save the increasingly problematic relationship. On the part of Turkey however, it is met with scepticism due to its being tied to conditions which conflict with the country’s foreign policy stance and national interests in Eastern Mediterranean. The contents of the agenda namely “areas of the economy and trade, people to people contacts, high level dialogues and continued cooperation on migration issues” would be welcome developments for Turkey-EU relations. However, it should also be noted that any reference to Turkey’s accession process or candidacy to the EU is omitted from the proposal for a positive agenda. While the offer specifically mentioned modernisation of the Customs Union and trade facilitation, in this renewed version, a vaguer reference to economy and trade is made without specifically calling for modernisation of the Customs Union. The European Council nevertheless underlined that cooperation in migration management and financial assistance to refugees and host communities will continue: “The EU will also be prepared to continue providing financial assistance to Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey and to cooperate on the responsible management of migration flows towards all Member States and on stepping up efforts in the fight against migrant smuggler networks”.

    Intense Discussion on Turkey-EU Relations Foreseen for March 2021

    The major question regarding the conclusions of the European Council was whether or not new sanctions would be implemented towards Turkey. As noted above, several Member States such as France, Greece, GCASC, and Austria advocated a tougher approach to Turkey and supported the adoption of tough sanctions including disruption of trade and economic links. The Council decided to postpone a more serious discussion on Turkey and whether or not to implement sanctions to the March European Council. A limited extension of existing restrictive measures was adopted which foresaw additional listings of persons involved in the drilling and seismic exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean region. In addition, the Council tasked the Commission and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell to prepare a report on Turkey-EU relations: “...invites the High Representative and the Commission, to submit a report on the state of play concerning the EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations and on instruments and options on how to proceed... at the latest at the March 2021 European Council”. Hence, the March European Council is expected to turn into a platform where the future of the Turkey-EU relationship will be up for discussion. Owing to the fact that the EU and UK were able to arrive at an agreement on the new trade and cooperation relationship between the two, this new agreement could be a source of inspiration for recalibrating the Turkey-EU relationship. While the EU’s preference would be for a partnership that would take the place of the current Association+Accession framework, Turkish government would object to the elimination of candidacy and accession status. Recent announcements from the President and other officials attest to a return to the EU perspective as a strategic goal for the current government. The March European Council will be critical in determining the future direction of the relationship.

    The European Council also touched upon the Cyprus issue, condemned Turkey for partially opening the closed city of Maraş/Varosha, called for a return to negotiations under the UN auspices for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. It also underlined that it awaits Turkey to support the resumption of talks for a resolution of the Cyprus problem and requested the High Representative to proceed with the organisation of a “multilateral conference on the Eastern Mediterranean” which was an initiative already put forward in the 1 October European Council. This call for a resumption of talks for the resolution of the Cyprus issue is a positive step. However, considering that Turkey supported the Annan Plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem back in 2004 and had to then observe the membership of GCASC to the EU after rejecting the Plan in a referendum, it would not be wrong to assume that the EU’s calls for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue could fall on deaf ears.

    The final point made by the European Council in its conclusions on the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey was quite interesting and critical regarding the near future of the relationship. The Council noted that issues in this regard, i.e. with respect to relations with Turkey and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean would be coordinated with the United States. Taking into account that the EU is looking forward to revitalise the transatlantic relations under the Biden administration with a view to mending the relationship that was dealt a heavy blow by the Trump administration, coordination of policies towards Turkey and resolution of the Eastern Mediterranean quagmire would be one of the most prominent issues likely to be included in the renewed transatlantic agenda.

    Assoc. Prof. Çiğdem NAS, IKV Secretary General 

  • DECEMBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL: WHAT TO EXPECT FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS - DECEMBER 2020

    The European Council is scheduled to meet on 10 and 11 December 2020 with a busy agenda including efforts against COVID-19, Hungary and Poland’s efforts to prevent rule of law criteria to be applied to EU funds, trade policy, climate change, security and external relations. The issues to be taken up will also include Turkey-EU relations. It is no secret that relations between Turkey and the EU are going through a very difficult period. Turkey has been a candidate to join the EU since the Helsinki European Council of 1999 and negotiating accession since 2005. Although the candidacy status is still valid, no new chapters in the negotiations could be opened since June 2016. Moreover, the EU decided to implement sanctions against Turkey starting with the suspension of comprehensive air transport agreement negotiations, cuts in IPA funds and calling off of the Turkey-EU Association Council meetings as well as high level dialogue meetings. In addition to problems in the fulfilment of political criteria for EU accession, foreign policy issues began to undermine Turkey-EU relations. Turkey was placed under fierce criticism by the EU over hydrocarbon explorations in Eastern Mediterranean and maritime delimitation issues. 

    Recently the European Council, meeting on 1 October, extended an offer of a positive political agenda on the condition that Turkey would cease its activities in Eastern Mediterranean. The conditional offer of a positive political agenda included a revitalisation of Turkey-EU relations by way of Customs Union modernisation, trade facilitation, people to people contacts, high-level dialogues and cooperation on migration based on the 2016 Turkey- EU Statement. The conclusions of 1 October also added that “the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States” in case Turkey continues its unilateral actions in Eastern Mediterranean. Those instruments and options noted in the above-mentioned articles of TEU and TFEU make it possible for the EU to apply sanctions and restrictive measures. Article 215 stipulates that where the Union adopts a decision under Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU regarding “the interruption or reduction,  in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries”, the Council can adopt the necessary measures by qualified majority voting. 

    Developments following the Proposal for a Positive Political Agenda 

    Following the proposal for a positive political agenda, Turkish officials mostly objected to this offer being tied to a condition regarding Turkey’s foreign policy actions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticised the European Council conclusions to be based on “narrow-minded interests and blindly-extended membership solidarity”. The press release regarding the 1 October conclusions started with the following statement: “Conclusions adopted at the Special European Council Meeting yesterday (1 October) regarding Turkey, even with certain positive elements, are far from reality in most aspects. The text is an evidence of how certain EU countries aim to further relations with Turkey on the one hand and how the Greek-Greek Cypriot duo takes Turkey-EU relations hostage on the other...”. The Ministry also added that Turkey remained committed to the EU membership perspective and open to all initiatives based on de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy. 

    Following the 1 October Summit, Turkey continued to declare NAVTEX alerts in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, i.e. 5 new NAVTEX alerts for the seismic exploration vessel Oruç Reis until 4 November and two more alerts for Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa, the vessel named after a historical commander of Ottoman maritime forces who lived in  the 15th-16th centuries. Turkish officials saw the area where explorations would be made as legitimately falling under Turkey’s maritime zone which was contested by Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). While Turkey’s actions were deemed as “provocative” by the EU, Greece also engaged in a similar type of action when on 3 October, it declared two new NAVTEX alerts also concerning the contested maritime zones. 

    The exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey regarding questions of territorial waters, continental shelf and related issues over the Aegean could not be restarted due to lack of agreement on the agenda regarding the specific issues to be addressed. The opening of the contested zone of Varosha in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the dispute with France starting after the murder of history teacher leading to a response by the Turkish side starting a boycott of French products and Turkey’s stance and role regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict did not help with a re-engagement between Turkey and the EU. Hence, the window of opportunity created by the 1 October European Council could not provide for a re-energising of the relations. 

    Member State and Institutional Positions prior to the December European Council 

    Statements by Greece and France prior to the December European Council have indicated that the December European Council could result in quite worrying developments regarding the future of Turkey-EU relations including the application  of sanctions towards Turkey. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias sent a letter to the European Commissioner for Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi regarding the suspension of the Turkey-EU Customs Union due to what he considered as “Ankara’s continued provocations”. In addition, he also complained about extra tariffs implemented by Turkey and saw these as a violation of Customs Union commitments. 

    President Erdoğan called for a ban on French products as a protest against French President Macron’s statements following the murder of a history teacher in France. Such a ban regarding goods which should be in circulation according to the rules of the Customs Union was also criticised. The disagreement between President Macron and President Erdoğan regarding Islam and radicalism also attested to a conflict over the question of religion, secularism and integration of Muslims in Europe. France’s European Affairs Minister Clément Beaune stated that individual or sectoral economic sanctions could be debated in the December European Council and added that France changed the European position on Turkey. 

    Even Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, who tried to reconcile the parties prior to the October European Council, changed her approach and said that current developments will be observed until the European Council meeting, but also added that “most recent developments were not like what [the EU] has wished to see in the region”. 

    High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell, spoke during the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting saying that “the recent actions and a statement by Turkey related to Cyprus, were considered contrary to UN resolutions and further igniting tensions”. He criticised Turkey’s behaviour and said that this unchanging behaviour is leading to a separation from the EU and makes it impossible to implement the positive agenda: “We consider also that it is important that Turkey understands that its behaviour is widening its separation from the EU. In order to return to a positive agenda, as we wish, we will require a fundamental change of the attitude on the Turkish side”. Regarding the European Council in December when the question of “what to do about Turkey” will again be taken up by the EU leaders, he drew attention to a “watershed moment” in Turkey-EU relations where the future direction would also be shaped: “European Council will provide crucial direction on this, next month. Time is running, and we are approaching a watershed moment in our relationship with Turkey”. He also added that the opening of Varosha by the TRNC was criticised by EU foreign affairs ministers. 

    Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee (INTA) for the EPP, also called for the suspension of the Customs Union. She said: “We are not going to trade with someone who blackmails us and boycotts us”. She called for a meeting of the INTA Committee to discuss Turkey’s violation of trade commitments vis-à-vis the EU. Such a suspension of the Customs Union seems to be unlikely given the large-scale investments by European firms in Turkey and the degree of interdependence between the parties. Chair of the INTA Committee, German MEP Bernd Lange said that he did not favour such sanctions against Turkey since he did not believe that sanctions would lead to the anticipated outcome. He also said that due to the scale of economic relations between Turkey and the EU, it would not be in the EU’s interest to suspend the Customs Union: “[The EU has] intensive economic relations with Turkey, including many car manufacturers that are on site. We would be shooting ourselves in the foot”. The European Council meeting in December would definitely like to send a message of warning to Turkey. This message could take the form of sectoral measures or protective measures such as anti-dumping duties. 

    In the meantime, steps that could be taken by Turkey regarding a restart of reforms, embodying improvements in rule of law, judicial independence, autonomy of regulatory bodies, freedom of expression and media could affect the EU’s approach towards Turkey. Statements by President Erdoğan and Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gül in recent days regarding the importance of rule of law and Turkey’s strategic objective of EU membership give reason to be hopeful about a U-turn in the EU process. In order for Turkey’s efforts to mend its relations with the EU to be credible and elicit a positive response by the EU, they have to be accompanied by concrete steps aiming at amelioration of the democratic, legal and human rights situation backed up by a comprehensive political, legal and administrative reform strategy. 

    THE 2020 TURKEY REPORT: NEGLECTED TOOL OF EUROPEANISATION - NOVEMBER 2020

    The European Commission published its regular report about Turkey on 6 October 2020 together with the 2020 enlargement strategy and reports for the other candidate and potential candidate countries. This is the 22nd report for Turkey, the first one written in 1998 as part of the European Strategy to prepare Turkey for membership in line with the Cardiff Council conclusions of the time. Going back to those days, the conclusions of the Cardiff European Council noted: “The European Council welcomes the Commission’s confirmation that it will submit at the end of 1998 its first regular reports on each candidate’s progress towards accession. In the case of Turkey, reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.” 

    To refresh our memories, Article 28 of the Association Agreement stipulated the possibility of Turkey’s membership to the then EEC: “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.” Though the Cardiff European Council predated the declaration of Turkey’s candidacy status at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, reference was made to Article 28 and also to the European Strategy for Turkey included in the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council of 1997. It is awkward and ironical that references to Turkey’s goal of membership and candidacy status are quite scarce these days. EU officials and leaders point to Turkey’s importance as a strategic partner and neighbouring country and between the lines allude to its indispensability for Europe. 

    The 2020 Turkey Report evaluates Turkey’s performance regarding the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership including political and economic conditions and commitment to adopt the EU acquis. Hence, the report’s existence per se can be seen as an indicator of Turkey’s status as a candidate to join the EU. Yet the accession process is at a standstill, the latest chapter having been opened to negotiations nearly four and a half years ago. Despite the EP’s calls to formally suspend the accession negotiations, the Council did not adopt such a decision except for the General Affairs Council conclusions of 26 June 2018 which noted that: “...Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.” Several factors and events negatively impacted on Turkey’s EU accession process and rising tensions in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey’s relations with several Member States further complicated Turkey-EU relations. On 1 October this year, the European Council proposed a positive political Turkey-EU agenda which would be dependent on Turkey’s ending its actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, actions which were characterised as “illegal” by the Council. The positive agenda did not include a revitalisation of accession negotiations but instead modernisation of the Customs Union, trade facilitation, people to people contacts, high level dialogues and continuation of migration cooperation. 

    The Turkey Report was published days after the European Council’s proposal for a positive agenda. Gone were the days when the publication of the Commission’s reports made headlines in Turkey. Turkey Report of 2020 drew the attention of a couple of institutions specialised on Turkey-EU relations such as our IKV and a small group of experts and academics working in the field of EU studies and Turkey-EU relations. The report was critical of Turkey’s backsliding in several issue areas and chapters of the EU acquis. In some instances the term “serious backsliding”was used by the Commission to denote the condition of democratic checks and balances, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, human rights, procedural rights, freedom of opinion, freedom of the media, civil society autonomy,  and independence of regulatory institutions. 

    Turkey’s hosting of 3.6 million Syrian refugees and around 370,000 registered refugees from other countries was appreciated by the Commission while a more critical note was added regarding the opening of the Pazarkule border crossing with Greece for the passage of refugees and migrants, an incident which created a crisis situation in March of this year. In addition to the political rights, the report included serious problems in Turkish economy and the implementation of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. Turkey’s quite assertive foreign policy moves in the recent period were also assessed in the report and criticised for infringement of international law and sovereign rights of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration. All in all, the Commission’s report painted a quite critical picture of present day Turkey. 

    According to a poll conducted by IKV and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) in 2019, 60% of Turkish citizens support Turkey’s EU membership while only 23% believe that it is going to take place in the near future. Despite all the problems in the accession process, Turkish people continue to aspire to EU membership which they associate with democracy, freedom and welfare. It is up to both the EU and Turkey to commit themselves to fulfilling this aspiration. The EU should be able to do this by providing for a credible membership perspective and facilitating the accession process by lifting obstacles and unilateral vetoes blocking smooth progress. The Turkish government and decision-makers should restart a process of reforms in order to rekindle the EU perspective and align with EU norms and values which ultimately will serve the good of the Turkish people. 

    EU LEADERS AGREED TO PURSUE A POSITIVE POLITICAL AGENDA WITH TURKEY - OCTOBER 2020

    Greek-Turkish tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, reminiscent of the ones in the Aegean in 1990s, have topped the agenda of Turkey-EU relations this summer. The dispute over maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean was further complicated by the multiple conflicts brewing in the region from Libya to Syria, the involvement of extra-regional actors such as France and increasing military mobilisation in the region. The risk that a misstep could trigger a maelstrom pitting several NATO Allies against one another had become extensively pronounced. In this period, Turkey-EU relations were significantly strained as the EU acting under the principle of “Union solidarity” provided unconditional support to the maximalist claims by Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration and made clear that sanctions would be on the table in case of continued escalation. In a major breakthrough, the European Council convening on 1 October 2020 proposed initiating a positive political agenda with Turkey which could help restore and inject the much needed dynamism to Turkey-EU relations.

    Heavy Diplomatic Traffic ahead of Crucial Summit

    In the run up to the Special European Council meeting initially scheduled for 24-25 September, there were encouraging signals creating optimism that the latest episode of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean has been overcome. Turkey’s decision to pull back the Oruç Reis seismic survey vessel to the port of Antalya for maintenance and resupply on 12 September was seen as an important window of opportunity for creating the necessary space for dialogue. Moreover, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and EU term president Germany have been engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Athens since the very beginning of the crisis, investing a great deal of political capital in defusing tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, since 10 September the two NATO Allies have been involved in technical military talks within NATO to establish a de-confliction mechanism with the aim to reduce the risk of military incidents and accidents.

    Diplomatic traffic between Brussels, Berlin and Ankara intensified in the countdown to the Special European Council meeting. On 22 September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a trilateral video conference call with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Council President Charles Michel where he announced that Ankara and Athens had agreed to resume the exploratory talks that had been suspended since 2016. The resumption of the exploratory talks was also confirmed by Athens. On the same day, President Erdoğan also spoke to French President Emmanuel Macron over the phone. Primacy of dialogue and diplomacy in de-escalating the situation were the main messages in the first conversation the two leaders had in months following the standoff in the Eastern Mediterranean. All these developments have created optimism that the tension characterising the past two months was over and that turning a new page in Turkey-EU relations was possible.

    The Special European Council meeting, which was initially planned for 24 and 25 September, was postponed to 1 and 2 October after European Council President Charles Michel went into self-isolation due to his possible exposure to the coronavirus. This postponement also provided additional time for diplomacy and dialogue.

    The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and relations with Turkey was the most crucial foreign policy issue on the agenda of the EU leaders convening on 1 October 2020. The discussion was also crucial in disentangling the impasse over EU’s proposed sanctions on Belarus. At the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 21 September, in a move that raised eyebrows across other EU capitals and dealt a huge blow to EU’s credibility in its neighbourhood, the Greek Cypriot Administration engaging in what Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics described as an act of “hostage taking” blocked the proposed sanctions against Minsk insisting that the EU take firm action against Turkey. The move sparked a particularly strong reaction from the Baltic states which had long demanded that the EU step up its response to Minsk’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protestors taking to the streets after the 9 August presidential elections which were neither free nor fair. Ahead of the Special European Council, the issue had turned into what High Representative Borrell rightfully described as “a high-voltage political problem” that EU leaders would have to address.

    Towards a Positive Political Turkey-EU Agenda

    Against this background, the draft Council conclusions on the Eastern Mediterranean had to be revised three times. After four hours of discussions, the leaders finally agreed on the wording of the conclusions.

    While reiterating their rhetorical support for the so-called sovereign rights of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, EU leaders announced their decision to launch a positive political agenda with Turkey. According to the Council conclusions, the proposed Turkey-EU positive agenda is set to focus on the modernisation of the Customs Union and trade facilitation, people to people contacts (i.e. visa liberalisation), high level dialogues and continued cooperation on migration in line with the 2016 Turkey-EU refugee deal. To this end, the leaders tasked European Council President Michel, in cooperation with Commission President von der Leyen and with the support of High Representative Borrell, with developing a proposal for re-energising the Turkey-EU agenda.

    EU leaders acknowledged that stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the development of a cooperative and mutual beneficial relationship with Turkey was to the EU’s strategic interest. They welcomed the announcement on the resumption of exploratory talks between Ankara and Athens, while at the same time urging Turkey to engage in dialogue with the Greek Cypriot Administration to resolve the maritime-related disputes. Concerning the Cyprus question, EU leaders expressed support for the resumption of UN-sponsored comprehensive settlement talks and proposed appointing a representative to the UN Good Offices Mission upon the resumption of the talks. The Council conclusions also included the warning that in the event of renewed tensions, the EU would be willing to consider all the instruments in its toolbox including those falling under Article 29 of the Treaty on the EU and Article 215 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU which form the EU’s general framework on sanctions. EU leaders are to revisit the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in December 2020. Finally, calling for a multilateral conference on the Eastern Mediterranean to address issues such as maritime delimitation, security, energy, migration and economic cooperation, EU leaders mandated High Representative Borrell with engaging in talks to this end.

    All in all, the willingness to leave behind the recent episode of tension and move towards a positive agenda by advancing Turkey-EU ties on several fronts such as the modernisation of the Customs Union, people to people contacts and cooperation on migration is an important step which would revitalize Turkey-EU relations.

    CHRONICLES OF A CRISIS FORETOLD: EAST MED TENSIONS SOAR AS GREECE SIGNS DEAL WITH EGYPT - SEPTEMBER 2020

    Greek-Turkish tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean topped the agenda of Turkey-EU relations in August. As it can be recalled, on 21 July 2020 Turkey issued a navigational telex (NAVTEX) reserving an area off the tiny island of Kastellorizo and announced its plans to carry out a new round of seismic survey in the Eastern Mediterranean by the Oruç Reis Seismic Research Vessel. Even though Ankara made clear that the Oruç Reis would operate in an area falling entirely within Turkey’s continental shelf registered with the UN and the license blocks awarded to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in 2012, Athens portrayed the mission as a direct violation of its sovereign rights. Claiming that islands can generate maritime jurisdiction areas, Greece has made accusations that the area covered by Turkey’s planned seismic survey overlapped with its continental shelf. Athens argues that the island of Kastellorizo, which has a surface area of 10 square kilometres and is located only 2 kilometres away from mainland Anatolia while 580 kilometres away from the Greek mainland, is entitled to a maritime jurisdiction area of 400,000 square kilometres. Turkey rejects Athens’ approach to claim maritime jurisdiction areas for tiny islands and islets as this approach contradicts with international law and jurisprudence. Moreover, Turkey views these moves as an attempt to block its access to the Mediterranean and confine it to the Gulf of Antalya.

    In attempt to defuse tension and allow space for diplomacy and negotiations, Ankara agreed to suspend its planned seismic survey on 29 July. However, exploratory talks between Ankara and Athens broke down after Athens used this opportunity to conclude a maritime boundary delimitation agreement with Egypt on 6 August. The agreement is seen as an attempt to invalidate the memorandum of understanding signed last November between Turkey and Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas. Ankara declared the agreement null and void as it violates the continental shelves of both Turkey and Libya. The agreement prompted Ankara to resume its planned seismic survey activities. Escorted by Turkish naval ships and auxiliary vessels Cengiz Han and Ataman, the Oruç Reis Seismic Vessel was re-dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean to conduct seismic survey until 23 August. Alarmed by this move, Athens has mobilised its forces in the area and asked its fellow EU partners to summon an extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting. On 12 August, an incident sparking fears of a military confrontation occurred between the Turkish frigate Kemal Reis and the Greek frigate Limnos. Turkey stated that the Greek frigate was harassing the Oruç Reis, while Athens has tried to downplay the incident as an accident.

    Ahead of the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu sent letters to EU capitals explaining the rationale underlying Ankara’s legitimate steps in the Eastern Mediterranean. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu also held phone calls with his counterparts from several EU Member States including Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania along with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell.

    Convening via video conference on 14 August, the Foreign Affairs Council reiterated the EU’s traditional stance expressing solidarity with members Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration. Meanwhile, EU foreign ministers acknowledged that “the serious deterioration in the relationship with Turkey is having far-reaching strategic consequences for the entire EU, well beyond the Eastern Mediterranean.”

    Highlighting the importance they attach to relations with Turkey, EU foreign ministers stressed that the issues concerning maritime jurisdiction areas and hydrocarbon exploration rights could only be addressed through dialogue, on the basis of international law and the principle of good neighbourly relations.

    Lastly, recalling the outcome of the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 13 July, they reiterated their support for the efforts by High Representative Borrell to re-establish dialogue with Turkey and tasked Borrell, in case of continued tensions, with outlining possible options on further measures. It was announced that a more comprehensive discussion on Turkey-EU relations would be held at the Gymnich meeting scheduled for 27-28 August. Moreover, as announced by European Council President Charles Michel on 19 August, a special European Council meeting focusing on Turkey-EU relations is planned for 24-25 September.

    Enter France: The Perils of Further Escalation

    The latest episode of tension between Greece and Turkey risks spiralling into a full-blown open confrontation between several NATO Allies as France has thrown its weight behind Greece. French President Emmanuel Macron announced his intention to temporarily strengthen French military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Paris deployed two naval frigates and two fighter jets into the area in show of support for Greece. Relations between the Ankara and Paris remain increasingly strained as the two NATO Allies find themselves supporting opposing sides in the Libyan crisis.

    Paris, along with Athens and Nicosia has demanded that the EU take stronger action on Turkey with the possibility of additional sanctions. As it can be recalled, backing Greek and Greek Cypriot claims over maritime jurisdiction areas, the EU had placed several rounds of sanctions on Turkey starting July 2019. Although the sanctions have been mostly symbolic in nature, the EU’s approach based on the use of sticks has proved counter-productive as it created resentment in Turkey and put additional strain on Turkey-EU relations which remain burdened by the stalemate in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.

    While stating that it would continue to resolutely safeguard its legitimate rights and interests along with the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has extended an olive branch to Greece and expressed its readiness to engage in dialogue. As indicated by senior Turkish officials, Turkey favours a solution in line with international law and the principle of good neighbourly relations. There is hope that Germany, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, could help de-escalate tensions by mediating between Ankara and Athens. Berlin is perceived as having the necessary clout and ability to talk to both sides. Last month, Berlin’s mediation efforts proved fruitful in the relaunching of exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece. In a bid to defuse tensions ahead of the Gymnich meeting, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas visited Athens and Ankara on 25 August. In Ankara, Maas met with Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Speaking at the joint press conference with Maas, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu stressed Turkey’s openness to dialogue which envisaged equitable sharing without preconditions.

    As outside powers move to interfere and military mobilisation in the region continues, the risk that a misstep could trigger an open confrontation across existing fault lines in the wider Mediterranean has become more pronounced. Therefore, constructive engagement on the EU side is urgently needed to prevent further escalation in the region.

    EU’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEADER IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT: GERMANY’S EU PRESIDENCY - JULY-AUGUST 2020

    Germany, one of the EU’s six founding members and the locomotive of the EU, took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Croatia for a six-month period on 1 July 2020. This marks Germany’s 13th Council Presidency and the first time since 2007. Two German conservative politicians, current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, will work together and aim to steer EU policies until 31 December.

    The German EU Presidency is the first presidency within the scope of the 18 month-long Germany-Portugal-Slovenia Presidency trio. During its EU term presidency, Germany is expected to serve both as an engine and as a mediator.

    Germany’s Presidency Priorities

    Germany has announced its EU Presidency programme on 30 June. Acting in line with the motto “Together for Europe’s Recovery”, Berlin will focus on six areas during its six-month long EU Presidency. These areas have been defined as “overcoming the long-term consequences of the coronavirus crisis as well as economic and social recovery”, building “a stronger and more innovative Europe”, “a fair Europe”, “a sustainable Europe”, “a Europe of security and common values”, and “an effective EU for a rule-based international order anchored in partnership”.

    The coronavirus pandemic, which is regarded as the greatest challenge the EU has ever faced, puts great responsibility on Germany’s EU Presidency. German Chancellor Angela Merkel will have to make great efforts to address the socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic crisis throughout Germany’s term presidency. In this regard, facilitating an agreement on the next long-term EU budget and the 750 billion-euro recovery fund proposed by the Commission known as “Next Generation EU” will be at the centre of Germany’s efforts. The plan is expected to be discussed at the European Council meeting scheduled for 17-18 July.

    Besides the urgency of addressing the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, Germany is expected to take the first steps in the implementation of the action plan known as the “European Green Deal” which aims to make Europe the world’s first climate-neutral continent. The European Green Deal is also at the centre of EU’s COVID-19 recovery plan.

    Another important objective for the EU during this period will be reaching a deal on the post-Brexit relationship with the UK. Having left the EU on 31 January, the UK has entered into a transition period which will last until 1 January 2021. Given the fact that London has declined seeking an extension to the transition period, a new agreement will need to be signed between the UK and the EU before the end of the year.

    German Chancellor Merkel has touched upon digital transformation as another priority area under Germany’s Presidency. Highlighting that Europe should be technologically and digitally independent; Merkel stated that the pandemic crisis clearly showed in which digital areas Europe was dependent.

    Indicating that the EU should take on more responsibility globally, Merkel has advocated a greater role for the EU in promoting concepts such as human dignity, democracy and freedom. Moreover, she has underscored the Conference on the Future of Europe, which is set to begin during Germany’s EU Presidency, as an opportunity to discuss reform proposals on foreign policy.

    According to Merkel, Africa will receive special attention during Germany’s EU Presidency, the main objective being the development of a new partnership between EU and Africa by looking at Africa as the continent of the future. Engaging with China will be another priority for Berlin. Chancellor Merkel stated that they remained open to dialogue with China on the rule of law, human rights and the future of Hong Kong. She also said that they wanted to continue working with Beijing on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and climate change.

    Germany’s EU Presidency and Turkey

    During its EU Presidency, Germany’s main focus will be on managing the negative effects of the coronavirus crisis, ensuring digital transformation and increasing the EU’s competitiveness. Germany’s EU Presidency programme briefly touches upon the enlargement policy. While Germany’s EU Presidency programme mentions that maintaining a credible accession perspective for the Western Balkans is in the EU’s own strategic interest, sadly it makes no specific reference to Turkey.

    As known, since 2016 Turkey’s EU accession negotiations have been at an impasse due to the blockages in the EU Council. The talks aimed at the modernisation of the Customs Union have not been launched, nor has the years-long dream of visa-free travel for Turkish citizens been realised. Recently, Turkey-EU ties have been strained over the disagreements regarding the Libyan conflict and hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Turkey sees Germany’s EU Presidency as an important opportunity and wants to revitalise its relations with the EU. Turkey’s main goal during Germany’s EU Presidency is launching the talks aimed at the modernisation of the Customs Union. In addition to the associated economic benefits it would bring to both sides, the modernisation of the Customs Union is seen as an important step which would inject new dynamism into Turkey-EU relations. Turkey also expects a revised refugee deal addressing its concerns regarding the efficiency and delivery of financial aid as well as the EU’s failure to deliver on the commitments made in the deal. We hope that Germany’s EU Presidency will be an opportunity for a breakthrough in Turkey-EU ties by building on the numerous areas of common interest and restoring trust in the relations.

    BATTLE OVER THE BUDGET: EU LEADERS STARTED DISCUSSIONS ON THE MFF AND COVID-19 RECOVERY FUND - JUNE 2020

    President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen presented the revised proposal for the EU’s next long-term budget known as the “Multi Annual Financial Framework” (MFF) for the 2021-27 period, along with the 750 billion euro coronavirus recovery fund called “Next Generation EU” at the European Parliament’s (EP) plenary session on 27 May 2020. Asking the Member States to leave their prejudices aside and act together, Commission President von der Leyen stressed that no Member State could get out of the crisis alone and urged all Member States to unite and walk on the same path. She also highlighted that the EU owed this to future generations.

    The 750 billion euro coronavirus recovery fund, which will consist of 500 billion euros in grants and 250 billion euros in loans, will be financed by bonds to be issued by the Commission and will be repaid from future EU budgets between 2028 and 2058. To repay the debt, the Commission has proposed a series of new taxes. Examples include; a tax on the CO2 limit for imports of goods from third countries with lower environmental standards, the application of digital tax on tech giants and income from emissions trading.

    The largest support through the recovery fund is planned to be channelled to the two countries hardest-hit by the pandemic namely; Italy and Spain. In this context, Italy will receive 172 billion euros from the recovery fund while 140 billion euros will be allocated to Spain. Moreover, France and Poland will each receive 39 billion euros and Germany will get 29 billion euros under the proposed recovery fund. The Commission’s proposal, which was welcomed by the EP, must get the approval of the Member States at the European Council to become operational.

    Divergences concerning the MFF and “Next Generation EU”

    In the European Council, while most of the Member States have viewed the Commission’s proposals favourably, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands dubbed as the “Frugal Four” have voiced strong opposition. Stating that the Commission proposal was only the starting point of the negotiations, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz highlighted that nothing had yet been clarified, and thus the grant and loan figures must be discussed again. Kurz stressed that the “Frugal Four” would only approve the proposal, provided that it would have a clear time limit and come as a one-time “emergency aid”.

    Besides the recovery fund, the next EU budget has caused divisions among Member States due to their diverging priorities. Northern countries, which have already stepped in to put forward a proposal of their own against the Commission’s proposal as well as the recovery plan proposed by Germany and France, want to reduce the volume of agricultural spending and cohesion funds and reject all kinds of “significant increases” in the EU budget. Meanwhile, southern countries such as Italy and Spain demand more money to deal with the problems posed by the pandemic, while Central and Eastern European countries do not want their cohesion funds to be affected negatively.

    German Chancellor Angela Merkel has emphasized that negotiations that are expected to be difficult could not be concluded solely in a leaders’ summit. She has argued that the issue should be discussed in the EP and national parliaments so that the package could take effect as of 1 January 2021.

    EU leaders had the first opportunity to exchange views on the Commission’s proposals concerning the 2021-27 MFF and the coronavirus recovery fund during the virtual European Council meeting on 19 June 2020. Speaking after the meeting, President of the European Council Charles Michel stated that they had the opportunity to consult each Member State and highlighted that they are now entering the negotiation phase. Council President Michel also underlined the importance of taking a decision as soon as possible so that the proposal could efficiently help Member States tackle the multi-layered challenges posed by the pandemic.

    Turkey and the Western Balkans to Receive 4 Billion Euros from the “Team Europe” Package

    On 8 June 2020, two months after the launch of “Team Europe” package, which forms part of EU’s global response to the coronavirus crisis and aims to support EU partner countries in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects, the amount of aid to be mobilised has reached 36 billion euros. The initial amount to be mobilised was around 20 billion euros and included funds from the EU, its Member States and financial institutions, in particular the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

    The Team Europe package launched on 8 April 2020 focuses on responding to the immediate health crisis and the resulting humanitarian needs, strengthening health, water and sanitation systems, and mitigating the immediate socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic. Moreover, the package aims to improve partner countries’ capacities and preparedness to deal with the pandemic via financial aid.

    The EU Council, in its conclusions dated 8 June 2020, expressed deep concern about the global spread of the pandemic which continues to cause loss of lives worldwide and has far-reaching social and economic implications. Meanwhile, the Council welcomed the fact that around 36 billion euros have been mobilised through the package. According to the revised figures, Turkey and the Western Balkans will receive a total amount of 3.967 billion euros while 7.872 billion euros have been earmarked for the Neighbourhood and 4.756 billion euros under the Team Europe package will go to Sub-Saharan Africa.

    70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SCHUMAN DECLARATION: TURKEY AND EU CELEBRATED EUROPE DAY - MAY 2020

    Europe Day, celebrated since 1985 in the EU and since 1999 in Turkey, has taken on a different meaning this year as it coincided with the 70th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration which formed the basis of the European project. In order to overcome the devastation caused by World War II, the idea was to focus on economic cooperation which would then spill over to other areas and gradually lead to further integration in Europe.

    At the time, French Foreign Minister Schuman stated in his famous Declaration that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”

    History proved him right. Many crises have been overcome with the intentions of solidarity on the part of the Member States.

    Today, the world is living through another of these crises. The COVID-19 pandemic is causing devastation in healthcare systems, economies and individuals’ lives in Europe and worldwide. Solidarity of all sorts is desperately needed.

    This is exactly why, in their Europe Day messages, both EU High Representative Josep Borrell and Head of the EU Delegation to Turkey Ambassador Christian Berger made a reference to the need to act in the same spirit as that of Schuman 70 years ago and made a point of remembering that the EU is about peace, solidarity, democracy and rule of law.

    President Erdoğan Underscored Turkey’s Determination for Full EU Membership

    In his message on the occasion of Europe Day, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the Schuman Declaration “brought to life the idea of a European Union” and “ensured the rebirth of Europe from its own ashes” after the war.

    Today, the virus as the common enemy “threatens not only our health but also our welfare, social order, and humane ties” and is a reminder of “being strong in unity”, said President Erdoğan. He stressed the importance of being inclusive and just, for moving towards better days, and expressed his belief that the EU will “come out of this crisis stronger with the right and timely steps that they will take”.

    President Erdoğan underlined the significance of making good use of the opportunities these tough times would present to revitalise Turkey-EU relations. Indicating the fact that some Member States asked for help from Turkey during the pandemic, President Erdoğan said that “the participation of Turkey…in all the measures and efforts that the Union will be taking during the course of, and following the pandemic, will render the EU nothing but stronger” as in the case of Turkey’s exemplary healthcare system.

    Making a point of the discriminative and exclusionist attitude of the EU towards Turkey on various issues until now, he expressed his hope that the EU will realise that “it is time for uniting our forces in every area.” He continued to say that advantages of having Turkey as a full member will not be limited to the various contributions but also “will bring a more participative and a more embracing vision to the EU, and will turn it into a global actor.”

    President Erdoğan concluded by saying that “As Turkey, we are determined to attain full membership in the EU, which we deem as our strategic objective in spite of all the hardships we run into during the negotiation process.”

    Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu Emphasized Turkey’s Openness to Sincere Cooperation

    In his statement celebrating Europe Day, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stressed the significance of a strong and inclusive EU for both its Member States and the international community at large. In order to deal with the world’s many challenges, he pointed out that the EU needs to increase the cooperation and solidarity between the existing partners while at the same time forming new partnerships and alliances.

    Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu made the point that reforms are needed in the EU and stated that as a candidate country, Turkey is ready to contribute in any way it can for the EU to become “a responsible, consistent and principled global actor”.

    Emphasizing that accession negotiations form the basis of Turkey-EU relations, he said that efforts to increase cooperation in all areas would not only be mutually beneficial but also would help make an impact on the future of the region and the international system at large.

    Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu pointed out that Turkey’s attitude during the pandemic has proved its willingness to cooperate with the EU and that Turkey expects the EU to go beyond national interests and adopt a policy reflecting EU’s global responsibilities and its motto of “Unity in Diversity” in its approach to Turkey. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu concluded by stating that “Turkey is open to all sincere and meaningful cooperation for our common future.”

    Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs Ambassador Kaymakcı Focused on Solidarity

    Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs Ambassador Faruk Kaymakcı sent messages for “tolerance”, “solidarity” and “unity” to Europe and the world in his speech. He made the point that today when global solidarity is most needed in these challenging times, Turkey-EU cooperation and solidarity became even more significant. He underlined the fact that just as Turkey has a common history with Europe; it also has a common future.

    Head of the EU Delegation to Turkey Ambassador Berger Stressed Cooperation

    In his message on Europe Day, Head of the EU Delegation to Turkey Ambassador Christian Berger referred to the pandemic crisis and stressed the need to stand and work together with Turkey. He emphasized the fact that apart from being an EU candidate country, Turkey is a strategic partner of the EU in many areas and that its ties with Europe are manifold; historical, geographical and economic. He concluded by saying that “May 9, 2020 is the best opportunity to mark and celebrate this cooperation and togetherness.”

    IKV Chairman Zeytinoğlu Called for the Modernisation of the Customs Union

    Speaking at the Europe Day special programme organised by the EU Delegation to Turkey and broadcasted on various TV channels and platforms, IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu highlighted that in these challenging times, the EU, while being a significant and indispensable market, continues to be Turkey’s target in the name of democracy and freedoms. Turkey’s main expectation is that of modernisation of the Customs Union in a way that would meet both Turkey’s and EU’s needs and expectations. He underlined the fact that Turkey is a part of this peace project and that he believes that steps should be taken to continue to be a part of it. He concluded by saying that there is a real need in this direction but there are also political obstacles and these can be resolved in time.

    The Europe Day messages show that just as cooperation and solidarity were among the main pillars of European integration 70 years ago, they still are as important today, both for Europe and Turkey-EU relations.

    IMF’S WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UNDER THE THREAT OF THE PANDEMIC - APRIL 2020

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its World Economic Outlook report on 6 April 2020. “The Great Lockdown” marked the title of the report, as it is emphasized that the world economy is under the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic and protection measures including containment and social distancing intended to prevent the spread of the virus are severely impacting global economic activity. It is underscored that the world is encountered with an unprecedented crisis due to both its magnitude and speed of collapse in activity that followed. Substantial uncertainty about the impact of the pandemic on the global economy poses a greater challenge. As a result, both advanced and developing economies are expected to fall into recession.

    There is extreme uncertainty concerning the global growth forecast and it is worried that the actual outcome could be far worse. It is largely linked to the course of the pandemic as the economic fallout depends on uncertain factors that interact in ways difficult to predict. The main factors are the pathway of the pandemic, the progress in finding a vaccine and therapies, the intensity and efficacy of containment efforts, the extent of supply disruptions and productivity losses, the repercussions of the dramatic tightening in global financial market conditions, volatile commodity prices and behavioural changes of the society.

    In a baseline scenario, which assumes that the pandemic and required containment peaks in the second quarter of 2020 for most countries in the world, and fades in the second half of this year, global growth is projected to contract sharply by 3 percent in 2020. This represents a downgrade of 6.3 percentage points from IMF’s January 2020 forecast, hence a major revision in a short period of time of about three months. The upcoming global decline is described much worse than the 2008 global financial crisis and the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

    Under the assumption that the policy actions taken around the world would be effective in preventing widespread firm bankruptcies, extended job losses, and system-wide financial strains, the global economy is projected to expand by 5.8 percent in 2021. But the recovery in 2021 might be only partial as of now the level of economic activity is projected to remain below the one foreseen for 2021 before the outbreak. The cumulative loss to global GDP over 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic crisis is estimated to be around 9 trillion dollars which is greater than the economies of Japan and Germany, combined. Moreover, global trade in goods and services is expected to drop 11 percent this year but it is expected to increase by 8.4 percent next year. It is anticipated that risks of a worse outcome might become concrete if the pandemic and containment measures last longer, emerging economies are more severely hit, tight financial conditions persist and unemployment extends.

    Growth Outlook for Countries and Regions under COVID-19

    According to the report, advanced economies, especially those experiencing widespread outbreaks and containment measures are expected to contract by 6.1 percent in 2020 including the USA (–5.9 percent), Japan (–5.2 percent), UK (–6.5 percent), Germany (–7.0 percent), France (–7.2 percent), the hard-hit Italy (–9.1 percent) and Spain (–8.0 percent). The growth in advanced economies is not projected to get back to its pre-virus peak until at least 2022. The Euro Area economy is also forecast to shrink by 7.5 percent in 2020 and it is expected to expand by 4.7 percent in 2021 while the growth rates foreseen for the EU in 2020 and 2021 are -7.1 and 4.8, respectively.

    IMF growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies point to a contraction of 1.0 percent in 2020. All countries in this group face a health crisis, severe external demand shock, dramatic tightening in global financial conditions and drop in commodity prices. The growth rate for this group of countries except for China, is estimated to be –2.2 percent. Under an optimistic expectation, growth among emerging markets and developing economies is projected to rebound to 6.6 percent in 2021. China diverges from other countries in this group. It is the country where the COVID-19 pandemic originated and the outbreak peaked in the first quarter of this year. The world’s second-largest economy, which had gone into lockdown first, has begun to resettle before other countries. Economic activity, resuming with the help of large fiscal and monetary stimulus is foreseen to maintain positive but mild growth of 1.2 percent in 2020. China’s economic growth is expected rebound to 9.2 percent in 2021.

    Emerging Asia is projected to be the only region with a positive growth rate in 2020 (1.0 percent). Several economies in the region are forecast to grow at modest rates, including India (1.9 percent) and Indonesia (0.5 percent).

    On the other hand, other regions are projected to experience severe slowdowns or contractions in economic activity, including Latin America (–5.2 percent) with Brazil’s growth forecast at –5.3 percent and Mexico’s at –6.6 percent; emerging and developing Europe (–5.2 percent) with Russia’s economy projected to contract by 5.5 percent; the Middle East and Central Asia (–2.8 percent), with Saudi Arabia’s growth forecast at –2.3 percent, with non-oil Saudi GDP contracting by 4 percent, and most economies, including Iran, expected to contract; and sub-Saharan Africa (–1.6 percent) with contraction in Nigeria and South Africa expected at 3.4 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively. Following the dramatic decline in oil prices since the beginning of the year, short-term prospects for oil-exporting countries have deteriorated significantly: the growth rate for the group is projected to drop to –4.4 percent in 2020.

    Turkey, classified under the emerging and developing Europe group of countries, is predicted to contract by 5 percent in 2020 and grow by 5 percent in 2021.

    In order to fight with the worst recession since the Great Depression, IMF suggests that multilateral cooperation is essential, including helping financially constrained countries and channelling aid to countries with weak healthcare systems. Working together not only to slow down the spread of the virus but also to develop vaccine and therapies is of paramount importance, as underscored by the IMF.

    TURKEY’S MEASURES AGAINST COVID-19: PREVENTIVE ACTION AND ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSE - MARCH 2020

    In the midst of a pandemic, every country is trying to find their own way of dealing with the unprecedented challenges presented each day. As of 1 April 2020, the total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in the world has reached 911,308 with total number of deaths at 45,497 spread over 180 countries or regions over a period of four months. Of course, the initial challenge for the countries is to ensure the safety and health of their citizens in the face of this pandemic affecting an exponentially increasing number of people; in almost all cases this becomes a burden surpassing the capacities of national health systems of individual countries. However, the impact of this pandemic does not stop there as we all experience on a daily basis. National economies and the world economy started to suffer on a global scale since measures adopted cause disruptions on all aspects of life and are calling for countries to come up with urgent solutions on a daily basis.

    In Turkey’s case, there are a total number of 15,679 confirmed cases with 277 deaths, as of 1 April 2020. According to the data from the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Centre, Turkey ranks 10th in the world in terms of the total number of confirmed cases. More significant data point to the steep curve representing the increase in the number of daily cases; the total number went up from 98 to 15,679 in only about two weeks.

    Preventive Actions against COVID-19

    Turkey began taking some preventive measures as early as 6 January 2020. An Operation Centre and a Science Council have been formed and Turkey started to draw up a “Guide for COVID-19” in line with the flow of information coming from all over the world. In the first stage, measures taken aimed at containing the coronavirus and preventing it from spreading which included stopping flights first from countries in Asia and then gradually from all around the world as the gravity of the situation increased. Repatriation efforts of Turkish citizens from these countries have been coordinated; self- isolation at home for 14 days was the advice given to them.

    With the announcement of the first COVID-19 case in Turkey on 10 March 2020, new restrictions have begun to be introduced gradually. Flights to and from more countries have been banned, day care centres, clubs have been shut down and schools and universities have been temporarily closed. Restrictions have been put in place regarding visitors for hospitals and prisons. National and international meetings and conferences have been postponed. Cafés, restaurants, and all the venues where people could come together in large numbers were next to be closed down. The rule of 14 days of quarantine for people arriving from abroad became compulsory.

    To this day, more restrictions are being introduced every day. People over the age of 65 are banned to go out of their homes and outdoor leisure activities are banned on the coastal areas of Istanbul. Intercity maritime lines carrying people to and from Istanbul have been cancelled and intercity travel by car and by bus is made conditional upon pre-approval by the authorities. Health checks have been set up entering and leaving every city and a number of villages have been put under quarantine all over Turkey. Banking hours have been limited to 12:00-17:00 in line with the other social distancing measures.

    Economic Policy Response to COVID-19

    As for the economic and financial dimension of the pandemic, the statement made by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 18 March following the Coronavirus Assessment Meeting has been pivotal in announcing the relevant measures. These can be outlined under two categories; fiscal and monetary.

    As stated in the press release by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), the CBRT has adopted monetary measures in relation to providing banks with as much liquidity as they need through intraday and overnight standing facilities; injecting liquidity to the market through repo auctions; increasing the liquidity limits of Primary Dealers in the framework of Open Market Operations (OMOs); giving the possibility of holding conventional swap auctions with different maturities; reducing FX reserve requirement ratios by 500 basis points in all liability types; offering banks targeted additional liquidity facilities to secure uninterrupted credit flow to the corporate sector. Extending the maturities for repayment of rediscount credits, offering an additional 12 months export commitment fulfilment time and extending maximum maturities for rediscount credits are among the measures taken regarding rediscount credits for export and foreign exchange earning services.

    On the fiscal side, the 100-billion-lira worth package of “Economic Stability Shield” has been announced by the President to help the economy. Within this context, withholding VAT tax and SSI premiums have been postponed for six months for affected industries. Accommodation tax will not be levied until November 2020. VAT for domestic airline transport, will be brought down to 1 percent for three months. Repay instalments and interests payable on loans by firms whose cash flow is adversely affected and credit debts, capital and interest payments by tradesmen and craftsmen will be postponed for at least three months. Exporting firms will be given stock financing support in order to keep their capacity utilisation rates. The Credit Guarantee Fund limit has been raised from 25 billion liras to 50 billion liras to support those SMEs which are in need of liquidity as a result of the recent developments. Minimum down payment for housing with a value of less than 500,000 liras will be brought down to 10 percent. The procedure for Short Term Working Allowance will be made easier and quicker. The minimum pension will be increased to 1,500 liras and the religious fest bonus for the pensioners will be paid in the beginning of April 2020. The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services will give a total of 2 billion liras worth of financial aid to those in need. A periodical follow-up programme has been set up to provide support to people who are over 80 years of age and who are living alone in their homes.

    On the legal side, in order to ease the burden on the legal system, most bankruptcy and debt enforcement procedures have been halted until end of April 2020; legal notification procedures are postponed to the end of March 2020. Most tax administration and other procedures and title deed transactions will be processed either electronically or by post; deadlines for income tax declarations are to be extended; court cases will be postponed and mediation meetings will take place via teleconference.

    New measures keep coming in order to offset the adverse effects of the pandemic on a global scale. Like Turkey, the EU has also been taking some measures to keep the internal market moving smoothly, to help the firms and industries under distress due to the pandemic by activating escape clauses in relation to budgetary concerns, easing the State Aid rules to provide financial aid to industries as well as bringing together resources from Member States to redistribute them to those in greater need among others. However, it still remains to be seen whether EU will be able to act in unity on issues which matter most to keep the spirit of Europe. It also remains to be seen whether the world at large will be able to unite under the threat of the pandemic affecting the whole world.

    REFUGEE CRISIS ONCE AGAIN: HOW CAN TURKEY AND THE EU CONTINUE THEIR COOPERATION? - FEBRUARY 2020

    “I do not want to create any illusions that the refugee crisis will be over any time soon. It will not. But pushing back boats from piers, setting fire to refugee camps, or turning a blind eye to poor and helpless people: that is not Europe. Europe is the baker in Kos who gives away his bread to hungry and weary souls. Europe is the students in Munich and in Passau who bring clothes for the new arrivals at the train station. Europe is the policeman in Austria who welcomes exhausted refugees upon crossing the border. This is the Europe I want to live in...” 

    -Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 9 September 2015 

    “[...] We have come here today to send a very clear statement of European solidarity and support to Greece. Our first priority is making sure that order
    is maintained at the Greek external border, which is also a European border. I am fully committed to mobilising all the necessary operational support to the Greek authorities. [...]Those who seek to test Europe’s unity will be disappointed. We will hold the line and our unity will prevail. [...] I thank Greece for being our European ασπι´δα [English: shield] in these times.” 

    -Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, 3 March 2020 

    The above are excerpts from two speeches made by Presidents of the European Commission five years apart.The first excerpt is from former President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union speech in 2015 when the EU for the first time met with a sudden upsurge in refugees fleeing war in Syria. In that year, 885,386 crossings have been registered along the Eastern 

    Mediterranean route spanning the transit path from the Aegean shores of Turkey through to Greece’s Aegean islands which dropped to 182,277 in 2016. The second excerpt is from a speech the current President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen made during her visit to Greece after the Turkish government decided to open the Turkish-Greek border to refugees on 28 February 2020 following the loss of 36 soldiers in Idlib, Syria. 

    It is difficult not to notice the difference in the tone and approach between the two speeches. Faced with a sudden influx of refugees fleeing war in Syria, President Juncker focused on the moral responsibility that Europe had to play in the face of a humanitarian crisis. He said that Europe cannot be impartial to people in need and had to extend its helping hand. Almost five years later, the current President of the same institution von der Leyen inspected the Turkish-Greek border on board a helicopter akin to a military commander inspecting deployed troops and made a speech which only emphasised protection of Europe’s borders in an orderly fashion and praised Greece for acting as a “shield” for Europe. Several figures from EU institutions and EU Member States criticised the Turkish President for opening the borders and using migrants as a bargaining chip to get concessions from the EU. 

    The situation is quite gruesome and both Turkey and the EU may be criticised for a number of failures. The EU’s failure to live up to its moral responsibility is of great concern as is Turkey’s use of refugees as a tool to receive concessions from the EU. Answering a question about the use of rubber bullets by Greek border guards against migrants trying the cross the border, Margaritis Schinas, Commissioner responsible for promoting the European way of life, answered that it was not for “the Commission to offer an operational opinion or judgment on a situation which is exceptional”. 

    At least 24,000 people have been stopped from crossing the border from Turkey according to Greek government figures as of 3 March 2020. Compared to the refugee numbers in 2015 this is not much. Yet Greece’s capacity to host refugees has long been gone. Since the 18 March 2016 deal with Turkey, it seems that the EU has not used its time wisely and could not resolve internal migration problems stemming from the lack of a working common asylum policy. Failure to display solidarity among Member States and problems in reacting to migrant flows and sharing the load of frontline countries like Greece, the EU was paralysed in the current refugee situation and reacted only by pledging to help Greece protect its borders with a cash flow of 700 million euros. Yet everyone knows that this will neither be sufficient nor feasible under the present circumstances. 

    Turkish President Erdoğan’s visit to Brussels to meet with the President of the European Council, Charles Michel and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen did not immediately produce any tangible results. Yet Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell were tasked with drawing up a plan for continued cooperation between the parties. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s planned visit to Turkey to meet with President Erdoğan on 17 March was cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic. Instead a teleconference is going to take place between the three leaders. Among the topics that are going to be discussed, the continuation of  the Turkey-EU refugee deal is on the top of the agenda. Turkey, hosting 4.1 million refugees - 3.7 of which million are Syrians- requires increased and substantial assistance from the EU. Another expectation is that the modernisation of the Customs Union may be initiated in the near future and progress towards visa-free travel to the EU for Turkish citizens may be realised. 

    Yet, under the current state of affairs where several of the EU Member States are devastated by the coronavirus pandemic, it seems unlikely that the EU may offer Turkey much in return for its hosting of refugees. Ongoing negotiations between the EU and Britain to determine the post-Brexit relationship is a major challenge for the Union. The coronavirus crisis has also displayed some weaknesses of the EU which failed to engage in swift action and emergency assistance especially to deal with the situation in Italy. This may intensify internal fractures and disagreements within the Union. Pending upon the ending of the coronavirus crisis, Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU may offer a window of opportunity for a revitalisation of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey could use this opportunity to achieve progress in its relations with the EU by engaging in reforms in rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and fundamental rights and freedoms.

    It seems imperative that the EU also needs to engage with Turkey more and step up cooperation in security and migration issues. In this age of global threats and uncertainties, both Turkey and the EU cannot afford to ignore each other and sacrifice the benefits of forging a cooperative and productive relationship. 

     

    EU’S YOUNGEST MEMBER STATE AT THE HELM: THE CROATIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EU - JANUARY 2020

    On 1 January 2020, the EU’s youngest member state Croatia assumed the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU for the very first time. The EU Presidency is regarded as a historic moment for Croatia which became the EU’s 28th member state on 1 July 2013. Croatia is the second ex-Yugoslav country along with Slovenia and the first Western Balkan country to join the EU.

    Following its EU membership, Croatia has prioritised deeper integration with the EU. To this end, Zagreb has been moving towards adopting the single currency and membership into the Schengen area. In November 2019, the European Commission confirmed that Croatia had fulfilled the technical criteria to join the passport-free Schengen area. To accede to the Schengen area however, Zagreb must now seek the approval of the European Council which could prove difficult as suggested by the cases of Romania and Bulgaria. Meanwhile, Zagreb has applied for joining the so-called Eurozone waiting room the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) and is aiming to adopt the euro no later than 2024.

    Croatia’s Priorities and EU’s Political Realities

    Driven by the motto “A strong Europe in a world of challenges” Croatia during its first-ever EU presidency in the first half of 2020, will strive to create “A Europe that is developing, a Europe that connects, a Europe that protects, and is influential”. Six and a half years into its EU membership, EU’s newest member state Croatia is presiding over the Council at a highly critical time, just a month after the new European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen and the new President of the European Council Charles Michel took office. Coupled with geopolitical uncertainty, rising populism in EU member states and environmental challenges, there are plethora of issues requiring Croatia’s attention. Additionally, the EU’s agenda is likely to be dominated by the UK’s looming departure from EU membership and the negotiations on the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027 known as the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF).

    With Brexit scheduled for 31 January 2020, at the end of the first month of its EU Presidency, Croatia is likely to coordinate the efforts related to the UK’s departure from the EU which will be followed by negotiations concerning the future relationship framework throughout the transition period. In addition, during its term presidency, Zagreb will also try to ensure that the next MFF retains sufficient level of funding for cohesion and agricultural policies while having the resources necessary deal with emerging challenges. Finding the middle ground between the demands of net contributors and the expectations of net beneficiaries in the negotiations over the 2021-2027 MFF will be a key challenge. According to Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, to ensure that EU programs and policies continue to operate swiftly it is imperative that an agreement on the 2021-2027 MFF is reached as a matter of urgency. The Conference on the Future of Europe, which is among the political priorities of the new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, will also be high on the agenda of the EU during the Croatian EU Presidency. Tasked with defining the Council’s position on the process, Zagreb will try to find common ground between member state capitals on the content, scope, composition and functioning of the Conference on the two-year long Conference on the Future of Europe.

    Enlargement in the Spotlight

    Enlargement is regarded as a priority dossier for the Croatian EU Presidency. Zagreb aims to use its tenure to push forward with EU integration in the Western Balkans. In this regard, the EU-Western Balkans Summit scheduled for 7 May 2020 is regarded as a major milestone. Given the recent stalemate caused by the controversial French veto on opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, ensuring a green light for launching accession talks with the two Western Balkan countries is an urgent priority for Zagreb. The Council is set to decide on the matter prior to the Zagreb Summit most probably in the March. Meanwhile, the Commission is expected to present its proposals for the reform of the EU accession methodology in early February. The Commission proposal follows the so-called French non-paper calling for a complete overhaul of the accession methodology introducing reversibility and the reorganisation of the existing negotiations based on chapters into policy blocks, and counter-proposals by the foreign ministers of Austria, Czechia, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovenia indicating that internal EU reform cannot be a pre-condition for enlargement.

    Concerning Turkey-EU relations, Zagreb promises to push for a constructive dialogue between Turkey and the EU. Croatia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Gordan Grlic Radman during a visit to Turkey ahead of Croatia’s EU Presidency last month, voiced optimism that new chapters could be opened in Turkey’s EU accession talks during Croatia’s term presidency. Ankara’s main expectation is for Zagreb to work for eliminating the obstacles to Turkey’s EU membership process and contribute to the revitalisation of Turkey-EU relations.

    As it is known, while Croatia and Turkey started accession talks simultaneously on 3 October 2005, Turkey’s path towards EU membership has been complicated by political vetoes in the Council resulting in an impasse in its accession negotiations. The weakening of the EU anchor and controversial statements by some EU leaders have in turn translated into a weaker reform momentum in Turkey. The relations have been further strained by the recent Foreign Affairs Council conclusions imposing sanctions on Turkey over its hydrocarbon drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, criticisms concerning Turkey’s counter-terrorism operation in northern Syria and the agreements with Libya. In the meantime, the talks aimed at the modernisation of the Customs Union, which apart from creating a win-win situation for the businesses on both sides could breathe new life into Turkey-EU relations, have been blocked due to additional political conditionality introduced by some EU member states. Visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens initially foreseen for June 2016 is yet to be realised. Given the vast mutual interests in a wide range of areas from security and migration to trade and energy, and common challenges requiring cooperation between the two sides, the need to restore mutual trust in Turkey-EU relations and put the accession negotiations back on track has never been so urgent. We hope that the Croatian EU Presidency will contribute to creating a new positive agenda in Turkey-EU relations.

  • WHAT’S NEXT FOR BREXIT? POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY-UK RELATIONS - DECEMBER 2019

    In the UK’s recent general election, Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party won a tremendous majority. Johnson’s majority puts him in a position to comfortably pass his Brexit deal through Parliament after several years of stalemate. Unless something very unexpected happens, the UK will officially leave the EU at the end of January 2020.

    What’s Next for Brexit?

    On 17 October 2019 the UK and the EU reached a deal on the conditions for the UK’s departure from the EU (Brexit) and a transition period. Before the election, it was impossible for Johnson to get Parliament to agree on this deal. But with 365 seats in the House of Commons, the Conservatives no longer have to rely on the support of minor parties. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s general election victory on 12 December makes it likely that the agreement will be approved by the UK Parliament soon. On 20 December, the first vote to this end was held in the House of Commons, where the Withdrawal Agreement passed with a comfortable majority. There are more votes still to come, however. The parliamentary approval process in the lower and upper houses of the UK Parliament (the Commons and the Lords) is expected to be concluded in January 2020. If the UK Parliament approves the agreement, the EP can vote on it in January.

    If the UK Parliament and the EP vote in favour of the Brexit agreement, the UK will leave the EU on 31 January 2020. This will be followed by a transition period, which will last until 31 December 2020. During this period, all EU rules and regulations will continue to apply to the UK. Virtually nothing will change for businesses or for the public. This will give everyone more time to prepare themselves for the new agreements that the EU and the UK will conclude concerning their future relationship after 31 December 2020. If both the UK and the EU agree, this transition period may be extended once by two years, meaning it could remain in place until 31 December 2022. Prime Minister Johnson has said, however, that he would not seek an extension.

    The UK will use the time to negotiate a free trade deal as well as other aspects of its future relationship with the EU, including law enforcement, security and access to fishing waters. If negotiators fail to agree a trade deal by the deadline and no extension is agreed, this would leave the UK trading on World Trade Organization (WTO) terms with the EU, with the likelihood of tariffs on imports and exports. Although there is still a possibility that no trade deal will be in place before 31 December 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s election victory has made this much less likely.

    Potential Implications for Turkey-UK Relations

    Approaching the issue from the perspective of Turkey, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU may have several effects on Turkish-British relations. One point which immediately comes to mind is that Turkey will lose a precious supporter of the EU’s enlargement and its membership prospect in the EU. Hence, after Brexit the EU will be a Union of continental Europeans only and the outlook towards Turkey may become more shortsighted and overcritical.

    A second important effect of Brexit will be in the area of trade relations. By leaving the EU, the UK will also leave the Turkey-EU Customs Union which has abolished all customs duties, quantitative restrictions and all other measures having equivalent effect in trade of industrial goods between the parties. All imports from and exports to the UK will be subject to customs duties once again.

    Therefore, Turkey and the UK need to negotiate a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement that will enter into force as soon as the transition period ends. Any time gap between the UK’s departure from the EU and thereby the Turkey-EU Customs Union and the signing of a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the UK will result in considerable losses in trade due to the reimposition of customs duties and other restrictions. The two countries will leave behind a preferential trade regime and will become third countries for each other within the framework of the WTO.

    Such an FTA can also raise the potential of trade and investment relations between the two countries by reaching a trade volume of 25-30 billion dollars, stimulating joint production in Turkey to be exported to third markets, as well as joint ventures entailing technology transfer and know how.

    On 9 November 2017, a working group made up of British and Turkish officials started preparatory work with the aim of determining the scope and framework of future trade relations. It is expected that the FTA that will take the place of the Customs Union between Turkey and the UK will include agriculture and industrial products as well as services, investments, public procurement and e-commerce.

     

    THE ENLARGEMENT REFORM DEBATE GAINS MOMENTUM AFTER THE FRENCH “NON” - NOVEMBER 2019

    France has been in the spotlight since President Emmanuel Macron blocked the launch of accession negotiations North Macedonia and Albania at the European Council meeting on 17-18 October 2019. Despite the European Commission’s favourable opinion, arguing that the enlargement policy was in need of a fundamental overhaul, Macron has dealt a severe blow to the EU hopes of North Macedonia and Albania. Although Paris was also backed by Amsterdam and Copenhagen, which voiced reservations about Albania’s level of preparedness, Macron’s stance was seen as the major stumbling block for launching accession talks with the two Western Balkan countries. The failure to open accession talks with the two Western Balkan EU-hopefuls was heavily criticised especially after North Macedonia had agreed to change its name ending a decades-old dispute with Greece with the main motivation to clear its path to the EU. The French “non”, which was interpreted as a huge blow to the EU’s credibility, has created fury among EU leaders and senior EU officials with the outgoing President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker calling the move “a grave historic mistake”.

    Enlargement Reform “à la française”

    A month following his decision to block the launch of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, Macron has outlined his ideas for “a renewed approach to the accession process” in a non-paper addressed to EU capitals. According to the 5-page-long document leaked to the press on 15 November 2019, gradual association, stringent conditions, tangible benefits and reversibility will be the four principles guiding the renewed approach to the accession process. The reversibility principle will allow the EU to backtrack to the previous stage or abandon accession talks if a candidate country moves away from EU standards.

    According to the current methodology, following the unanimous approval of the Council the candidate country formally begins accession negotiations trying to bring its national legislation in line with the EU’s body of laws -also known as the acquis- which is divided into 35 chapters. Once negotiations in the 35 acquis chapters are completed, the candidate country signs the accession treaty which has to be approved by the Council and ratified in each Member State.

    The French proposal departs from the current methodology by reorganising the accession process based on 35 chapters into seven policy blocks, each of which is to be tackled in a separate stage. Paris argues that this would allow the candidate countries to be gradually integrated into EU policies and programmes. Instead of simultaneous negotiations, under the French proposal negotiations are to progress in a sequential manner with each stage conditional on successful completion of the previous one.

    In a nod to the “new approach” prioritising the rule of law currently applied in the accession process since 2011, the first stage in the French proposal will address cross-cutting issues such as the rule of law, fundamental rights, justice and security. This will be followed by the second stage which will tackle education, research and space, youth, culture, sport, environment, transport. Stage three will deal with employment, social policy, health and consumer protection and competitiveness while economic and financial affairs will be addressed at stage four. Internal market, agriculture and fisheries will be dealt with at stage five whereas foreign affairs will be covered at stage six and finally the seventh stage will deal with other matters. The completion of the negotiations in each stage will unlock the possibility to participate in relevant EU programmes, to be involved in sectoral policies and to benefit from targeted financing.

    Six EU Capitals Support Enlargement Reform

    The French non-paper has sparked an intense debate among EU policy circles with some analysts expressing unease about the stringent conditions laid out in the proposal with many of the rewards back-loaded while others question Paris’ genuine motivation. The latest contribution to the enlargement reform debate came from the foreign ministers of Austria, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, Italy and Slovenia. On 18 November 2019, the six foreign ministers, in a joint letter addressed to outgoing Commission President Juncker, invited the Commission to elaborate by January 2020 concrete proposals for enhancing the effectiveness of the accession process. Moreover, the six foreign ministers have set a deadline for the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia by March 2020.

    As the new Commission takes office, the debate on the future of enlargement policy is likely to intensify. It remains to be seen whether the EU will be able to honour its commitments and launch accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania before the EU-Western Balkans Summit to be held in Zagreb in May 2020.

     

    TURKEY ESTABLISHED AN EU COORDINATION BOARD - OCTOBER 2019

    Turkey established an EU Coordination Board through the Presidential Circular No. 2019/22 which entered into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette No. 30921 of 17 October 2019. The Board aims at conducting the work related to the EU in a coordinated manner. The Board, which will be composed of deputy ministers of the relevant ministries and senior executives of the institutions, will be chaired by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs.

    In the Circular, it was stated that the political, economic and social reforms within the scope of Turkey’s EU membership goal contributed to a drastic change in the country and enabled Turkey to become a powerful actor in its region as well as in the international arena. Moreover, the efforts for alignment with the EU acquis, which affects every aspect of the social life, played an important role in improving life standards in Turkey. Therefore, in the Circular it was stressed that Turkey continued to pursue EU harmonisation efforts with determination.

    According the Circular, public institutions and organisations will conduct their duties and responsibilities within the framework of the main objectives, principles and objectives set by the President and in line with the development plan and other programs, according to a program that will be coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs. Furthermore, the principles to be followed in the draft legislation aiming at alignment with the EU acquis and the procedures regarding the references to EU legislation will be prepared taking into consideration the guidelines to be published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs. Moreover, as stated in the Circular, public institutions and organisations should inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs about their correspondence, meetings, consultations and high-level meetings with EU institutions and officials.

    In the Circular, the main responsibilities of the EU Coordination Board are stated as determining the priority areas and work to be done for alignment with the EU acquis; directing, monitoring and evaluating the work of the public institutions and organisations on the harmonisation and implementation of the EU acquis; examining the proposals from the public institutions and organisations, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, and universities on harmonisation and implementation efforts related to the EU acquis.

    As stated in the Circular, the Board is set to meet at least once a year and the secretariat services will be carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs. In addition, if deemed necessary, the Board will establish working groups for different aspects of Turkey-EU relations, including negotiation chapters.

    Considering the fact that on 14 October 2019 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs organised another meeting with the relevant parties in order to revive the efforts to carry out Turkey’s EU Communication Strategy, one can mention about a stir in the EU process on Turkish side. However, in order to overcome the current stagnation in the Turkey-EU relations, Turkey should take more concrete steps and return back to the reform agenda. Having an EU Coordination Board, planning the harmonisation efforts to EU acquis, giving the necessary references to acquis in legislations will certainly contribute to Turkey’s accession process. Moreover, Turkey’s EU Communication Strategy will be instrumental if it is translated into action and is supported by concrete steps taken by Turkey. In European Commission’s latest Turkey Report, the word “backsliding” was used 14 times in six fundamental areas. According to the report, Turkey made good progress only in six acquis chapters, whereas in other acquis chapters the progress was either limited or non-existent. Although Turkey’s determination of EU membership is underlined in every occasion by the decision-makers, it is time for action.

     

     

    WORLD LEADERS GATHERED IN NEW YORK FOR UNGA 74 - SEPTEMBER 2019

    The 74th session of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 74) took place in New York on 17-30 September 2019. 193 heads of state and government attended UNGA 74, which was organised under the theme “galvanising multilateral efforts for poverty eradication, quality education, climate action and inclusion”. UNGA 74 hosted numerous high-level side events including the Climate Summit and the High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage on 23 September, Summit on Sustainable Development Goals on 24-25 September and High-Level Dialogue on Financing for Development on 26 September.

    The general debate of UNGA 74 kicked off with speeches by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and President of UNGA 74 Tijjani Muhammad-Bande. The main themes in António Guterres’ speech were soaring tension in the Gulf escalated following the attack on Saudi state-owned oil company Aramco, allegedly done by Iran and polarising effects of trade wars between the US and China. One of the curiously awaited speeches on the first day of the general debate, when 21 leaders took the floor, was that of US President Donald Trump. Appreciation of patriotism instead of globalisation, a possible trade agreement between the US and Japan, China’s WTO membership, and the sanctions on Iran were the highlights of US President’s speech.

    US President Trump’s phone call scandal allegedly pressuring Ukrainian President  Zelensky to investigate the business dealings of his rival Joe Biden’s son which unravelled during UNGA and Iranian President Rouhani’s statement ruling out negotiations with Washington as long as sanctions were in place made the headlines during the UNGA 74. But if someone remembers only one thing in the future, it will undoubtedly be 16-year-old Greta Thunberg’s speech at the UN Climate Summit. The young climate activist blamed world leaders for stealing her dreams and childhood at her highly emotional and furious speech. Greta Thunberg, who was portrayed as “a very happy young girl, looking forward to a bright and wonderful future” by Donald Trump because of her speech, changed her bio on Twitter accordingly.

    Turkey’s Participation in the UNGA 74

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the accompanying committee were in New York on 21-25 September to participate in UNGA 74 and the side events. Within the scope of his New York contacts, President Erdoğan attended the Climate Summit on 23 September, and he gave a speech at the Summit of Sustainable Development Goals. President Erdoğan hosted a high-level side event with Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan with the theme “Tackling Hate Speech” and participated in Turkey-Malaysia-Pakistan Trilateral Meeting. Moreover, President Erdoğan held bilateral meetings with numerous world leaders including with Belgian Prime Minister and the incoming President of the European Council Charles Michel, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic. President Erdoğan also met Turkish, Muslim and Jewish communities in the US. Furthermore, President Erdoğan unveiled the Ara Güler Exhibition and attended the 10th Turkey Investment Conference Gala Dinner organised by Turkey-US Business Council.

    On the first day of general debate at UNGA 74, President Erdoğan was the fourth leader to address the audience and his speech lasted approximately 35 minutes. President Erdoğan began his speech by reiterating his famous sentence criticising the current voting system giving veto power to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: “The world is bigger than five.” Afterwards, President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey makes the highest amount of contribution to humanitarian aid in proportion of its national income. President Erdoğan reminded the large sum of money spent for Syrians under temporary protection in comparison with the financial support promised by the EU that has not fully come yet. Other issues voiced by President Erdoğan included three-year-old Aylan who was drowned in the Aegean in 2015 while trying to reach the Greek islands by an inflatable boat, illegal settlement activities of Israel and its vague borders, the Cyprus issue, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, nuclear armament and the rise of populist rhetoric. In terms of Syria, President Erdoğan reminded the fifth summit gathered the leaders of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Ankara on 16 September and touched upon the significance of the effective functioning of the Constitutional Committee.

    The EU Side at the UNGA 74: Priorities and Participation

    At UNGA 74, the EU was represented by President of the European Council Donald Tusk and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini. On 15 June 2019, the European Council adopted the Union’s priorities at UNGA 74 which are going to be valid from September 2019 to September 2020. As known, the EU tries to strengthen its connection with the UN to promote, develop and reform the rules-based international order. Every year, the EU determines its priorities for the UNGA and the work for the upcoming period in order to coordinate the agenda of the EU and the UN concurrently. The EU’s three interlinked and mutually reinforcing priorities adopted for the UNGA 74 are conflict prevention, peace and security, a common positive agenda and engagement on global challenges.  

    Within the framework of his speech on 26 September, Donald Tusk emphasised the importance of finding a common ground for globalisation and patriotism to prevent the spread of national egoism. His statement was by way of an answer to Donald Trump who praised patriotism rather than globalisation. Having mentioned that the rules-based international order should be maintained, Tusk drew attention to the rising threats on environment and indicated that the EU plays leading role in implementing the Paris Agreement. On the margin of the UNGA 74, Donald Tusk also had bilateral meetings with a number of leaders including British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.  

    FINLAND’S PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EU: PRIORITIES AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

    Finland took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Romania, on 1 July 2019. Finland’s six-month EU Presidency is part of Romania-Finland-Croatia trio presidency which focuses on common EU values, sustainable growth and security. Thematic areas of the Romania-Finland-Croatia trio presidency consist of a Union for jobs, growth and competitiveness; a Union that empowers and protects all its citizens; towards an Energy Union with a forward-looking climate policy; a Union of freedom, security and justice and the Union as a strong global actor.

    From theory to practice, Romania-Finland-Croatia trio have defined their concrete priorities as bringing Brexit process that is due on 31 October to an end, finalising the Union’s budget for 2021-2027 and realising high-level assignments to key EU institutions. In addition to these, breaches to the rule of law namely in Poland and Hungary are expected to be at the top of Finland’s agenda for its EU Presidency. Concerning the rule of law, Finland is likely to adopt a more active approach than its predecessors, Romania and Austria.

    Finland’s Road Map: Common Values, Competition, Climate and Security

    The priorities of Finland’s EU Presidency, which has chosen its motto as “sustainable Europe- sustainable future”, include strengthening common values and the rule of law, making the EU more competitive and socially inclusive, strengthening the EU’s position as a global leader in climate action and protecting the security of citizens comprehensively. Moreover, it is expected that the EU Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024, which was endorsed on 20-21 June at the European Council, will be ratified during Finland’s EU Presidency. In this regard, Finland is the first country which is supposed to integrate the priorities of the Strategic Agenda –namely; protecting citizens and freedoms, developing a strong and vibrant economic base, building climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe, promoting European interests and values on the global stage- into the Council’s work.

    Within the scope of Finland’s priorities, improving the processes regarding the rule of law and continuing the work for ensuring the receipt of EU funds conditional on respect for the rule of law are planned to be realised. In regard to enhancing the EU’s competitiveness, Finland is highly aware of the fact that it has to face a variety of challenges like increasing tension in international trade, Brexit and other political uncertainties in both the EU and the world. It is emphasised that the EU Single Market, which has a GDP of 15 trillion euros and embraces 500 million consumers along with 21 million SMEs, should be equipped with the rule-based and latest standards. In today’s world of new technologies, digitalisation, different business models and prevailing value chains, eliminating the barriers to cross-border trade in services and promoting online trade in services are regarded as two significant tools for enhancing the EU’s competitiveness.

    In Finland’s EU Presidency Programme, where the shortage of skilled workers in the Union is underlined, education is given particular importance. In this context, Finland aims to focus more on the Erasmus programme and create a “super-university” model by strengthening European universities.  Furthermore, pointing to the rising tensions and uncertainties in global trade, Finland’s EU Presidency indicated that the EU has to defend multilateral and rule-based trading system in a way especially satisfying the need for the modernisation of the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism. During Finland’s Presidency, the Union’s trade negotiations are set to continue. In line with this, the EU’s determination to proceed with the negotiations, which started following the joint statement issued by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump on 25 July 2018, is reiterated.

    As to Finland’s priority regarding the climate, the Union’s commitment to the Paris Agreement is restated. Other themes under this priority are the integration of climate policy into all sectors, the role of circular economy in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, waste management and the decrease of plastic consumption. Concerning security, Finland’s EU Presidency is committed to protecting European citizens against the rising threats inside and outside the EU through diplomacy, crisis management, trade policy and development aid. Last but not least, in order to raise awareness and endurance against the hybrid and cyber threats including cyber-attacks, election interferences and disinformation campaigns, organisation of scenario-based political discussions at various levels is planned.

    What Does Finland’s EU Presidency Mean for Turkey?

    Finland’s first Presidency of the Council of the EU which lasted from 1 July to 31 December 1999 witnessed a milestone event for Turkey-EU relations. At the historic Helsinki European Council, namely Helsinki Summit, on 10-11 December 1999, Turkey was officially declared a candidate state.

    On the 20th anniversary of the historic Helsinki Summit, Finland holds the Presidency of the Council of the EU again. This has increased the hopes for the revitalisation of Turkey-EU relations and holding of a Turkey-EU Summit similar to the one in Varna held on 26 March 2018 under the Bulgarian EU Presidency. On the other hand, the beginning of the Finland’s EU Presidency coincided with the rising tensions in Turkey-EU relations due to Turkish drilling activities in the East Mediterranean. The EU Foreign Affairs Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Turkey on 15 July is likely to shatter the hopes for the revival of the Helsinki spirit. Lastly, whereas EU’s enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans is stated to be maintained, Turkey finds a place for itself as a candidate country having strategic importance for the EU in a number of areas at Finland’s Presidency Programme.

    EUROPEAN COMMISSION ADOPTED THE 2019 TURKEY REPORT- JUNE 2019

    On 29 May 2019, the European Commission adopted its annual assessment of the implementation of the reforms for alignment with the EU acquis in Turkey and the Western Balkans together with recommendations for the coming period. As it is known, EU’s current enlargement agenda covers Turkey and the six Western Balkan countries. Accession negotiations have been opened with candidate countries Turkey (2005), Montenegro (2012) and Serbia (2014) whereas North Macedonia and Albania are candidate countries since 2005 and 2014, respectively. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has submitted its application for membership in February 2016, and Kosovo, which has a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU since April 2016, are potential candidates. The reports were presented to the public by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn.

    Covering the period from 1 March 2018 to 1 March, 2019, the Commission’s 2019 Report on Turkey highlighted Turkey’s position as a candidate country and a key partner for the EU. In the report, it was stated that dialogue and cooperation, including at highest level, in essential areas of joint interest have continued, including through effective cooperation on migration and support to refugees. However, it was also emphasised that Turkey has continued to move further away from the EU, with serious backsliding in the areas of the rule of law and fundamental rights and through the weakening of effective checks and balances in the political system, brought forward by the entry into force of the constitutional amendment. In June 2018, the Council noted unanimously that Turkey's accession negotiations had effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters could be considered for opening or closing. In the report, the Commission reiterated that the underlying facts leading to that assessment still held.

    In this year’s report, the Commission for the first time mentioned that there has been a serious backsliding in the Turkish economy, leading to deeper concerns over the functioning of the country's market economy. Moreover, according to the report, concerns regarding the independence of key economic institutions have deepened.

    The report praised the effective dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the field of migration. “Turkey made good progress in the area of migration and asylum policy and remained committed to the effective implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey statement”, the report said.

    Ankara’s Response the Commission’s Turkey Report

    Turkey’s official response to the report was expressed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs Faruk Kaymakcı, who said that it was not possible to accept “the unjust and disproportionate criticisms” in the European Commission’s 2019 Report on Turkey. “The EU does not demonstrate impartial attitude towards Turkey because of the prejudices arising from their own problems”, Kaymakcı added. Emphasising that the report shows EU's own existential crises, Kaymakcı said that populist movements correspond to the European public opinion as seen in the European Parliament elections.

    Kaymakcı also claimed that the EU cannot assess the current situation in Turkey correctly and added: “The statements claiming that Turkey is moving away from European values are inconsistent and invalid... Turkey is a part of Europe. Turkey is Europe.” On the other hand Kaymakcı agreed that Turkey will contemplate on the consistent and reasonable criticisms in the report.

    THE SIXTH REFORM ACTION GROUP MEETING: IN PURSUIT OF THE HELSINKI SPIRIT- MAY 2019

    The sixth meeting of the Reform Action Group (RAG) was held under the chairmanship of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 9 May Europe Day in Ankara. Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Negotiator Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Treasury and Finance Dr. Berat Albayrak and Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu were among the participants of the sixth RAG meeting which was coordinated by the Directorate for EU Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was also high-level participation from relevant Grand National Assembly Committees as well as public institutions such as the Human Rights and Equality Institution, Personal Data Protection Authority.

    RAG meetings have been monitoring the implementation of reforms on the way to EU accession on the basis of the political criteria and key chapters on judiciary, civil liberties, freedoms and security. To date, many vital steps regarding Turkey’s EU accession process, such as reforming the judicial system, preparing proposals for political reforms were initiated just after the RAG meetings. The sixth RAG meeting was marked as the first of its kind that was chaired by President Erdoğan.

    According to the Directorate for EU Affairs, main issues discussed were the remaining six benchmarks in the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, recent developments and the reforms to be realised concerning Chapters 23 and 24 in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.

    What is High on the Agenda?

    The press statement, which was released just after the sixth RAG meeting, features the key attributes concerning how Turkish government would be tackling critical issues related to justice, home affairs, rights and freedoms in the upcoming days. In this regard, according to the press statement, the RAG once again emphasised that Turkey remains committed to its objective of EU membership and continues its efforts in this respect. Yet, Turkish officials made the following criticism towards their interlocutors in the EU: “Our expectation from the EU is to treat Turkey on equal footing with other candidate countries and to remove political barriers on the way of negotiations which is supposed to be a technical process.”

    In regard to the reform steps to be taken, the RAG clearly pointed out that finalisation of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was the top priority. To that end, the press statement reminded the ongoing negotiations for conclusion of the Agreement between the EU and Turkey on the Exchange of Personal Data between Europol and the Turkish Competent Authorities for Fighting Serious Crime and Terrorism. Regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, the government will announce the Action Plan on Human Rights, which is being prepared in an inclusive manner as the statement underlines.

    Another significant issue has been the reform of the Turkish judicial system. The RAG ensured that the Judicial Reform Strategy would be announced in short notice. As the press statement indicates, the Reform Strategy will be in line with decisions taken during fourth and fifth RAG meetings and recommendations from stakeholders including the Council of Europe and the European Commission will be taken into consideration. The RAG also declared that on 14 March 2019 another one of the GRECO Recommendations was realised with the announcement of the Code of Judicial Ethics for Judges and Prosecutors. Moreover, the functioning of the Ombudsman Institution as well as steps to be taken with regard to action and cooperation plans concerning border management and organised crime were other significant issues that were elaborated.

    20th Anniversary of Turkey’s Candidacy       

    Speaking at the RAG meeting, President Erdoğan reminded that it has been 20 years since Turkey was officially declared as an EU candidate state in Helsinki. President Erdoğan explicitly emphasised the necessity of reviving the “Helsinki Spirit”. The same emphasis was made in the press statement with these words: “We anticipate support from the EU to revitalise the spirit of Helsinki.” Then the statement outlined the Turkish side’s expectations from the EU namely; the revitalisation of the accession negotiations, modernisation of the Customs Union, common fight against terrorist organisations, and maintaining Turkey-EU High Level Dialogues/Summits.

     

    TURKEY WENT TO THE POLLS FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS- APRIL 2019

    The local elections were held in Turkey on 31 March 2019 with a turnout of 84.67 percent, slightly lower than previous local elections held in 2014.  The official outcome showed that the People's Alliance, which consists of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), won 51.64 percent of votes, whereas the Nation Alliance between the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Good Party (İyi Parti) won 37.57 percent. Although People’s Alliance won the majority of the votes in general, they lost the major cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Antalya and Adana to opposition. What marked the election night was that the results of the race for İstanbul stayed unclear for a long time. In Ankara since Mansur Yavaş won getting 50.93 percent of the votes, he declared his victory easily. However the uncertainty regarding the results of the election in İstanbul continued more than two weeks and İstanbul’s mayor-elect Ekrem İmamoğlu, who participated in the 31 March local elections as the candidate of the informal Nation Alliance led by the main opposition CHP, has been invited to the Provincial Election Council at the İstanbul Courthouse to be given the certificate of election on 17 April 2019.

    AK Party has called for the annulment and rerun of the Istanbul vote and applied to the Supreme Election Council (YSK). Acting on the application from the ruling AK Party, the Council took the allegations of irregularities and unlawfulness into consideration. Having issued its interim decision on the last week of April, the YSK gave five days to district election boards to gather all pieces of evidence regarding ineligible voters and irregularities in balloting committees. While we were preparing this newsletter, the final decision of YSK was not declared and it was still a question mark, if there is going to be rerun of the elections in İstanbul.

    Reactions from the EU

    Following the elections, European Commission's First Vice-President Frans Timmermans claimed that AK Party shall respect the results of the local elections. However the statement of Timmermans caused tension between Turkey and EU and on 7 April the Spokesperson of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted by saying: "Turkish people went to the polls on 31 March with a participation rate that is seen in European countries rarely, and they once again showed their commitment to democracy. Nevertheless, the call of the European Union authorities to recognise the results, although the official results have not yet been announced in some places, have been recorded as an unfortunate blunder."

    On the other hand, the Spokesperson of the European Commission Margaritis Schinas stated that as Turkey leaves behind elections for a period of stability for four years, it presents an opportunity for reforms. Regarding the calls for suspension of accession negotiations between Turkey and EU, Schinas underlined that the doors of the EU are open and remain open but the hinges must work for the doors to remain open. He defined those hinges as reform, the rule of law, and democracy.

    The Spokesperson stressed the importance of Turkey-EU cooperation on the fight against terrorism as well as on immigration, intelligence, trade, transport, and energy.

    On visa liberalisation, Schinas said that Turkey is expected to fulfil its obligations to get visa-free travel. He added: “I am hopeful because contacts and dialogue between the authorities are continuing, but we have not reached the final point yet.”

    As it is well known, Turkey opened its doors to 3.6 million Syrian refugees and hosts the largest number of refugees in the world.  The Commissioner said Europe is doing its share by paying 3 million euros for the refugees in TurkeY. In March 2016, EU and Turkey reached an agreement to take stricter measures against human smugglers and discourage irregular migration through the Aegean Sea, and improve the conditions of Syrian refugees in Turkey, with the EU giving a 6 billion euro aid package to help Turkey care for millions of refugees hosted in the country.  Regarding the deal between Turkey and EU, Schinas underlined that the influx of refugees in the Aegean region is down by 90 percent.    

    MACRON’S SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TIME FOR A “EUROPEAN RENAISSANCE”- MARCH 2019

    On 4 March 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron added a new item to his initiatives for the future of Europe by publishing a simultaneous open letter in all Member States, including the UK, which will unlikely be a part of the upcoming EP elections, appealing to all Europeans as “Citizens of Europe”. Macron’s appeal entitled “For European Renewal” in 22 languages has created wide-ranging reactions from analysts praising his innovative approach to the EP elections to critics pointing out at his failure to present a concrete roadmap for the future of the Union.

    Since his inauguration at the Elysée Palace on 14 May 2017, the French President has repeatedly proven his enthusiasm for finding solutions to the vicious circles in which the EU has been deadlocked in numerous policy areas. Especially with the two hour-long speech he delivered at Sorbonne University on 26 September 2017, following the footsteps of François Mitterrand, Macron had explicitly declared his candidacy to be the next de facto leader of European integration. While sticking to his quest for renewing the EU, Emmanuel Macron considers himself, and thus France, as “the mind” leading the EU and clearly seems dedicated to making France regain its initial position as the motherland of EU’s founding father.

    Macron’s Appeal as a Potion against a Future without Project

    Since the very beginning of his article emphasising that the future of the EU is not in the hands of its leaders but in the hands of its citizens, Macron has argued that Brexit is a symbol of the European crisis. Describing nationalist and populist leaders’ rhetoric as a “rejection without an alternative” he indicates that challenges facing the Union are consequences of politicians who form their stance around lies and irresponsibility. In order to fight the lies and irresponsibility, Emmanuel Macron says that the EU should renew itself, declaring the time of a “European Renaissance” has come. According to him, this Renaissance should be built on three pillars, namely; liberty, protection, and progress.

    The first pillar refers to the democratic freedom on which the European model is based and the French President proposes creating a “European Agency for the Protection of Democracies” with the aim of protecting elections against any sort of manipulation or cyber-attacks. Moreover, mentioning online hate and violence incitements, Macron underlines the importance to fight these at the European level in the name of respect for fundamental rights.

    Speaking of protection, Macron clearly underlines that the second pillar means preservation of both European borders and core values. Moreover, he suggests the EU to rethink the Schengen area as well as have a uniform asylum policy across all Member States. Furthermore, he calls for an increase in the budget allocated to military spending, emphasising the importance of ratification of a treaty on security and defence by moving to the next stage of the established permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). Referring also to the provision of fair competition conditions in each member state, the French President argues that it would be a strategic step to punish those who do not comply with the EU norms on environmental standards, data protection and fair taxes.

    Last but not least, reminding the EU’s norm-defining character, Macron stresses that in order to preserve its power to define standards of progress; any future scenario should focus on convergence rather than competition. Similar to his previous speeches, Macron reiterates his ideas concerning social security standards such as introducing a social shield for all workers, the same pay in the same workplace, as well as a European minimum wage appropriate to each country. Moreover, the President has added an ecological cause to the third pillar calling on leaders to adapt their policies according to the zero carbon emissions by 2050 target and having their pesticide levels halved by 2025.

    40th Anniversary of the EP Elections

    This year’s European elections set to be held on 23-26 May 2019 would mark the 40th anniversary of the first direct EP election which took place in 1979 and resulted in the election of 410 MEPs to represent the nine Member States back then. Even though European citizenship has been introduced by the Maastricht Treaty as a concept, allowing all citizens to directly elect parliamentarians who would be representing them at a supranational level was without a doubt an important step towards the creation of this concept. However, from that moment on, national challenges and expectations have been at the forefront during European elections which in turn has led to the concept of European citizenship to remain merely on paper.

    Running campaigns for EP elections solely at the national level might be the biggest common denominator between pro-EU and Eurosceptic politicians. But French President Emmanuel Macron has chosen to address all European citizens instead of addressing solely French citizens, while giving the first hints of his election strategy. A move proving that the pro-European politician had discovered the bug of European elections has therefore allowed him to have a unique strategy not only for the upcoming elections, but also future discussions of the EU. Emmanuel Macron, who reminded the supranational character of the EP, might have answered those who criticized him for following the steps of Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand and not having his own stance. Calling on citizens to take action for the future of Europe, Macron implicitly gives the message that it would not be Alexander the Great who would cut off the EU’s Gordian knot, but the saviour of the Union would be the citizens themselves. Yet, his wake up call to the European citizen would not be enough to address the issues he has been facing at both the national and European levels since citizens are not interested in words, but action. So it remains for Macron to turn his words into reality for “Citizens of Europe”.

    Selvi EREN, IKV Junior Researcher

    6TH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE BUDAPEST PROCESS: IN PRAISE OF HUMAN MOBILITY- FEBRUARY 2019

    The 6th Ministerial Conference of the Budapest Process, a leading international venue to elaborate possible ways for enhanced migration management and refugee rights took place on 19 and 20 February 2019 in Istanbul. Within the framework of the Conference, competent authorities from 47 countries and 15 international organisations exchanged views and 40 countries agreed to adopt the “Istanbul Commitments” and a five-year call for action concerning irregular migration, workers’ migration, children’s rights and so forth. Before taking a deeper look into the 6th Ministerial Conference, it is necessary to understand the structure and content of the Budapest Process.

    The Budapest Process is an interregional dialogue on migration covering Europe and its Eastern neighbourhood as well as Central Asia. Operating for more than 25 years with a non-binding nature, the Budapest Process has not only enabled a flexible environment and opened up a platform for further cooperation and networking, but also acted as a knowledge hub. This hub of cooperation and information-sharing, on a regular basis decides thematic priority topics. Lastly, during its 2013 meeting, Istanbul Ministerial Declaration on a Silk Routes Partnership for Migration has been achieved.

    The 2019 Ministerial Conference has been built upon the 2013 achievements. Yet, since 2013, the whole picture has changed. Global migration management framework has witnessed one of the largest influxes of displaced persons. Therefore, taking account of the above described framework, the 6th Ministerial Conference and the measures discussed are of utmost importance.

    The 6th Ministerial Conference at A Glance

    To begin with, ministerial level participation from 20 different countries constitutes a signal demonstrating the importance attached to both the Budapest Process and the migration issue. Moreover, such an initiative affirms the fact that, non-binding processes which are not directly linked to the UN system and any other regional or international organisation or integration project are in time turning into effective global governance tools.

    These kinds of initiatives bring not only official state representatives around the same table in a highly structured manner, but also representatives from the civil society and international organisations’ within a much flexible setup. To this end, similar initiatives with special emphasis on migration management and other sensitive humanitarian matters should increase in number.

    Against this background, the 6th Ministerial Conference began with the opening remarks of Turkish Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu who also was the host as well as the conference chair. Conference Chair, Minister Soylu started by pointing out Turkey’s successful implementation of temporary protection. According to the figures he shared, Turkey currently hosts more than 3.6 million Syrians –more than any other country- who have been granted temporary protection.

    At this very point, Minister Soylu touched upon the vital risks which are currently giving a rise to irregular migration; namely, income inequality and security concerns. Minister Soylu also shared some other critical data regarding prospective durable solutions; as a critical part of reconstruction and re-stabilisation of war-torn areas, 311,968 Syrians have already returned to the regions covered by Operation Olive Branch and Operation Euphrates Shield. Together with the adoption of a five-year action plan and comprehensive Istanbul Commitments, many successful projects, cooperation commitments and migration management strategies have been shared within the Conference’s framework. On the other hand, many problems persist in the implementation phase on the field. In this regard, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s comments during the opening dinner of the 6th Ministerial Conference, which took place at the Çırağan Palace just before the official opening session, were of utmost importance.

    From Budapest Process to Turkey-EU Refugee Deal

    During the inaugural dinner, President Erdoğan brought the Turkey-EU Deal to the table and reminded the high amounts Turkey has allocated to overcome the migration crisis and integrate the Syrians in Turkey. Yet he criticised the EU side for the problems regarding the prospected 3+3 billion euros and the slow speed of allocation and contracting.

    Meanwhile, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos was present in the room. The next day, Commissioner Avramopoulos addressed the participants with the following words: “Our primary objective is to build an organised and sustainable management of human mobility, respectful of human rights, and inspired by the principles of solidarity, partnership, accountability and sharing of responsibility. This is the only way forward.” Moreover, he drew attention to the the Turkey-EU Statement as an important example of how close cooperation between true partners can bear very tangible results, in full respect of international law and human rights.

    All in all, the Budapest Process, the Turkey-EU Deal and all other instruments to overcome the migration crisis fully depend on common will and the notion of togetherness. The Budapest Process is a unique tool just because it provides a positive environment which helps the establishment of the common will highlighted above. Despite all the disagreements and confrontations, such venues are more needed than ever.

    Ahmet CERAN, IKV Researcher

    ROMANIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EU: PRIORITIES AND POSSIBLE IMPACT ON TURKEY-EU RELATIONS- JANUARY 2019

    Romania will be presiding over the Council of the EU in the first half of 2019. Turkey regards Romania’s term as an opportunity for improving its relations with the EU.

    Romania will be holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU from January to June 2019 for the first time since it became an EU Member State.  The Romanian Presidency is part of the trio Presidency consisting of also Finland and Croatia, and it will be the last Presidency acting throughout the EP’s current legislative cycle.

    Priorities of Romanian EU Presidency

    Romania’s Prime Minister Viorica Dancila emphasised the special importance they give to the Council Presidency of the EU as stating:  “Democracy, economic growth and the security that Romania enjoys today represent the incontestable outcome of our European road, a choice we are committed to and which cannot be reversed. We are Europe. The future of Europe means our future, and our contribution to a better and safer world.” The four priorities of Romanian Presidency are as follows:

    • Europe of Convergence
      • Competitiveness, development gaps, employment and social rights
      • Innovation and digitalisation
      • Connectivity, climate and sustainability
    • A Safer Europe
      • Internal security and combating crime and terrorism
      • Effective external borders’ management
      • Well-functioning Schengen area
      • Cyber security
    • Europe as a Stronger Global Actor
      • Enlargement of Western Balkans
      • EU defence capabilities (PESCO, EDF, CARD)
      • Consistency and effectiveness of the EU action in Eastern Neighbourhood
      • Multilateralism
    • Europe of Common Values
      • Democracy, freedom, human rights and respect for human dignity
      • Solidarity, equal opportunities, gender equality and social justice
      • Combating racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance and populism

    In fact, Romania will have less than 6 months to take action concerning these priorities. Both the EP elections in May and Brexit in March are expected to be taking place during the Romanian Presidency. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that the debates regarding the EU’s long term budget for the 2021-2027 period will be taking place in this term.

    Like every term presidency, also Romania has decided upon a thematic issue of particular focus: digital transformation. Even though Romania doesn’t have the most advanced level of technologic capabilities, the Presidency decided upon focusing this specific field. On the other hand, Romania has the fastest internet service in the whole EU. And there exists a rapidly developing start-up culture benefiting from the EU funds as well as the government and local administrations’ support. Romania even plans hosting the European Start-up Summit. With high rates of economic growth (6.7% in 2017), and a younger generation passionate in the latest technologies, some conterparts consider Romania as the new Silicon Valley of the EU.  Romania is expected to be using the Presidency’s all these evolving and strengthening aspects to its own advantage, particularly for the promotion of the country.

    Despite all these ambitious priorities, the Romanian EU Presidency has commenced with some controversial issues. At the official opening ceremony held on 11 January 2019, the dismissal of the Romania's Anti-Corruption Agency; the inadequacy of the steps taken to fight corruption and the EP's decision in November asking the Bucharest administration to respect judicial independence was reflected in the speeches of the EU Council’s President Donald Tusk and the European Commission’s President Jean-Claude Juncker as criticism.  President Juncker said, "Bucharest government has not fully understood what it means to preside over the countries of the EU." in which he shared doubts about the extent to which such an important task could be overcome during this critical period of the EU.

    Additionally the Prime Minister of Romania Viorica Dancila stated her support for Turkey’s EU membership bid during her official visit to Turkey. In response, President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan implied that Romania’s Presidency of the EU Council is an opportunity for Turkey. However, when Romania’s priorities are paid attention to, it is possible to realise that Romania is keen to focus its attention on Western Balkans’ EU membership process, just as their predecessors did. However, the Turkey’s accession process is not among the top priorities of the Romanian Presidency. During the first half of 2019, at a time when the EU’s agenda will be heavily dominated by Brexit and EP elections, it could be foreseen that Bucharest would try to leave its mark in trying to get these two processes sorted out. Therefore, the ball is now in Turkey’s court. In order to accelerate Turkey-EU relations and the accession negotiations, Turkey shall realize the Reform Action Group’s agenda.

    Detailed information about the Romanian Presidency can be found on the official website: http://www.romania2019.eu/#s-home

  • THE FIFTH RAG MEETING PUT CONCRETE JUDICIAL REFORMS ON THE TABLE- DECEMBER 2018

    The fifth meeting of the Reform Action Group (RAG) was held on 11 December 2018 in Ankara with the participation of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Justice Minister Abdülhamit Gül, Treasury and Finance Minister Berat Albayrak and Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu together with high level participation from the Presidency and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Also participation from Turkey’s PACE delegation as well as relevant public authorities including Human Rights and Equality Institution and Personal Data Protection Authority was ensured. Unlike the previous RAG meeting which was organised under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this meeting was hosted by Ministry of Justice.

    Reform Action Group meetings have been monitoring the implementation of reforms on the way to EU accession on the basis of the political criteria, judiciary, civil liberties, freedoms and security chapters. In the previous period, many vital steps regarding Turkey’ EU accession process, such as reforming the judicial system, preparing proposals for political reforms were made just after the RAG meetings. The fourth RAG meeting has been noted as the first RAG meeting after a longwinded three-year hiatus. The fifth meeting being held soon after the fourth RAG meeting is indicative of the Turkish decision-makers’ commitment to the EU accession bid.

    As a matter of fact, Turkey’s commitment and determination to its EU membership process was underlined. As reflected in the press statement following the meeting, Turkey would be decisively continuing its efforts to align with EU standards despite political obstructions in the accession negotiations. Moreover, increasing determination and impetus regarding the closure of the PACE monitoring process was a key outcome of the meeting.

    Furthermore, possible reform steps concerning the justice sector were brought to the agenda. Since the fourth RAG meeting, one of the priority areas has been the updating of the judicial Reform Strategy. Until now, the opinions and proposals of all stakeholders related to the judiciary have been received, according to the RAG, further work would be carried out together with EU institutions and the Council of Europe. Besides, another key objective for the Turkish justice sector is the strengthening and accelerating of the judicial processes as also reported by the Commission for many times. To this end, increasing the number of judges and prosecutors in coordination with the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe as well as the Commission is underway. Also during the same period, the Action Plan on the Prevention of the Violation of European Convention on Human Rights will be updated as expected by the EU bodies.

    For improving the fundamental rights and freedoms ecosystem in Turkey, RAG also elaborated concrete steps. To this end, Human Rights and Equality Institution’s capacity would be enhanced and a large scale conference for the Roman citizens would be organised.

    During the meeting, Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security, the visa liberalisation dialogue, migration and other relevant issues also were discussed. In regard to visa liberalisation, the fulfilment of the benchmark regarding issuing second-generation biometric passports, newly started negotiations on exchange of personal data between Europol and Turkish competent authorities as well as bringing Law Proposal on Parliamentarians Ethics on the GNAT’s table were highlighted. It was stressed that technical work within the scope of the Law on the Protection of the Personal Data is underway. Moreover, the RAG shared the plans about the National Migration Paper’s drafting process and the 2019-2021 Action Plan on the Fight against Organised Crime which is planned to be adopted in early 2019. Once again, the competent Turkish authorities called for the establishment and implementation of Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme to speed up the implementation of Facility for Refugees in Turkey.

    Lastly, the RAG welcomed the decision to hold Turkey-EU High Level Dialogue meetings on energy on 18 December 2018, on transport on 15 January 2019, on economy on 28 February 2019, and Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting on 18-20 December 2018 as reflected in the press statement. Apart from the fundamental rights and freedoms as well as the justice sector, the call towards the modernisation of the Customs Union, the decision of the EU institutions to cut IPA funds which would dramatically reduce the EU’s visibility in Turkey and Brexit’s effects to Turkey were the other topics mentioned. The RAG agreed to hold its sixth meeting under the auspices of the Ministry of Treasury and Finance in the first half of 2019.

    MOGHERINI AND HAHN VISITED ANKARA FOR HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE MEETING- NOVEMBER 2018

    On 22 November 2018, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn visited Turkey for the High Level Political Dialogue between Turkey and EU. The Turkish delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who is also in charge of EU Affairs. At the meeting, all issues of common interest and concern, such as developments in Syria, Iran, and Iraq as well as bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey, cooperation on migration and counter-terrorism and other important sectoral issues were discussed.

    Following the Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue meeting, the parties issued a joint statement in which they underlined the strategic importance of Turkey-EU relations. Moreover, they stated that they remain committed to maintaining an open and frank dialogue, to discussing issues high on both of our agendas in a comprehensive manner in view of addressing common challenges and to cooperating in essential areas of joint interest.

    Considering the recent statement of Commissioner Hahn in which he called for an end to accession negotiations with Turkey, it was important to underline that Turkey's accession process can provide an important framework for fully realising the potential of the EU-Turkey relationship as well as for the economic, social and political reforms in Turkey. As it is known, during the Reform Action Group meeting of 29 August 2018, Turkey clearly signalled its determination to rapidly undertake reforms in the area of the rule of law and fundamental rights.  The standards of the Council of Europe and EU norms will act as an anchor for these reforms.  During the High Level Political Dialogue meeting, Turkey reiterated its commitment to the EU reform process and both sides discussed ongoing updates to the Judicial Reform Strategy and the possible contribution of the EU.

    Both parties also repeated their strong will to enhance cooperation to combat terrorism. Turkey and the EU are pursuing concrete actions to increase cooperation to counter the threat of terrorism in an effective manner.

    Another important item on the agenda of the meeting was visa liberalisation. The two sides reconfirmed their intention to continuing the visa liberalisation dialogue to implement all pending benchmarks. For that purpose, Turkey has started to issue second-generation passports as 2 April and the negotiations for an operational cooperation agreement between the EU and Turkey on exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism will start on 30 November.

    As it is well known, over the recent years Turkey has become a home for the largest refugee population in the world and exerts outstanding efforts to provide access to services such as education and health. During the meeting, both sides reiterated the contribution of the 18 March 2016 Statement has allowed for a unique model of cooperation between Turkey and the EU to managing irregular migration.

    Recently another controversial issue in Turkey-EU relations was the financial cooperation within the framework of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). During the meeting, both sides underlined the importance of IPA funds for supporting Turkey’s compliance with the EU acquis in various areas.

    The meeting was finalised with the reconciliation of both parties to intensify their cooperation through a series of high level dialogues on economy, energy, transport and they agreed to work on improving the functioning of the Customs Union and on its modernisation as soon as circumstances allow. 

    PRESIDENT ERDOĞAN`S GERMANY VISIT: TIME FOR A RESET IN TURKISH-GERMAN TIES- OCTOBER 2018

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to Germany on 27-29 September 2018 upon the invitation of German President Franz-Walter Steinmeier. The visit was an important step to repair the relationship and to re-establish mutual confidence following the tensions and problems experienced in the last two years in Turkey-Germany relations.

    In fact, the diplomatic traffic between the two countries has already been busy in September. At the start of the month, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas paid an official visit to Turkey and met President Erdoğan as well as his counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Following that Treasury and Finance Minister Berat Albayrak, Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Sönmez visited Berlin in order to meet Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and Economy and Energy Minister Peter Altmaier.

    During his three-day visit to Germany, President Erdoğan was welcomed with an official ceremony by President Steinmeier, attended official state dinner and met Chancellor Angela Merkel at a working luncheon and breakfast. On the last day of his visit, he gave a speech at the official inauguration of the DITIB Central Mosque in Cologne.

    Erdoğan and Merkel, who came together twice in two days, discussed economic and global developments, the Syria crisis and irregular migration. During the joint press conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel following their meeting, President Erdoğan stated that German Economy and Energy Minister Peter Altmaier, along with a large delegation of businesspeople, will pay a visit to Turkey in October, and said: “We are in favour of preserving and further strengthening this momentum we have achieved through mutual high-level visits.”

    Regarding Turkey-EU relations and the visa liberalisation process, President Erdoğan announced that Turkey aims to fulfil the six remaining criteria in the visa liberalisation roadmap as soon as possible. Moreover, he highlighted that providing visa liberalisation, launching the negotiations for the modernisation of the Customs Union and revitalising accession negotiations are to the benefit of both Turkey and the EU and underlined that Turkey attaches great importance to Germany’s support which is one of the leading countries in Europe.

    Regarding the Syria crisis, President Erdoğan reminded that during the acute period of the refugee crisis, Turkey and Germany undertook responsibility and made serious sacrifices to ease the process. He expressed that Turkey and Germany share a common approach with regard to supporting a rules-based system in order to balance the increasingly protectionist trends in trade. President Erdoğan criticised using trade sanctions for political objectives, since it will damage global trade as well as international security, he added that he values deep economic ties with Germany and wants to further improve them on the basis of a win-win approach.

    During the press conference, German Chancellor Merkel underlined her country’s interest in an economically stable Turkey and said: “We want to further improve our cooperation in the fight against terror.”

    In fact, Turkey and Germany have many reasons to work together. In addition to more than three million people of Turkish origin living in the country, Germany is Turkey's main economic and trade partner with a bilateral trade volume of 37.6 billion euros. Therefore the two-day visit of German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier with a 30-person business delegation is another important step to strengthen ties between the two countries. Peter Altmaier, during the joint press conference with his counterpart Treasury and Finance Minister Berat Albayrak, noted: "In the past years, the two countries suffered difficulties in their relations, but we are determined to develop bilateral ties." It was also prominent that Altmaier and Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan were scheduled to convene for the first time a joint commission seeking ways to improve trade, industry, tourism and infrastructure projects between the two countries.

    4TH RAG MEETING REAFFIRMED TURKEY’S COMMITMENT TO EU REFORMS- AUGUST-SEPTEMBER

    The 4th meeting of the Reform Action Group (RAG) was held on 29 August 2018, in Ankara under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Negotiator Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu with the participation of Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gül, Minister of Treasury and Finance Dr. Berat Albayrak and Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu. Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Committee on Foreign Affairs Chair Volkan Bozkır and Committee on EU Harmonisation Chair Mehmet Kasım Gülpınar, Chairman of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee İsmail Emrah Karayel and the Chief Ombudsman Şeref Malkoç were also present during the meeting.

    The group, formerly called "Reform Monitoring Group," held its first meeting after a three-year break. Moreover, the RAG meeting in Ankara was significant for being the first of its kind following Turkey’s transition to the executive presidency system.

    RAG meetings have been instrumental in monitoring the implementation of reforms on the way to EU accession on the basis of Turkey’s compliance with the political criteria as well as the developments concerning the chapters on judiciary, civil liberties, freedoms and security. During the previous period, many decisions in terms of accelerating Turkey-EU accession negotiations, reforming the judicial system, preparing proposals for political reforms have been made just after the so-called RAG meetings. Therefore, it is critical to take a snapshot of the meeting’s outcomes.

    The RAG, the Reform Agenda and Expectations

    The RAG meeting took place just after the termination of the state of emergency. By ending emergency rule, Turkey withdrew its derogations from Article 4 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This step has been welcomed by the EU. The positive atmosphere has been reflected on the press conference held by the four ministers following the RAG meeting. The ministers started their remarks by underlining that utmost importance would be given to bolstering the EU Departments of the Ministries which are experienced in coordinating and conducting relations with the EU.

    In terms of the justice sector, the ministers emphasised their expectations towards the updating of the new Judicial Reform Strategy by the end of 2018, the main goal of which is enhancing the accessibility and quality of justice. As an integral part of this reform process, the competence of the Human Rights Compensation Commission was expanded by the legislation that entered into force on 31 July 2018. And, as agreed upon during the RAG meeting, bold moves targeting sexual harassment of children are foreseen in the near future.

    Regarding the home affairs and internal security arrangements, the reforms foreseen would most probably tackle the issues of mobility and organised crime. The participants of the RAG meeting once again reaffirmed the commitment to the Turkey-EU Statement and the refugee deal.

    Lastly, ongoing key negotiation areas namely; the Turkey-EU Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, modernisation of the Customs Union as well as EU accession negotiations were brought to the agenda. Regarding visa liberalisation, Minister Çavuşoğlu pointed to the fulfilment of another Visa Liberalisation Roadmap chapter which has to do with the alignment of Turkish passports to EU standards. Currently, there remain 6 more criteria to be fulfilled. And Minister Çavuşoğlu, during the press meeting, called for bona fide from the EU side concerning the visa liberalisation issue. Furthermore, in regard to the accession negotiations, chapters 23 and 24 covering the rule of law issues were brought to the table. The RAG called for the opening of those two chapters and as reflected in the press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was underscored that the opening of those chapters would facilitate Turkey’s reform and alignment efforts. As the final point, the RAG underlined with a tremendous enthusiasm that Turkey would continue its reform efforts with determination in the forthcoming period in line with its EU membership perspective. Turkey’s commitment to increase the level of standards in the area of political reforms has been highlighted.

    THE AUSTRIAN EU PRESIDENCY AND PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS-JUNE-JULY 2018

    Austria took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in a symbolic handover ceremony in Schladming with the attendance of European Council President Donald Tusk, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. Austria, which has assumed the EU presidency for the third time after 1998 and 2006, has chosen the motto “A Europe that protects”. The Austrian Presidency in the second half of 2018 has to work on prevailing complex dossiers, namely negotiations regarding Brexit and regarding the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for the period 2021- 2027. Another important aspect for the work of the Austrian Presidency concerns the EP elections that will take place on 23-26 May 2019. Since EP’s legislative period is coming to end, it will be essential to reach agreements on as many open legislative proposals as possible. Therefore, the Austrian Council Presidency has to work on reaching common positions in the Council on legislative proposals.

    The priorities of the programme of the Austrian Presidency were announced as follows: Security and fight against illegal migration; securing prosperity and competitiveness through digitalisation and stability in the neighbourhood – bringing the Western Balkans/South Eastern Europe closer to the EU.

    “A Europe that Protects” and the Priorities of Austrian EU Presidency

    It is clear that the motto of the presidency “a Europe that protects” reflects the essence of the priorities and the working programme of Austria adequately. While preparing the programme, the Austrian government preferred to approach the migration issue from a security perspective, digitalisation from the perspective of securing prosperity and competitiveness while considering only the Balkan countries as part of EU enlargement policy.

    It was not surprising that a special emphasis was put on security and fight against illegal migration by the Austrian Presidency. As one would recall, at the European Council meeting, which took place a few days before Austria took over the EU Presidency, one of the most controversial issues was immigration, and it took a great deal to reach final settlement among Member States. Thus, Austria aims to channel its efforts to reform the Common European Asylum System as well as strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), in order to guarantee the efficient protection of the EU’s external borders. Austria plans host a special summit in Salzburg on 20 September 2018, in order to deal with these issues.

    A considerable share of growth in the EU can already be attributed to the digital economy. Therefore, the Austrian Presidency considers that with an intelligent policy of digital transformation, it will be possible to safeguard the competitiveness and sustainability of the European economy in the future. In order to improve framework conditions for digital business models and services Austria suggested completing the Digital Single Market, modernising public administration on a broad scale and renewing industrial policy.

    Regarding the third priority, the Austrian Presidency undertook the task of advocating developing a concrete EU perspective for all Western Balkan/ South Eastern European countries based on clear criteria relating to their individual performance and work on achieving measurable progress.

    The Missing Item in the Programme of the Austrian EU Presidency: Turkey

    While the Austrian Presidency is referring to development of relations with many countries and regions ranging from Russia to ASEAN countries, from the Caribbean to Latin American countries, in its 70-page programme, which sets out its goals and priorities for the next six months, it is very striking that Turkey as an EU accession country was not even mentioned once. As many of the readers may recall prior to the Turkey-EU Summit on 26 March, which brought President Erdoğan and the heads of EU institutions together, the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz has claimed that Turkey no longer fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria and therefore EU accession negotiations with Turkey shall be suspended. Lately, the Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl made the position of her country vis-à-vis Turkey very clear by stating that they do not perceive Turkey as an EU candidate country. In the face of this attitude, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu took a realistic approach and said that he did not think that any positive steps were going to be taken during the Austrian Presidency and did not expect any new negotiation chapters to be opened.

     It seems that Austria does not want to deal with any issues related to the Turkey within its six month term at the EU’s helm. However, the attitude of the Austrian government overshadows the EU-wide leadership ambitions of Chancellor Sebastian Kurz who constantly emphasises EU’s values. On the other hand, Turkey with its new governing system shall reinitiate the reform process in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The objections of the Austrian government are not new for Turkey. Turkey had faced similar objections from Vienna when the decision regarding the start of EU accession negotiations was taken. At that time, Turkey overcame those obstacles with its ambitious reform process which showed Turkey’s determination to become an EU Member State. It seems that our previous experiences already provide the answer for Turkey’s EU bid, irrespective of whether Austria holds the EU presidency or not.

    9 MAY EUROPE DAY CELEBRATED IN TURKEY-MAY 2018

    It has been 68 years since then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman delivered his famous Schuman Declaration. During his speech on 9 May 1950, Schuman set out his idea for a new form of political cooperation in Europe which would make war between Europe’s nations unthinkable. He proposed creating a European institution that would pool and manage coal and steel production. With founding members France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created and it would be first of a series of supranational European institutions that would ultimately come to be known as the “European Union”. During in the Milan Summit in 1985, it was decided to celebrate 9 May as “Europe Day”. Since then, local EU offices in Europe and all over the world organise a variety of activities and events on the occasion of Europe Day. As a candidate country, celebrating 9 May Europe Day since 1999, key Turkish officials issued messages highlighting the significance of EU integration and shared their views on the future of Turkey’s place within the EU.

    President Erdoğan: “The EU Project is destined to Remain Unfinished without Turkey”

    In his message on the occasion of Europe Day, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan while praising the idea of EU integration for paving the way for peace, stability and prosperity in Europe, criticised the EU by saying that “an EU, of which Turkey is not a full member, is destined to remain an unfinished project”. He warned that the greatest threat for the future of the Union comes from inside Europe, stemming from trends such as discrimination, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia which has hijacked Europe’s socio-political life. He underlined the importance of integration with Turkey by saying that besides its economic, political and social benefits, Turkey’s full membership will also provide the Union with the greatest opportunity for addressing these threats.

    Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu: “Populist Trends Jeopardise ‘Unity in Diversity’”

    Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, started his message by stating that Turkey is a European country geographically and historically and has contributed to Europe’s security, stability and prosperity and continues to make the necessary efforts towards full membership to the EU. However, like President Erdoğan, he criticised the EU for drifting away from its own founding values due to the rising populist trends such as discrimination, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and therefore jeopardising the “unity in diversity” culture of the EU. He also expressed that enlargement has been the EU’s single most successful policy for spreading its founding values, and the cooperation between Turkey and the EU should not lay beneath one party’s interests, but lay with common interests instead.

    EU Affairs Minister Çelik: “Turkey’s Membership to the EU is the Way to Overcome Crises”

    Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik also issued a statement on the occasion of European Day. EU Affairs Minister Çelik expressed that the crises in the international system, Brexit, disputes between EU Member States regarding fundamental policy areas and the rise of the far-right has resulted in discussions on the future of the Europe and that refugee flows led to the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in many European countries. However, he also remarked that the EU can overcome all these problems as long as it adheres to its own strong and deep-rooted values and principles. He put forward Turkey’s membership to the EU as the way to overcome these crises. Lastly, Minister Çelik expressed his view that the 26 March Turkey-EU Summit held in Varna has been beneficial in restoring confidence in Turkey-EU relations which had been going through a difficult period. EU Affairs Minister Çelik called on the EU to adopt a fair and objective approach based on the will to build a common future regarding Turkey’s full membership in the EU.

    EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S 2018 TURKEY REPORT AND SNAP ELECTIONS-APRIL 2018

    It has been a long time since Reports on Turkey prepared by the European Commission created an excitement in the Turkish public. However, especially EU experts in Turkey and those who still believe in Turkey’s EU perspective wait in anticipation of these reports. This year the 20th of these reports was published by the European Commission on 17 April 2018. A few hours before the Commission Vice-President and High Representative Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn presented the Enlargement Strategy and Country Reports for 2018, a critical announcement was made in Turkey by Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Action Party. In the regular party group meeting in the parliament, Bahçeli called for the holding of early elections in August 2018. This call immediately captured the internal agenda in Turkey and opened the Pandora’s box. Following Bahçeli’s meeting with President Erdoğan, 24 June was set as the date for snap elections in the country.

    The results of the elections coming at a time of economic instability and continuing loss of value of the Turkish lira against the dollar and the euro are quite unpredictable. The elections are also important in one other respect. 24 June elections will be the first following the referendum on the transition to an executive presidential regime in Turkey. Hence, the person, who is going to be elected as the President of Turkey, will be the first of the executive presidencies. Parliamentary elections are going to take place at the same time as the presidential elections and the balance of votes in the parliament can make an important difference regarding the checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches.

    At the moment several candidates are running for presidency: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) alliance, Muharrem İnce from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Meral Akşener from Good Party (İyi Parti), Selahattin Demirtaş from People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Temel Karamollaoğlu from Felicity Party (SP), Doğu Perinçek from Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi). Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) issued a call for the postponement of the elections due to the problems associated with holding elections under a state of emergency.

    Returning to the report on Turkey, it can be said that the Commission has been quite critical about Turkey’s recent record in fulfilling the membership criteria. In addition to the decrees and measures adopted during the state of emergency, the report also noted “backsliding” in the following areas including political and economic criteria as well as some chapters of the acquis: rule of law, civil society, media freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, procedural rights, right to property, independence of the judiciary, civil service and human resources, market economy and business environment, social policy and employment, information society, audio visual policy and external relations. The number and breadth of the areas, where backsliding has been observed, are alarmingly varied and important. In order to rekindle the EU membership perspective Turkey needs to rekindle the reform spirit and take action in order to regain the ground which has been lost in the last couple of years.  The elections are also critical in this sense since we shall have to wait until after the elections in order to ascertain whether or not the new government and parliament that are going to take office will be enthusiastic about revitalising Turkey’s EU membership perspective by reinstating political and economic reforms. A working checks and balances system between the executive, legislative and judicial branches, effective separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, respect for and protection of rights and freedoms will be traits that the EU will look for in the executive presidency system.

    TURKEY-EU LEADERS’ MEETING: AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE-MARCH 2018

    Although parties could not reach any concrete results, the Turkey-EU Summit in Varna was important for the parties to underline their joint commitment to maintain channels of dialogue.

    The Turkey-EU leaders’ meeting, which was held in the Bulgarian coastal city of Varna on 26 March 2018, brought Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission and Boyko Borissov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria together in order to discuss Turkey-EU relations. Although the parties could not reach any concrete results, the summit was important to underline their joint commitment to maintain channels of dialogue. Cooperation in energy, security, the fight against terrorism, the management of migration flows and EU's assistance for the refugees in Turkey were the main issues discussed in the leaders’ meeting. Speaking at the joint press conference, Council President Donald Tusk reminded that at the previous leaders’ meeting in Brussels Turkey and EU had agreed to intensify dialogue at different levels. Since then a number of high-level meetings have taken place between the parties.

    Tusk pointed out the fact that, EU and Turkey remained very close partners on migration and support for refugees. He expressed the EU’s appreciation for the impressive work Turkey has been doing, and thanked the Turkish people for hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees these past years. Tusk also mentioned that during the leaders’ meeting, he and Commission President Juncker reaffirmed the EU's unwavering commitment to continuing their support to the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Donald Tusk also said: “We understand Turkey's need to deal effectively with its security after the attempted coup and the terrorist attacks it has suffered. But we are concerned that some of the methods used, undermine fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in Turkey. We encourage Turkey to work with the Council of Europe, of which Turkey has been a member longer than most EU Member States.” Tusk added that Turkey committed to improving respect for the rule ofaw and its relations with the Member States of the EU and underlined the importance of improving relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GASC), reaffirming the European Council conclusions of 22-23 March 2018.

    President Erdoğan’s Call for Working Together

    Following Tusk, President Erdoğan took the floor and said that during the leaders’ meeting they discussed what steps might be taken in order to overcome certain deadlocks, stressing that they hope to have left a difficult period in Turkey-EU relations behind. President Erdoğan reminded that Turkey has been duly fulfilling its responsibilities especially with regard to the fight against irregular migration. Visa liberalisation was one of the important items of Turkey’s agenda during the meeting. President Erdoğan mentioned that Turkey has submitted its working paper to the Commission in early February and is still expecting a reply from the EU side.

    Regarding the modernisation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union, President Erdoğan expressed Turkey’s expectation that the necessary steps should be taken for the modernisation of the Customs Union. Erdoğan also emphasised that a technical process such as the modernisation of the Customs Union should not be treated as a political matter. Regarding the fight against terrorism, President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey’s counterterrorism operations contribute not only to its own security, but also the security of Europe. On Turkey-EU relations, President Erdoğan warned that it would be a grave mistake for the EU, which claims to be a global power, to push Turkey out of its enlargement policy. Erdoğan emphasised that Turkey is a key player in the region, an ally of strategic importance, and a dynamic country with a young population. The last speaker of the press conference, Commission President Juncker said that Turkey and EU should be talking about areas of mutualinterest and ambitions that unite them, rather than the ones that divide them. Juncker added: "We want Turkey to be a true strategic partner of the EU. And between strategic partners, we must know how to maintain an open dialogue at all times in order to deepen what brings us together and to resolve what divides us.” Although many of the problems in Turkey-EU relations remained unresolved and no concrete results came out of the leaders' meeting on 26 March, the efforts to maintain the dialogue and restore mutual confidence are worthwhile. As President Erdoğan underscored, “Let’s join forces to establish stability and prosperity in the Balkans, our common geography. Let’s deepen our cooperation on international issues such as Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Al-Quds, Yemen, the Rohingya and Africa. Let’s build the strong and prosperous Europe which is an island of stability, together. We are sincere in these calls of ours today, as we were yesterday.”

    TURKEY-EU JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MET IN ADANA-FEBRUARY 2018

    On 20-21 February, the Turkey-EU Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) met for the 37th time in Adana.

    The Turkey-EU JCC, where representatives of Turkish employers and employee associations as well as NGOs are members, represents the social partners on both sides. On the Turkish side, they include the TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), TISK (Turkish Employers Association), IKV and Banks Association of Turkey as representatives of the employers, Türk-İş, Memursen, Hak-İş, and Kamu-Sen as representatives of employees and workers, and TZOB (Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture), TESK (Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen), KAGİDER (Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey) and Turkish International Industrial Relations Association as representatives of other organised civil society organisations.

    On the EU side, they are comprised of members of the Economic and Social Committee (EESC) including Confederation of Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria, Lithuanian Apparel and Textile Industry Association, National Confederation of Romanian Employers, Greek Tourism Confederation on the employers side, Italian Labour Union, Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, Netherlands Trade Union Confederation on the employee side, German Association of Consulting Engineers, Greek National Confederation of Disabled People, European Disability Forum and Farmer’s Unions on the part of other organized civil society organizations.

    The meeting was held in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding. Turkey’s Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik made the opening speech together with the Co-Chairs M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu of TOBB and Annie van Wezel of the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation. It was Minister Çelik himself who first suggested that the meeting be held in Adana, his hometown. Minister Çelik especially praised the JCC for being the only joint Turkey-EU institution where a moment of silence was observed in memory of those killed while trying to oppose the coup plotters on 15 July 2016.

    The moderation that characterised the JCC did not mean however that there were no criticisms or denouncements. The EU side in particular was critical of the political and human rights situation in Turkey and demanded an ending of the state of emergency as soon as possible. Turkish side on the other hand, tried to explain the situation in Turkey and the security threats facing the country. They also tried to provide a portrait of the civil society in Turkey, with a view to giving an idea about the working conditions and roles and responsibilities of trades unions. Several presentations were made by representatives of the participant organisations about the current developments in Turkish economy, modernisation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union, Syrian refugees in Turkey, blue economy and developments with regard to social rights.

    Relevance of the Social Partners for Turkey and EU Relations

    In line with the role attributed to the social partners in the making of EU policies and decisions in the social sphere, the social partners were also given a prominent role in the conduct of Turkey and EU relations. Together with the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the JCC became one of the two organs that aimed to place Turkey and EU relations on a pluralistic platform and engage representatives of civil society for the enhancement of bilateral relations. The JCC reflects the organizational logic of the EESC(EESC) including representation by three societal groups; employers, employees and workers and other organised interests.  The JCC is set to meet every six months with a view to debating Turkey-EU relations, Turkey’s progress towards the goal of membership, and progress in the political and social situation in the country. The Turkey-EU JCC was able to come up with a joint communique after each meeting, hence providing for an impetus in the relations.

    IKV Chairman at the JCC Meeting

    IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu also participated at the JCC meeting upon the invitation of the TOBB President M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu and made a presentation on the modernisation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union. IKV Chairman Zeytinoğlu outlined the expectations from a modernised Customs Union such as improved dispute settlement mechanisms, removal of non-tariff barriers such as transport quotas and visa requirements, Turkey’s involvement in the trade policy organs of the EU, and negotiation of free trade agreements between the EU and third countries in parallel with Turkey. Zeytinoğlu also dwelled upon the opportunities associated with an expansion of the Turkey-EU trade relationship to new sectors including services, agriculture and public procurement. Citing economic impact analysis studies, IKV Chairman said that important welfare gains are expected from such an expansion of the customs union, on average 1.44 to 1.90percent increase in Turkey’s GDP. “While important gains are expected, adaptation costs are also quite considerable and should be taken into account especially in the area of agriculture”, Mr. Zeytinoğlu added. IKV Chairman also talked about the significance of the Customs Union modernisation process as a mechanism that can provide an impetus to Turkey’s integration to the EU single market. He said that the process is at the moment on hold due to reservations by the EU regarding the political situation in Turkey. IKV Chairman said that if negotiations could be opened, it would provide for an improvement in the political situation in the country and bring Turkey closer to EU standards.

    Latest Developments in Turkey and EU Relations

    2018 took off as a more moderate year in terms of Turkey-EU relations. A thawing of the tension in Turkey-EU ties was observed as dialogue mechanisms were re-opened and high-level exchanges were conducted such as President Erdoğan’s visit to France, the meeting between the Turkish and German Foreign Ministers over a cup of Turkish tea, the re-opening of the “Iron Church” in Istanbul and the meeting between Prime Minister Yıldırım and Chancellor Merkel which also led to the release of the Turkish-German journalist Deniz Yücel. These meetings attested to a positive sign that silent diplomacy was replacing the megaphone diplomacy of 2017. However, Salih Muslim’s European tour including Czechia and Germany and his release by the Czech authorities again created a bitter taste in the Turkish government’s approach to the EU. In the face of pressing circumstances, such as ongoing conflict and violence in Syria, it becomes more difficult for the parties to find a common ground despite the urgency of international action.

    While the EU is busy putting its own house into order following the Brexit decision, Turkey is also involved with a transition to a new executive presidency regime and a military operation in Syria. The state of emergency and problems in the sphere of rights and freedoms as well as rule of law create an obstacle in progress in Turkey’s EU journey. The Summit meeting between President Erdoğan and Chairs of EU institutions set to take place on March 26 in Varna provides an opportunity where a new understanding may be reached between the parties. The stalemate in Turkey-EU relations can be overcome by the initiation of a new process such as the modernisation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union and visa liberalisation.

    Turkey had already presented a position paper to the European Commission including measures to fulfil the remaining criteria for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens. It should be taken into account by EU authorities that it will not only be Turkey and Turkish citizens that will benefit from such a process but the EU Member States. By fulfilling all the criteria for visa liberalisation, Turkey will be in a much more prepared position to be able to cooperate with the EU institutions and Member States in such matters as control of irregular migration, fight against organised crime, return of illegal migrants, dismantling of migrant smuggling, anti-corruption, personal data protection and cooperation in police and judicial matters.

    Regarding the Varna Summit, Chair of the European Council Donald Tusk announced that the decision whether or not to hold the Summit would be taken in the Council meeting on 22-23 March. Turkey’s prevention of the Italian vessel travelling towards the island of Cyprus in order to carry out gas exploration was protested by the EU as an infringement of the sovereign rights of a Member State. It is the old Cyprus question again which is creating a problem in Turkey and EU relations. It is yet to be seen whether the Varna Summit meeting will actually take place. Keeping in mind that dialogue is the key to the resolution of problems we hope that the meeting will take place and create an opportunity to carry bilateral relations to a new level.

    BULGARIA’S PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EU: PRIORITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS -JANUARY 2018

    On 1 January 2018, Bulgaria took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Estonia and will be succeeded by Austria in 1 July 2018. As it is known, the Presidency of the Council of the EU rotates every six months allowing member states to work closely in groups of three, called ‘trio’s. According to the official trio programme, which is made up of Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria, launched on 20 June 2017, the three countries agreed to work closely upon a positive agenda focusing on security, strengthening EU’s external borders, economic growth and competitiveness.

    Bulgaria emerged from communist rule on 10 November 1989, the day after the fall of Berlin Wall. The country had been ruled by the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) from 1946 to 1990. Following the removal of Todor Zhivkov, who had served as head of the one-party state since 1954, Bulgaria has transitioned into a multi-party system and applied for EU membership in 1990 after the end of Soviet influence. First democratic elections in the country were held on 10 and 17 June of the same year and Bulgaria entered into a process of democratisation which has continued for years. Bulgaria’s democratic transformation has taken place within the context of its EU membership process. The country that has maintained a peaceful democratisation process unlike several Balkan countries joined NATO on 29 March 2004 and became an EU Member State on 1 January 2007. In this sense, despite socio-economic and political challenges, Bulgaria has proved its ability to quickly adapt to changing global dynamics.

    “United We Stand Strong”

    Bulgaria is in pursuit of taking efficient steps for the Union during its first ever EU Council Presidency. In this regard, identifying its historical and cultural heritage in line with European values, Bulgaria has chosen the motto for its EU Council Presidency as “United We Stay Strong”. Underlining its commitment to the decisions taken on the future of the EU27, Bulgaria has determined four priorities for its first ever Presidency of the EU Council namely; “Future of Europe and Young People”; “Security and Stability”; “Western Balkans” and “Digital Economy”. Regarding its priorities, Bulgaria reveals clearly its ambition to take an active part in process of shaping Europe’s future. Initiatives which will be taken during the Bulgarian presidency may bring a new point of view on overcoming challenges that the EU has been facing.

    One of the youngest democracies in Europe, Bulgaria has joined neither the Eurozone nor the Schengen Area. 11 years into its EU membership, Bulgaria is a candidate to become the 20th member of the Eurozone in the coming years. Despite the progress made since 2007, sceptics note that the country is not ready to join the single currency zone, which is one of the most significant achievements of the European integration project. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria has to deal with corruption and organized crime and is the poorest country within the EU. To this respect, allowing Bulgaria into the Eurozone is believed to contain risks for the EU which is currently in struggle with defiance of core European values by several of its members as in the case of Hungary and Poland.

    Bulgarian Presidency: An Opportunity to Improve Turkey-EU Relations?

    A prominent subject for Bulgaria’s EU presidency is whether it could help improve Turkey-EU relations which have been strained over the past year. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 7 January during the inauguration ceremony of the Bulgarian St. Stephen Church also known as the Iron Church in Istanbul. During the ceremony, referring to the strong ties between the two countries, PM Borissov pledged to be a mediator for normalizing relations between Turkey and the EU. Afterwards, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zaharieva made a statement that a summit, which would bring Turkish and European leaders together could take place, although not planned in the program of the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council. In this respect, Bulgaria holding the rotating presidency after a period of worsening ties between Turkey and the EU, may be considered as an opportunity for breathing fresh air into the relations.

    Bulgaria emphasises the critical importance of Turkey’s partnership on many issues such as migration, counter-terrorism, economy and energy. A normalisation of relations between Turkey and the EU will surely play a crucial role particularly in achieving Turkey’s short-term objectives such as obtaining visa liberalisation and launching negotiations for the modernisation of Customs Union. Turkish leaders voice their ambition to get relations with the EU back on track. In this respect, President Erdoğan's visit to Paris to meet his French counterpart Macron on 5 January is hailed as a big step showing Turkey’s determination to improve relations with the EU.

  • HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC DIALOGUE: THE WAY TO DEEPER INTEGRATION? - DECEMBER 2017

    A high-level economic dialogue meeting took place on 7-8 December between Turkey and the EU. This was the second high-level economic dialogue meeting following the first one which took place in Istanbul on 25-26 April 2016. As it can be remembered, Turkey and the EU officials decided to start a high-level dialogue process on economy at a Summit meeting held on 29 November 2015. The high-level dialogue meeting took off with a reception given by the European Commission Vice-President Jryki Katainen at the prestigious Solvay Library in Brussels. Vice-President Katainen and Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek delivered short speeches in this reception which was attended by relevant public officials as well as members of the business community.

    The high-level dialogue meeting took place the next day in the European Commission’s Berlaymont building. During the morning session, Turkey-EU Business Dialogue took place, chaired by Vice-President Katainen and Deputy Prime Minister Şimşek.  Turkey’s Minister of the Economy, Nihat Zeybekçi and Minister of Customs and Trade, Bülent Tüfenkçi also attended the meeting and delivered opening speeches. The session continued with interventions from representatives of business organizations on the business environment, investment and access to finance, SMEs, innovation and skills, and service and industry sectors.

    The following business organizations were represented in the meeting and thereby had a chance to express their views (listed in order of place in the program): Eurochambers, Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB),  Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Unions (TISK), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Business Europe, Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD), International Investors Association (YASED), Private Industrialists and Businessmen Organization (MÜSIAD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (TESK), Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation (TÜRKONFED), Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (KAGIDER), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) European Services Forum (ESF), Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), Economic Development Foundation (IKV)  and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). Following the intervention of business organizations, representative of companies from Turkey and the EU also made speeches concerning their experiences of working or investing in Turkey.

    Following the lunch hosted by Vice President Katainen, the afternoon session was devoted to intergovernmental deliberations attended by government officials including Vice-President Katainen, Deputy Prime Minister Şimşek, Ministers Zeybekçi ve Tüfenkçi and Commissioner Pierre Moscovici.

    On behalf of the Turkish business community TOBB President and Eurochambres Vice-President M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu delivered opening remarks outlining Trade and economic relations between Turkey and the EU. He stressed the importance of deepening Turkey and EU relations by revitalising the accession process, starting negotiations for a modernized customs union, completing the visa liberalisation dialogue and continuing the cooperation regarding Syrian refugees. Other participants also noted the close relationship between Turkey and the EU regarding trade, investment and production. They underlined that Turkey had already been integrated into the European market by way of the customs union and a modernization of the customs union would make further integration possible by way of including services, agriculture and public procurement to the remit of the bilateral commercial framework.

    The high-level dialogue meeting was concluded in a very amicable and moderate atmosphere. The messages were also clearly outlined: Both sides need each other. Further progressing on the road of Turkey’s integration to the EU will produce a win-win situation. Despite the current stalemate and backtracking in the accession process and political tension in bilateral relations, starting talks on the modernization of the customs union with a view to improving its operation and extending it to new areas of the economy promises deepening of Turkey-EU ties. 

    IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu also made a speech at the meeting regarding Turkey and EU relations from the point of view of industry and services integration. IKV Chairman underlined that while the EU is Turkey’s number one trade partner, Turkey ranks as the 5th country in the EU’s imports and 4th in its exports. He also mentioned that around two thirds of the investments to Turkey originate from EU Member States. Chairman Zeytinoğlu noted that the customs union and also Turkey’s accession talks to the EU positively affected the business environment in Turkey, contributed to competitiveness of Turkish industry and quality of Turkish products. He also stressed that EU companies that have invested in Turkey and engaged in production of the EU market also achieved quite high rates of profit.

    Chairman Zeytinoğlu underlined that the modernization of the customs union promised to upgrade Turkey’s integration into the EU market. He also added that while Turkey’s aim remains as full integration as a member of the EU, customs union modernization could serve as an immediate aim that could revitalize and recalibrate Turkey and EU relations in the short to medium term. Chairman Zeytinoğlu announced the results of a public opinion survey conducted by the IKV in November 2017. He said that the survey conducted in 18 provinces of Turkey with 1311 respondents revealed that 78.9 percent of the public continue to support Turkey’s membership goal while only 31.2 percent actually believe that it is going to happen in the foreseeable future. Chairman of IKV concluded that the high level of support in Turkey regarding EU membership should be evaluated as a sign of the European vocation of the Turkish people and should be taken into account in the EU’s policies towards Turkey. 

    From Dialogue to Deepening?

    The holding of the high-level dialogue meeting in itself after an intermission of one and a half years may be viewed as a sign of progress in itself. After all, it may be interpreted as an improvement considering the political tensions of the last couple of months that prevented any sort of dialogue between the two sides. The fact that the economic dialogue is not limited to the governmental level but also includes representative of the business community is also an added factor that contributes to the importance of the mechanism. However Turkey and the EU cannot achieve progress in the relations just by dialogue mechanisms. Although continuing dialogue is a pre-condition for further progress, real progress can only be achieved by concrete commitments and contractual obligations that would bring Turkey closer to the EU in terms of legislative alignment, market integration and value attachment. Hence, what would be needed following the high-level dialogue mechanisms would be igniting Turkey-EU relations by revitalizing accession, starting talks of customs union modernization, and liberalising free movement by lifting visa barrier and overall strengthening the EU anchor for liberalisation and democratisation in Turkey.

    TURKEY’S WESTERN CONNECTION: THE USA, EU, NATO AND STRAINING RELATIONS – NOVEMBER 2017

    Turkey, a country lying on the margins of Europe in between two continents, has been a member of Western organisations established in the aftermath of the Second World War. The EU is an exception in this regard since Turkey has become a member of almost all other organizations encompassing Europe, i.e. NATO, OECD, Council of Europe and OSCE. In fact, prior to the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Ottoman Empire had already been proclaimed as a member of the Concert of Europe in 1856 at the Paris Congress. The destination of the young Turkish Republic and its leader Atatürk was always towards the West as may be evidenced in the modernizing reforms passed in the first years of the Republic. All in all, it could be said that Turkey has become a part of the West in a strategic sort of way though culturally and historically it had been designated as non-western.

    Turkey’s status as part of the West has been in jeopardy recently owing to changes in the global state system, internal changes in Turkey and changes regarding relations with the West. The West as a geopolitical term embodies the USA, the EU and its Member States as well as primary organizations such as NATO and Council of Europe. Turkey experienced political crises with the Netherlands, Germany and the USA lately. While relations with the EU took a turn for the worse following the July 15 attempted coup, relations with the USA worsened due to the Fethullah Terror Organization (FETÖ) and People's Protection Units (YPG) issues. While Turkey accused the USA of being the force behind the FETÖ organization and supporting and arming the YPG in Syria which is regarded as a terrorist organization by Turkey, anti-USA sentiments intensified among politicians, media and general public. The suspension of visa procedures at the US consulates in Turkey came as the climax of the straining relations with the USA. Fortunately, processing of visa application resumed as of the 6th of November. The trial of Reza Zarrab and Hakan Atilla in the USA created a renewed tension in the relations since Turkey was accused of breaking the embargo against Iran proclaimed by the UN Security Council. Despite statements by President Trump concerning his amicable approach to his Turkish counterpart, we have yet to witness improvement in TurkeyUSA relations. The current strain in the relations points to deeper and structural problems between Turkey and the USA and crystallizes over the issue regarding the future of Syria and Iraq.

    Regarding the approach of public opinion to relations with the USA, the results of a recent survey by Zogby Research Services provide interesting results. According to the survey, while 46 percent of the respondents in Turkey viewed having good relations with the USA as important, this percentage increased to 100 percent in 2017. All the respondents found that having good relations with the USA are important. Hence it may be appreciated that diplomacy and reason is bound to prevail in foreign relations especially with a prominent global power such as the USA. However conflicting positions with regard to the situation in Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s internal politics and the role that it may play in the Middle East may result in renewed tensions and bottlenecks between Turkey and the USA.

    A further crisis took place in NATO when it was found out that the images of Atatürk and Erdoğan were used in a military exercise conducted by NATO in Norway. The images were used to represent the enemy in the war game. Turkey rightly protested this flagrant denial of Turkey’s role in NATO and its ally status. NATO Secretary General personally apologized for this grave mistake. The incident was overcome in a relatively short period of time. Still, Turkey’s probable withdrawal from NATO was openly debated in the media. The overriding logic that resulted from these debates was that it would not be rational for Turkey’s security interests to leave NATO just on the spur of the moment.

    Finally, Turkey’s relations with the EU continued to proceed on a slippery path. Negotiations for the modernization of the Turkey-EU customs union which were expected to begin during 2017 were not started since the Council of the EU could not arrive at a consensus regarding giving a mandate to the Commission to conduct negotiations with Turkey. Especially Germany, having experienced serious problems in its relations with Turkey and also being extremely critical of the current political situation in the country voiced its opposition to the start of negotiations. During the election campaign, Chancellor Merkel stated that she would debate the issue of suspension of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU in the Council meeting to be held in October. Although such a decision did not materialize, the EU Council felt the need to send a “responsible” warning to Turkey regarding its EU aspirations. IPA funds within the pre-accession assistance provided by the EU to Turkey were cut by 105 million. Although this does not constitute a significant portion of the overall funding for 2014-19 period, it was still symbolically important since it was an indicator that worse could follow this move by the EU. 2018 will most probably be a year when we will continue to witness tension in relations with the West and the EU. However, it is also expected that economic and political significance of EU relations for Turkey and the importance of Turkey’s Western vocation will result in more moderate and rational policies in this regard.

    EU LEADERS AGREE TO RE-ORIENT PRE-ACCESSION FUNDING FOR TURKEY - OCTOBER 2017

    EU’s stormy relations with Turkey were among the numerous topics on the agenda of the EU leaders during the European Council meeting on 19 October. Included on the agenda upon the initiative of Germany, EU leaders held a debate on Turkey. During the meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for the diversion and reduction of the funds linked with Turkey’s bid to join the EU.

    Commenting to the press following the first session of the European Council meeting, German Chancellor Merkel stated that the Commission will look into ways to reduce pre-accession aid for Turkey in a responsible way. Germany’s move in the Council meeting was reportedly backed by Belgium and the Netherlands. EU governments seem to be divided on Turkey’s EU membership prospects with Austria demanding a complete halt to accession talks and countries such as the UK, Sweden and Poland maintaining their strong support for Turkey’s EU membership bid. In the Council meeting, EU leaders agreed to task the European Commission to explore ways to reduce and re-orient pre-accession funds for Turkey. The Commission is expected to present its proposals to this end by the end of this year. Turkey was set to receive 4.4 billion euros pre-accession aid for the 2014-2020 period.

    The topic came up in the discussions on the EU’s 2018 budget during the European Parliament’s plenary session on 24-25 October. In a resolution on the EU’s 2018 general budget, MEPs decided to withhold part of the pre-accession funds, to be released once Turkey has made improvements in the fields of rule of law, democracy, human rights and press freedom. Turkey-EU relations, which were re-energized after the outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015, have sharply deteriorated following the Fethullah Terror Organization (FETÖ) coup attempt in July 2016. The state of emergency measures introduced by Ankara came under increasing criticism on part of the EU which failed to comprehend the gravity of the situation. Meanwhile, the EU has been criticized by Ankara for failing to show solidarity with the Turkish people in the fight against terrorist organisations such as the PKK and FETÖ.

    Turkey-EU relations have been further complicated owing to the fact that 2017 has been an electorally challenging year both in Turkey and key EU Member States home to a substantial Turkish diaspora such as the Netherlands and Germany. The latest episode of tension between Turkey and the EU erupted in the run up to the German federal elections. Seeking re-election for the fourth time, Merkel during her campaign had promised to take up the issue of Turkey’s EU membership bid in the European Council meeting in October.

    The step to re-orient preaccession funding to Turkey marks a softening in Berlin’s tone which prior to the federal elections was dominated by messages in favour of ending Turkey’s EU accession talks. With this decision however EU leaders, very well aware of Turkey’s unparalleled value as a strategic partner and the huge potential for cooperation in a wide range of areas such as foreign policy, counter-terrorism and migration to name a few, opted for keeping communication channels with Turkey open. The decision, which was not reflected in the official council conclusions, aims to convey to Ankara the EU’s disapproval of the rule of law and human rights situation in Turkey, but leaves the door for membership open. With this in mind, as stated in the press release issued by IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu on 20 October, if the period till the presentation of the European Commission’s 2018 enlargement package, which is due in April 2018, is used for undertaking the necessary political reforms, there is a real chance that ties with the EU can be restored and re-energized.

    The EU should keep the dialogue channels with Turkey open and show greater understanding to Turkey’s sensitivities whereas Turkey should re-focus its attention on the political reform process. As indicated in the IKV press release, given its indispensable importance for Europe’s security, EU leaders and institutions cannot risk losing Turkey. Therefore maintaining the EU membership perspective for Turkey is in EU’s interest, just as joining the EU is in the interest of Turkey.

    SEVENTH REPORT ON THE TURKEY-EU STATEMENT NOTES STEADY PROGRESS –SEPTEMBER 2017

    On 6 September, the European Commission published Seventh Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. According to the Report there is steady progress. Turkey-EU Statement was first introduced on 18 March 2016 to address the migration crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean region in coordination and cooperation between Turkey and EU. The Statement’s relocation and migration management mechanisms has been delivering results and these results has been evaluated regularly by the Commission through the progress reports.

    According to the Seventh Report, the number of irregular crossings through the Eastern Mediterranean migration route remained low. Since the Sixth Report, the total number of arrivals from Turkey to the Greek islands was 7,807 which is an average daily arrival of 93 persons. The daily arrival rate is lower in comparison to months before the Report was published as emphasised by the Commission.

    In regard to fatalities and missing persons during the reporting period, 113 persons died or were reported missing while attempting to irregularly cross the Eastern Mediterranean region since the activation of the Statement. This number was 1,115 during the year preceding the Statement. The Commission underlined and praised the efforts of all stakeholders relatedly. Since the previous Report, the Commission has been supporting the Greek authorities in coordinating and managing safety as well as security in the Greek Islands. Later, the Commission called upon all Member States to faster and more efficiently provide personnel to the European Asylum Support Office and the European Border and Coast Guard. These additional expert personnel would be deployed at the hotspot islands. The Commission identified shortcomings in this area. The current shortfall in the European Asylum Support Office which deploys experts to the Greek Islands is of 54 experts. The European Border and Coast Guard’s shortcoming is 11 experts for September and 13 experts for October. The Seventh Report also assessed all relevant stakeholders’ cooperation with NATO. The cooperation is a critical dimension of the management of the migration crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean region; active patrolling and prevention of departures from Turkey continued.

     The return of the irregular migrants from Greece to Turkey is the primary foundation of the Statement. The total number of migrants returned to Turkey since the date of the Turkey-EU Statement is 1,896. Since the previous Report until 4 September 2017, 97 persons who came to Greece from Turkey have been returned under the Turkey-EU Statement. Moreover, as underlined by the Commission, “one for one” resettlement mechanism works in a steady pace. According to the Seventh Report, the total number of Syrians resettled from Turkey to the EU under the 1:1 framework was 8,834. In the reporting period, 2,580 Syrians have been resettled to 15 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands). Yet, 13 Member States haven’t fulfilled any resettlement procedure.

    For a long time, the humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance and its funding provided by the EU was the most attractive dimension of the Statement. Therefore, the Seventh Report shares the most updated status concerning the EU Facility for Refugees. For 2016- 2017, already 48 projects for a total amount of 1.664 billion euros have been signed and disbursements have reached 838 million euros. Also some flagship projects are ongoing such as the Emergency Social Safety Net. The number of vulnerable refugees supported by the Emergency Social Safety Net has rapidly increased to 860,000 persons and the two sides working together to identify solutions for registration related issues. The Commission expressed that the implementation phase of the projects should be in line with the principles of sound financial management.

    Lastly, the Report includes some assessments concerning the key issues in Turkey-EU relations. In this context, the modernisation of the Customs Union was highlighted as a primary item on the agenda. The Visa Liberalization Dialogue and the remaining 7 criteria also is another issue that is elaborated. At the end, the Commission calls for continuous efforts and political determination from all sides.

    TURKEY-EU HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE MEETING WAS HELD - JULY-AUGUST 2017

    Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue Meeting was held in Brussels on 25 July with the participation of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn. The meeting’s agenda included Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, cooperation in the fields of energy, economy and the fight against terrorism, migration and the visa liberalisation process, regional issues as well as the hypothetical modernisation of the Customs Union. However the highlight of the meeting was the effort to sustain cooperation and dialogue among parties following the high political tensions prevailing in 2017.

    As it is known, during the NATO summit on 25 May, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the presidents of EU institutions agreed on increasing the dialogue between Turkey and EU. Following that a political dialogue meeting at the level the directors was held on 13 June in Brussels with the participation of representatives from the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commission and the European External Action Service. The meeting was as a significant step for re-starting the dialogue process between Turkey and the EU following a long break.

    Following the Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs Çavuşoğlu mentioned that when President Erdoğan met the leaders of EU institutions on 25 May, they agreed on a roadmap for 12 months. He underlined that the Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue meeting was significant with respect to the implementation of the roadmap. Çavuşoğlu pointed out that in addition to accession negotiations, cooperation in energy, anti-terrorism and the modernisation of the Customs Union were on the table during the meeting. Migration and the migration deal between Turkey and EU, which brought concrete results, were also important items of the agenda. Both parties exchanged opinions with respect to the regional issues such as Syria, Iran, Iraq, Gulf crisis etc.

    During the press conference following the meeting, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Çelik mentioned that they had discussed bilateral, regional and global issues and their discussion was constructive. He added that they mutually exchanged their thoughts and visions. Çelik stated that it is clear that Turkey and EU had differences, but he underscored the necessity to keep channels of communication between the parties open. According to the roadmap, in the upcoming 12 months, Turkey and the EU will engage different dialogue areas, namely anti-terrorism, energy, economy, trade and transportation. However, Çelik underlined that the backbone of Turkey-EU relations remains the accession negotiations.

    High Representative Mogherini indicated that cooperation and dialogue need to be sustained in concrete, positive steps in areas of rule of law and fundamental freedoms. She also noted that the meeting had provided a platform for both parties to discuss issues that were of critical importance in a very comprehensive manner. These issues included elements fundamental to Turkey-EU relations and the aspirations of the people of Turkey and the EU.

     Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn said that the EU has a great interest in close cooperation with a stable, economically secure and democratic Turkey on issues of common interest. He underlined that in the meeting, both parties discussed how they can better structure their cooperation in economic security and migration issues.

    POLITICAL DIRECTORS’ MEETING WAS HELD IN BRUSSELS - MAY-JUNE 2017

    EU-Turkey High Level Political Dialogue at the Level of Directors was held on 13 June with the participation of Ministry for EU Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Commission and European External Action Service.

    In the context of Turkey’s EU accession process, both parties have already engaged in closer cooperation by organising annual meetings in topics of critical importance. Looking back, at the occasion of the EU General Affairs Council which was convened on 16 December 2014, it had been specified to establish high level dialogue in terms of economic affairs. At this current time, these high level dialogues have been developed in three key areas: energy, political affairs and economic affairs. Following the meeting of EU Heads of State or Government with Turkey on 29 November 2015, the parties highlighted that a new momentum has been achieved in relations with a pledge to re-energies Turkey’s EU accession process.

    The first Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue was held on 25 January 2016 in Ankara. During the Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue on 13 June in Brussels, parties discussed Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, joint management on irregular migration, and fight against terrorism, visa liberalisation dialogue, the modernisation of the Custom Union as well as other regional and global issues.

    This meeting came at a critical juncture for Turkey-EU relations as regard the fight against terrorism as well as other concerns in the aftermath of the referendum in Turkey in April and the meeting between President Erdoğan and EU Officials on the sidelines of NATO Summit in May in Brussels. In general, the parties recognised the critical importance of strengthening their cooperation towards common challenges such as the fight against terrorism and the refugee crisis.

    Accession Talks Constitute the Cornerstone of the Relations

    In the meeting on 13 June, Ankara demanded the opening of the opening of negotiating Chapters 23 and 24, related to the rule of law and fundamental rights, whilst Brussels clearly underlined the state of fundamental rights in Turkey. Regarding the visa liberalisation dialogue, Brussels still demands that Turkey needs to fulfil the requirements of five of the remaining benchmarks even though the majority of the criteria have been met.

    Their cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in tackling the ongoing refugee crisis seems to have more predictable way of solutions between Turkey and the EU. However, the parties have reaffirmed that the accession negotiations constitute the cornerstone of Turkey-EU relations. As might be recalled, at Malta Summit in April, leaders from the EU side decided to maintain dialogue with Turkey even though some Member States tried to block the accession talks.

    In the Aftermath of the Meeting on 25 May

    Indeed, the coup attempt on 15 July led to a rift in relations between Turkey and the EU. However, high level political dialogues between Turkey and the EU have provided an important platform for the parties to assess the latest developments with respect to the implementation of EU Acquis as well as Copenhagen criteria. So far, they provided a significant opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest. Furthermore, as of today, Turkey is recognised as an active regional foreign policy player by the EU.

    In the aftermath of the meeting on 25 May, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and President of the European Council Donald Tusk came together, parties agreed to work on a positive agenda.

    The most important thing for Turkey is to keep accession talks with the EU strong by returning to democratisation agenda, strengthening the rule of law, justice and ensuring respect for fundamental rights in Turkey. This is not only because there is an ongoing negotiation process with the EU but also Turkey should remain state of law.

    TURKEY-EU RELATIONS AFTER THE REFERANDUM - APRIL 2017

    After the April 16 referendum, harsh comments in Turkey-EU relations and calls to end accession negotiations with Turkey left their place to a more reasonable approach following the Gymnich meeting.

    Looking back, the referendum scheduled for April 16 will undoubtedly be considered an important milestone in Turkey’s history. Approximately 50 million voters went to the polls and 51.41 percent of voters voted for the 18-item constitutional amendment package in the referendum. However, the small distinction between the 'yes' and 'no' votes, as well as the statement of the Supreme Election Board regarding the validation of unsealed votes on the referendum day, Turkey led to a dispute on coming days. Whereas with the result of the referendum Turkey decided to change its political system, it is clear that its long lasting ties with EU will also be affected by the change.

    During the referendum campaign there have been tensions with various EU countries, especially with the Netherlands, which was also prominent in Turkey-EU relations. It was expected that the results of the April 16 referendum will end this tension, however, immediately after the referendum, the statements by the Turkish side that the EU membership of the country could be subjected to a referendum showed that more time is needed to settle the waters. In fact, after the referendum, the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the draft report for Turkey debated at the European Parliament and the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers' (Gymnich meeting) held on the last weekend of April were important developments that will shape Turkey-EU relations in the coming days.

    The official announcement on behalf of the EU on the referendum in Turkey issued by President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn stated that the reported results of the referendum in Turkey on the amendments to the Constitution, adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 was noted. However, it was especially emphasised that the EU will wait for the assessment of OSCE/ODIHR International Observation Mission and also the constitutional amendments and their implementation will be evaluated in light of the responsibilities of Turkey as a candidate country to the EU and as a member of the Council of Europe. Indeed, this approach of the EU was embraced by many western leaders.

    For example, US President Donald Trump called and congratulated President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but the official statement by the White House and the US State Department was similar to the EU. Indeed, leaders of the EU's leading nations such as German Chancelor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande also called on the Turkish government to seek a respectful dialogue with all political and social groups, stating that the results of the referendum reveal the division in Turkey. This approach in the political arena was also reflecting the views of various think tanks in Brussels and experts working on Turkey.

    The first official move came from PACE, which at its session on 25 April voted for re-opening of political monitoring procedure for Turkey. As it will be remembered, this process was relaxed in 2004 and it paved the way for Turkey to start accession negotiations with the EU.  The decision was condemned in Turkey at the highest level, in particular by the Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President's Spokesperson. However, this decision will take place in Turkey-EU relations for a long time as a formal note of Turkey's backsliding with respect to the Copenhagen political criteria. Just as the day the decision was taken, we remembered an article of deceased journalist Mehmet Ali Birand which published in 2003. In his article, Mr. Birand mentioned that he could not even believe in the favouring attitude of PACE, which he had watched for 22 years. On that day in Strasbourg, Mr. Birand, who felt a great joy for the positive developments in Turkey-EU relations, warned us that if we think that this is over, we will have trouble again after 10-15 years. Unfortunately, the point reached today is just justified his prediction.

    Gymnich Meeting Following the PACE Decision

    Following the PACE decision, the EU discussed the future of its relations with Turkey at the informal meeting of the EU foreign ministers, briefly called Gymnich meeting held in Malta’s capital city Valetta on 28-29 April. The invitation of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavuşoğlu for the meeting was the first signal that a ground-breaking decision would not be taken, such as terminating the negotiations. Indeed, after the meeting, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini stated that the EU should provide clear signals that the doors are open to Turkey, but Ankara has to meet the criteria for human rights and the rule of law.

    It seems that the role of the bad police was undertaken by Johannes Hahn, who stated that Turkey-EU relations should be carried out within the framework of economic relations, since overcoming of the stagnation in accession negotiations in short term appeared to be unrealistic. In fact, the message of Mr. Hahn to focus on the practical side of bilateral relations and the updating of the Turkey-EU Customs Union in the upcoming period was a common talk of many experts following Turkey-EU relations. However, even in the process of focusing on practical side of relations such as refugee agreement, fighting terrorism, cooperation in the field of energy and upgrading the Customs Union, it is inevitable to face the political criteria. Today, increasing number of MEPs in the European Parliament is saying that there have to be some political conditions for the launch of negotiations for upgrading the Customs Union. At this point, it should be re-called that the impact analysis carried out by the European Commission shows that the upgrade of the Customs Union, which is expected to start negotiations this year, will contribute 1.44 percent to Turkey’s GDP and 0.01 percent to the EU. In short, the upgrade of the Customs Union is more important and meaningful for Turkey.

    It is obvious that reforms are inevitable in order to obtain the maximum benefit for Turkey from the upgrading of the Customs Union, which has made a significant contribution to the transformation of Turkish industry from low-technology production to middle-technology production. Beyond all this, from the 2000s to the present, it is necessary to remember how Turkey can be a game changer when it moves with determination. In the upcoming period, President Erdogan is expected to meet with EU leaders at the NATO Summit to be held at the end of May and have bilateral meetings with EU leaders. Then, a Turkey-EU Summit will probably take place. Keeping mutual dialogue mechanisms open rather than criticising each other over media will undoubtedly have a more positive effect in easing the tension and improving the relations. 

    EU27 LEADERS STRESS UNITY AT THE ROME SUMMIT - MARCH 2017

    EU27 leaders, who gathered in Rome to mark the 60th Anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, sent a strong message of unity and renewed their commitment to the European project in light of UK’s impending exit from the bloc.

    On 25 March, leaders of EU Member States except the UK gathered in Rome to mark the 60th Anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome which laid the foundations of the EU. The meeting of the 27 Heads of State and Government was perceived as an occasion not only to celebrate the accomplishments of the EU, but also to discuss the future trajectory of the European project. Just four days before the UK was set to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and start formal divorce proceedings from the EU, leaders of remaining Member States sent a strong signal of unity

    Leaders of EU27 signed the “Rome Declaration” which not only underscored the EU’s unity, but also set the agenda for the next ten years. The declaration hailed the achievements of the European project as a “unique Union with common institutions and strong values, a community of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, a major economic power with unparalleled levels of social protection and welfare”.

    Recognising the unprecedented global and domestic challenges that the EU is currently faced with, EU leaders in the so-called Rome Declaration, confirmed their determination to make the EU stronger and more resilient through even greater unity and solidarity, and respect for common rules. “Unity is both a necessity and our [EU’s] free choice”, leaders declared in the declaration. Aware of their inability to cope with global challenges individually, the leaders pledged to act together at “different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction” and “keeping the door open to those who want to join later”, a statement which signalled that the divisions among member states over the emergence of a multi-speed Europe were put aside. In the declaration, leaders pledged to work in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the Rome agenda which foresees “a safe and secure Europe”, “a prosperous and sustainable Europe”, “a social Europe” and “a stronger Europe on the global scene”. Furthermore, the leaders also promised to address the concerns expressed by the citizens and engage with national parliaments, and promote a democratic, effective and transparent decision-making process and better delivery.

    Five alternative trajectories for the future of EU integration after Brexit

    In the run up to the landmark Rome Summit, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker unveiled the “White Paper on the Future of Europe”. The white paper, which constitutes the Commission’s input to the debate on the future of Europe, is intended to serve as basis for the EU-wide discussion concerning the future direction of EU integration. With the white paper, the Commission lays the foundations of an EU-wide debate to be launched at different levels, which would culminate at December’s European Council meeting where EU leaders would decide on which path to follow. Moving from there, a course single currency and limited defence cooperation. Alternatively, as foreseen in the second scenario, EU integration could be scaled back to the Single Market which would see the EU pulling back from many policy areas. The third scenario would see the emergence of the coalitions of willing among like-minded countries doing more together in specific areas such as defence, internal security or social matters. of action would be prepared in the time for the European Parliament elections in 2019.

    In the white paper, the Commission outlines five alternative futures for the EU after Brexit which in terms of ambition vary from the EU being reduced to the Single Market on the one hand, to the EU pushing forward with integration in all policy areas on the other. The scenarios are as follow: “carrying on”, “nothing but the Single Market”, “those who want to do more do more”, “doing less more efficiently”, and “doing much more together” (See graph below). Based on each scenario the white paper glimpses into how the EU would look like in 2025.

    The starting point for each scenario is that the remaining 27 Member States will move forward as a union. The first option would see the EU maintain the status quo with some progress on strengthening the single currency and limited defence cooperation. Alternatively, as foreseen in the second scenario, EU integration could be scaled back to the Single Market which would see the EU pulling back from many policy areas. The third scenario would see the emergence of the coalitions of willing among like-minded countries doing more together in specific areas such as defence, internal security or social matters.

    On the other hand, the forth scenario would see the EU refocusing its attention on selected policy areas while reducing or entirely giving up its role in areas where collective action is perceived not to have an added value. Lastly, the fifth scenario would see the EU move forward with integration full steam ahead.

    The scenario foreseeing the emergence of several “coalitions of the willing”, which advocates the idea of a “multi-speed Europe”, has been at the heart of debates across EU capitals. The Benelux countries, Malta which holds the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the four biggest economies of the Eurozone Germany, France, Italy and Spain have all conveyed a strong preference for a multi-speed Europe. It is important to note that there is strong resistance on part of the central and eastern European Member States to the emergence of a multi-speed Europe. The so-called Visegrád group (V4) consisting of Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary in a joint statement released as an input to the Rome Summit on 2 March, voiced their concerns about this scenario.

    While acknowledging that enhanced cooperation which already exists in the treaties could be utilised, the V4 have warned that any type of enhanced cooperation should be open to all Member States and strictly overrule any kind of disintegration of the Single Market, Schengen Area and the EU itself. The V4 have been joined by the youngest EU Member States namely Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia which fear that they will be left at the periphery and will not be let among the core nations. Leaders of the Benelux countries announced their decision to discuss the future of the EU with different regional groupings in the coming months. First of such meetings which is scheduled for 19 June, will take place between the Benelux group and the V4. The decision follows a disagreement between Poland and the remaining 27 Member States concerning Donald Tusk’s reappointment for a second two and a half year term as the President of the European Council at the European Council meeting on 9 March, which Warsaw vehemently opposed.

    EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF MIGRATION BROUGHT TOGETHER LEADERS IN MALTA - FEBRUARY 2017

    Leaders from the EU met in Malta for a two-day summit to find a solution to stem irregular migrants from Africa to the EU. During the Summit, the Malta Declaration addressing measures to manage the migration flow along the Central Mediterranean route was adopted by leaders of the EU on 3 February.

    Informal EU Leaders Summit hosted by Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat took place in Malta on 3 February 2017. The summit was chaired by the President of the European Council Donald Tusk.

    Regarding the external dimension of migration, leaders adopted the Malta Declaration during the morning session of the summit. The declaration aims to take a pragmatic, flexible and tailor-made approach at each and every point of involving all actors along the Central Mediterranean migration route. Concerning the control and stabilisation of the Central Mediterranean route, the EU leaders decided to work with Libya as the main country of departure as well as with its North African and sub-Saharan neighbors. This cooperation between the EU and Libya will be consisting of training, equipment and support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies; efforts to disrupt the business model of smugglers through enhanced operational action; supporting where possible the development of local communities in Libya; seeking to ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions in Libya; deepening dialogue and cooperation on migration with all countries neighboring Libya and supporting other actors of international humanitarian community such as UNHCR within Libya. The Maltese Presidency showed the intention to ensure close monitoring of the implementation of the Declaration.

    Moreover it is important to note that the Declaration has vowed to include the necessary resources in order to meet the objectives agreed by the leaders. As such, and in accordance with the Valletta Action Plan, it is sad that the Official Development Assistance for Africa would be strengthened to a total value of 31 billion euros. This fund would be used in a variety of projects, notably funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa with the objective of helping Africans at the source and thus combatting the reasons for enduring migration flows.

    Furthermore, the Declaration also noted that the external migration policy would be developed in line with international law, by notably identifying potential barriers with respect to the conditions to be met for the returns along with a reinforcement of EU return capacities in that particular subject.

    EU27 Set the Tone for the EU’s Future Debate

    At Malta Summit, leaders also discussed the 60th Anniversary of the Rome Treaties. The afternoon session’s agenda item concerned the preparations for the 60th Anniversary. The 60th Anniversary event is planned to take place on 25 March in Rome. Leaders from 27 EU countries participated the session except from the UK.

    In the aftermath of the meeting, President of the European Council Tusk “tweeted” that constructive discussion on the future of EU27, importance of unity and preparation for the Rome Summit occurred. During the meeting, a letter entitled “United We Stand, Divided We Fall” identifying main threats for the stability of the EU was presented by President Tusk. These threats have been described by President Tusk as increasingly assertive China and Russia's aggressive policies, instabilities within Middle East and Africa, unpredictability of the new administration in the US, rise of the nationalist, increasingly xenophobic sentiment in the EU and doubts in the fundamental values of liberal democracy of the Union. Yet, Malta Summit could not find a comprehensive result oriented answer to neither of these two issues.

    However, the Malta Summit represented an opportunity to reinvigorate cooperation and trust between the remaining Member States at a crucial time for the Union. 

    DRIVING FORCES OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS IN 2017 - JANUARY 2017

    From presidential and general elections in key EU Member States to the Constitutional referendum in Turkey, both parties are likely to witness tremendous political upheavals and possible changes. It is now essential more than ever that Turkey’s integration with the EU should continue at a more advanced level.

    2016 has been a difficult year for the world, Turkey and the EU for different reasons. Indeed, the world witnessed tremendous crises and instability such as the continuation of the civil war in Syria, migrant flows, a wave of terrorist attacks and economic upheavals. With respect to the EU, the referendum on Brexit in June 2016 which formally heralded a period of uncertainty with the UK leaving the Union has left many questions unanswered. It represented a growing sentiment of dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement with current EU policies. Likewise, the election of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency of the US in November 2016 signified for many the dawn of a new era in international politics, the role of the US in the world and transatlantic relations.

    Turkey has also passed through a significantly difficult period in 2016. Indeed, terrorist attacks struck major cities throughout the year, causing fear and undermining political and economic stability. A failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 also resulted in further causes for concern. Furthermore, Turkey has initiated a normalisation of its relations with the Russian Federation which, notably, has led to the building of joint initiatives with respect to the Syrian crisis. However, the warm bilateral relations were strained after the assassination of Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey H.E. Andrey Karlov in an art gallery in Ankara on 19 December 2016.

    2017 will be a critical year for both Turkey and the EU. Indeed, from presidential and general elections in key EU Member States to the Constitutional referendum in Turkey, both parties will witness tremendous political upheavals and possible changes.

    Despite all the difficulties, Turkey’s accession process to the EU should not be left out in 2017. The issues pertaining to the current Turkey-EU deal with respect to the management of the migrant flows, the joint fight against terrorism, initiatives to find a long lasting settlement to the Cyprus issue and modernisation process of the Customs Union in a comprehensive manner will remain on the agenda. Here are some key dates and developments that could be in parallel to Turkey-EU relations:

    The Start of the Trump Era in the US:

    Donald J. Trump’s first actions as President –executive orders on issues as varied as Obamacare, the construction of a possible wall with Mexico, ban on immigration from certain Middle Eastern countries- contributed to raise doubt over the ability of Trump to effectively lead the US. With respect to the EU, his longstanding opposition to TTIP may render any commercial rapprochement between the two sides of the Atlantic impossible. Furthermore, his remarks regarding the future of NATO, notably urging other Member States to increase their defence expenditure and rely less on the US have led some to question his belief in transatlantic solidarity. The eroded relations between Ankara and Washington may be repaired if both sides are reaching out to each other and willing to build on a more constructive relationship.

    March-October: Elections in Major European Countries:

    With respect to the various political events (general elections in the Netherlands in March, presidential elections in France in late April and early May, general elections in Germany in October), it is of utmost importance to highlight that they may herald the beginning of significant political changes, with a growing trend of political and economic populism with leaders such as Geert Wilders (Party of Freedom, Netherlands), Marine Le Pen (National Front, France) and Frauke Petry (Alternative for Germany, Germany) who are, respectively, defending projects which are fundamentally opposed to European integration along with a tightening of borders and change with respect to political and economic orientations. In the aftermath of the refugee crisis across Europe, Germany’s new popülist party, Alternative für Deutschland, for instance, increased its votes from 5 percent in 2013 to 12-15 percent in 2016.

    March: Will the UK Trigger Article 50?:

    Another subject which will determine the future fate of the EU this year will notably be the Brexit process. This process will be invoked for the first time in the history of the Union. The British Supreme Court had stipulated that the Brexit process could not be started without prior and formal approval from the British Parliament. In early 2017, the Parliament approved the first step of the process, thus heralding the beginning of a difficult and unprecedented period for both the UK and the EU. It is expected that British Prime Minister Theresa May would formally lodge the British request to withdraw from EU membership in March 2017 by invoking Article 50. Importantly, the Brexit process is being followed closely in Turkey.

    25 March: The 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome:

    The EU will celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Traety of Rome on 25 March 2017 in Rome. In the summit, EU Heads of State or Government are expected to adopt a declaration. The Treaty of Rome had first and foremost envisaged the construction of a Customs Union between members with the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour which would later lead to the formation of a Common Market. In the aftermath of the Brexit, this anniversary will undoubtedly represent a moment to ponder on the current shape of the Union for EU leaders and to underscore that it would have a strong symbolic meaning, as growing popülist trends are putting into jeopardy the foundations of the Union.

    16 April:  Constitutional Referendum in Turkey:

    With respect to a most awaited event in Turkey, one should mention a referendum which is envisaging enacting swiftly a new Constitution for the country. The new constitution would effectively change Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Furthermore, the new constitution would bring changes such as increasing the number of MPs in Parliament from 550 to 600, voting age lowered to 18 and abolish military tribunals, change the nomination of members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutor. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, principles such as fundamental rights, media and freedom of speech, democratic balance should be uphold in line with the shared values of the EU.

    Modernisation of Customs Union:

    One should stress that Turkey has a functional Customs Union with the EU currently and the modernisation process of the Customs Union with the opening of formal negotiations is on the agenda this year. The modernisation process of the Customs Union would also necessitate Turkey to further comply with EU norms and standards and with provisions included within the framework of the EU Acquis. Whilst Britain is negotiating for its withdrawal from the EU, Turkey should aim to bring her integration with the EU to a more advanced level. In a survey conducted by IKV among 152 Turkish firms in the industry and services sectors, 61 percent of the respondents support the modernisation of the Customs Union.

    Visa-free Travel Talks with the EU:

    Even though there are still remaining hurdles, especially regarding the revision of the antiterror legislation in Turkey in line with Council of Europe guidelines, Turkey already fulfilled most of the criteria for visa liberalisation. These remaining conditions could be swiftly overcome in the next couple of months. Regarding the importance of visa-free travel for the impending modernisation of the Customs Union, Turkey’s message is still not to accept the visa requirement for the citizens of a country which is in a Customs Union with the EU for 21 years and a candidate negotiating accession to the EU for 11 years.

    The Cyprus Question:

    It is clear to state that the UN-sponsored Cyprus reunification talks have entered a decisive phase in Geneva in January 2017. This has a unique opportunity to settle a dispute since the Annan Plan which is regarded as the most comprehensive plan for a solution. A Cyprus settlement would be a constructive step for Turkey’s membership process with the EU. A settlement would also make significant progress on relations by providing the opening of Chapter 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security. The leaders requested the UN to prepare for the Conference on Cyprus at political level in early March 2017.

  • GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL DEBATED TURKEY’S ACCESSION TALKS– DECEMBER 2016

    Regarding the outcomes of the General Affairs Council which was held on 13 December 2016, the Council rejected the calls made by Austria to freeze the accession process with Ankara. However, EU Member States would not open new chapters on Turkey’s accession negotiations.

    The Council was chaired by the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU. The main topics of the Council were the mid-term review of the multi-annual financial framework, inter-institutional agreement on better law-making, preparation of the European Council on 15 December 2016 and the European Semester 2017.

    Three weeks after the EP voted in favour of a temporary freeze of membership talks with Ankara, the ministers discussed the enlargement policy with a special attention to Turkey. The Council was divided over the issue, with countries such as Austria and the Netherlands advocating for putting on hold the accession negotiations, while the majority argued in favour of a softer line. The suspension of membership talks with Ankara did not get the support of the vast majority of Member States. Apart from Austria, the other 27 members approved and announced that the group welcomed a deepening of EU-Turkey cooperation in key areas of joint interest and challenges, including migration, counter-terrorism, energy, economy and trade. The Council reiterated its commitment to maintain “an open dialogue” with Turkey and considered it “crucial” to continue cooperating on counterterrorism and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016.

    At the same time, while rejecting calls made by Austria and the EP to freeze the accession process, the General Affairs Council agreed that, at least as a result of the current situation in Turkey, no further accession chapter will be opened. The Presidency’s statement reiterates the grave concerns of the Member States regarding the scope and collective nature of the measures taken since the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016. The EU continues to expect Turkey, a candidate country, to observe the highest standards in democracy, rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms.

    The decision has caused major criticism on the part of Turkey. Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik criticised the EU for lacking self-confidence after the bloc unanimously decided not to open new chapters on Turkey's accession talks.

    IKV Chairman Ayhan Zeytinoğlu, in a written statement indicated that “We are pleased that the Council did not follow the example of the EP in proposing a temporary freeze of negotiations." Yet with regard to the decision not to open new chapters in Turkey’s accession talks, IKV Chairman Zeytinoğlu underlined that the EU’s approach to Turkey is far from being honest and consistent. “On the one hand the EU wishes to support political and economic reforms in Turkey and accelerate the alignment to the EU acquis; on the other hand, it fails to provide an impetus for engaging Turkey into European integration due to the stalemate in the accession process and the lingering of the goal of visa liberalisation. Despite problems in bilateral relations in the recent period, keeping Turkey’s EU perspective alive is valuable for both the EU and Turkey”, IKV Chairman Zeytinoğlu added. 

    SEVERE CRITICISM ISSUED IN TURKEY’S RECENT PROGRESS REPORT - NOVEMBER 2016

    Despite progress made in Turkey’s EU accession with the opening of two chapters since the previous Progress Report, serious backsliding have been recorded in the newly released Progress Report in areas such as freedom of expression, fundamental rights and the functioning of the market economy.

    The European Commission published its 19th Turkey Progress Report on 9 November 2016. The European Commission’s regular Progress Reports constitute a main instrument assessing annually Turkey’s efforts and level of alignment towards the EU membership goal within three areas; political criteria, economic criteria and ability to assume the EU Acquis.

    This year, the Commission generally underlined some backsliding in certain areas, mostly related to fundamental rights and freedoms. Nevertheless it has praised the outstanding efforts of various stakeholders in Turkey providing shelter to about 3 million refugees and reminded the importance of re-invigorating and deepening the relations in all key areas of common interest such as the Customs Union and the High-Level Energy Dialogue. As emphasised within the 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, the Commission plans to move the adoption of the annual progress reports from Autumn to Spring. Therefore, the 20th Progress Report is expected to be published in Spring 2018.

    With respect to compliance with the political criteria, the Commission assessed that prior to the failed coup attempt which constituted a grave threat for Turkish democracy on the night of 15 July, Turkey has engaged in a heavy legislative agenda in order to implement ambitious government reforms and to fulfil the remaining criteria within the framework of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap. Yet, the effects of the 15 July coup attempt along with the measures taken in the context of the state of emergency had a wide impact on the tone and content of the evaluations regarding the political criteria. In this respect, together with the post-coup measures, the situation in the South Eastern region and the Commission’s assessments regarding the situation of freedom of expression in Turkey were undoubtedly the determining elements.

    Public administration and judicial system are also key areas that the Commission closely monitors as part of the political criteria. Both in public administration and judicial system, removals and suspension from some professions, dismissals and arrests were found alarming by the Commission. It has been emphasised that the judiciary must work in an environment allowing it to perform its duties in an independent and impartial manner, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of powers.

    The Report puts concerns with respect to fundamental rights as its highest priority and points out to the shortcomings in the area of freedom of expression. The Commission claims that the selective and arbitrary application of Turkey’s legislation on national security takes place and this situation leads to a negative impact on freedom of expression. Criminal cases against journalists and closure of media outlets are also causes for concern for the Commission. Finally, the Commission also strongly reiterated that the unequivocal rejection of the death penalty is an essential element of the Turkey-EU accession framework and with respect to Turkey’s international obligations.

    As regards to the economic criteria, the Commission confirms that Turkey has a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. However, the Commission drew the attention to some important macroeconomic imbalances, especially the high level of the current account deficit and unemployment as well as the inflation rate remaining above the official target. The deterioration in the business environment and the slowing pace of structural reforms in markets for goods, services and labour have been other areas of concern expressed by the Commission. As a result, the Commission noted a regression in Turkey’s economic performance as a functioning market.

    In contrast, Turkey is considered to be well-integrated with the EU single market in terms of trade and investments relations. Moreover, Turkey’s efforts to further liberalise the energy sector (especially in the electricity market) have also been recognised. Nevertheless, there are still some important concerns from the EU side regarding the quality of education, gender equality as well as the support for research and development in Turkey.

    In terms of Turkey’s ability to assume the obligations of its membership, it is noted that Turkey has pursued the legislative alignment with the EU acquis but at a rather slow pace. According to this latest Progress Report, Turkey has made good progress in only five chapters, namely, Company Law; Energy; Trans-European Networks; Foreign, Security and Defence Policy as well as Justice, Freedom and Security. The Commission stressed the importance for Turkey to achieve the legislative alignment with the acquis and to ensure its enforcement.

    WORLD ENERGY CONGRESS WAS HELD - OCTOBER 2016

    The 23rd World Energy Congress, which brought together more than 10,000 participants from 85 countries, including 250 ministers and top decision-makers in energy, was held in Istanbul on 9-13 October 2016. Without doubt, the Congress stands out with the revitalisation of the Turkish Stream project.

    The 23rd World Energy Congress (WEC) took place in Istanbul on 9-13 October 2016 and gathered more than 10,000 participants from 85 different countries. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefcovic attended the congress, which was organised under the motto of “Sharing for Peace”.

    In his speech, President Erdoğan stated that the WEC aimed not only to establish a platform to exchange ideas regarding a global vision on energy and future scenarios, but also to make energy a tool for peace and justice.  He also underlined that the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project, which will transfer Russian natural gas to Europe through the Black Sea and Turkey, is still being developed. Moreover, President Erdoğan emphasised that Turkey is seeking ways to implement plans for a third nuclear power plant. He also referred to Turkey’s aim of producing 10 percent of its electricity from nuclear power in the upcoming years.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia has been providing energy to the EU for over more than 50 years. He also informed about the Turkish Stream project. In his speech, President Putin mentioned that Russia aims to ratify the Paris Agreement and reduce CO2 emissions by shifting its focus to renewable energy. Although Russia is moving towards clean and renewable energy resources, President Putin also underlined the importance of natural gas.

    During his speech, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan's energy investments in Turkey will reach 20 billion dollars. President Aliyev informed about the cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan on energy infrastructure, such as pipelines, in order to ensure energy security. 

    European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefcovic focused on the role of gas in the low-carbon transition in his speech. He pointed out to the EU’s objective of enhancing energy security and diversifying its energy sources as well as expanding and deepening its energy ties with strategic international partners across the globe including Turkey.

    Reminding Europe’s dependence on imported fossil fuels, Vice-President Šefcovic underlined the need to continue in world-leading progress on renewable energy and energy efficiency. He supported his argument by providing some data reflecting Europe’s dependence on imported energy. As it is well known, currently the EU imports in that area represent 87 percent of oil, 65 percent of gas and 44 percent of solid fuels consumed. The overall dependence rate of imported energy in EU is 73 percent. By 2030, it is predicted that the EU will import around 90 percent of the oil, 73 percent of gas and 49 percent of solid fuels it consumes.

    Vice-President Šefcovic also discussed the EU’s close energy ties with Turkey. He mentioned Turkey’s growing importance as an energy transit country in particular with the construction of the Southern Gas Corridor. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which will run through Turkey, is part of this Corridor.

    THE FIRST TURKEY-EU HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE AFTER 15 JULY - SEPTEMBER 2016

    Turkey-EU High Level Political Dialogue Meeting took place in Ankara on 9 September 2016 and was particularly important as it was the first high level political dialogue to convene after the coup attempt of 15 July in Turkey.

    The Turkish side was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Cavuşoğlu and Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik while the EU was represented by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn. According to Turkey’s Permanent Representation to the EU, the meeting was initially foreseen to take place in Brussels, however after the coup attempt, the EU side proposed to visit Ankara to demonstrate the EU’s solidarity with the Turkish Government.

    During the meeting, the Turkish side informed their European counterparts on the 15 July coup attempt and its aftermath. The parties had a constructive discussion on Turkey’s accession talks and Turkey-EU cooperation in a wide range of areas including the migration crisis, counter-terrorism, and the visa liberalisation dialogue and upgrading the Turkey-EU Customs Union as well as on regional issues.

    Speaking at the joint press conference following the meeting, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu expressed his concerns about the delivery of the 3+3 billion euro aid for Syrian refugees in Turkey and stated that the delivery of the promised aid should be accelerated. Regarding the visa issue, Çavuşoğlu underscored the need to agree on a solid roadmap and stressed that the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement, the 18 March refugee deal and the visa liberalisation process are interlinked.

    Concerning the fight against terrorism, indicating that Turkey is currently fighting against multiple terrorist organisations such as PKK, FETO and ISIL, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu urged the EU to prevent PKK’s propaganda within the EU Member States.

    In his statement following the meeting, Minister for EU Affairs Çelik, underscored that Turkey has a first class democracy and reassured that despite the State of Emergency in place, Turkey has not compromised on values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. Indicating that accession negotiations are at the heart of Turkey-EU relations, Çelik called for the opening of Chapters 23 and 24 on judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security as well as Chapter 15 on energy. Commenting on the meeting, Çelik stated that this meeting provided an opportunity for renewing the dialogue between the parties. Çelik expressed his hope that relations between Turkey and the EU would continue with a new momentum and stronger ties.

    In the joint press conference, High Representative Mogherini, stated that the meeting was an important occasion to reiterate the EU’s unequivocal condemnation of the attempted coup and to stress the EU’s solidarity with Turkey. According to Mogherini, the main outcome of the meeting was a strong commitment to dialogue and working together. “We need to talk more with each other, a bit less about each other”, Mogherini stated.

    Commissioner for Enlargement Negotiations Hahn, in his statement, expressed his solidarity with the Turkish people. Concerning the rule of law, Hahn stated that they have been reassured about Turkey’s commitment to respect and follow higher standards with respect to the rule of law.

    Regarding Turkey-EU cooperation on a wide range of areas, Hahn stated that the high-level dialogues on energy and economy are set to continue and that the discussions on upgrading the Customs Union are on track. Hahn confirmed that Turkey and the EU have achieved a lot with the 18 March refugee deal. Concerning visa liberalisation, Hahn stated that finding a solution should be possible.

    In the context of their visit to Turkey, Mogherini and Hahn came together with Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the leaders of the main political parties. Mogherini and Hahn also visited the shelled sections of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and paid tribute to the victims of the attempted coup.

    WHAT HAPPENED DURING AND AFTER THE FAILED 15 JULY COUP ATTEMPT? - JULY-AUGUST 2016

    A group within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to take over control of the country by force on 15 July 2016. The perpetrators have been repelled by civic resistance and the  resolution of all elements of Turkish society.

    Approximately at 10-10:20 PM on 15 July, sounds of F16 fighter aircrafts started to echo over Ankara and Istanbul. The jets flew over these two cities lower than ever, aiming to cause fear among the citizens by creating supersonic impacts. At the same time, photos and videos of soldiers blocking off two main bridges connecting Asia and Europe in Istanbul reflected on the press and social media while military vehicles were surrounding General Staff Headquarter in Ankara and Atatürk Airport in Istanbul.

    As it has become evident that some unusual activities were taking place, fire shots were heard inside and outside of the General Staff Headquarter and the Police Special Operations Centre in Gölbaşı, Ankara. When things started to rise to the surface clearer, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım made the first statement on a television channel and described these fatal actions as an insurrection which would not be tolerated. He also emphasised that the perpetrators were a small group within the army. Then it became evident that the puschists were the followers of the clandestine Gülenist organisation. At that time, the perpetrators took Chief of General Staff General Hulusi Akar hostage and opened fire on the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) Headquarter from military helicopters. Most of the commander-in-chiefs were also taken hostage. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was targeted by a group of soldiers who assaulted the hotel he was vacationing in. However, President Erdoğan survived the attack since he left the hotel he resided in a few minutes before the arrival of the assassin group.

    A major television channel was able to connect to President Erdoğan through a FaceTime video connection. He made a plea to citizens not to give in and go out on the streets to prevent the military operations. Several thousands of citizens went to the Bosporus Bridge to stop the army, parliamentarians stayed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to protect the Parliament despite the heavy bombardment going on. Thus, for the first time in history, the Turkish parliament, government, police forces, military and people stood against the coup attempt and did not give in against the attempt to take over control of the country by force.

    Turkish citizens played a significant role on the night of 15 July by showing heroic resistance by confronting the pro-coup soldiers at the occupied buildings of media organisations including TRT, on blocked bridges and critical junctures of the cities. During attacks from air vehicles and tanks to the Presidential Complex, Gölbaşı Special Operations Center and Kızılay Square in Ankara and Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul, a large number of citizens lost their lives. Heroic stance of Turkish citizens from different ideological backgrounds, operations of police and military forces; the unity of political parties, civil society as well as the business circles broke the attempt.

    Declaration of the State of Emergency after the Failed Coup Attempt on July 15

    On 20 July 2016, the Turkish Government announced a State of Emergency (SoE) for the entire country in response to the failed coup attempt. SoE has been scheduled for a period of three months, starting from 21 July 2016. The decision took into consideration the National Security Council’s advisory decision, published on the very same date. Right after that, approval decision by TGNA was published in the Official Gazette no. 29778 on 22 July 2016.  The most significant legal implication of SoEs under Turkish law is known to be the legislative authority, which under normal circumstances belongs to the Parliament, being also granted to the Council of Ministers for the matters that are necessitated by the SoE. By way of such authorisation, the Council of Ministers (as the executive body) becomes entitled to issue Decree Laws with respect to matters necessitated by the SoE, without following the Parliament’s ordinary legislative procedures. Since 21 July 2016, five Decrees have been enacted within the context of SoE (Decree Laws No. 667, 668, 669, 670 and 671 respectively).

    In accordance with these Decree Laws, many institutions and organisations have been shut down on the basis of constituting a threat to national security and being overrun by the followers of the clandestine Gülenist organisation. These include the following: private health institutions, private educational institutions and student dormitories as well as pensions, foundations and associations, universities, unions, federations and confederations.  The private-run radio and television institutions, newspaper, magazine, publishing companies and distribution channels which belong to, connected to, or have contact with the clandestine Gülenist organisation have also been closed. All assets, receivables, rights, documents and information belonging to closed entities are transferred to the Turkish Treasury.

    Within the framework of these Decree Laws, certain changes have also been made as to the structure and personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). A total of 3,073 military personnel including 158 general and admirals have been dismissed from the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) over links to clandestine Gülenist organisation. The Land Forces, Naval Forces and Air Force Commands came under the control of the Defence Ministry, while the President and Prime Minister would have the authority to receive direct information and issue force commanders direct orders that is to be executed immediately without the need for approval from another post.

    Also as part of the amendments to the structure of the Supreme Military Council, several top cabinet ministers will have seats on the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ). It will consist of the Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff, Vice-Prime Ministers, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior, Minister of National Defence and commanders-in-chief. Turkey’s War Colleges Command, military high schools, and high schools that train non-commissioned officers have been closed. A new university named as the National Defence University will be established under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defence.

    Historic Yenikapı Rally Delivered Message of Democracy and Unity

    After one of the longest and bloodiest nights in the history of Turkish Republic, President Erdoğan asked the citizens not to leave the streets; keep their determination and continue their “democracy vigil”.  Since then, citizens from various backgrounds and political stances gathered at the symbolic squares of all 81 provinces of Turkey at nights, delivered the message of togetherness; and condemned the failed coup attempt.

    The citizens’ democracy vigils ended with a historic anti-coup rally on 7 August at Yenikapı, Istanbul, the biggest rally ever in Turkish political history. The Yenikapı Rally saw the participation of millions of Turkish citizens carrying Turkish flags and it delivered a clear message of democracy and unity. After a minute of silence for those who lost their lives during the vicious attempt, President Erdoğan, Prime Minister Yıldırım and two opposition party leaders Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and Devlet Bahçeli addressed the citizens at the same rally for the first time. Thousands of buses and more than 200 boats brought citizens to the rally and the rally was simultaneously broadcasted at the squares of other provinces hosting crowds.

    SLOVAKIA TOOK OVER THE EU COUNCIL’S PRESIDENCY - JULY-AUGUST 2016

    Slovakia took over the EU Council’s Presidency for six months from the Netherlands as of 1 July 2016.  The Slovak Presidency comes just at a very critical time with the debates heating up about the future of European integration following the Brexit decision.

    As a member of the EU since 2004, Slovakia is assuming the EU's rotating presidency for the first time. The Programme of the Slovak EU Presidency focuses on four main priorities which are as follows: An economically strong Europe, a modern single market, sustainable migration and asylum policies and a globally engaged Europe.

    Priorities of the Slovak Presidency

    The Slovak Presidency aims to create a better environment for the investments so as to support the EU’s sustainable economic growth and the creation of new job opportunities for all EU citizens. In this respect, the establishment of a Capital Markets Union is of crucial importance since it will present alternative financial sources for the SMEs. The Slovak Presidency will encourage Member States to pursue with the implementation of their structural reforms.  Furthermore, the Slovak Presidency will also seek to build the fiscal pillar of the Economic and Monetary Policy and to complete the establishment of the Banking Union. Discussions over the 2017 budget of the EU will also constitute an important item in the economic agenda of the Slovak Presidency.

    Despite the success story of the Single Market, it can be observed that some obstacles are still obstructing the good functioning of the Single Market. In this respect, the Slovak Presidency will take measures to further strengthen and deepen the Single Market integration. For instance, as regards to the Single Digital Market, the Slovak EU Presidency will focus in removing the obstacles in digital economy, the promotion of electronic services, facilitating the market access as well as reinforcing the protection of consumers. One of the other priorities of the Slovak EU Presidency regarding the Single Market is the establishment of an Energy Union through which the EU wants to increase the security of the energy supply in the EU.

    Regarding the migration issue which is currently one of the most important topics concerning both Turkey and the EU, the Slovak Presidency wants to reinforce the security and the protection of the EU’s external borders. In this respect, the Slovak Presidency will prioritise the implementation of aSmart Border Package aiming to fight against irregular migration and to accelerate and simplify the entry procedures with the use of new emerging and modern technologies.  Further efforts to reinforce cooperation with third countries, mainly with countries of transit and origin of migrants are also envisaged during the Slovak Presidency.

    Lastly, with the aim to reinforce the global role of the EU, the Slovak Presidency will purse efforts to strengthen the economic and trade relations with key partners. It foresees to continue leading policies promoting stability, prosperity and democracy in the neighbourhood. In this respect, the enlargement policy is considered to be an essential tool for ensuring stability in the region.

    Holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the first time, Slovakia will assume its Presidency at a very critical and challenging time since it just after the referendum results in Britain. This could undermine the realisation of some of the action plans foreseen by the Slovak Presidency. The success of the Slovak Presidency will mostly depend not only how it will manage the process regarding Brexit but also how it will restore confidence in the European project among European citizens.

    Slovak Presidency and Turkey’s EU accession process

    As mentioned above, the Slovak Presidency will put greater emphasis upon the enlargement policy. In this respect, it is aimed to make concrete progress in the ongoing accession process of the Western Balkans and Turkey. Indeed, during Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik’s visit to Slovakia in June 2016, Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Lukáš Parízek ensured that the Slovak government is supporting Turkey’s EU accession process. He also expressed his wish to open new chapters to negotiations in Turkey’s EU accession process. 

    All this put aside, Turkey is considered as a key partner, especially in the area of migration. In its Programme, the Slovak Presidency highlighted the importance of the cooperation between Turkey and the EU in terms of mitigating illegal migration flows. Without doubt, reinforcing this cooperation would continue to be a main priority for the Slovak Presidency.

    OPENING OF CHAPTER ON FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY PROVISIONS TO NEGOTIATIONS - JUNE 2016

    Chapter 33 entitled Financial and Budgetary Provisions was opened to negotiations at the meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels on June 30 2016. After two years of standstill in Turkey’s EU negotiation process, the chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy was opened to negotiations last year in December. This was followed this year by the opening of Chapter 33 which constitutes a positive development for the progress of the accession negotiations. As a result of the opening of Chapter 33 to negotiations, the total number of chapters opened so far has reached 16.

    What is in Chapter 33?

    The chapter mainly covers rules concerning the financial resources for the contribution of all member states to the EU budget. The Budget resources are mainly composed of the traditional own resources consisting of customs duties on imports from outside the EU, sugar levies, agricultural duties; own resources based on value added tax (VAT) and own resources based on gross national income (GNI) of each Member State. All Member States must establish necessary administrative capacities in order to ensure effective coordination for the EU budget, correct calculation of the contributions regarding their own resources and the collection, payment and auditing of their own resources. 

    Chapter 33 does not include any opening benchmarks. This chapter is directly linked with the alignment of the relevant part of the EU acquis. The implementation of legislation is expected to take place once the accession to the EU has been realised. Therefore the legislation in question must be transposed into national law following membership to the EU. It is noteworthy to highlight that the content of this chapter is also closely related to other chapters such as agriculture and rural development, customs union, statistics, taxation and financial control.  

    Turkey’s Alignment with Chapter 33

    Chapter 33 was one of the chapters blocked by France for a significant period since it was among the four chapters blocked during the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy with the argument that the opening of these chapters would facilitate Turkey’s EU accession. After the election of Francois Hollande as the President, an improvement was witnessed in Turkey-France relations which led to the decision of lifting the obstacle regarding the opening of Chapter 33 to negotiations.

    Turkey’s alignment with this chapter is considered to be at an early stage. Measures leading to stronger coordination structures, reinforced administrative capacity and the establishment of implementing rules would have to be proposed before the realisation of accession. According to the assessments made within the framework of 2015 Progress Report published by the European Commission, Turkey’s customs legislation is considered to be largely aligned with the acquis in the area of traditional own resources while preparations to calculate the statistical VAT base have not started yet. It is emphasised that Turkey needs to take additional measures to combat fraud in VAT and in customs duties so as to ensure appropriate contributions to the EU own resources system upon accession. On the other hand, regarding the GNI-based resource, Turkey continues to align the compilation of its financial and statistical data with the European System of Accounts.

    Regarding the administrative capacity, Turkey will need to take new measures to reinforce its administrative infrastructure by the time of its accession. In this regard, stronger coordination structures and the establishment of implementing rules for the accurate collection and efficient monitoring of their own resources as well as for the preparation of reports to the EU are required.   

    The opening of Chapter 33 bears a critical importance since it indicates that both Turkey and the EU are committed to progress towards Turkey’s EU membership. The lifting of France’s veto regarding the opening of this chapter to negotiations represents a positive development with a view tothe revitalisation of Turkey’s EU accession process and it constitutes a good example in pursuing the lifting of the remaining obstacles on the other chapters.

    THIRD VISA LIBERALIZATION REPORT PUBLISHED WITH GOOD PROSPECTS - MAY 2016

    The European Commission published on 4 May 2016 its third Report assessing the progress achieved by Turkey in terms of fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap.

    As it is known, this Roadmap sets out the requirements that Turkey needs to meet in order for the European Parliament and the EU Council to put Turkey on the visa-free list for short stays in the Schengen area. In the report, the progress realized by Turkey’s progress mainly in meeting the 72 criteria for the visa liberalisation has been assessed.

    According to the assessments of the Commission, Turkey has fulfilled 65 of the 72 technical criteria. However 5 criteria remain to be fulfilled and a longer timeframe is needed for the implementation of 2 other criteria because of practical and procedural reasons. These two criteria are the following:  “Upgrading of the existing biometric passports” and “implementing the provisions of the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement”. Nevertheless, the Commission has tabled a legislative proposal to enable the Parliament and Council to take the necessary decisions to allow Turkish citizens to travel without a visa for short stays in the Schengen area, once all the requirements have been met by Turkey.

    The visa liberalisation dialogue has accelerated after the meetings of the Heads of State or Government of the EU and Turkey on 7 March and 18 March. During these meetings, both parties have agreed on the implementation of the refugee deal and on the acceleration of the visa liberalisation dialogue with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016 at the latest.

    5 Remaining Criteria to be Fulfilled

    Following the re-energisation of Turkey-EU relations, Turkish authorities have put great effort towards fulfilling the remaining criteria and carried out significant legislative reforms. Nonetheless, Turkey still needs to fulfill the 5 criteria for which the Commission argued there is a lack of alignment with EU standards and the acquis.

    The 5 remaining criteria are as follows: “Adopting further measures in line with GRECO recommendations to prevent corruption”; “aligning the legislation on personal data protection with EU standards”; “concluding an operational cooperation agreement with Europol”; “offering effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters to all EU Member States”; “revising the legislation and practices on terrorism in line with European standards”.

    What is Next?

    With the implementation of the remaining benchmarks, co-legislation procedure is expected to be applied. The visa liberalisation issue would be put on the Parliament and the Council’s agenda. In order to assist the co-legislators in their deliberations, the Commission will continue to monitor the steps.

    At the end of the process, visa-free travel towards Turkish citizens would be voted both at the Parliament and the Council. If quality majority of the Council vote in favour; short term visa-free travel maximum of 90 days for touristic, educational, business purposes will be ensured for Turkish citizens.

    LAUNCH OF TURKEY-EU HIGH LEVEL ECONOMIC DIALOGUE - APRIL 2016

    During the launch of Turkey-EU High Level Economic Dialogue, the Turkish and European officials and representatives of the business community of both sides assessed strategies to reinforce bilateral trade and investment relations.

    The first Turkey-EU High Level Economic Dialogue aiming at further enhancing economic relations and creating a platform for representatives of the business communities was held in Turkey on 25-26 April 2016. The EU Delegation was constituted of Vice-President of the European Commission Jyrki Katainen, European Commissioners responsible for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs Pierre Moscovici, for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn and Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Karmenu Vella. The Turkish delegation included Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Volkan Bozkır, Minister of Economy Mustafa Elitaş, Minister of Customs and Trade Bülent Tüfenkci, Minister of Development Cevdet Yılmaz and Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications Binali Yıldırım.

    Turkey-EU Business Dialogue

    During the first day of the Turkey-EU High Level Economic Dialogue Meeting, officials from the Turkish Government and the European Commission came together with leading Turkey and European representatives of the business community and European investment and development banks to discuss the means to reinforce economic relations between Turkey and the EU. During this close session, Turkish and European representatives emphasised the importance of lifting the visa and transport quotas which create a situation of unfair competition for Turkey, revising the Customs Union and accelerating Turkey’s EU accession process. Turkey’s inclusion to the TTIP process was also a key message highlighted during the discussions. This organisation of this meeting was praised since it was the first time the representatives of the business community of both sides had the opportunity to come together with Turkish and European policy-makers to discuss how to create a better business environment which will contribute in further enhancing economic and trade relations between both parties.

    Foreign Direct Investments and Investment Climate Conference

    The same day of the Turkey-EU Business Dialogue, a conference entitled “Foreign Direct Investments and Investment Climate” was organised by the Ministry of EU Affairs, Undersecretariat of Treasury and the EU Delegation to Turkey in cooperation with TOBB and TEPAV.  This conference gave the opportunity to discuss thoroughly how to improve the business and investment environments especially in Turkey.  In this respect, the need to accelerate Turkey’s shift towards advanced technology and high value-added based industry and improve the quality of the education in Turkey was highlighted. Furthermore, the presence of strong, transparent and democratic institutions and the respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights are also considered as essential components of a sound and attractive business environment.

    Economic Dialogue at Governmental Level

    During the second day of the Turkey-EU High Level Economic Dialogue Meeting, officials of the Turkish Government and the European Commission shared information regarding the current economic situation in Turkey and in the EU, macro-economic policies, structural reform process as well as business and investment environments. During this meeting, a special emphasis was placed on investments. Within this framework, Europe’s Investment Plan, the incentives for foreign direct investments, the investment opportunities in green and blue economic as well as the financial support provided by regional and multilateral investment and development banks were discussed

    At the end of the Turkey-EU High Level Economic Dialogue, in the context of a joint press conference, Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek and Vice-President of the European Commission Jyrki Katainen expressed their wish to reinforce and deepen further the economic integration between Turkey and the EU. Stressing the important role the business community will play during this process, further meeting with representatives of Turkish and European business community are scheduled in the upcoming period in order to determine the agenda of the second meeting of the Turkey-EU High Level Economic Dialogue which will be held in Brussels in 2017.

     

     

     

     

    TURKEY AND EU REACH LANDMARK DEAL - MARCH 2016

    Turkey and the EU reached a landmark deal on migration in exchange for reenergizing Turkey’s accession talks, accelerating visa liberalization dialogue and additional financial support for refugees. The deal- if efficiently implemented-has real potential to stem the irregular migrant flows to Europe.

    Following months of high-level exchanges and diplomatic efforts between Turkish and European officials, EU leaders and Turkish Prime Minister Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu finally reached an agreement with a real potential to stem the flow of irregular migrants to Europe at the Turkey-EU Summit on 18 March 2016. EU leaders, who initially met with Prime Minister Davutoğlu on 7 March in an informal meeting, had asked for additional time to study the proposals presented by Turkey. In essence, these proposals foresaw returning all irregular migrants crossing to the Greek islands to Turkey in exchange for doubling the 3 billion euros funding already agreed, re-energizing Turkey’s EU accession talks by opening five chapters to negotiations, introduction of a 1:1 formula foreseeing resettlement of a Syrian refugee from Turkey for each Syrian Turkey readmits from the Greek islands and the acceleration of the implementation of the visa liberalisation roadmap with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016. The proposals put forward, especially the request for an additional 3 billion euros and the opening of five chapters in the accession talks, took the EU leaders by surprise. Following hours-long discussions, European Council President Donald Tusk confirmed that a preliminary agreement was reached on the key elements however Member States would need to work out the details with Turkey before the 17-18 March European Council.

    What has been agreed?

    Following months of uncertainties regarding the future of the Schengen area with thousands of migrants stuck in miserable conditions in Greece, finally white smoke emerged from the Justus Lipsius building on 18 March 2016. The EU and Turkey reached a deal, which if efficiently implemented, has real potential to weaken the business model of human traffickers by substantially reducing irregular migration via the Aegean route, which has been used by 885,386) irregular migrants in 2015 according to Frontex. Under the deal, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. The return process will be carried out in compliance with the principles of EU and international refugee law. By this logic, knowing that they will be returned to Turkey, irregular migrants will avoid embarking on a dangerous journey undertaken by around 2,000 people every day. Despite assurances that there will be no blanket returns and the principle of non-refoulement will be respected, human rights groups seem unconvinced about the legality and applicability of the deal. Their criticisms centre on the return process and Turkey’s status as a safe third country given the limitations applied within the framework of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Furthermore, one should note that the chief sponsor of the deal German Chancellor Angela Merkel admits that the deal is far from being perfect and they are likely to face legal obstacles implementing it. According to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the deal is a “Herculean task” especially for Greece which has neither the capacity nor the means to process all asylum requests. The Commission stated that a small army of 4 thousand judges, asylum officers and interpreters will need to be stationed in Greek islands.

    Under the deal in accordance with the 1:1 resettlement formula, for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, EU leaders agreed to resettle another Syrian from Turkey to the EU. 18,000 places will be used from the existing relocation capacity and an additional quota of 54,000places will be made available, with the deal being capped at 72,000 resettled Syrians. The latter quota will be used voluntarily by the Member States. Nonetheless, the question of how this quota will be distributed among them remains unanswered. Given the Member States’ rather poor performance in relocating refugees from Italy and Greece, there is reason to believe that they might act hesitantly.

    Furthermore, in order to avoid the emergence of alternative routes for irregular migration Turkey committed itself to taking the necessary measures. It was agreed that once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU were substantially reduced a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme would be activated. Furthermore, the EU agreed to speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the facility for refugees and to mobilise an additional amount of 3 billion euros by the end of 2018. Given the fact that Turkey has spent around 8 billion dollars for refugees in the last four years with the international community contributing less than half a billion dollars, the increase in financial assistance is key for meaningful burden-sharing. Moreover, Turkey and the EU committed themselves to working to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria.

    According to the deal, the parties decided to speed up the implementation of the visa liberalisation roadmap with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016, provided the Turkish government’s fulfilment of the necessary criteria. The Turkish government confirmed that it complies with 35 out of the 72 criteria outlined in the visa liberalisation roadmap and expressed its determination to fulfil the remaining requirements by May 2016. Following the fulfilment of the necessary criteria and a proposal by the Commission, the ball will be in the European Parliament and the Council’s court which will decide on the matter by a qualified majority vote.

    Regarding Turkey’s accession negotiations, the parties reconfirmed their commitment to re-energize Turkey’s EU accession process and agreed on opening Chapter 33 on Financial and Budgetary Provisions during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the EU. The chapter, which was previously among the five chapters blocked by France under President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 on the grounds that it was directly linked to membership, will be opened for negotiations in the first half of 2016, which will bring the total number of opened chapters to 16. It is important to note that Turkey initially requested opening five chapters covering judiciary and fundamental rights, justice and security, foreign policy, education and energy, which have been blocked by the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) in 2009. Despite intense diplomatic efforts by Council President Donald Tusk, who shuttled between Southern Cyprus and Turkey before the summit, the GCASC refused to lift its veto on the five chapters and threatened to veto the deal. Analysts argue that in the run up to the parliamentary elections in the south of the Green Line in May 2016, EU leaders have been careful not to exert too much pressure on the Greek Cypriot leader in order to avoid derailing the UN-sponsored reunification talks on the island which are perceived as the last chance to solve the decades-long Cyprus problem.

    THE COMMISSION ADOPTED THE 2nd REPORT ON VISA LIBERALISATION - MARCH 2016

    The European Commission published on 4 March 2016 its second Report assessing the progress made by Turkey in terms of fulfilling the requirements of its Visa Liberalisation Roadmap.

    European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos expressed his satisfaction in Turkey’s progress although it is in the frontline of the Syrian refugee crisis. The report which was published before the critical Turkey-EU Summit, presents an assessment of Turkey’s progress in meeting the 72 criteria in order to achieve visa liberalisation.

    What’s Hot in the Second Report?

    The report not only details the progress which has already been achieved by Turkey but also reminds the criteria which still needs to be implemented by Turkey. According to these criteria, Turkey is expected to achieve further progress in combating irregular migration, preventing smuggling of migrants, implementing the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement, enhancing border controls, adapting the visa regime, advancing in the fight against organised crime and corruption as well as making further progress regarding the law on data protection and the law on the fight against all forms of discrimination. Thus, it will be possible to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens in 2016 only if Turkey succeeds in meeting these criteria.

    Along with the Second Report, the Commission published a Staff Working Document where it assesses Turkey’s progress and the possible effects of visa liberalisation upon migration. The Commission also evaluates the effect of visa liberalisation upon migration flows as it conducted a research regarding the assumptions that migration towards the EU would increase and a security risk would be created as a result of lifting visa requirements on Turkish citizens. Whilst the Commission recognizes that visa liberalisation may have an effect in increasing to some extent migration flows towards the Member States which have a sizeable Turkish diaspora, it stressed that it would have a limited effect. The Commission’s positive assessment within the Second Report regarding Turkey’s capacity in meeting the remaining criteria strengthens the  visa free travel hopes in 2016 for  Turkish citizens.

    Irregular Migration as the Main Obstacle towards Visa-free Europe

    According to the Second Report, the most important pending issue remains the irregular migration and entry of third country nationals to the EU through Turkey. Whilst this number was 57,000 in 2011; it increased approximately by 15 per cent reaching 888,000 in 2015. In spite of tough winter conditions, this number increased to 110,000 between 17 December 2015 and 31 January 2016.

    Such unprecedented numbers constitute a strong pressure on the EU. In the previous summer season, German Chancellor Angela Merkel came to Turkey to try to find a common solution to this issue but unfortunately did not receive the necessary support from most EU Member States. Following the Turkey-EU Summit which was held on 29 November 2015 and where the parties agreed on a joint action plan, the Commission recognized Turkey’s increased efforts in this particular area. Furthermore, the decrease in the number of irregular migrants entering the EU through Turkey and the implementation of the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement in June 2016 represents sine qua non conditions for the EU. To that end, the cooperation between Turkey and Greece regarding migration control and a functioning readmission mechanism is of utmost importance.

    COMMISSION’S IMPLEMENTATION REPORT ON EU-TURKEY JOINT ACTION PLAN WAS RELEASED - FEBRUARY 2016

    The European Commission released on 10 February 2016 its implementation report regarding the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan which had been activated on 29 November 2015.

    The overarching aim of the plan is to enhance cooperation between the parties in order to support the ever growing flow of refugees from Syria whom are under temporary protection in Turkey as well as to coordinate operations aimed at preventing irregular migration flows into the EU. With the implementation of the Joint Action Plan, migration flows are expected to decrease.

    Furthermore, the parties recognise the utmost importance to continue to work on the implementation of the Joint Action Plan with the aim of strengthening its effectiveness. The Commission stresses the need to coordinate joint efforts in order to achieve rapidly tangible results in that respect as regards the prevention of irregular migration flows. The Commission reminded that more than 880,000 people have arrived from Turkey to Greece since the first semester of 2015. Moreover, it was revealed that the EU is working in close cooperation with Turkish authorities to effectively reduce the scale of irregular flows stemming from the Aegean Sea. As such, the Commission indicated that thanks to the successful cooperation between the parties, there has been a steady decrease in the number of arrivals since October 2015. Indeed, whilst in that month, there were above 200,000 arrivals from Turkey, this number had dropped to below 100,000 in January 2016. Nonetheless, these numbers still remain high. The Commission thus underscored the need to further work together in order to continue to reduce the migration flows.

    Commission: Turkey Committed to the Alignment of Turkish and EU Visa Policy

    The Commission highlighted the commitments and the progress achieved by both parties. In that respect, the Commission explains that Turkey has committed itself notably to continue to ensure that migrants are properly registered and provided with the appropriate documents on a compulsory basis. Turkey pursued its efforts in further facilitating the access of Syrian nationals in Turkey under temporary protection to public services such as education, health and employment. Regarding the fight against irregular migration, the Commission highlights that Turkey has committed itself to step up cooperation with its neighbours (Bulgaria and Greece) in order to prevent further flows of irregular migrants as well as to readmit irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection and that have been intercepted coming from Turkish territory.

    Furthermore, Turkey also committed itself to pursue the progressive alignment of Turkish and EU visa policy, especially for countries representing a significant source of illegal migration. As for what has already been achieved, the Commission has noted that Turkey has accelerated its work towards the implementation of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, including the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement which is expected to enter into force for third country nationals as of 1 June 2016. Furthermore, the Commission also commended the efforts achieved by Turkey with respect to preventing irregular departures as well as drafting legislation on personal data protection in order to facilitate further cooperation with Frontex, Europol and Eurojust along with law enforcement agencies of the Member States. It also further referred to the introduction of visa obligations for Syrian nationals travelling to Turkey by air and sea from a third country as well as the permission which has been granted to them under temporary protection in order to work in Turkey.

    As for the commitments made by the EU, the Commission notably underlined that the EU has vowed to increase its financial assistance to support Turkey in meeting the requirements of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue as well as to mobilise new sources of funding aimed at helping Turkey cope with the challenge represented by the presence of Syrian nationals under temporary protection. Another important point which has been mentioned is that cooperation should be enhanced between the parties in terms of exchange of information in order to effectively combat smuggling networks. As for what has been achieved by the EU, the report indicated that a 3 billion euro facility for refugees has been tabled and adopted and that work has been further undertaken towards the full activation of the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement regarding third country nationals as of 1 June 2016. Moreover, the report also alluded to the adoption by the Commission of a Recommendation for a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme with Turkey for persons displaced by the conflict in Syria. 

    What Is Next?

    The report also indicated the next steps which are scheduled to take place. In that respect, it pinpointed to four concrete steps as follows:

    -Effective deployment of funding from the 3 billion euro Facility for Refugees in Turkey to provide assistance to Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey;

    -The need for Turkey to make significant progress in preventing further irregular departures of migrants and refugees from its territory;

    -Strengthen efforts against migrant smuggling especially in coastal areas, notably through joint land-based operations;

    -Increase bilateral cooperation as regards to the readmission of irregular migrants between Turkey and Greece and continue to focus and prepare the full implementation of the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement with respect to third country nationals.

    THE NETHERLANDS TOOK OVER THE EU COUNCIL’S PRESIDENCY - JANUARY 2016

    The Netherlands took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Luxembourg as of 1 January 2016.

    Holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU for 12th time, the Netherlands is expected to set the agenda and chair all Council meetings for 6 months except the meetings of the EU Heads of State and Government and of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers. The Dutch Presidency constitutes the first pillar of the current Trio Presidency consisting of the Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta which will chair the Council until June 2017. The main priorities of the current trio has been specified as growth and competitiveness; employment; Energy Union as well as freedom, security and justice. The current trio also aims at enhancing the EU’s role as a global actor and empowering EU citizens as well as ensuring their security.

    Priorities of the Dutch Presidency

    As one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Netherlands has hosted key meetings which have laid down the legal foundations and the main pillars of the Union throughout the institutional history of Europe.

    The Dutch Presidency will put a special emphasis on the concept of EU citizenship and on enhancing the participation of EU citizens in the decision-making process and that of the civil society in the EU system. 

    During these turbulent times in which the Schengen system has been brought into question, the Dutch Presidency has determined its four main priorities as follows: “Migration” and international security”; “Innovation for growth and employment”; “Forward-looking energy and climate policy” and “Sound finances and robust Eurozone”. In line with these priorities, the Dutch Presidency will encourage structural reforms in Member States and a more coordinated economic policy within the EU. All these priorities will be negotiated and discussed in details during the Dutch Presidency.

    Turkey as a Key Actor during the Dutch Presidency

    Due to the re-energizing of Turkey-EU relations and the target dates of June 2016 for the implementation of the Readmission Agreement and October 2016 for visa-free Europe for Turkish citizens, the migration crisis and the future of the Schengen Code are expected to be major agenda items of the Dutch Presidency which are of great importance for Turkey. In addition, stronger cooperation between Turkey and EU to overcome the migration crisis and the establishment of efficient cooperation for border management remain important priorities for this year as it has been emphasized during the Turkey-EU Summit which was held on 29 November 2015 and the Leaders’ Summit in December 2015.

    Moreover, the Dutch Presidency is expected to carry out the role of facilitator and mediator between Turkey and the EU institutions. Starting from the first days of 2016, the Council of the EU would put vital topics on the EU’s migration agenda which require close and efficient cooperation with Turkey. One of the most critical topics related to this cooperation is the 3 billon euro aid facility which will be granted by the EU to Turkey which aims at supporting Syrian refugees by improving their living conditions. It is expected that this aid would help stem the influx of migrants seeking to enter the EU.

    With regards to the migration agenda, it is worth mentioning that the Netherlands will be holding the EU Council’s Presidency when the European Commission’s second evaluation report on progress achieved by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalization roadmap will be published on March 2016. Furthermore, the opening of two essential chapters concerning fundamental rights and rule of law (Chapter 23 and 24) in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations process is expected to be also on the agenda of the Dutch Presidency.  

  • A NEW CHAPTER OPENED TO NEGOTIATIONS - DECEMBER 2015

    Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy was opened to negotiations on 14 December 2015 at the Intergovernmental Conference held in Brussels.

    A new chapter is opened to negotiations approximately two years after the opening of Chapter 22 on Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments to negotiations. This shows that Turkey’s EU accession process is being pursued regardless of all obstacles. The chapter constitutes one of the most important requisites for harmonisation with the EU concerning economic and financial management. It was one of those blocked by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy under the argument that “ Chapter 17 is directly linked with membership”. With the opening of Chapter 17, the number of chapters opened to negotiations has increased to 15 out of 35.

    Chapter 17 covers specific rules requiring the independence of central banks in Member States, prohibiting direct financing of the public sector by the central banks and prohibiting privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. Member States are expected to coordinate their economic policies and are subject to the Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal surveillance. New Member States are also committed to complying with the criteria laid down in the Treaty in order to be able to adopt the euro in due course after their accession. Alignment with the principles of open market economy based on free competition, single currency and the price stabilisation targets establishes the basis of this chapter. Turkey’s level of alignment with the Economic and Monetary Policy legislation is considered to be partial. Turkey has the organisational structure, human resources and institutional capacity to fulfil its obligations in terms of harmonisation with the related legislation.

    The 2015 Turkey Progress Report of the European Commission states that further progress is needed to ensure the independence of the Central Bank. There are some remaining incompatibilities regarding the principle of independence of the Central Bank and the prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. The Progress Report also recommends Turkish authorities to avoid any political interference in the independence of the Central Bank and to submit fiscal notifications and the Economic Reform Programme by the set deadlines regarding Chapter 17.

    Turkey needs to meet two technical closing benchmarks: First, Turkey should align its legal framework in order to ensure full Central Bank independence, the prohibition of monetary financing of the public sector and of privileged access by public authorities to financial institutions, and the full integration of its central bank into the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), including the compatibility of the central bank's objectives with that of the ESCB. Second, Turkey should align its legal framework in order to ensure compliance with the requirements for national budgetary frameworks as laid down in Council Directive 2011/85/EU.

    Turkey’s level of alignment with the Maastricht Criteria is considered to be at a satisfactory level especially regarding level of public debt and deficit. The fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria is imperative for a candidate country to join the Euro Area once joining the European Union.

    The opening of this chapter to negotiations will give further impetus to Turkey’s EU negotiation process and will strengthen its economic position in the international arena. These developments in the economy affect positively on Turkey’s external trade and investments as well as its economic growth.

    18TH PROGRESS REPORT ON TURKEY - NOVEMBER 2015

    With its new methodology and format, the European Commission’s 18th Progress Report on Turkey has been published on 10 November 2015. The European Commission published its first Progress Report on Turkey in 1998. The postponement of the publication of the 18th Progress Report on Turkey by the Commission after the 1st November snap elections has been subject to criticisms both in Turkey and the EU.

    In the recent Progress Report, some technical and methodological changes could be clearly seen within the sections on political criteria and economic criteria. The political criteria section has been divided in different sub-sections which consist of significant developments on areas such as the rule of law, governance, functioning of the judiciary, fight against corruption, fight against organized crime, freedom of expression and public administration reform. The detailed analysis on these issues, on the other hand, is presented within the context of specific negotiation chapters. The economic criteria section has become more apparent in the recent Progress Report with the inclusion of updated data, tables and graphs.

    The report which was announced within the framework of the Commission’s Enlargement Strategy until 2019 contains warnings but also encouraging messages to Turkey. In regards to the content of the report; in general, the report stresses Turkey’s difficulties in fulfilling the political criteria. A great emphasis was given to the rule of law, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

    Regarding the fulfillment of the political criteria, it is highlighted that the reforms are slowing down and there are areas where the backsliding is clearly reflected: freedom of expression including media and freedom of internet; freedom of assembly and public procurement. The Commission issued also some criticisms concerning the 10% threshold, political polarization, the situation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the context of the fight against terrorism, the fight against corruption, excessive powers granted to security forces and the judicial system. On the other hand, the report highlighted the progress achieved in regards to the high turnout rate in the election, the public administration system, the presence of active civil society and the activities carried out by the Ombudsman.

    As for the economic criteria, Turkish economy is considered to be well-advanced with an average annual growth rate of 3% over the past three years. However, the attention was drawn to the high current account deficit and relatively high inflation which can threaten in the long run the macroeconomic stability of the country. The Commission calls upon also for the acceleration of structural reforms to improve the functioning of the markets for goods, services and labour.

    In addition to the section on political and economic criteria, the report contains a large section on Turkey’s level of alignment with the EU acquis. According to the 2015 Turkey Progress Report, Turkey’s level of alignment in 3 chapters is considered to be well-advanced, in 8 chapters it is considered to be at good level, in 3 chapters it is considered to be moderately prepared, in 15 chapters it is considered to be at some level and in 4 chapters it is considered to be at early stage. For instance, regarding Chapter 23 and Chapter 24, which are considered as key chapters, Turkey’s alignment with the EU is assessed as ‘some level of preparation’ and ‘moderately prepared’, respectively. The alignment of the chapters opened to negotiations is considered to have reached a good level of preparation whereas that of the chapters blocked only reached to some level of preparation.

    EU-TURKEY JOINT MIGRATION ACTION PLAN IS ON THE AGENDA - OCTOBER 2015

    The EU leaders came together in Brussels on 15 October 2015 and agreed on an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan regarding the migration crisis.

    According to the latest data published by FRONTEX, border management agency of the EU, 710,000 migrants have crossed EU borders in 2015. A considerable number of the migrants have used the Eastern Mediterranean route located between Turkey and Greece. EU leaders came together in Brussels on 15 October and agreed on an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan regarding the migration crisis that has also been handed over to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

    The Joint Action Plan includes a series of collaborative actions to increase cooperation to support refugees and to manage the migration flows which is the result of the situation in Syria and Iraq. As indicated in the Joint Action Plan, current migration crisis would be addressed by tackling the root causes by supporting Syrian refugees under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey as well as strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU in a spirit of burden sharing.

    The plan focuses on some operational measures including enhancing cooperation to strengthen the capacity to combat migrant smuggling, deploying a liaison officer in Turkey for FRONTEX to exchange information on smuggling networks, organizing joint return operations between Turkey and EU countries towards countries of origins for the migrants that are not eligible for asylum. As indicated in the plan, Turkey is expected to register the migrants properly and to implement policies aiming at the integration of migrants to Turkish society. In addition, the establishment of six new refugee reception centres that would be co-funded by Turkey and the EU is also foreseen. The EU authorities expressed that the implication of the plan would contribute to Turkey’s eff orts in fulfilling the benchmarks of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap.

    The outcomes of the EU leaders’ meeting in Brussels have been subject to discussion both in Turkey and in the EU. The mostly debated topic was the possible financial assistance amounting 3 billion euros that would be used to enhance Turkey’s capacity regarding the refugee crisis. As for the financial assistance, both Turkey and the EU hold sceptical positions regarding the funding and distribution aspects. The EU’s offer containing prospect of visa facilitation towards Turkish citizens and “re-energizing” accession talks have also been widely discussed among the counterparts in Turkey and the EU.

    C20 TURKEY ESTABLISHES THE DEMANDS OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY – SEPTEMBER 2015

    C20 Summit was held on 15-16 September 2015 at Boğaziçi University with the participation of more than 400 civil society representatives across the world coming from 52 countries. C20 Summit became a significant platform for global civil society representatives to share their experiences and recommendations to G20 leaders with regard to current global issues.

    C20 Turkey Steering Committee Chair and IKV Vice-President Zeynep Bodur Okyay gave the opening speech of the C20 Summit. During her speech, Okyay underlined that civil society organisations have an important role to tackle the injustices in the world which have been on the rise for the last 30 years and where the gap between the “haves” and “have nots” is growing each day. In this process, she mentioned, that the C20 Turkey Steering Committee acts as a facilitator to bring together the experiences, wealth of knowledge and expertise of the global civil society. C20 Chair Okyay further underlined that C20 Summit creates an opportunity to accumulate all the eff orts and to finalise the C20 Communiqué that would convey the message of civil society to the G20 leaders. Following the opening speech of C20 Chair Okyay, participants of the Summit developed common policy positions and recommendations on different issues ranging from support measures for women’s businesses to long-term decarbonisation goals; from exploring causes to fight against poverty and inequality to the role of civil society in the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals.

    At the second day of the C20 Summit, the participants came together with the representatives of G20 engagement groups namely B20, W20, L20, T20 and Y20 to discuss common issues on the agenda. In addition Dr. Sare Davutoğlu gave a speech on improving people’s lives within G20 and beyond and addressing global challenges with a particular focus on the refugee crisis. The keynote speech of the C20 Summit was given by Prof. Daron Acemoğlu (MIT) on the relationship between democracy, economic growth and civil society. Underlining the findings that economic growth increases by 25 percent in the following years after democratization, Prof. Acemoğlu highlighted that inclusive political institutions are essential for the effective distribution of political power within which civil society has a significant role.

    At the end of the C20 Summit, reflecting his comments on the C20 Communiqué, Deputy Prime Minister Cevdet Yılmaz underlined the importance of democratization both at the national and international level to tackle global injustices. During his speech, Former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan mentioned that the growth policies following the global fi nancial crisis are not inclusive and the current global economic growth is a result of monetary expansion rather than structural reforms. In this respect, he mentioned that G20 Turkish Presidency identified priority areas as inclusiveness, innovation and implementation. Finally, G20 Sherpa Ambassador Ayşe Sinirlioğlu underlined that G20 Turkish Presidency puts inclusive growth at the centre since inequality is the major impediment for economic growth. C20 Communiqué was presented to Deputy Prime Minister Cevdet Yılmaz, former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan and G20 Sherpa Ambassador Ayşe Sinirlioğlu.

    The C20 Communiqué which was developed on the basis of policy recommendations of the C20 Working Groups and finalized at the C20 Summit conveys the message of civil society to G20 leaders. The C20 Communiqué calls upon G20 leaders to address the multi-faceted inequalities facing the world today by integrating inclusive growth, gender equality, sustainability, anti-corruption and tax justice into all aspects of its work, and finding solutions that create a world economy that works for all. With regard to inclusive growth, the C20 Communiqué calls upon G20 leaders to devise strategies that target decreasing inequality and fighting against poverty as well as committing to tackle the multidimensional nature of inequality by way of facilitating access to social protection and public services.

    With regard to anticorruption, the C20 Communiqué asserts that G20 leaders should ensure transparency in procurement processes through disclosure of awarded contracts; ensuring legal right to access public information and to implement the Los Cabos High Level Principles on Asset Disclosure by Public Officials. On international taxation, civil society organizations calls upon G20 leaders to commit to a multilateral mechanism for automatic exchange of information including Beneficial Ownership information, to collect and publish annually statistics on the aggregate sums passing through their financial systems and to reaffirm that the aim of international tax rules should be to ensure that multinational enterprises are effectively taxed.

    With regard to gender equality, the C20 Communiqué asserts that G20 leaders should recognize and reduce women’s unpaid work, to create gender responsive policies and legislation and to monitor commitments made by G20 by setting up a national monitoring mechanisms and systematically measuring progress in gender equality and empowerment.

    On sustainability, the C20 calls upon G20 leaders to agree on a fair and equitable long term emission reduction and decarbonisation goal, to commit to a 100 percent renewable energy future by 2050, to make energy efficiency and renewable energy an infrastructure investment priority and to take action to phase out fossil subsidies by 2020.

    The C20 Communiqué and policy papers produced by C20 Turkey Working Groups could be found at www.c20turkey.org.            

    LIBERALISATION IN TRANSPORTATION IS EXPECTED TO ENHANCE TRADE BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU - AUGUST 2015

    In case of full liberalisation in transportation between Turkey and the EU, it is estimated that trade between the parties will increase by 3.5 billion euros and contribute to the creation of new employment opportunities for 39,000 people.

     Over the past few years, the problems encountered within the current way of functioning of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU have been increasingly discussed among officials but also within the business community. In this respect, Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekci and Commissioner in charge of Trade Cecilia Malmström agreed in May 2014 to deepen Turkey-EU trade relations by updating the Customs Union. Within this process, it is expected that transit quotas between Turkey and the EU would constitute an important item of the negotiation agenda. Indeed, transit quotas continue to compose a significant hurdle in the further development of trade between the parties. According to the International Transporters’ Association of Turkey (UND), quota restrictions applied by 24 Member States (out of 28) to vehicles with Turkish licence plates contribute in the decrease of the share of Turkey within the EU’s exports, which retreated to 43% from 60% in the last 10 years.

    One should note that the World Bank pointed out in its report on the “Evaluation of EU-Turkey Customs Union” that road transport permits create obstacles to the free movement of goods and goes in contradiction with the principles of the Customs Union. Therefore, the World Bank recommended the liberalisation of the road transport permits for the goods covered by the Customs Union. Furthermore, “A Study on the Economic Impacts of an Agreement between the EU and Turkey” which was prepared by an independent consortium at the behest of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport and released in July 2015, also reveals that in case of full liberalisation in transportation between parties, trade between the EU and Turkey will increase by 3.5 billion euros and contribute to the creation of new employment opportunities for 39,000 people.

    In the report, the analysis has been conducted over the impact of abolishing quota restrictions which are implemented by Member States on registered highway transport companies in Turkey. According to this report, in case of “full liberalisation”, which is one of the four scenarios concerning the liberalisation of freight transport between the EU and Turkey, it is estimated that trade between the parties would increase by 3.5 billion euros; Turkish exports to the EU would rise to 1.9 billion euros whilst EU exports to Turkey would reach 2.6 billion euros. Moreover, in the report, it is foreseen that full liberalisation would provide Turkey with new employment opportunities for 25,000 people and the EU with employment for an additional 14,000 people. Another point mentioned in the report is regarding the decrease in the costs of transportation. In this context, it is estimated that the journeys made by Turkish hauliers would increase by 11% with 40,000 additional journeys, and European consumers would save approximately 145 million euros following the decrease in costs and consequently in prices.

    Along with full liberalisation, the other scenarios included in the report are as follows: “business as usual”, “transit liberalisation” or “transit liberalisation plus additional EU permits” and EU management of quotas. In the context of the “business as usual” scenario, it is assumed that the quota systems would continue as today under Member State control. They are assumed to evolve according to the market needs and the negotiations between partners. It embodies certain assumptions about evolution of legislation (further alignment to the EU acquis and the subsequent enforcement of the legislation), macroeconomics (GDP, trade) and microeconomics (operating costs including as main factor labour costs) and the number of permits granted (number and type) with special attention to transit issues and payable transit in specific countries.

    In the context of the “transit liberalisation” scenario, it is assumed that liberalisation may solve the issue which stakeholders, such as Turkish hauliers, seen as principal constraint on EU-Turkey trade. The application would entail some practical problems as all bilateral agreements would need to be discussed in order to clearly quantify the number of bilateral permits to be granted. Under the “transit liberalisation plus additional EU permits” scenario, it is aimed to remove constraints to trade imposed by the limited number of permits currently issued. Finally, as for the “EU management of quotas” scenario, it is assumed that the EU has legal ownership of the negotiation process with its external partners. This requires allocation of the number of permits globally negotiated by the EU with the partner country to Member States.

    According to recent research conducted by UND, it is predicted that Member States and Turkey would gain at least 10 billion euros overall from increased exports and imports. Furthermore, according to the Chairman of UND Çetin Nuhoğlu, the latest report prepared for the Commission strengthens Turkey’s negotiating power ahead of the Customs Union talks which are scheduled to begin in the course of 2016.

    LUXEMBURG TOOK OVER THE EU COUNCIL’S PRESIDENCY - JULY 2015

    After 10 years, Luxembourg took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Latvia for six month as of 1 July 2015. It is the last country to take over the presidency from the 18-month Trio Programme formed with Italy and Latvia. Although leading the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the 12th time, it is the first time that Luxembourg takes over the EU Presidency under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty which has given new competences to the Union and established a new institutional balance.

    The Luxembourg Presidency emphasises the importance to re-establish a strong link with every citizens. Thus, its main motto is determined as the “Union for citizens”. Indeed, it has outlined three guiding principles: listening to the citizens, supporting businesses, cooperating with partners and institutions in order to act in the interests of Europe.

    One of the most important items in the agenda of the Luxembourg Presidency is to further progress in the negotiations on the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Regulation prepared by the European Commission. This agreement will enable better inter-institutional cooperation which should improve the quality of legislation by ensuring that the interests and needs of citizens are in forefront.

    The programme of the Luxembourg Presidency gives am emphasis on the implementation of the Strategic Agenda for the Union adopted by the European Council on 26-27 June 2014 which outlined the key priorities for the EU over the next five years. The programme also takes into account the policy orientations of the President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the annual work programme of the Commission and the work of the 'Trio' Presidency.

    The priorities of the Presidency are as follows:

    • Stimulating investment to boost growth and employment;
    • Deepening EU's social dimension;
    • Managing migration, combining freedom, justice and security;
    • Revitalising the single market by focusing on its digital dimension;
    • Placing European competitiveness in a global and transparent framework;
    • Promoting sustainable development;
    • Strengthening EU’s presence on global stage.

    The Luxembourg Presidency explicitly refers to Turkey’s negotiations process within the framework of the agenda of other candidate states’ negotiations process. In this regard, the Luxembourg Presidency ensures that it will encourage the opening of new to negotiation with Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro on equal footing once the necessary conditions have been fulfilled in that respect.

    Luxembourg is among the EU Member States that have actively supported Turkey’s EU membership from the early beginning.  In 2013, Grand Duke Henri visited Turkey – the first one since 1947 – and emphasised in his speech that Luxembourg supports taking further steps on Turkey–EU relations and fostering closer and stronger bilateral relations. Furthermore, in 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn declared that his government is supportive of Turkey’s accession process and that Luxembourg will take the necessary steps during their term presidency in that respect.  In November 2014, Minister Asselborn made a statement where he further stressed that during the Luxembourg Presidency his government will strive to open three chapters within the framework of the negotiations process. The chapters Luxembourg will seek to open are as follows: Chapter 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security and Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy. Moreover, it can be added that is likely that Turkey’s role as regards to migration and energy issues and the ongoing economic crisis will be further taken on board during the Luxembourg Presidency.

    GENERAL ELECTIONS TOOK PLACE IN TURKEY - JUNE 2015

    The general elections in Turkey took place on 7 June 2015. Turkish voters went to the polls to determine the 550 parliamentarians who will be in office until 2019; yet, none of the political parties, which were in a tight race before the elections, could secure a majority in the parliament to form the government alone.

    Supreme Election Board (YSK) announced the official results of the elections on 18 June 2015. According to the results, the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 40.87 percent of the votes and obtained 258 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The main opposition party, Republican People’s Party (CHP), won 132 seats with 24.95 percent of the votes. With a slight increase in the votes compared to the previous elections, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) obtained 16.29 percent of the votes and has 80 seats in the Parliament. People’s Democratic Party (HDP), entering the June 7 election as a party rather than as independent candidates as they did in previous elections, surpassed the 10 percent national threshold and secured 80 seats in the TGNA with 13,12 percent of the votes.

    According to election results announced by YSK, it is evident that while AKP and CHP have lost votes compared to the 2011 election, MHP and HDP increased their vote shares and secured more seats in the TGNA. In 7 June elections, AKP has lost about 70 seats and the Party is 17 seats short of a majority. Similarly, CHP has lost about 1 percent of its vote share which was equivalent to 3 seats in the TGNA. On the contrary, MHP slightly increased its vote share from 13 percent in 2011 elections to 16.5 percent and secured 80 seats compared with 53 in the previous general elections. HDP increased its votes by 6.5 percent compared to 2011 elections and succeeded in surpassing the 10 percent national threshold. HDP is the successor to the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) whose candidates stood as independents before the 2011 elections and formed a group of 35 Parliamentarians in the TGNA after the elections.

    According to the results of the poll, although AKP remains the most popular party with almost 41 percent of the votes, the possibility for a coalition government has emerged since none of the political parties could secure the majority in the Parliament. Leaders of political parties are expected to announce their preferences regarding the formation of a coalition government in the near future.

    TURKEY AND THE EU AGREED TO REVISE THE CUSTOMS UNION - MAY 2015

    On the 12th May 2015, the European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström and Turkish Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekci announced their decision to revise the framework and to expand the scope of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU which was established 20 years ago.

    As IKV, we consider as a positive development the decision to revise the Customs Union which is considered as one of the cornerstones of Turkey-EU relations. We wish that such a step taken at the 10th anniversary of Turkey-EU accession negotiations would make remarkable contributions to the process.

    We believe that it is time for the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU to be revised in line with the structure and requirements of the new global economic system. The current status of Turkey and the EU is different from what they used to be 20 years ago. The revision will provide a window of opportunity for the parties to overcome the chronic problems of the current Customs Union such as visa issue and transport quotas as well as enabling Turkey to build a solid ground for the new generation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that are becoming more important in EU trade policy.

    REVISION OF THE CUSTOMS UNION IN 5 QUESTIONS

    1- What is the revision of the Customs Union?

    The revision of the Customs Union aims to ensure a wider economic integration between Turkey and the EU and to overcome the obstacles in the current functioning of the Customs Union.

    2- Why is the Customs Union being revised?

    The increasing momentum of the new generation FTAs in the EU’s trade policy and Turkey’s exclusion from decision-making mechanisms has negative impacts on Turkey’s trade relations. It is feared that if Turkey is not included in the TTIP process which currently negotiated between the two biggest economies, would affect Turkey’s economy negatively. Moreover, Turkey and the EU needed to address the chronic obstacles encountered in the current functioning of the Customs Union. The transport quotas and visa restrictions applied towards Turkish citizens constitute a major source of concern for the Turkish business community.

    3- What is going to change through the revision of the Customs Union?

    The revision of the Customs Union will provide the opportunity to deepen the economic integration between Turkey and the EU by expanding the scope of the Customs Union to areas such as agriculture, services and public procurement. The revision is also important for addressing the chronic obstacles related to the transport quotas and Turkey’s absence in the decision making process.

    4- What are the stages of the revision of the Customs Union?

    During a period of one year, both parties will carry out impact assessment and consultations with various stakeholders. The European Commission will ask from the EU Council the mandate to conduct negotiations for the revision of the Customs Union with Turkey. It is expected that the negotiations between Turkey and the EU would start in 2016.

    5- How should Turkish business community be prepared to the revision process?

    To improve the negotiation capacity of public and private sectors: In this process, it is essential for public sector to carry out consultations with the private sector. In this respect, a strong negotiation capacity for public and private sectors should be built up.

    To build an efficient public-private communication mechanism: It is essential to enhance the dialogue and the exchange of information between public and private sectors through a strong communication mechanism. In this respect, private sector should also insist in having a permanent representative in the negotiating team of the public sector.

    Developing a stance for private sector along with a strong will: Agriculture and services, with no doubt, will be among the most challenging areas of the upcoming trade negotiations. In addition to the challenges, the experience and willingness of the European negotiators to include new rules to the game should also be underlined.  For a “successful” negotiation with European counterparts, the Turkish business community should have a strong negotiating stance. Developing such a strong stance depends on the willingness of the Turkish private sector.

    CAN WE SPEAK ABOUT A NEW ERA IN TURKEY-EU ENERGY RELATIONS? - APRIL 2015

    The first official visit of Vice President of the European Commission in charge of Energy Union, Maroš Šefcovic on 16-17 March 2015 paved the way for strengthening the relations with Turkey in the energy sector and coming a step closer to achieving one of the key priorities under the recently announced Energy Union.

    The main item on Šefcovic’s agenda was the European Commission’s proposal to Turkey to upgrade cooperation by launching a high-level energy dialogue. This idea was announced during the first meeting of the Advisory Council of the Southern Gas Corridor that kicked off in Baku on 12 February. One month later, on 16 March, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız and Vice-President of the Commission Šefcovic announced the launch of Turkey-EU High Level Energy Dialogue. The role of Turkey as an energy hub between energy sources in the Middle Eastern and Caspian Regions and EU energy markets was emphasized in the draft joint declaration. It was also stated that both Turkey and EU will benefit if Turkey becomes an energy hub. 

    The declaration was also important to confirm the progress made by Turkey in aligning its legislation with the EU acquis.  Since the negotiations on the chapter of Energy is blocked because of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus’ veto, launching the High Level Energy Dialogue will allow both parties to strengthen their relations in energy policy and to support Turkey’s progress in alignment with the EU acquis especially with regular meetings at ministerial level. Moreover this dialogue will not only cover energy security but also other relevant energy sectors such as gas, electricity, nuclear, renewables, energy efficiency and climate action, with a particular view to the preparation of COP21 that will take place in December 2015 in Paris.

    In the communication on Energy Union, it has been stated that “as part of a revitalised European energy and climate diplomacy, the EU will use all its foreign policy instruments to establish strategic energy partnerships with increasingly important producing and transit countries or regions such as Algeria and Turkey; Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan; the Middle East; Africa and other potential suppliers”. Considering this statement, one can easily argue that the launching of the High Level Dialogue with Turkey will contribute to the EU’s ambition to play a stronger role in global energy markets.

    Another important development during the visit of Vice-President of the Commission Šefcovic’s was the ground-breaking ceremony of the TANAP pipeline, which sets up the Southern Gas Corridor with South Caucasian Pipeline (SCP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). As it is well known, the Southern Gas Corridor envisages the delivery of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field to Europe via Turkey, Greece and Italy. As it was pointed out in the first EU official documents in 2008, Southern Gas Corridor is one of the priority energy projects that will increase EU’s energy supply security. The Southern Gas Corridor reveals to be of great importance since it will ensure the diversification of both energy routes and sources. Considering EU’s dependency on imported energy, mainly the high level of dependency of Eastern Europe towards Russia, completing the Southern Gas Corridor acquired a renewed urgency for the EU. Russia uses easily its advantage on energy as a political leverage and there is currently an increasing tension between Russia and the EU regarding the crisis in Eastern Ukraine. At the ceremony, Vice-President of the Commission Šefcovic not only underlined the importance attributed to the TANAP (with its 1850 km route the main part of Southern Gas Corridor) but also the role of Turkey as a reliable energy partner for the EU.

    For Turkey, the importance of TANAP for its own as well as the EU’s energy security will help to contribute to its goal of becoming an energy hub and to improve its regional clout. Turkey needs to also bolster other areas of energy policy such as renewables, energy efficiency, liberalisation of energy markets or to invest more in energy technologies. Undoubtedly, there are still more areas of opportunity to exploit in Turkey-EU energy relations. However one should not underestimate that opening the chapter on Energy to negotiations remains a higher priority on the agenda.

    GENDER (IN)EQUALITY IN TURKEY - MARCH 2015

    EU accession process has greatly contributed to accelerating the efforts to promote gender equality in Turkey.

    Gender equality is (and has always been) a key issue in Turkey. In fact, Turkey is one of the countries where the first legal acts regarding equality between men and women date back to the 1920s. In 1925, a political party for women’ rights (Women’s People Party – Kadınlar Halk Fırkası) was established with the aim to increase the participation of women in politics. Five years later, Turkish women were granted the right to vote in municipal elections. On 5 December 1934, they were granted full suffrage and in the first elections women obtained 18 seats in the Parliament (4.6% of total seats).

    Legal and Institutional Developments for Promoting Gender Equality

    Considering the fact that women in some of the oldest (i.e., France, Italy) and relatively newest (i.e. Slovenia, Malta, Bulgaria and Romania) EU Member States gained the right to vote and to be elected in the 1940s, Turkey stands as one of the pioneering countries for providing gender equality in Europe. EU accession process has been the main contributor for accelerating these efforts. In 1985, Turkey signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which is the most comprehensive legal regulation at international level. Furthermore, with the aim of harmonising Turkish legislation on gender equality with the EU acquis, Turkey has introduced a series of amendments in the Constitution, the Turkish Civil Code, Labour Law and the Penal Code which are the main legislation regulating gender policy throughout the 2000s. In addition to these legal regulations, institutional changes also have been brought to realize the goals of eliminating discrimination against women in line with CEDAW standards. To that end, the General Directorate of Women’s Status, Ministry of Family and Social Policies and Equal Opportunities Commission in the Turkish Grand National Assembly were established. Yet, it is important to note that the replacement of the State Ministry for Women and Family Affairs with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies were subject to severe criticism and is considered a step-back in promoting gender equality due to removal of “women” from the title of the Ministry.

    Gender (In)Equality in Turkey: What Do the Figures Say?

    Although Turkey initiated comprehensive policies for promoting gender equality in the early days of the Republic and maintained its efforts during the EU accession process, Turkey finds itself well below many countries on global rankings. In fact, when gender equality in Turkey is compared to those of EU Member States, Turkey ranks as the country representing the highest gender inequality. According to 2014 Global Inequality Index of United Nations which is one of the widely-used indices of gender equality, Turkey ranks 69th out of 187 countries while the worst-performing EU Member State Bulgaria ranks as the 58th.

    Furthermore, in 2014 Global Gender Gap Report (GGGR) published by the World Economic Forum, Turkey ranks 125th out of 142 countries (only leaving countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia behind). According to GGGR, female-to-male ratio of economic participation and opportunity in Turkey is 0.43 compared to the average level of all countries which is 0.59. In other words, men are twice more likely to be able to participate in the labour force than women in Turkey.  The figures for political empowerment of women in Turkey represent a more pessimistic picture: female-to-male ratio of political empowerment in Turkey is 0.08 compared to the average value of 0.214.

    Considering the steps taken by Turkey within the framework of EU accession process, these figures represent a big controversy between the legal and institutional developments with regards to gender equality in Turkey. The major reason for such a gap between the policies and practices is likely to stem from limited implementation of the regulations due to dominant social norms and practices in Turkey. Such norms and practices which are already deeply-rooted in the society are also supported by high-level political figures which impede further development of gender equality in Turkey. As indicated in the 2014 Progress Report, Turkey does not fulfil the economic and political criteria for maintaining the equality between men and women and should increase efforts to foster women participation in labour market, policy making and decision-making in the public sector for further alignment with EU standards.

    TURKEY APPROVED ILO’S CONVENTION ON SAFETY AND HEALTH IN CONSTRUCTION - FEBRUARY 2015

    Turkey became the 26th Member State of ILO who approved ILO’s Convention No: 167 concerning safety and health in construction while 159 member countries have not yet approved the Convention.

    In accordance with ILO’s Convention on Safety and Health in Construction, the draft law No: 6571 which aims to provide internationally acknowledged safety standards for construction workers has been approved on 5 February 2015 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. With its entry into force after its publication on the Turkish Official Journal on 6 February 2015, Turkey became the 26th Member State of ILO which has approved the Convention. 

    ILO’s Convention No: 167 on Safety and Health in Construction which includes 44 articles had been signed in 1988 and is in force since 1 January 1991. Its main objective is to set international standards regarding work safety for construction sector workers. The convention encompasses areas regarding the safety of workplace as well as of vehicles, machinery, equipment and hand tools used in the construction sector. Furthermore, it also includes work safety and health dispositions that have been determined by Member States as well as the obligations of workers and employers. 

    Currently, ILO’s Convention No: 167 has been approved only by 9 EU Member States. These countries are Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary and Slovakia. 19 Member States have not yet approved the Convention.

    LATVIA TOOK OVER THE EU COUNCIL’S PRESIDENCY- JANUARY 2015

    Accession negotiations with Turkey remain of strategic importance for the Latvia’s EU Council’s Presidency.

    Latvia took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from Italy for six months as of 1 January 2015. Latvia holds the Presidency for the first time and it coincides with the 10th anniversary of its membership to the EU. The Latvian Presidency takes part in the common 18-month Trio Program under which three Member States, namely Italy, Latvia and Luxemburg have determined the priorities of the EU Council.

    Latvia’s EU Presidency will focus on the following three guiding principles: “A competitive Europe” to create jobs and boost economic growth; “a digital Europe” to ensure a digital Single Market and “an engaged Europe” to strengthen the EU’s role in global issues. The Presidency wishes to contribute to the implementation of the European Council’s 5-year Strategic Agenda in the area of protection of citizens, climate change, energy union, freedom, security and justice as well as Juncker’s Investment Plan announced in November 2014. On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership Summit that will take place in 21-22 May 2015 in Riga is of great importance for Latvian Presidency. It is also expected that EU sanctions towards Russia will be reviewed depending on the state of the disagreements over the Ukrainian crisis. Lastly, as mentioned by the President of Latvia Laimdota Straujuma, TTIP negotiations between the EU and the US will continue with result-oriented efforts. 

    With regards to the accession negotiations with Turkey, Latvia supports Turkey’s EU membership. During high-level meetings with Latvia, the Latvian leaders confirmed the positive impacts of Turkey’s integration to the EU. The 18-month Trio Program approved on 17 June 2014 underlines that the Union’s enlargement policy remains of a strategic importance and a fundamental tool to promote peace, democracy and security in Europe. As the Trio Program indicates, the three Presidencies will seek to continue the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey. The Council will also seek to ensure that the EU remains the anchor for reforms in Turkey, especially in the areas of the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. The Latvian Presidency will encourage Turkey to advance in the fulfilment of negotiation benchmarks and meet the requirements of the Negotiating Framework. The Cyprus issue will remain to be a key factor in Turkey’s accession negotiation process. It is also mentioned in the Trio Program that the EU will continue encouraging Turkey to support the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions.

    Turkey is also hopeful for this new momentum brought by the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU. As it was mentioned by the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn during his official visit to Turkey in December 2014, the possibility to open the Economic and Monetary Policy Chapter to negotiations is high during the Latvian Presidency.

  • TURKEY TOOK OVER THE G-20 PRESIDENCY - DECEMBER 2014

    During its G-20 Presidency, Turkey will prioritize actions that will contribute in strengthening the global recovery, enhancing the international economic system and supporting sustainability. Turkey aims to play the role of a bridge between the developed and less developed economies by helping the latter to increase their voice in the world economy.

    Turkey took over the G-20 Presidency from Australia as of the 1st December 2014. Taking into account the agenda and priorities of previous G-20 Presidencies as well as the emerging topics within the international economic system, the Turkish Presidency has defined three main priorities which are “Strengthening the Global Recovery and Lifting the Potential”, “Enhancing Resilience” and “Buttressing Sustainability”. The G-20 foresees in the course of the year 2015 to take collective actions to ensure a more inclusive and robust growth. Compared to previous G-20 Presidencies, Turkey is the first country to show real determination in tackling the challenges faced by the less developed countries with the aim to encourage their integration to the international economic system.

    In order to achieve global recovery, a special emphasis is given to improving the macroeconomic policy cooperation among the G20 countries to ensure a strong, sustainable and balanced growth. It is also foreseen to take new measures to improve the investment in climate and to encourage investment by the private sector for infrastructure and SMEs. Within this framework, initiatives to develop more efficient Public-Private-Partnerships will be encouraged. Following the recession after the global financial crisis, increasing employment and creating qualified jobs continue to be an important priority for the G-20. In this regard, one of the main missions of Turkey during its Presidency is to monitor the implementation of the Employment Plans where the emphasis is given to the improvement of women’s participation in the labour force and to the reduction of youth unemployment. In the light of the commitments made by leaders of G-20 to resist protectionism, the Turkish Presidency will support the efforts in the multilateral trading system. In the meantime, a special attention will be given to better integrate the SMEs particularly those of the developing countries to the global value chains.

    In order to enhance the resilience of the international economic system, the Turkish Presidency will seek to finalize and implement the new financial regulation,  to complete the IMF reform by establishing a more effective and efficient international financial framework (especially by strengthening the IMF surveillance), ensuring the smooth transition to a fairer and more inclusive international tax system as well as fighting corruption by ensuring the effective implementation of the 2015-2016 Anti-Corruption Action Plan and by increasing transparency of the relations between government and business.

    Within the objective of buttressing sustainability, the emphasis will be put on three areas which are development, energy sustainability and climate change finance. The development constitutes an integral part of the agenda of the Turkish Presidency since G-20 needs to be prepared for the United Nations Summit that will take place in September 2015 where the Post-2015 Development Agenda is expected to be adopted. Turkey gives great importance in integrating developing and low income countries into the world economy as well as ensuring the food security in the developing countries. Turkey will be the first G-20 Presidency to implement the Food Security and Nutrition Framework. Turkey will also give importance in enhancing the role and contributions of the private sectors in development.

    With regard to energy sustainability, the Turkish Presidency will focus on the issues related to the access to energy sources and to boost the investments in the energy.  The ways to encourage the investments in renewable energy will be explored as well to improve the transparency of the energy market.  Climate change also constitutes an important priority for the Turkish Presidency since it is expected to reach an international agreement on climate change in December 2015 during the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. On the other hand, the Turkish Presidency will give a particular attention to the financial aspects and the needs of the low income developing countries.

    THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PUBLISHED ITS FIRST REPORT ON VISA LIBERALISATION – NOVEMBER 2014

    The European Commission published the first report on visa liberalisation with Turkey on the 20th October 2014 regarding the progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap that started with the signing of the Readmission Agreement between Turkey and the EU on the 16th December 2013.

    The report includes 5 chapter (named as “blocks”) where Turkey’s compliance with the EU norms and practices are assessed by its level of adoption and implementation of national legislation as well as its administrative capacities. The report assesses Turkey’s progress in 72 criteria that Turkey needs to fulfil for the visa requirements to Turkish citizens to be lifted. In this report, the European Commission assesses the situation and the implementation of the relevant legislation, administrative capacities and practices of Turkey in areas within the benchmarks of the roadmap. Furthermore, it presents a set of recommendations to Turkish authorities concerning the further steps to be taken for the fulfilment of these benchmarks.

    Turkey has already achieved comprehensive progress and shows its determination to pursue its efforts to meet these benchmarks. The European Commission acknowledges that significant progress has been made regarding Turkish passports and civil registry system and underpins the importance of the reforms that have recently been adopted in the field of migration and international cooperation. Positive developments have been successfully achieved in areas such as border cooperation with the Member States as well as the EU’s external border security agency FRONTEX. There have been encouraging initiatives undertaken also in order to reform the anti-terror legislation of Turkey. The EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström welcomed Turkey’s “effective efforts” in meeting the benchmarks set up by the Commission. She further added that reforms are still needed in border management and police and judicial cooperation.